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THE IDEOLOGY OF LABOURISM AND BRITAIN'S IMPERIAL ROLE 
This thesis seeks to examine the ideology of the Labour Party 
in relation to the Party's attitude towards Britain's role East of 
Suez since 1945. Both periods of office and opposition are examined 
in depth, although the major emphasis is on the period of office from 
October 1964 to June 1970. The ideology of Labourism is a synthesis 
of working-class politics and middle-class revisionism which became 
the basis of Labour's realpolitik in its foreign policy during and 
after the Second World War. Labour as a result of the influence of 
this ideology put nation before class. The leaders of the Labour 
movement aligned themselves - with a few notable exceptions - with 
all the national symbols of monarchy, judiciary and Parliament. They 
also identified themselves with the Commonwealth; an aspect central to 
this thesis because neither the utopian nor marxist left within the Labour 
Party found it expedient, or even moral, to~ndamental~questi~the 
East of Suez role, until it was clear that it was inconsistent with 
Labour's ambitious social and economic programme. The imperial role 
was not at first rejected by ti1e utopian and marxist left of the Party 
because it identified in the Commonwealth the basis of a possible 
neutralist foreign policy for 9ritain. When that proved a chimera 
the left repudiated the imperial role. The revisionist right and 
the Labourist centre regarded the East of Suez role as the basis of 
Britain's pretence to remain a great power. When that proved also a 
chimera the right repudiated the imperial role. This explains why 
the Labour leadership could embrace the imperial role with considerable 
enthusiasm and abandon it with alacrity when circumstances forced 
them to do so. Cultural Labourism and democratic socialist 
revisionism within the Labour Party became the dominant ideology of 
the Labour government but was not an ideology which encouraged a 
consistent attitude towards international politics. The myth that 
a Labour government meant a commitment to a socialist foreign policy 
- which can never be defined - even in principle, was however 
effectively destroyed. Labour in office indeed differed only from 
the Conservatives in the slight emphasis it occasionally gave to 
pursuing national policies which in the long-run - and perhaps 




This thesis seeks to examine the ideology of the Labour Party 
in relation to the Party's attitude towards Britain's role East of 
Suez since 1945. Both periods of office and opposition are examined 
in depth, although the major emphasis is on the period of office from 
October 1964 to 1970. The major source of influence over external 
policy was the ideology of Labourism which is derived from the four 
distinct socialist groupings which the distinguished historian of the 
Labour PartY , the late Professor G. D. H. Cole~ identified as constituting 
the doctrinal basis of the Labour Party. Cole distinguishes four 
sorts of socialism - utopian, scientific, anarchist and evolutionary -
but his principal distinction is between utopian socialism and 'scientific' 
socialism. Labourism, however, mediates "between nation and class and 
1 does so by establishing the general ascendency of nation over class." 
I argue in this study that the ideology of Labourism is a synthesis of 
working-class power . and middle-class revisionism - an equally 
contradictory mix of liberalism and collectivism - which was articulated 
by John Strachey and Anthony Crosland derived, perhaps, from Evan Durbin. 2 
The ideology of Labourism became the basis of Labour's realpolitik in its 
foreign policy during and after the Second World War. 
The utopian socialists identified in this thesis are the residual 
heirs of men like Owen and Blatchford who today are represented by figures 
3 like Fenner Brockway (now Lord Brockway) and Michael Foot. As Cole 
1 Nairn, Tom. The Left Against Europe, p.8l. 
2 See Evan, Durbin. The Politics of Democratic Socialism, for an example 
of ea.rly revisionist doctrine published in 1940. 
3See the political beliefs of Lord Brockway in his own account, entitled 
10wards Tomorrow, 1977. 
(ii) 
wrote "where most of the early socialists (the utopians) differed 
from the marxists •.. was ... in resting their case on arguments 
of justice and human brotherhood rather than on a conception of class-
power" 1 The 'scientific' socialists Whfen are also identified in 
this study are the marxists who claim that socialism must come about 
by way of class-conflict. However, the ideological character of 
Labour's foreign policy is essentially derived from Labourism and 
revisionism which have since the mid-fifties become synonomous. This 
ideology encapsulates working-class interests, that is, a set of 
attitudes, preferences and feelings of a distinctive group. Labour as 
a result of the influence of this ideology put nation before class. 
The leaders of the Labour movement aligned themselves - with a few 
notable exceptions - with all the national symbols of monarchy, 
judiciary and Parliament. They also identified themselves with the 
Commonwealth; an aspect central to this ~~esis because neither the 
utopians nor the marxist left within the Labour Party found it expedient, 
or even moral, to<fundamenta}~sti~the East of Suez role until 
it was clear that it was inconsistent with Labour's ambitious social 
and economic programme. 
This study seeks to relate the ideology of Labourism to Britain's 
wider politico-strategic interests as perceived by the Labour Party 
both in power and in opposition and, indeed, only Chapter II concentrates 
on the solely military character of Britain's East of Suez role, covering 
1 DeCrespigny and Cronin. Ideologies of Politic~, p.83. 
(iii) 
the period starting with the war in Korea and ending in the year of 
Labour's first major Defence Review. But the importance of Chapter II 
to this study should not be underestimated simply because it deals with 
the nature and style of British deployments East of Suez. I have 
included in Annex a, b, c and d diagrams which illustrate salient 
features of Britain's military role outside Europe which certainly 
had an impact upon Labour's own strategic and political perceptions. 
This brief analysis of Britain's emergency operations during the first 
two decades of the nuclear era seeks to grapple with two direct and 
simple questions: what had happened? and what military power had been 
most used? The answers to these questions are of direct relevance to 
Labour's attitude towards maintaining Britain as a military power 
capable of contributing to emergencies, particularly East of Suez. 
(For a discussion of the nature of ' these operations see the attached 
diagrams relating to the Preface to Chapter II) • 
Finally, turning to the ideology of Labourism, it is important 
to establish the three different and differing perspectives of the 
Labour Party as they have developed historically. The Labour Party 
approaches its external and domestic policies from three perspectives: 
those of trade unionism, socialism, and government. These differing 
perspectives have not so far resulted in the growth of distinct 
groupings - hence this study is concerned with ideology in its widest-
sense and not with decision-making as such - but they have thrown up 
peculiar problems and unresolved contradictions for the Labour Party, 
(iv) 
particularly when Labour is in power. Trade Unions are products of 
industrial capitalism, organizations bent upon the articulation and 
representation of worker's interests. Clearly trade unions need 
capitalism as a plant requires water. The Trade Union power-base 
is derived from the rich economic pluralism of western capitalism 
which ideologically makes the trade unions seek independence vis-v-vis 
the state. As free organisations the trade unions are inherently 
anti-socialist. Free trade unionism and socialism are clearly 
incompatible. A fully-fledged socialist state threatens to plan 
the unions out of existence and to cast them into the oblivion of 
an obsolescent capitalist economic pluralism. Therefore the great 
trade union leaders - Bevin and Deakin of the TGWU, Watson of the 
NUM, Williamson of the NUGMW and Carron of the AEU - were always 
• )I 
suspicious and even hostile towards the social~st "intellectuals like 
Laski, Cole, Crosland and Cr~ssman, including, for a brief period, 
even Hugh Gaitskell, Labour's first real right-wing Leader. Clearly, 
insofar as the Labour Party remains a predominantly trade union 
party, the ideology of Labourism, somewhat attentuated by revisionist . 
doctrine, remains the essentially distinctive symbol of the Labour Party 
in the twentieth century. Yet the socialist element within the 
Labour Party remains because the party needs a set of beliefs and 
values to distinguish it from the liberals and from the more 
'progressive' Tories. The Fabians urged the idea of clause IVlwhich 
commits the Labour Party to take into common ownership the means of 
production, distribution and exchange, ' upon the trade union leaders as a 
(v) 
relevant ideology for an independent working-class party seeking power 
with middle-class support. The potential administrators of a 
socialist commonwealth were to be recruited from the professional 
classes. This historic compromise resulted in middle-class 
socialists acquiring their clause IV and in the trade union leaders 
acquiring the infintely more tangible weapon of the all-powerful bloc 
votes of the party conference. The unions proved flexible when the 
adaptation of working-class interests required the application of 
socialist doctrine in regard to a limited programme of nationalization. 
Trusproved to be the case with regard to the nationalization of the 
mines and in the support given to the modest but timely programme of 
socialization which Mr. Attlee's government introduced between 1945 
and 1951. However, the clause four commitment remained largely 
notional in the eyes of the trade union leaders. The trade unions 
supported Britain's traditional great power commitments wi~~ marked 
enthusiasm, consistency and, indeed, proved themselves as stalwart 
opponents of the monarch's enemies at home and abroad. Both the 
trade union perspective and the socialist one were well-established 
within the Labour movement by 1918 - if not before - but a genuinely 
governmental perspective took longer to emerge and to mature. This 
was to prove of great importance in the sphere of foreign-policy 
making because the earlier minority Labour governments before the war 
were not expected to change things very much. Labour simply lacked 
detailed policies in regard to internal and external policies. It 
was assumed with bovine optimism that a Labour Government \~ould 
(vi) 
manipulate the capitalist economy in the interests of the working-
class in conditions approaching the ideal. In fact, Britain's secular 
economic decline had accelerated by 1929-31 and the Labour Government 
was forced to make remedies to save the capitalist system which 
inevitably brought it into opposition with both its trade union and 
socialist perspectives. Labour's historic contradiction was born. 
But this contradiction was all but removed after the final crisis 
of 1931. However, by 1945, with the arrival of the post-war Keynesian 
revolution, the Labour Party was abla to accept that a modified 
capitalist system was just compatible with the 'Socialist' goals 
to which the party was formally committed. The Labour movement 
could achieve a workable consensus in regard to domestic and external 
policies, in that more favourable environment. The emergence of the 
'managed' mixed-economy complemented the somewhat traditional view of 
'national interests'. This was seen to be the case after 1945. The 
stage was set for Mr. Ernest Bevin and for the triumph of a Labourist-
revisionist foreign policy based upon historical 'national interests' 
as perceived by successive Labour leaders. This thesis is concerned 
with analysing this singular and important development with particular 
reference to the imperial role and to the decision to withdraw from 
East of Suez which the government of Mr. Wilson finally took in 
circumstances which need further explanation and analysis. Part I 
deals with the period of opposition and Part II with the period of 
power. 
(vii) 
PREFACE TO CHAPTER II 
"A Study of United Kingdom Emergency Operations 
from 1950 to 1966" 
The following analysis relates to annex a, b, c. 
I seek to answer two direct and simple questions: what had happened? 
and what had been most used? 
Perhaps this analysis should have started at 1945, but to have 
done so would have created an unreal picture because at that time most 
countries had inflated military forces and many of the crises were 
directly connected with the aftermath of the Second World War. Therefore 
1950 seems a good round date which gives a span of 17 years - short 
"Tt.:,. l,. , I,..t OV04()V-e-v ., 
in terms of historical perspective but packed with incident. lAft« a 
period which roughly covers Labour opposition years but not entirely. 
Type I Counter-Insurgency Operations 
This is by far the largest group. If resistance to Egyptian pressure 
on the Canal Zone i s included there were ten counter-insurgency 
operations. 
Canal Zone Eritrea 
Malaya Kenya 
Cyprus (EOKA) Aden 
Bahrein British Guiana 
Muscat/Oman Borneo 
The most obvious thing about these operations was their long 
duration and the sustained effort needed for success. Two other things 
are clear: the preponderance of the Army 'Scarlet' in this type of 
operation and the increasing use of air transport and the decrease in 
other types of air support. 
(viii) 
Type 11 Intervention Operations 




East African Mutinies 
Azahari's Rebellion in Brunei 
They were all short and sharp, and involved much larger naval and air 
forces than the typical counter-insurgency operations. If an operation 
lasted any length of time the Army strength increased and the Naval and 
Air effort settled down to a routine level. This was best shown on 
the Borneo plot when the initial intervention against Azahari in Brunei 
gradually turned into a counter-insurgency type of operation in Borneo. 
The very prominent Naval 'blips' which appear in these operations, 
and indeed the majority of similar 'blips' in the other naval cperations, 
were caused by the presence of carriers. Whilst the extent of these 
'blips' was largely a product of the carrier's high scoring under my 
point system, their frequency and position at the beginning of so many 
operations does illustrate how intelligent use of any warning period 
together with the inherent mobility of naval forces had more often than 
not enabled the United Kingdom to deploy these powerful and effective 
units in the right place at the right time. 
Type III Specific Deterrent Deployments 
In addition to the United Kingdom's normal world-wide dispositions 
of ships, troops and aircraft which contributed to deterrence in general, 
there were a n~~er of specific air and naval deployments which did not 
result in active operations because they succeeded in containing the 
threat and enabled political action to be taken successfully. It would 
(ix) 
be wrong not to show these operations because they represented a very 
real strain on Naval and Air resources. Six of them are shown: 




western Malaysian Patrol 
Naval and Air Strike Force~ 
facing Indonesia ) 
Part of 
Confrontation 
It is imperative to list all the United Kingdom's military operations 
during the 17 years. There were some 85 operations, the details of which 
are set out in Annex a. Only 22 of these could be classed as major 
operations requiring study in depth. These are shown in heavy type. 
It is now necessary to plot the operations in a way which will show 
their duration and scale, and how they fitted into the pattern of world 
events. 1~ Annex b are the results in relation to duration and scale. 
Along the top of the diagram are the yearsj at the side, the main theatres 
of operations; , and. at the bottom are shown the 63 minor operations in 
annual totals. 44 of these were military operations and the remaining 
19 were assistance to civil authorities such as hurricane and famine 
relief or fishery protection. There was no obvious pattern in these 
minor operations, but they averaged three per year, two military and 
one civil assistance. 
In plotting the 22 major operations the widths of the coloured 
bands represent numbers of operational units engaged. The colour code is: 
Royal Navy Units 
Army Units 
Royal Air Force: Transport Units 
Other Operational 
Units 




Hatchered Light Blue 
Solid Light Blue 
consideringlduration of operations first, two things stand out: 
The length of operationsj most were far longer than expected. They 
averaged 3~ years per operation. The Concurrency of Operations; ~~ere 
(x) 
were rarely less than three operations in hand at anyone time 
except in the period of the 1960/62 'Gap' which I will be referring 
to later. 
Scale of Operations 
There is one overwhelming weakness in this diagram. It must 
not be used to compare inter-Service effort for two reasons: first~1) 
because the point system used to relate major units of the three 
Services is only a crude approximation (e.g. one frigate = one battalion 
= one air squadron); an~, secondly, and much more important, because 
the United Kingdom did not have to fight for naval or air superiority 
except fleetingly at Suez, in the 17 years. It is impossible to 
quantify and present diagrammatically the effort needed to maintain 
the deterrent effect of general naval and air presence. The 22 
operations fell broadly into four types: 
Type I Counter-Insurgency Operations 
Type 11 Intervention Operations 
Type III Specific Deterrent Deployments 
Type IV UN Operations 
For a number of reasons the Iceland or Antarctic Patrols are not shown; 
they are included, however, in the 'minor' operations total. 
Nor are the separate operations in the Western Malaysian Patrol 
and the Naval and Air Strike Force , facing Indonesia included. They 
are part of the complex of operations which are shown as one operation 
within the black 'Confrontation BOX'. The Commonwealth operations against 
Indonesia combine examples of the first three types of operation and of 
true deterrence: the initial intervention in Brunei showing the characteristic 
(xi) 
high level of Naval and Air activity; then the counter-insurgency in 
Borneo with its long duration and, in this case, the marked increase 
in tactical air transport effort; the deterrent deployment of naval 
and air forces in the Western Malaysian Patrol; and, finally, the true 
deterrent strike force on Malaysian airfields and in Malaysian waters 
which probably did more than anything else to discourage Indonesia 
from escalating her 'Confrontation' with Malaysia. 
Type IV UN Operations 
There were three United Nations Operations in which the United 




but they were peculiar in that the United Kingdom was not contributing 
balanced forces, and so their shape looks unreal when plotted with only 
the United Kingdom contribution showing. For instance, in Korea, the 
Royal Navy's presence looks and was large compared with that of the 
British Army although this was essentially a land campaign. The latter 
contributed only some 8 major units to the Commonwealth Division 
whereas the Royal Navy maintained a force of 1 carrier, 2 cruisers 
and 6-8 destroyers/frigates in Korean waters. 
The Pattern of World Events 
My third task in answering the question 'What has happened?' was 
to relate these United Kingdom emergency operations to world events 
during the 17 years. At Annex c there is a diagram designed to do this. 
At the top there is the same date line as before. Immediately below 
(xii ) 
the date line there is a selection of major politico-military highlights 
- one per year - to set the perspective of world events. In the 
centre, ~~e dark blue, scarlet and light blue shape is the sum of the 
22 United Kingdom emergency ope~ations shown on the previous diagram 
(Annex b). Below this comes the major military operations during the 
17 years in which the United Kingdom was not involved. And finally, 
~~e line of mushrooms at the bottom shows ~~e stages in ~~e proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. 
;; 
> ' 
The major military operat.ions in which the Unite'd.~ingdom was not 
involved are surprisingly few, but they do confirm her experience of the 
length and costliness of counter-insurgency operations and the relative 
shortness of intervention operations. The diagram, however, does not 
show the great difference in scale of effort between our operations 
, and those of the French and Americans. The French used 263,000 men in 
Indo-China, and 400,000 in Algeria at the height of their campaigns. 
,J ' 
The Americans had " so far deplo~ed a maximum of 464,000 in South Vietnam. 
By comparison, our 44,000 soldiers and airmen in Cyprus and 51,000 in 
Malaya were small. 
One of the interesting things about ~~is diagram is the 1960/62 
'Gap' in United Kingdom Emergency Operations. This may well have been 
caused by random coincidence, but three specific streams of events 
probably helped to create this pattern. 
First there was the major change in British Defence Policy which ~. 
was initiated by the Duncan Sandys' ~'lhi te Paper of 1957. In 1950 the 
United Kingdom increased National Se~,ice to two years; in 1952 the 
Home Guard was resuscitated - an event which is often forgotten; and 




had swung through 180 degrees as the significance of the nuclear 
bur sts on the bottom of this diagram seeped through its body-politic. 
The 'Gap' probably represents the watershed between the era of National 
Service with its dependence on conventional weapons and conscript 
manpower and the era of Deterrence based on nuclear weapons and regular 
forces. It is arguable a s to whether the last burst on the bottom 
line - the Chinese Nuclear Device - did not herald another major change 
of policy in the years to come. The second stream of events was closely 
r e lated to the first. It was only possible to abandon National Service 
if the United Kingdom was prepared to liquidate its residual Colonial 
responsibilities as quickly. as possible. It is important to note the 
position of Macmillan's 'Wind of Change' speech on the top line. 
During the 'Gap' period ~.'. grants of independence were more numerous, 
particularly in Africa ) than at any other time and this seems to have 
taken the sting out of many potential insurgency situations. 
For a time, as the 'Gap' shows, emergency operations were at their 
lowest. However, the 'Wind of Change' speech conceivably suggested to 
people like Nasser and Soekarno a further weakening of the British 
position. Their efforts to accelerate the Uni ted Kingdom's withdrawal 
from her remaining overseas bases caused the upsurge in operations 
in the later years of the period. 
Nasser and Soekarno's appreciations, however, did not take into 
account the third stream of events. Revulsion to the ponderous build 
up at Suez encouraged the united Kingdom to look for quicker means of 
bringing military power to bear. Transport Command's build up and the 
development of the Commando Carriers, both of which were planned before . 
(xiv) 
Suez, were given fresh impetus and paid a good dividend at Kuwait. 
Although Kuwait was not a perfect military operation, it set the trend 
and gave a further spur to the development of air transported and 
amphibious forces. The 'Gap' may well be the watershed between two 
eras in strategic mobility - the era of sea transport supplemented by 
air and the era of air transport supplemented by amphibious forces. 
The theory of 'quick in' saving time and effort later, seems to have 
worked well in operations after the 'Gap'. 
As a conclusion to my attempt to answer the first question 'What 
has actually happened?' I make some sweeping generalizations whose 
only merit is that they appear to be consistent with the assumptions 
made by Labour's defence thinkers in Opposition. On Plate I 
is set out a diagrammatic version of the Spectrum of War. 
a. The Deterrent Effectiveness (Red Curve) of the United Kingdom's 
forces, indeed the forces of the Western alliance as a whole, in 
preventing outbreaks of the use of force during the period. 
b. The Duration of Operations (Green Curve) which is an indirect measure 
Of the effort expended in the various types of operation during 
the period. 
c. The Threat to World Stability (Blue Curve) at the end of the period. 
The first two are self-explanatory, but the third needs some 
amplification. Considered first are those bands of the spectrum which 
were most applicable to each major operational theatre - the primary 
arcs which are shown in blue on the bottom of Plate I. There seems 
little doubt that the upper end of the spectrum (i.e. the nuclear and 
full conventional bands) belonged essentially to Europe and the 
(xv) 
confrontation of the Super-Powers. The central bands have been in the 
primary arc of the Middle East where the topography is suitable for 
heavy conventional weapons and where Russia had been providing 
countries like Egypt, Iraq and Syria with advanced equipment. The 
lower bands had been essentially the prerogative of the Far East and 
Africa where the topographical conditions and the inclinations of those 
who wish to use force favour these types of warfare. 
Then considered next are the main dynamic forces which had arguably 
cause instability in each theatre. In Europe, Russian Communism was the 
main 'threat', but over the 17 years it had moved from open hostility 
through coexistence to the onset of detente, leaving the 'threat' over 
the 'upper bands' of the spectrum at a low ebb. In the Middle East, 
Arab nationalism had been a potent force, but disunity had made it less 
of a threat to world stability than Chinese style insurgencies which in the '60s 
had been upsetting the Far East and influencing ev~nts in Africa. 
I~ s\t"W\o'\ 
Hence ~ ~ the peak of the Blue 'threat' curvejlYing over the 
'lower bands' of the spectrum applicable to the Far Eastern Theatre. 
Thus the peaks of 'duration' and 'threat' lie directly over the 
bands in which 'deterrent effectiveness' was weakest, and hence that 
the most preSSing problem in the next decade appeared to be how to 
improve military efficiency in the 'lower band' operations. There was, 
however, one important proviso; improvements would have to be made 
without jeopardizing military efficiency in the 'upper bands' of the · 
spectrum. This conclusion is shown diagrammatically on Plate I1. 
The problem was how to raise the Red line over the 'lower bands' 
without l~tting it fall over the 'upper bands' - hence the arrow and 
pillar. Labour had plenty to contemplate. 
(xvi) 
In trying to answer the second question it is necessary to break 
down the large Red arrow on Plate 11 into its component parts - possibly 
four or five sub-arrows suggesting the most profitable fields for 
development in the next decade. The answers to the first question 
suggested that two of the sub-arrows were likely to be: Increasing 
Speed of Strategic Reaction and Increasing Speed of Tactical Reaction. 
The success of the United Kingdom's air transported and amphibious 
forces since Kuwait pointed to the former : and the successful use of 
helicopters and transport aircraft in the Indonesian Confrontation 
suggested the latter. In studying what has been most used I sought 
confirmation of these two sub-arrows and looked for others. I found 
however, that there was no quick and easy way of answering the question. 
The first thing~to look at are the changes in the deployment and 
the composition of the United Kingdom's forces over the 17 years. In 
deployment, there was a marked drift towards the Indo-Pacific area 
at the expense of the Mediterranean and Near East. In composition, the 
Naval trend was towards smaller but more complex ships; the Army's 
balance between fighting arms h~wever remained remarkably constant; 
there was a marked increase in the proportion of transport aircraft 
with a corresponding decrease in fighter aircraft, the latter 
reflecting the decline in importance of the ma~~ed defensive fighter. 
Superimposed on these trends there was, of course, the major change 
of the nuclear deterrent responsibility from the RAF to the Royal 
Navy which was just beginning at the end of the period. 
I 
'~ These case histories provide relevant background information about 
trends, and superficially appear at any rate to corroborate the thesis 
that the greatest threat had lain in the Far East and hence over the 
(xvii) 
lower bands' of the spectrum. They also illustrated the way in which 
the perceived threat had drawn the United Kingdom's forces eastwards. 
They did not, however, answer the specific question of what has been 
most used. To discover this an analysis of each of the 22 major 
operations was necessary, first by looking at which units and then at 
which weapons had been most used. 
Units 
In the main, the 22 operations were land campaigns with naval 
and air support because the United Kingdom was not challenged either 
upon the sea or in the air during the 17 years. Therefore, it is 
important to know what units the Army had used most. Plate III shows 
how many units of each of the three principal fighting arms were used 
on active operations per quarter year. The Infantry - the Army's 
maid of all work - is shown in a dominant position, but not quite so 
overwhelmingly so as the Scarlet on Plate III shows. 
At sea, it was often difficult to distinguish between overall 
deployments designed to maintain a naval presence and those connected 
specifically with the 22 operations. As a generalisation every type of 
ship was used although often on tasks for which they were not primarily 
designed, the requirement being for hulls rather than for the specific 
weapon system carried. The inherent flexibility of United Kingdom naval 
forces enabled them to meet these requirements although for many of the 
operations this entailed the use of all available operational units 
and often for long periods. (This problem vexed Labour in Opposition 
to a great extent). Within the general overall operational deployment 
it is possible to identify on Plate IV three specific tasks on which 
(xviii ) 
BM Ships were used: amphibious operations, off-shore patrol work and 
inshore patrol work. 
In the air a very similar situation existed. There was no need 
to fight for air superiority and though it is not possible to quantify 
the deterrent effect of the United Kingdom's air deployments. Like 
the Royal Navy, every type of aircraft was used, again very often on 
tasks for which they were not primarily designed. Plate V shows the 
pattern over the 17 years. The outstanding feature of the diagram is 
in the increasing use of transport aircraft shown in the latter 
years, particularly helicopters, confirming the contention that 
improvement in speed of tactical reaction was one of the important 
trends. Strategic air transport forces are not shown because they 
were not under Theatre commanders. 
In looking for the answer to this question, it is necessary to 
draw a notional ladder of escalation in an insurgency situation, typical 
of the 'lower bands'. This is shown in Black on Plate VI~ Then in 
Green, the weapons which were used to damp down escalation are added; 
the conclusion therefore follows that there were two 'escalation 
barriers' which controlled the use of weapons. The first was the obvious 
'nuclear escalation barrier' between nuclear and full conventional war. 
The second was not so obvious. There seemed to be something that 
prevented the use of heavier weapons in the 'lower bands', and this is 
marked as the 'heavy weapon barrier' on Plate VI : This barrier was 
caused by the possible coincidence of two further peaks in this area of 
the spectrum; firstly, there was the greatest need to minimise civilian 
casualties; and secondly, there was the greatest difficulty in target 
acquisition. 
(xix) 
The paramount considera tion in trying to re-impose constitutional 
government in a counter-insurgency situation was always the need to 
avoid alienating the civil population - the doctrine of minimum 
force. Unfortunately the heavier conventional weapons and surveillance 
systems are and remain at their weakest in the counter-insurgency 
environment. The weapons are too indiscriminate and surveillance on 
land is still in the stone age. The soldiers and police were in the 
position of the airmen before the invention of radar in the 1930s. 
Conclusion 
This brief survey based on the United Kingdom's emergency operations 
during the 17 years under review reveals that although there was no 
need to fight for naval or air superiority it would be wrong to suggest 
that success in these elements was any less important than it had been 
in previous military operations. However, it is clear that the 
greatest military weakness in the 'lower bands' in the 17 years had lain 
in failure to deter escalation from the police to the lowest level of 
military action - the counter-insurgency environment. There is some 
evidence to suggest that one of the reasons for this failure had been 
the unsuitability of some of the weapons used. There was little doubt 
that to improve British effectiveness in the anti-terrorist/guerilla 
role Britain had to ensure that the advanced conventional weapons 
systems of the future were sufficiently flexible to be used in the 
'lower' as well as the 'upper bands' of the spectrum. Meanwhile those 
who wish to use force as a means of imposing political change could ' 
still do so because no one, still less the British government, had yet 
been able to give the ,oliceman and the infantryman the necessary degree 
(xx) 
of superiority to deter the terrorist and guerilla. This is an 
age old problem which used to be solved by reprisal. Such methods 
were no longer acceptable in the Western World. Britain would have to 
look for other and more humane ways of achieving the same end - deterrence 
of terrorism. Labour in its defence policy formulated in opposition 
endeavoured therefore to grapple with some of the problems revealed 
in this brief survey of emergency operations in the period 1950-1966. 
Those responsible for Labour's defence policy before 1964 were largely 
unaware of the details and difficulties associated with the mounting 
of e@ergency operations inescapable from an East of Suez role. However 
after 1964 the Labour Government discovered by a process of trial and 




THE IDEOLOGY OF LABOURISM 
Why was Labour in favour of an imperial role in the post-war 
years? And what part did socialist ideology play in shaping the Labour 
Party's view of Britain's role Eas t of Suez and why did no conherent 
socialist critique emerge which might have cast doubt on the validity 
of that role? 
These are major questions which raise issues that go beyond the 
politics of the Labour Party. They invoke questions which impinge upon 
a whole range of political, strategic and economic factors which successive 
post-war governments have sought to grapple with in the making of Britain's 
external policies. This thesis is primarily concerned with the Labour 
Party and with the performance of the Labour governments of the mid-sixties 
which actually, however reluctantly, took the final decision to quit 
playing a major world role. The nature of Labour's ideology - or at 
least the various interpretations of it - is central to this study 
because the party's policies embody and reflect the commitment to 
certain values which are associated with socialism in its widest sense. l 
That is, with the existence of at least five aims which the Labour 
Party has been concerned to articulate, promote and introduce within 
the framework of its legislative programme once it has achieved power. 
Those five aims have traditionally been concered with social welfare, 
the equitable distribution of wealth, the pursuit of the classless 
society, the belief in the fundamental equality of all races ~ld 
peoples, and the commitment to a mixed-economy with an attempt to establish 
the proper dividing line between the public and private spheres of responsibilit§. 
1 See discussion of the syndrome of 
and Bartholomew, D.J., Back-Bench 
1955-59, London, 1961. 
e. 
socialism in Fin(r, S.E., Berrington, H.B., 
Opinion in the House of Commons, 
2 See discussion of the nature of social democratic thought in Crosland, 
Anthony. The Future of Socialism, Jonathan Cape, 1965. 
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These five aims amount to the syndrome of democratic socialism in 
Bri tain. But in the context of Labour's defence and foreign policies 
the syndrome of socialism has always appeared less relevant or valid 
and no precise 'Socialist' foreign policy has proved possible either at 
a theoretical or operational level. Labour has found agreement over its 
external policies even more difficult to resolve than in the sphere of 
domestic policy where great difficulties have traditionally frustrated 
anything like complete party unanimity over long-term objectives 
and goals. Although we are concerned to identify Labour's ideology and 
the role it actually plays in policy-making in regard to the East of 
Suez controversy in the period, roughly speaking since 1950, this thesis 
also seeks to explore and analyse the nature of the Labour governments 
defence and foreign policies between 1964-1970. This involves a complex 
analysis of politico-strategic factors which continued to affect both the 
internal and external environment within which Labour sought to make 
policy whilst in control of the nation's affairs. It appears on the surface 
that Labour's ideological stance in the area of foreign policy was generally 
consistent with the ideology of Liberal-democracy rather than with socialism 
in any specific sense. 1 Even then it still remains a curious fact that 
Britain's imperial role excited so little attention from those who 
described themselves as 'socialist'. 2 Labour's internal debate proved 
turbulent when foreign policy was raised but the rationale of the 
East of Suez commitment was never seriously challenged or rejected. 
1 
2 
See discussion for foreign policy issues in regard to Labour in 
Haseler, Stephen. The Gaitskellites, Macmillan, 1969. 
One obvious and notable exception was John Strachey who examined the 
imperial role in his The End of Empire, Macmi11an, 1960. Christopher 
Maynew did in 1967 attempt to analyse the imperial role after his 
dramatic resignation from the Government in 1966. His book, Britain's 
Role Tomorrow, constitutes a serious p ie ce of strategic analysis. 
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This thesis therefore examines the proposition that the ideology of 
socialism as represented by the various traditions from utopian 
socialism to the ideas associated with social democracy, is functional 
to Labour when in Opposition but (almost) irrelevant when related to 
the national priorities pursued by Labour in office~ ihat socialist 
ideology proves to ,be a recessional factor when Labour addresses itself 
to the conditions prevailing in the international environment, although it 
is clear that in office Labour Cabinets succeed in mobilising ideological 
support for the fulfilment and pursuit of national interests'. If we 
/ are to regard ideologies as systems of practically orientated beliefs 
and attitudes related to social or political groups, then the failure of 
1 the 'socialists' to assert themselves does need special explanation. 
Moreover, Labour's strong support for a post-imperial role needs critical 
reappraisal in the light of the party's foreign and defence policies. 
Successive Labour governments since the war have stoutly insisted that 
the governmental perspective which emphasizes continuity in policj and 
common definition of the public interest must take precedence over the 
socialist perspective which reflects a belief in dominant values, such as 
equality or co-operation or collective welfare or indeed internationalism. 
The pre~dominant governmental perspective of the Labour Party was 
reinforced over the years by the attitude and interests of the trades unions. 
TheY , as a powerful producer group~ looked towards government for protection 
and for the promotion of their interests. 2 Trade Union leaders never fUdged 
1 De Crespigny, Anthony and Cronin, Jeremy, Ideologies of Politics, Oxford 
University Press, 1975, p.5. 
2 Allen, V.L., Trade Unions and the Governmen~ r Lon4~lL 1960. 
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the issue of power. They possessed a clear set of attitudes towards 
government, towards society and towards their members whiCh revealed a 
collectivist ideology compatible with socialism but also reconcilable 
with capitalism and liberal-democracy. 
It is contended that indeed only one of the multiplicity of 
ideological groupings within the Labour Party had ever ignored or 
rejected the notion of power politics or even took the view that 
parliamentary power was not worth winning~~ ~ a contention that 
the party was not as a whole disposed to support. Early in its history 
Labour became a parliamentary party with a large extra-parliamentary wing 
1 
the so-called Labour movement. However, the least power conscious 
group were the so-called utopian socialists who were rightly accused of 
not possessing a coherent attitude towards political power or having a 
2 
specific programme of action which could be implemented successfully. 
This group, whatever their shortcomings in the area of domestic policies 
were undoubtedly deficient in facing up to the ugly realities of 
international politics. They rejected power politics as immoral and 
were thus more concerned with dispensing with them, because a Socialist 
society would be characterised by features fundamentally different from 
those of a capitalist society dominated by class exploitation and economic 
inequality.3 In some unspecified way power in its widest sense - that 
aggregate at the disposal of a minority - would be dispersed or shared 
amongst the majority in society. These attitudes derived from Robert OWen 




See Ralph Milibandls marxist critique of Labourls preference for 
Parliamentary methods in his study Parliamentary Socialism, Merlin Press, 
1973. 
See general discussion of this phenomenon in G.D.H. Colels volumes 
entitled A Short History of the British Working-Class Movement, 
Vols. 1-3, Allen and Unwin, 1948. 
Pelling, H., ,The Origins of the Labour Part~, London, 1954. 
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figures like George Lansbury and Fenner Brockway (later Lord Brockway) 
1 in their often eloquent advocacy of the brotherhood of man. To them 
Socialism was fellowship. The actual influence of the utopian socialists 
and of the pacifit.sts within the Labour movement - the christian socialists 
were a distinct and coherent sect - is difficult to determine. Clearly 
though they gave the Labour Party something like an emotional and intellectual 
distaste for power, particularly that aspect of power related to inter-state 
relations. As . G.D.H. Cole wrote "all the 'Utopians' believed that apart 
from considerations of power, it was possible to affect the future by appealing 
2 
to reason and conscience" The belief that the balance of power was an 
evil exceeded only by that of war itself was a view which most utopian 
socialists shared. 
Such attitudes were not shared however by the Trades Unionists - the 
pristine Labourites - who were the product of industrial capitalism, 
urbanisation and of political democracy. They, as a powerful producer group, 
wanted to take part in the political process by the exercise of their 
industrial and economic power. The establishment of the right to free 
collective bargaining certainly ensureJthat they shaped economic 
decisions taken both by government and private industry. Therefore trade 
union leaders acquired a healthy respect for power, especially that 
embodied in state~power. Political power then was something to be used 
for the furtherance of trade union interests or indeed 'national interests' 
which union leaders regarded as synonomous with working class interests. 
The organic relationship between the trade unions and the Labour Party 
created the phenomenon of so-called cultural Labourism (which is discussed 
1 
2 
See 'What is Socialism' by G.D. Cole who distinguishes four sorts of 
socialism - utopian, scientific, anarchist and evolutionary in 
Ideologies of politics, op. cit., p. 16. 
op. cit" p.84. 
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later). These attitudes when translated into the area of international 
poli tics became powerful arguments in favour of national power which if 
necessary should be built.up and used for the pursuit of national interests. 
Mr. Ernest Bevin's rejection of pacifism at the Labour Party conference 
in 1935~as the fore.runner of Labour's commitment to collective security 
or even national self-defence which after the Second World War led to 
the Attlee government's commitment to NATO. Between 1935 and 1949 the 
Labour Party - or at least the majority of its parliamentary leaders - passed 
through a utopian to a realist phase in the party's historic evolution in 
relation to international politics. Future Labour governments would construct 
a foreign policy based upon perceived national interests. The rhetoric 
of party conference and the language of socialism together with the 
idealism of internationalism were down-graded or retained merely as declaratory 
principles only. The Labour leadership became committed to the maintenance 
or indeed expansion of British power in the service of traditional goals 
of state.power - that is, the achievement of national security, economic 
prosperity and the maintenance of the values of social democra~' (based on 
the assumption that Britain has ceased to be merely a liberal-democracy 
and had become a social democracy after 1918 but especially after the 
introduction of the Welfare State in the wake of the second World War) • 
However such state orientated attitudes carryingrith them the suppressed 
premise that the mixed-economy was what Labour had wanted to create and 
sustain, were open to challenge by another influential group within the 
2 Labour Party. This group were the heirs to the so-called 'scientific' 
1 
2 
See Bullock, Alan, Ernest Bevin,' Vol. I, p. 567. 
The F~ian influence within the Labour Party, though greatly exaggerated, 
~erta~nly enc~uraged the use of the ballot box and the development of the 
~deals of soc~al democracy. The Fabian Essays published in 1889 revealed 
a somewhat insular concern for domestic politics. The Fabian Society did 
not show much interest in international politics until after the Second 
World War. See Cole, Margaret, The Story of Fabian Socialism~ 
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socialists - the marxist-socialist tradition who represented those 
1 
committed to a class-war theory of politics. The marxists were conscious 
of power, in fact they thought of nothing else. They saw power in its 
widest sense as a factor to be acquired from those who possessed it, and 
they therefore regarded state-power as that embodied in the dominance of 
one class over another. The state was seen as an instrument of class 
p 
oppression. The capture of the state, in the name of the o~essed 
masses, would require a power struggle but not one involving overt use 
of violeuce. To Labour's marxists that power struggle was to take the 
form of a parliamentary contest for power won through the ballot box and 
not by manning the barricades. This analysis of the class struggle was 
based upon the central assumption that the course of history was determined 
finally by the forces of economic development. But as G. D. H. Cole 
once contended the "economic conception of history is equally reconcilable 
with an evolutionary, or gradualist conception of social development. There 
is nothing contrary to logic in supposing that, as economic conditions 
change, political and social conditions change with them gradually, and 
not by revolutionary upheaval". 2 Labour's parliamentary marxists from 
the Keep Left to the Tribune Group were evolutionary socialists rather 
than revolutionaries and were never indifferent to the notion of power! 
The power-struggle was the name of the game. They saw perfectly easily 
that inter-state relations had to be conducted on the basis of power-
politics. Their interest in a socialist foreign policy was seen as part 
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to shape a new world order based upon appropriate economic foundations 
which would then pre.determine the nature of the world~wide political 
super'structure. That political superstructure would inevitably arise 
upon the basis of an essentially non-market economy. But in practice 
Labour's Left-wingj whether Marxist or not, accepted the mixed economy 
and argued that the extension of public ownership did not imply an 
increase in state monopolies. "It is clear to the serious student of 
modern politics", wrote Mr. Aneurin Bevin in 1952, "that a mixed 
1 
economy is what most people of the West would prefer". But Labour's 
marxists could still agree with Richard Crossman's contention made in 
April 1959 that overall advantage of state own~rship and planning had 
been demonstrated in the case of the Soviet Union. Mr. Crossman wrote 
in a Fabian pamphlet that "in terms of military power, of industrial 
development, of technological advance, of mass literacy and, eventually, of 
mass consumption too, the planned Socialist economy, as exemplified 
in the Communist states, is proving its capacity to outpace and overtake 
2 
the weal thy and uncomfortable Western economies". This prediction proved 
over-elaborate, but, as far as Labour's Left-wing was concerned, it also 
perhaps appeared to point towards what Crossman further argued was 
an eventual Communist victory in the cold war. He stressed that "It is 
possible to predict with a good deal of assurance that, unless and until 
there is a fundamental change in the structure of our modern managed 
capitalism, the peaceful competition which has now began between East 
3 
and West must result in a series of Communist successes". The case for 
an expansion of public ownership and of state control of the economy 
1 Bevan, Aneurin, In Place of Fear( Heinman, 1952, pp. 118-119. 
2 Crossman, Ricr.ard, Socialism and the New Despotism, Fabian Tract, 1956, 
pp. 16-17. 
3 
op. cit., p.20. 
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became also the case for survival, if not victory, in the cold war 
struggle between totalitarian communism and democratic socialism. 
As Crossman argued, a major transfer of ownership, by whatever means, 
was the central need if the West was to prevail. He ponderously concluded 
that "We can predict with mathematical certainty that, as long as the 
public sector remains the minority sector throughout the Western World, 
we are bound to be defeated in every kind of peaceful competition which 
we undertake with the Russians".l This led to Crossman's prediction that 
"when the trend of world development becomes clear and the Communist 
victories are undeniable I a deep revulsion will set in •.••• and anger 
2 
will replace complacency". The Left-wing of the Labour Party saw a 
connection between domestic economic strategy, the question of economic 
ownership and social justice - which were in their thinking inseparably 
linked - and success or failure in the Cold war which would be won . by 
those states with valid and popularly supported dem9cratic regimes. 
Labour's marxist Left, then, were conscious of state power both in the 
context of domestic and inter-state politics. 
The third ideological grouping within the Labour Party centred on 
what Stephen Hasler has described as 'cultural Labourism', a portmanteau 
term to cover an essentially anti-intellectual populism with its emphasis 
upon movements rather than parties.3 This cultural Labourism was a synthesis 
4 
of "patriotism, anti-communism and working class power and interest". 
Clearly given these tendencies, Labourism favoured a marked national 
foreign policy, alliance with America, a European commitment {but not a 
1 
op. ci t., p. 2 3 . 
2 
op. ci t., p. 26. 
3 
Ionescu, Ghita, and Gellner, Ernest, Populism, ijeidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969, 
in whicl: chapter 7 by Peter Wiles deals wit.'1 Labour's populists and 
their influence. 
4 
Haseler, Stephen. !he Death of British Democracy,. Elek, 1976, p.l37. 
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supranational involvement) and the commonwealth connexion. Cultural 
Labourism was even somewhat chauvanistic, insular and decidedly populist 
if not reactionary when defining 'national interests ~ Indeed Labourites 
like Gunter, Mellish, Brown and Callaghan had little difficulty in talking 
about the 'national interest', which is a concept that academics tend to 
treat with analytical distain - and not without reason (see below) • 
Labourites put nation before class, capitalism before socialism (whatever 
meaning this latter term had for such an anti-intellectual approach), 
instinct and intuition before theory, and, finally, displayed a virulent 
anti-totalitarian and therefore anti-communist ethos. Labour under 
this influence was a party of King and country in both world wars and 
loyal to working class interests. Ernest Bevin embodied these virtues 
and a few beside. His rugged commitment to certain basic but ill-defined 
principles Was central to cultural Labourism. He was always more than a 
1 trade union leader but something less than an ideologue. He reflected 
what Haseler has called "the magic formula for British Labourism" 
which embodied ~'Y'-a.:rj~ff.\.".$t1I , anti-,s·c.Gi1tU~~ .~ and working class power • 2 
The Labourists were not neutral in the cold war and never shared the 
ambition to form a 'Third Force' between 'capitalism' and 'Communism'. 
That aspiration lay with the utopian and scientific socialists within 
the party but it remained an aspiration totally alien to the cultural 
Labourites and their trade union colleagues (or brothers as they were 
called). The Labourites were not averse to taking power through a 
11-1-' 
parliamentary majority or even to governkWith a minority of the seats in 
1 See (Private View of Ernest Bevin', John Bull, 17 August 1946 for a 
brief discussion of his political and personal characteristics. 
2 
op. cit:., p.l3S. 
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the commons if necessary and they considered Labour governments just as 
concerned with upholding the nation's interests as the Tories, indeed 
they could be more successful than the Tories because they were closer 
to and more representative of the common people. Peter Wiles contends 
that populism therefore expresses the conviction that virtue rests with 
the simple people, who are the overwhelming majOrity.l 
(l ,"""S ~o""' p o~ .~ 
The fourth iflOgical group~ ~ the social democrats who 
were also conscious of political power and in the post-war period were 
the elegant advocates of winning electoral power ;, and who} in the 
international field, found NATO a more realistic device for collective self-
defence than the illusory pursuit of collective security through the United 
Nations. The so-called "revisionists", the Gaitskcllites, were also 
disposed to acknowledge the basic "ethnicity" of the average Labour voter. 
It is arguable that revisionism took over from Labourism in the mid-fifties 
following the publication of two seminal publications~ The Future 
of SooiaZism by Anthony Crosland, and Contemporary CapitaZism by 
2 John Strachey. The post-Attlee combination of party leadership - a 
shift to right of centre - marked Labour's acceptance of the realities of 
power politics. 'National interests'were paramount both as a concept and 
as a practical political goal. The traditional socialist commitment to 
internationalism stretching from pre-1914 days was greatly qualified. And 
under the influence of Hugh Gaitskill and his close supporters, particularly 
that of Denis Healey (see below), the Labour Party faced and indeed removed 
a basic contradiction in its declaratory foreign policy that had lain at 
the heart of the party's inter-war foreign policy which hung like a 
great shadow over the post-war 'realist' phase of its declaratory policy. 
1 Populism/ OPe cit., Chapter 7. 
2 
Crosland, Anthony. The Future of Socialism, Jonathan Cape, 1956 and 
Strachey, John, contemporary Capitalism, Gollancz 1956. 
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This related to the rejection of the balance of power - hence the bitter 
opposition to rearmament in the thirties - and the simultaneous 
commitment by the party to the doctrine of collective security - which was 
at once a more nebulous concept. l Also, the revisionists within the party 
questioned the relevance of proletarian internationalism. They accepted 
the logic that" the view that a certain section of society is naturally 
internationalist is plausible only when it is asserted before that 
section of SOCiety has achieved power" but "once they rise to power at 
2 home, they inherit the concerns for the state's power abroad". Labour's 
revisionists could agree with Rupert Emerson that the ethnic group was 
"the terminal community - the largest communities that, when the chips 
are down, effectively commands men's loyalties, overriding the claims 
of both the lesser communi ties within it and those that cut across it 
'Nithin a still greater society".3 The nation to the Labour voter, 
contended the revisionists, was prior to class. George Orwell 
believed working class people are "patriotic because more than any other 
group they have a vested interest in the nation since they cannot easily 
leave it". 4 Chief amongst the revisionists in the area of foreign and 
defence policies was a' former marxist, Denis Healey. His career, his 
attitude and general analysis constitutes the core of the revisionist view 
of Labour's post-Bevinite foreign policy.5 In order to establish the 
nature of that policy, and its basic rationale, we need to look rather 
more closely at Denis 8ealey's own career because he points · up the new 
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general analysis was widely shared by Hugh Gaitskill, Geo.rge Brewn, 
Rey Jenkins, Hareld Wilsen and Teny Cres~land - with Richard Cressman 
offering ne real dissent except in regard to detail and nuance. Also. 
his attitude to. the east of Suez rele reflected an incensistency 
characteristic ef the party as a whole. His six years as Secretary ef 
the International Department ef the British Labeur Party, which began. 
1 in January 1946, gave him a geed understanding ef pelitics and peliticians. 
The r.ew Labeur Government w~s . also coming to. grips with reality. 
The Second Werld War had left Britain victerieus, but exhausted. Seme 
of the limitatiens ef British pewer had become apparent on IS February 
1942, when mere than 100,000 Allied troeps had surrendered to. a Japanese 
4-force less than half its size at Singapere. This Far Eastern strengheld 
had had £60 millien spent on making it impregnable - but its lS-inch guns 
peinted eut to. sea. It was ill-prepared fer the landward invasien. 
The war had made werse Britain's relatively declining econemic 
positien.~ The problems of majer industries in danger - engineering, 
shipping and textiles - and the demands ef new light industries fer skills 
and capital were wersened by grewing cempetitien frem developing natiens 
and the rapid pace of change. Britain's capacity to. trade and manufacture 
were hit. She lest almest a third ef her merchant shipping; mere than 
five millien heuses were destreyed er damaged; much ef her everseas 
investment had been seld to. pay fer the war effert.~ Victery ever Hitler 
and the Japanese hid the reality of her ecenomic exhaustion. 
I \l.\v H~ ... \o..1 ~~ w.,\- t,.~ .... ~ k~ 1"-.11- ...... ~:L l~t,." ~ '-.t- wu~ CI ... , ... • .... (d ' .... ~~".u-.k 14I\lt~ . 
"l. 
Leaser, James, Singapere! pp. 1-22. 
3 Pellard, Sydney, _The Develepment ef the British Ecenemy, 1914-50. 
It Calder, Angus. The Peeple' s War.! p. 17. 
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The new mood of the nation, however, eager for changes towards 
greater social justice and economic reconstruction, gave Labour a 
landslide victory, with 393 seats to the Conservatives' 213, and a 
mandate for their Five Year Plan. 1 
Ernest Bevin's foreign policy was dominated by the need to find 
new sources of power, to drop any responsibilities considered 
inessential, and to encourage the United States, as an ally, to pick 
up the burden. Healey watched from close range. He was appointed 
International Secretary of the Lab~ur Party on 29th November 1945. 
When Healey first entered the square room on the sixth floor of 
Transport House, his windows overlooked a dismal courtyard and a fire 
escape. It was a desolate setting, made more so by the near collapse of 
, , 2 
any organ~zat~on. , Iillie Gillies, the previous Secretary, had 
resigned a year earlier. Gillies had recognized the nature of German 
and Soviet imperialism in the 1930s, and written SoZar System and Finnish 
War to expose it. 3 Idealistic left-wingers like Laski never forgave him. 
As part of his job to re-establish links with European socialist 
parties, and to help form a new Socialist International, Healey toured 
fraternal conferences in West and East Europe till the Iron Curtain 
came down. 
'I was committed to the Social Democrats in Europe.' he said. 'As 
soon as I came into contact with the problem I began to see the difference 
between them and the Communists. I thought at first that we could do 
business with the Soviet Union, but I became more and more depressed -
particularly in 1947 and '48 when the Socialist parties in Eastern 
Europe were being eliminated. ,4 
1 
Williams, F. Fifty Years' March: The Rise of the Labour Party. 
2 
Denis Healey and the Policies ~f Powe!, op. cit., p.54. 
3 ibid. 
4 ib' ~d. _.
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Bevin's growing disillusionment with the Soviet Union was aptly 
reflected in Healey' s pamphlet of May 1947 - Cards on the Tah Ze. 1 It was 
a pamphlet that nearly split the Party, for it went much further than 
Bevin was able to go publicly, although, as Healey's colleagues said, it 
was his idea, and not Bevin's. He was well in touch with Foreign Office 
opinion at the time, however, having frequent contact with Bevin and Hector 
McNeil, his Minister of State>~s well as the civil servants. 
Cards on the Tahle argued that Britain had to reduce commitments 
because of her declining resources, yet in an orderly manner so as not 
to lose control over the process, or her power and initiative. It savagely 
attacked the way Russia's 'attempt to destroy Britain's freedom of initiative 
was double-edged' and clearly argued that the Soviet Union represented the 
biggest danger to Britain, while America - seemingly unwilling to shoulder 
the burdens and responsibilities of power - had to be encouraged to give 
up her desire for isolationism. 
The Left especially were horrified at the clear tones in which Healey 
stated that 'Britain could not under any circumstances adopt a policy 
which might lead her to war against America', and added 'we can only be 
greateful if America is prepared in any way to make it easier for us to 
defend our security. ,2 The pamphlet greeted the way Bevin had encouraged 
the Americans to help the British prop up certain regimes in Europe as a 
triumph - a presence which the left did not appreciate. Between capitalist 
America and communist Russia, he asserted, 'democratic socialism will only 
survive as an alternative if Labour Britain survives as a world power.') 
1 
Healey, Denis. Cards on the Table, International Department 




When Cards on the Table was put before the Executive at the Margate 
Party Conference there was tremendous opposition, led by Laski, supported by 
Richard Crossman. As Francis Mennell said: 'Although Laski and Denis 
thought in similar terms in 1945, by 1947 they were arguing about almost 
everything. ,1 The problem was compounded by the prejudice among some 
leading Labour Party politicians who thought that the research department 
for international affairs was a waste of members' money. This in itself 
made it difficult to put through documents on foreign policy. 
The fall of Czechoslovakia brought a change in the Labour Party's 
attitude to the Soviet Union and the menace of Communism. Healey did not 
succeed in getting a much more active policy adopted by Labour Party 
leaders, who became bogged down in the Korean War in June 1950. To compensate 
for this perhaps, he edited The Curtain Falls,2which was a clear 
condemnation of the Soviet Union and its methods of taking control in 
Eastern European states. 
He had difficulty in persuading Aneurin Bevan to write the introduction, 
for, although he was extremely anti-Communist and had many friends among 
the refugees, he had just split with the official leadership of the party, 
and needed the support of the Left, who were more sympathetic to the Soviet 
Union. Bevan didn't mince his words, however, and wrote: 'It is a grim, 
depressing narrative •••• The Communist Party is the sworn inveterate 
enemy of the Socialist and Democratic Parties. The Communist does not look 
upon a Socialist as an ally in a common cause. He looks upon him as a dupe, 
as a temporary convenience, and as something to be thrust relentlessly to 
3 
one side when he has served his purpose.' 
1 Denis Healey and the Policies of Power, Ope cit., p. 61. 
, 
2 Healey, Denis, The Curtain Falls( International Department of the 
Labour Party, 1950, p.l. 
3 ' b' 1. l.d. 
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Healey played a vital part in drawing up the Aims and Tasks of 
Democrati c SociaZism the importance of which, as one prominent socialist 
philosopher stated, 'can be compared only to the Inaugural Address of 
the International Working Men's Association in London in 1864' .1 
The International Socialist Conference held in Copenhagen on 1-3 
June 1950, set up a sub-committee to prepare a declaraction on the basic 
principles of democratic socialism common to all party members. The 
sub-committee had representatives of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Britain, Scandanavia, Switzerland, and Eastern Europe, and was nominally 
under the chairmanship of Guy Mollet, although Solomon Gumbach, another 
Frenchman, exercised this role in practice. It met in Paris in October 
1950, in London in March 1951, and in Strasbourg in May 1951, before a 
final meeting in Frankfurt in June 1951. 
Four drafts were elaborated before the final one was submitted to 
the Socialist International, meeting at Frankfurt during 30 June - 3 July. 
Two of the five sections were written by Healey. He wrote the preamble, 
and, when Grumbach's draft for the section on 'International Democracy' 
~ 
proved inadequ~e, he wrote that too. The full meeting of the foundation 
Congress of the new Socialist International unanimously accepted the 
'charter' that Healey had done so much to mould. 
In the Declaration, Healey wrote of the evils of capitalism. 
'Socialism aims to liberate the peoples from dependence on a 
minority which owns or controls the means of production, ,2he said. But 
he also attacked Communism which falsely claimed a share in the socialist 
tradition. He continued: 
1 
2 
Remark made to author by Crosland and quoted in Denis Healey and the 
Policies of Power, op. cit., p. 69. 
peclaration of Socialist Principles, Frankfurt, June 1951. 
- 18 -
'Communism has split the International Labour Movement and has 
set back the realization of Socialism in many countries for decades. 
It has distorted that tradition beyond recognition. It has built up a 
rigid theology which is incompatible with the critical spirit of Marxism. 
'Where Socialists aim to achieve freedom and justice by removing the 
exploitation which divides men under capitalism, Communists seek to sharpen 
those class divisions only in order to establish the dictatorship of a single 
party. International Communism is the instrument of a new imperialism.' 
Socialists who built their faith o~ Marxist and other methods of 
analysing society, he wrote, 'all strive for the same goal - a system 
of social justice, better living, freedom and world peace' • 1 
The final section emphasized the international nature of the 
I 
socialist movement, and thundered: 'Absolute national sover~ty must be 
transcended.' 2 
After speaking of the need for socialists to help overcome extreme 
poverty, illiteracy, and disease throughout the world, he continued: 
'Democratic Socialists recognise the maintenance of world peace 
as the supreme task in our time. Peace can be secured only by a system 
of collective securi ty. This will (::reate the conditions for international 
disarmament •.••• The struggle for world peace is inseparably bound up with 
the struggle for freedom. It is the threat to the independence of free 
3 peoples that is directly responsible for the danger of war in our time.' 
The Soviet threat to economically weak nations was the major 
preoccupation of Western statesmen in the late fort"ies. Bevin set about 
1 ibid. 
2 ibid. 
3 ' b ' d ~
- 19 -
drawing the United States into an alliance that would protect the 
integrity of the West European states. Healey supported him ardently. 
His strong pro-Americanism dates from 1948. 
Like many of Healey's firmly held beliefs it was not emotionally 
conceived. As Adam Ciolcosz stated: 'He is not that kind of man. He 
simply does his sums and puts two and two together.' He added: 'I think 
Denis contributed very much to the military thing against the Soviets. 
If they were not to be trusted, then you had to defend the rest of Europe -
1 
and the U.S.A. was necessary for the defence of Europe.' 
Healey confirmed that 'basically I was an Atlantic Community man 
2 from about 1948' • 
For Transport House the Cold War dated from the coup in Czechoslovakia, 
w 
and the flo~ of refugees who came in and out all day long. Bevin saw 
the essential problem, Healey explained, 'as committing the Americans to 
the protection and economic support of Western Europe before we accepted 
any more responsibilities in Europe'. He added: 'The only time we went 
ahead of events was with the Dunkirk Treaty, but that was definitely 
the sprat to catch the whale of NATO. ,3 
The Dunkirk Treaty, concluded between Britain and France in March 
1947, was for mutual defence against aggression by Germany - occupied at 
that time by the Allies. It symbolized the re-emergence of France as a 
- European power, and led, in March 1948, to the Brussels Treaty, which 
promised 'all the military and other aid and assistance in their power' 
to any of the signatories (Belgium, Britain, France, Luxembour~, and the 
Netherlands) if they were the object of armed attack. 4 When the arrangement 
1 
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ended in May 1955 it was replaced by the expanded Western European 
1 Union, which included Italy and the German Federal Republic. 
Healey watched while Bevin, 'a master of timing', which he learned 
as a trade union negotiator, brought America out of isolation and into 
the defence of the free Western European states. The MarshallPlan, to 
give economic aid to the struggling democracies, was perhaps the highlight 
of the period. On 5 June 1947, George Marshall, the American Secretary 
of State, had talked of 'a programme designed to place Europe on its 
feet economically', and added, 'The initiative, I think, must come 
2 from Europe. ' 
Bevin welcomed the proposal eight days later, on 13th June. 
'He had been looking for a chance to catch the Americans on that.' 
explained Healey. 'The Americans themselves didn't regard the speech 
made at Harvard as much more than waffling aloud" but Ernie seized on 
3 it as an American "offer" that Europe should respond to. ' 
The report and plan drawn up by the Europeans for the European 
Recovery Programme were gi~n to Marshall on 22nd September 1947, and 
the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.) was 
set up to administer it. 
The plan, together with the Brussels Treaty and the stationing of 
American B29s with atomic bombs in East Anglia in 1948, led to the formal 
NATO alliance, established on 4th April 1949. This was the first post-
war alliance linking the two North American powers to the defence of the 
Western democracies. Bevin had taken the cold dregs of wartime collaboration 
and cemented them into a big power relationship.4 Britain's freedom to act 
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Denis Healey wrote in 1952 that "the period of 
was pre-eminently the period of the Big Three, 
belonged more by prestige and diplomatic skill 
New Fabian Essays, 1952, p. 172. 
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't/ould prosper only if she could milk the special relationship with the 
United States for all it was worth. With the coming of the superpowers 
the old idea of 'balance of power' diplomacy gave way to 'alliance diplomacy'.l 
It was a new form of diplomacy which Healey could see at close quarters 
from its inception, and which he was to practice in the 1960s. One 
contribution to the general spirit of construction was his pamphlet Feet 
on the Ground. 2 
When Denis Healey entered the House of Commons in February 1952 the 
Labour Party had already begun to tear itself apart publicly over defence 
and foreign policy in the battles of the fifties and early sixties. 
Gaitskell's first Budget, of the lOth April 1951, -marked the beginnings 
of the rift on foreign and defence policy which was to characterize the 
public's image of the Party. The imposition of charges on teeth and 
spectacles to help finance the rearmament programme for the Korean War, 
which had begun in June 1950, was the excuse for Bevan to resign. Slighted 
in Attlee's appointment of Morrison to Foreign Secretary, and the young 
Gaitsktll as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Bevan resigned from the Cabinet, 
along with Harold Wilson and John Freeman. The idealistic left now had 
a leader of stature. 
'The main reason why the Labour Cabinet consciously assumed the 
political handicap of so daunting an arms programme.' said Healey, 'was 
not so much the belief in its military necessity, but the feeling that 
unless Britain gave a dramatic and unequivocal pledge of her readiness to 
lead Europe in building a serious military force on the continent, the 
United States might not be prepared to make her indispensable contribution.' 3 
Britain needed the threat of America's nuclear power to deter 
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When Healey entered Parliament the Labour Party had lost power, 
and its foreign policy was under fire from the Left who demanded a 
major modification. They regarded the Party as being too committed to 
the idea of Cold War, and accused it of siding with the forces of 
capitalism against the international workers' movement led by the 
Soviet Union. In 1952, in his New Fabian Essay entitled Power 
PoZitics and the Labour Party, Healey emerged as the major contributor 
to the 'power-political' school of thinking on foreign and defence 
1 policy in the Party. 
Healey argued for a strong American commitment through NATO, 
rejecting the idea of a 'socialist foreign policy'. The Bevanites 
had to be tolerated because as 'the Party as a whole lacks any systematic 
theory of world affairs, it has often fallen victim to the besetting sin 
of all progressive opposition - Utopianism.,2 Healey soon became a leader 
of the 'realists' fighting against 'Utopians' who believed that Britain 
had to join the side of tGe workers in the international class war. 
'It's very difficult to get everybody to see that, if you want to 
stop anarchy and get peace, then you have to have some way of making 
3 
states stick to the rules'. 
Healey attacked the Party for its lack of a coherent view of the 
world. In New Fabian Essays he admitted that the critical influences 
, 
on the Party's thinking on world affairs came 'from the Liberal-nonconformist ' 
wing, with its bias towards pacifism, and the neo-Marxist wing, stemming 
1 See Healey, Denis, New Fabian Essay, 1952, pp. 161-174. 
2 
_Ope cit., p.162. 
3 . ,Den~s Healey and the Policies of powe~, OPe cit, p. 
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from continental Social Democracy and Communism. ,1 Characteristically 
he suggested that Party members seriously interested i1foreign policy 
should read Hobbes' Leviathan rather than Fabian or Party literature. 
Denis Healey contended that "an understanding of the power 
element in politics is the first necessity for a sound foreign 
policy. The trade union movement as the other main contributor to 
British socialism, can still, as so often in the past, go some way 
towards filling this gap in Fabian theory. But the trade union movement 
is even more afflicted by parochialism, and it tends to intervene in 
the formation of foreign policy to correct errors rather than to give 
positive direction. 
The major positive influences on Labour Party thinking about world 
affairs bave come from neither the Fabians nor the trade unions, but 
from the liberal-Nonconformist wing with its bias towards pacifism, and 
the neo-Marxist wing, stemming from continental Social Democracy and 
2 Communism. " 
Healey's essays, and articles in the magazine Socialist Commenta~~ 
established him as the major intellectual force behind collective 
security. Like other right-wing intellectuals Healey believed that the 
important thing about international politics was their anarchical nature -
as in Leviathan only a sr.rong world government could bring peace and order 
to the state of nature where every country was intent on doing anything 
that it considered best for it. Other writers in the magazine agreed 
with Healey that with the lack of world government ideology was almost 
. 1 3 ~rre evant. 
1 
Few Fabian Essays, Ope cit., p. 161. 
2 ibid., p. 163. 
3 Dr. Rita Hinden the editor of Socialist Commentarx encouraged a more 
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Bevin as Foreign Minister had built his policy on alliance with 
the United States and opposition to Soviet expansion. Healey, together 
with other intellectuals like Strachey, Younger, Mayhew and Crosland, 
provided the intellectual backing for such polcies. Healey, in 
particular, besides attacking the Left for being utopian also accused 
it of tending to 'discount the power element in politics, seeing it as a 
specific evil of the existing system rather than a generic characters tic 
1 
of politics as such.' Of Utopians, Healey said, the liberal ones thought 
that left to themselves men would act for the common interest, and the 
marxists overestimated economic factors, believing that evil stemmed 
from bad property relations. 
'In both cases', argued Healey, 'deprecation of the power factor 
2 
entails an inadequate understanding of the techniques of power.' 
The Left did not really understand that foreign policy needed 
the 'power-political' approach instead of wishful thinking about good 
intentions of other states. This argument Healey pressed with vigour. 
"For the utopian," wrote Healey, "Heaven is always round the corner, 
eve~y evil has a single cause and thus a single cure - there is always 
'One Way Only'. Socialist attitudes to war provide many examples. 
Esperanto has always been popular among socialists on the grounds that 
nations would cease to fight one another if they all spoke the same 
language. Though war is at least 3,000 years older than capitalism, 
many socialists believe believe that capitalism is the only cause of war, 
and that therefore the Soviet Union could not commit aggression because 
it has a 'socialist' economy. Others maintain that the only serious 
danger of war springs from disparities between the living standards of the 
1 Ope cit., p. 162. 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid., pp. 162-163. 
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peoples; yet it is difficult to find a single war in modern times which 
was caused primarily by such disparities . " 1 
The Bevanites in the mid-fifties were growing in strength in the 
constituency parties and in leftist unions such as the Electrical 
Trades Union and the Amalgamated Engineers. In Tribune and the New 
Statesman Bevanite journalists attacked the right wing. At the 
1952 Party Conference at Morecambe they gained six of the seven 
constituencey places on the Executive, with Crossman and Wilson ousting 
2 
veterans Dalton and Morrison. 
At the conference, Mendelson gave a classic statement of the Left's 
attitude to foreign affairs which he said: 'We can best serve the cause 
of peace by sticking to our distinctive socialist principles and refusing 
to subordinate them to American, Russian or any other pressures. ,3 
With its view that socialism was somehow midway between the ideologies 
of capitalism and communism the Left tended towards neutralism, and 
were opposed by Healey, who thought British interests lay closer to the 
Americans, and that neutrality or the creation of a 'third force' would 
alter the balance of power in the world. 
Healey decided to attack Bevan and the left-wing analysis of 
foreign policy as a 'dream for escapists'. The volatile state of 
Party policy was matched by the delegates, since most of them had been 
mandated to oppose German rearmament. Healey had decided to expose the 
Bevanites as advancing irrelevant and tendentious arguments by mounting 
1 
New Fabian Essays.' OPe cit., pp. 162-163. 
2 
Labour Party Conference Report 1952, p. 145. 
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a frontal assault on the idol of the Left, the imposing , Bevan himself. 
Healey accused Bevan of reducing debate to the level of • a diet of 
candyfloss', urged him to face up to the realities of foreign policy, 
and called upon delegates to throwaway the 'stale mythology of Peter 
Pans'. Britain must work with America, accept German rearmament, and 
seek to keep the Commonwealth together, he said. l 
In the 1952 Labour Party pamphlet ProbLems of Foroeign PoLioy 
Healey wrote: 'The security of Europe against Russian attack and German 
domination depends on America being permanently involved on the Continent. ,2 
This remained the core of his policy throughout the fifties. 
Healey fought continually with the extreme Left of his Party, 
whose antipathy to the American social system led it to react against 
Labour's foreign policy. In Broitain and Europe he had argued that there 
was an organic unity between all non-Communist forces against the U.S.S.R. 
and her allies. 3 In The Defence of Weste171 Europe he argued for an 
expenditure of ten per cent of the gross national product by Britain 
on the defence of Europe against Russian expansion~ And at a Fabian 
Conference in 1951 he argued that an anti-American posture by Britain 
would either make America isolationist or would encourage her to ally 
with even more right-wing governments in Europe as the basis of her 
foreign policy. 5 
The other reasons why Britain needed an alliance with the Americans, 
he said, were to help solve the Russian problem, to find answers to the 
problems of German rearmament and demilitarization, to hold the 
1 
Ope cit., pp. 191-192. 
2 
Quoted in penis Healey and the Policies of Power, OPe cit. pp. 113-114. 
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Commonwealth together, and to help Britain and under-developed countries 
on economic issues. 
In a November 1953 debate in the Commons he clearly showed he had 
come to terms with the declining power of Britain: 'I am very proud 
to be an unrepentant Bevinite,' he said, referring to the man who had done 
most to get NATO established. He spoke of the two basic principles of 
British foreign policy; the first being the alliance 'to build up a 
new community of like-minded nations' and the second 'to re-organize 
the whole basis of Britain's international position so that it rests 
1 
not on force, but on consent.' 
In a nutshell: 'Interdependence replaces an independent foreign 
policy.' 2 
In July 1955, in an article in the NeW8 Chronicle he defended 
NATO as the means whereby peace was guaranteed, and emphasized that it 
3 
was a political as well as military alliance. 
In his book, Neutralism, published in the same year, 1955, he 
attacked the left-wing dislike of alliance: 'Neutralism,' he wrote, 
'based upon the belief that Socialists should stand midway between Communist 
Russia and Capitalist America, is faulty, not only in its vision of the 
Soviet System as in some way Socialist ••••. Indeed this type of 
Neutralism depends essentially on the argument that there is nothing to 
choose between a little of a bad thing, and a great deal of a bad thing. '4 
He stressed the need for a definite stand against Soviet expansion as being 
5 necessary in any step towards an international society. 
1 
Op. cit., p. 114. 
2 3 ibid. 
The News Chronicl~ July 12, 1955. 
4 Op. cit., p. 114-115. 
5 
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This was typical of his attacks on the Left,and more precisely, 
the Communists. In the Daily He~ald, in October 1952, he had emphasized 
clearly just how anti- Communist he had become, when he wrote: 'It thrives 
on betrayal', and listed Communist spies recently captured, including 
Klaus Fuchs and Allan Nunn May. 
'A good Communist cannot be a good patriot', wrote the fresh-thinking 
Healey. 'Every Communist is a potential traitor - though of course, 
a great many do not realize the sinister implications of the movement they 
have joined, and would undoubtedly leave it if they did 50.,1 
In 1955 he warned that a summit meeting might bring about a 
weakening of NATO and the Anglo-American alliance that was essential to 
British interests. When in January 1956 he wrote When Shrimps learn to 
WhistZe: Thoughts after Geneva, he summed up the Communist threat: 'The 
main aims of Soviet foreign policy, as defined by Soviet leaders themselves, 
remain unchanged - to get Germany out of NATO, to get NATO out of 
Europe, and to persuade the West to abolish all nuclear weapons while 
i ,2 leaving conventional forces in be ng. 
But Healey's anti-Communism and pro-NATO position did not prevent 
him from producing the Party's most novel foreign policy suggestion of 
the fifties - disengagement. 
The idea of 'disengagement' in central Europe was not entirely new. 
It had been discussed in 1952, and M. Paul Van Zeeland, a former Belgian 
Foreign Minister, advocated it in 1953. German strategists like 
Colonel von Bonin, Dr. Pfleiderer, and Albert Weinstein had also suggested some 
1 
Daily Herald, October 6th 1952. 
2 Ope cit., p. 115. 
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kind of militarily neutral and politically independent area as the only 
way in which Germany might be reunited.l Even Sir Anthony Eden had 
suggested the possibility of a demilitarized zone at the 1955 Geneva 
Conference - but his insistence that this would be conditional on free 
elections and unfettered government in Germany made this a non-starter. 
The Gaitskell/Healey Plan, however (which Healey devised) was 
better thought-out. It had its origins in the brutal Soviet invasion of 
Hungary. This event perhaps made Healey more interested in the 
political freedom of Eastern Europe than in the military security of 
Europe as a whole. 
Out of his belief that the status quo was intolerable came his 
pamphlet A Neutral Belt in Europe which was published in January 1958. 2 
The Daily Telegraph grudgingly admitted that this reduced a 'hitherto 
vague and nebulous concept to fairly precise and manageable terms,.3 
With the Soviet invasion of Hungary, and the first Soviet sputnik 
launched in 1957, the West was becoming increasingly alarmed that another 
possible Soviet move could be followed, for example, by West German 
retaliation that might lead to global war. Healey therefore devised a 
plan that he hoped would lead to a neutral belt in central Europe, with 
the NATO and Warsaw Pact armies no longer faCing each other across a border. 
Healey had high hopes for the plan. M. Rapacki, the Polish Foreign 
Minister, proposed a nuclear-free zone for central Europe at the end of 
1957. Professor George Kennan, former State Department specialist in Russian 
affairs and U. S. Amb,assador to Moscow, supported the broad idea of 
1 See Eugene Hinterhoff, Disengagement in Europe, 1959, pp. 414-42. 
2 
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disengagement in the B.B.C.'s Reith Lectures. At the Labour Party 
Conference in October 1958 a resolution was passed urging the peaceful 
re unification of Germany within the framework of a European Security 
Pact. 
Healey was a front bench supporter of Gaitskell when the ban-the-
bomb debate split the Party. In March 1960 Healey's New Fabian pamphlet 
The Raae Against the H-bomb was published one day after forty-four 
Labour left-wingers, including Crossman and Wigg, had abstained in the 
defence debate because of Gaitskell's support of nuclear weapons. I 
Healey emphasized that the anxiety of NATO members to get their own 
nuclear weapons was undermining the alliance, as well as drawing 
America into isolation. It was a typical example of the statesman 
Healey looking beyond the frontiers of Britain to see the wider 
implications of British policy. 
The debate about nuclear weapons had been going on inside the 
Party from about 1955, when a resolution to oppose the manufacture 
of the H-bomb was defeated at the annual conference by some five votes 
2 to one. 
By 1957 it regretted Ithe undue dependence on the ultimate 
deterrent
'
, although there was still a 5,000,000 majority at the 
3 Brighton Conference in favour of continued manufacture of the bomb. 
The right-wing trade union support for the Executive ensured that three 
4 
similar resolutions at the 1958 Conference met the same fate. Gaitskell's 
attack on Clause Four after the 1959 election, however, lost him this 
1 Healey, Denis, The Race A2ainst the H-B0m9, Fabian Tract No, 522, 1960, 
2 
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3 See Labour Part.:t Conference 
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Re20rt for 1957, p. 
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support; the unions were determined to uphold a traditional commitment. 
Gaitskell, unwilling to diminish the power of his possible future 
job, defended Britain's independent nuclear capability because of 
'excessive dependence on the United States'. Britain might wish to 
act independently of America against the Soviet Union, he argued. This 
gave Britain influence in world affairs, and bargaining power. Unilateral 
disarmament, argued the 'realist' right-wingers, was only a moral 
gesture which would have no effect on other powers. 
George Wigg, who became obsessed with the excessive reliance on 
nuclear weapons that he thought had been imposed on Britain by the Sandys 
White Paper on Defence of 1957, and left-winger Richard Crossman drew 
attention to the difference of opinion between Gaitskell and Healey. 
They demanded that conventional forces should be strengthened at the 
expense of the nuclear deterrent. 
They were joined by the Campai9B for Nuclear Disarmament, an 
organization supported by Christian pacifists, left-wingers, communists, 
and large numbers of the idealistic youth of the country. Healey himself 
had been at the meeting of a small group of friends - Kingsley Martin, 
John Collins, J. B. Priestley and his wife, and George Kennan - who had 
got together to discuss nuclear problems. Out of this C.N.D. had started. 
Healey and Kennan did not join. As Robert Taylor has written: "In an age 
of so-called consensus politics, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament provided 
a dramatic and colourful diversion."l 
Healey criticized the C.N.D. movement 'because they tended to argue 
that we mustn't think rationally about force, which is the beginning of 
evil'. He adds: 'It was the precursor of the hippy movement, and the 
2 
anti-political movement among the young.' 
1 
2 
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The right-wing of the Party . regarded it as a truism to talk of 
nuclear weapons as being' evil'. Fred .. Mulley in The Politics of 
Western Defence and John Strachey in On the Prevention of W~ argued 
that the moral force of the argument against nuclear war hindered 
people from looking properly at the problems; problems that Healey 
emphasized could not be ignored in the real world where power is the 
1 
major factor governing the relationship between states. 
With the cancellation of the British Blue Streak missile in 
April 1960 the case for having an 'independent' deterrent collapsed by 
default - although the Conservative Party continued to talk of Britain's 
ability to use nuclear weapons independent of America if necessary. In 
July 1960 the Labour Executive and the Trades Union Congress accepted 
the Healey line as official policy.2 They opposed an independent nuclear 
weapon for Britain, and called for arms control in central Europe as a 
step towar~ disengagement. They demanded less dependence on nuclear 
weapons in NATO strategy, and called for an agreement to end nuclear 
tests . 
At the Scarborough Conference, where Gaitskell presented the policy, 
he accused the Left and C.N.D. of being neutralist. Knowing that the big 
unions were mandated to vote against the policy, he declared that he would 
not accept the defeat: 'There are some of us who will fight and fight and 
fight again to save the Party we love.' 3 
Healey spoke out in support, urging Boilermakers' Union leader 
Ted Hill to be realistic about Krushchev, who was unlikely to be impressed 
by fine gestures. 'I would like to see Ted Hill going into industrial 
1 See Mulley, Fred, The Politics of Western Defence and Strachey, John, 
_On the Prevention of War, for a discussion of defence problems seen 
from the realist viewpoint. 
2 . Jo~nt statement by Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress April 18, 1960. 
3 
.Labour Party Conference Report for 1960, p. 217. 
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negotiations armed with nothing except the purity of his intentions.' 
h 'd I e sa~ • 
Gaitskell, who saw clearly that 'the issue is not really 
defence at all, but the leadership of this Party' was narrowly defeated 
2 by 3,339,000 votes to 3,042,000. When Parliament re-assembled he was 
re-elected to the leadership with 166 votes to Wilson's 81. It was 
necessary, however, for Gaitskell and his supporters to regain the 
confidence of the Party. 
Gaitskell received the support of the Campaign for Democratic 
Socialism (C.D.S . ), which was active in the constituencies, unions, 
and Parliament. Its leaders, through their magazine Campaign, supported 
Gaitskell over almost everything. Healey, and other Shadow Ministers, 
did not belong to it but used it as a platform and a flag under which 
they could congregate. The unorganized 'right-wing' sector of the 
Party backed the official line on defence under C.D.S. leadership. and the 
unions swung back to Gaitskell. 
In 1961 the National Executive had set up a 'Committee of Twelve' 
to draft a policy document on defence. Of the major drafts, the Healey 
draft was most committed to the NATO alliance. 'Britain must remain a member 
of NATO, and seek to reform it from the inside', it said. It added that 
the Party should 'cease to attempt to remain an independent nuclear 
power, since this neither strengthens the alliance nor is it a sensible 
use of our limited resources'. The Healey draft was accepted while 
Crossman's was rejected, and became the official Policy for Peace. 3 
1 Ope cit., p. 224. 
2 Ope ci t. p. 218. 
3 
Denis Healev and the Policies of Power, OPe cit., p.126. 
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At the Blackpool Conference in October 1961 the Party rejected 
unilateralism by 4,526,000 votes to 1,756,000, and overwhelmed a 
resolution in favour of neutralism by nearly 5,000,000 votes. l The 
debate on the British bomb had been defused. 
This brief analysis of revisionist foreign policy as expostulated 
by Denis Healey, who may be regarded as a representative figure, virtually 
encapsulates the essence of the social democratic ideology within the 
Labour Party. The overt commitment to national pcwer also reflected 
other aspects of Labour's pclicies which are paralleled in the domestic 
environment. Internally this 'national'commitment pointed towards the 
acceptance of group interests whose constant interaction would require 
institutional control which under the Labour Governments of the mid-
sixties led to the tripartite relationship between the Government, the 
trades unions, and industry. Some would see in this the seeds of the 
corporate state with its emphasis on national unity and maximization of 
state power . and the denial of merely private interests over that of the 
collectivity. Given the eclectic nature of revisionism it was inevitable 
that the ideology of social democratism would be drawn from many sources. 
Indeed four distinct origins are discernable in social democratic thought 
making a strange admixture of thinking drawn from diverse sources, including-
"Communism, fascism, liberalism and conservatism. 1I2 Thus we can discern 
in Labour's domestic and foreign policies the impact of concepts of class, 
of national economic planning, belief in individual freedom and respect 
for the institutions of state, particularly those associated with 
1 
See L.abour Party Conference Report for 1966) 1-. 101-
2 
Haseler, Stephen, OPe cit., p.153~ 
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parliamentary democracy. These ingredients have given Labour's foreign 
policy both in opposition and in government (especially strongly in 
regard to the latter) a distinctly ambivalent nature. It has presented 
1 
"a popular, if muddled, view of the world". And yet despite Labour's 
manifest commitment to traditional values and to the need for continuity 
in foreign policy, the myth still persisted that a Labour government would 
mean the dismemberment of national power through a policy of unarmed 
neutrality or pacifism and disarmament. But, of course, the ideology 
of social democracy pointed fil:"mly in the direction of a protracted 
clash with the ideology of communism and of Soviet political power in 
particular. Mr. Attlee's Government from 1945-51 established the 
essentially 'atlanticist' commitment of the British Labour Party as well 
as that of the governmental perspective of his cabinet. The ideology 
expressed by the Labour leadership was to reveal intellectual and emotional 
attitudes which virtually encapsulated those associated with the so-called 
cold war liberals. Such sentiments also reflected the overall view of the 
social-cemocratic majority in the PLP and of successive Labour cabinets. 
Inevitably therefore in October 1964 Labour came into office, after 
13 years in opposition, with a well-formulated defence policy which 
emphasized traditional'national interests' and values. The ideology of 
socialism was not considered prior to' national interests'. But 'national 
• I " ~nterests were also considered as subordinate to latent internationalism 
even if this aspect of policy was somewhat suppressed in practice. As 
John Strachey argued "Britain can serve the cause of peace above all by 
1 
,Op. ci t., p.154. 
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promoting the emergence of a world authority", to which a Labour, government 
would be committed and that commitment , "would in fact constitute an 
almost revolutionary break with any foreign policy which Britain, or for 
that matter any other nation, has ever pursued." Strachey recalled 
that "During the period of the Labour Government of 1945-51, the Prime 
Minister sent round a minute to all Ministers defining the basic foreign 
and defence policies which he desired his Government to promote. They 
were, first, undeviating support _ of the United Nations and, second, 
a sustained effort to pursue the goals of international disarmament 
and peace. It was characteristic of Lord Attlee that he saw no 
contradiction between such a policy and the steady rebuild~ng of the 
power of Britain, both by means of participation in such alliances as 
NATO and by the creation of British nuclear weapons. Nor do I".l Here 
we see the neat balancing of national with international interests. And 
it is clear that in regard to 'High Politics', Labour pursued traditional 
policies based upon 'national interests' whose definition was substantially 
unaffected by the ideology of democratic-socialism. But some element 
of the ideology of socialism (as loosely identified in the opening 
section of this chapter) clearly shaped Labour's foreign and defence 
policies. However, in the sphere of 'Low Politics', the relevance of 
2 ideology was more strongly expressed and felt. Labour found both the 
internal and external environments difficult to manage but on balance 
even in a period of economic constraint, the domestic environment gave 
greater scope for attempts to achieve some of the goals of socialism as 
defined by the Labour movement since 1918. Nevertheless Labour's defence 
1 
2 
Strachey, John, The Pursuit of Peace, Fabian Tract 329, 1960, p.22. 
I am using the distinction made by Professor Stanley Hoffman who 
identified 'High Politics' as concerned with foreign and defence 
issues and 'Low Politics' as essentially those concerned with social 
and domestic issues. 
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and foreign policies were not devoid of ideological influence derived 
from the syndrome of socialism. And in fact Labour's enormously 
ambitious defence programme which the party had painfully built-up in 
Opposition, especially between 1960-1964, contained a number of serious 
ideological and strategic contradictions. The decision to withdraw from 
East of Suez did not arise in the event solely from economic exigency 
but from those contradictions within the policy itself which events 
forced to the surface in 1966 and beyond. 
Finally, Labour's policy declarations, resolutions and ministerial 
statements often refer to 'national interests' or specifically to 'the 
national interest'. I shall use both terms where necessary, although it 
is not implied that either term has a specific meaning or even any 
1 
meaning at all. However it is generally left to the government of the 
day to decide to which particular national interests it seeks to attach 
importance. 
1 See discussion of this concept in Frankel, Joseph, The National 
,Interest, 1970; Frankel observes that "the concept of national 
interest is usually seen as lacking in differentiated content, when 
it should be seen as containing a number of different functions. 
N7I. = N.I. should be N.l. = a + b + c + d ..•• + n, where N.l. 
is the concept of national interest and a to n are its different 
functions". pp. 42-3. 
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C H APT E R 11 
DEFENCE POLICY: THE TRADITIONAL POSTURE 1945-1964 
- THE BI-PARTISAN APPROACH 
Before considering Labour's attitude to Britain's traditional 
defence and foreign po1icies,(see next Chapter) a brief description and 
evaluation of the nation's strategic interests is necessary, covering 
the period since the war in general and from 1951-1964 - the period of 
opposition for Labour in particular. (See Annex A and B) • 
Although strategic policies pursued since the war were not always 
precise or clearly articulated certain perceived interests of the 
government emerged and the following analysis seeks to describe and evaluate 
them in general terms. As Professor Frankel wrote: "when we deal with 
a field as broad and as hard to comprehend as foreign policy, the 
1 
temptation to resort to generalities becomes overwhelmingly strong". 
This temptation is unavoidable because Labour inherited policies which it 
embraced when in power, and whose rationale and origins were relevant to 
its consideration of what it perceived to be in the national interest or 
indeed in the state's interests (if a distinction is to be drawn between 
the nation and the state). Labour when in power inherited liabilities 
conditioned by historical factors of long standing. As Anthony Eden 
observed .' ' .. :. "Britain's story and her interests lie far beyond the continent 
of Europe. Our thoughts IOOve across the seas to the many communities in 
which our people play their part, in every corner of the world. That is 
. 
our life: without it we should be no more than some millions of people living 
on an island off the cost of Europe." 2 
1 
2 
Frankel, Joseph., Jiatjooal Interest. London, Pall Mall & Papermacs, 1970,p.4 
Mausergh, N. Documents and Speeches on COmmonwealth Affairs 1931-1952 1 
Vol. 2, ~ondon, Oxford University Press, 1953, p. 1157. 
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The view that the government of a great power cannot break free of 
the inertia and weight of traditional, or what Lord Palmerston called 
'eternal interests' i is strikingly ralffirmed in the foreign policies of 
Successive Labour administrations. Clearly, as Hans J. Morgenthau 
r6;cognised <.:": " "the national interests of great powers, and in a good 
measure the methods by which it is to be secured, are impervious to 
1 ideological and institutional changes." 
But the emphasis on particular factors that generally co~ain and 
shape the policies and decisions of political elites who form whatever 
government comes into existence must not be over-stressed. In fact 
though policy is shaped by intractable realities and unchanging 
circumstances, it would be wrong to take an entirely determinist view 
of the political process. Clearly "images, values, attitudes, beliefs 
and perception in foreign policy" play their part as well; and indeed 
2 hard 'interests' are really "subjective preferences". 
Clement Attlee's post-war government clearly had room for choice and 
to make one. There had long been a division of opinion in the corridors 
of power between the advocates of the so-called maritime and continental 
schools of strategy. But in this debate over the kind of international 
environment in which Britain should seek a suitable role for herself, 
there was a division between adherents to vague concepts of "Atlantic 
-interdependence" and those who attached prime importance to similarly 
vague concepts of "European unity". In the new setting of the nuclear-
missile age there emerged two different and differing conceptions of 
how best to promote the nation's strategic interests, that is, between 
1 
2 
Morgen~~au, H.J. 'Restoration of American Politics', Vol. 3 of Politics 
in the Twentieth Century, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962, 
p. 199. 
Barber, J. External Rela~ions, DL03, Block VII, Part 3, Open University 
Publication, p. 46. 
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choosing, essentially, the Europeanist and Atlanticist . versions of 
security. It was clear that a long-term commitment to a continental 
strategy involved the sensible diminution of a commitment to a maritime 
strategy which was important in the context of an alliance system based 
on Washington. 
However from the standpoint of this study, it is clear that Labour 
both in opposition and power accepted a bi-partisan approach to foreign 
and defence policies. For the Labour Party as a whole this meant a 
well merited commitment to the Commonwealth and a world role. It meant 
also Labour's commitment to NATO and a European balance of power. 
Broadly speaking, British defence policy after World War II must be 
examined in the light of the controversy between Atlantic independence 
and European partnership which became crucial after the abandonment by the 
US Department of Defence of the policy of relying principally on a 
capacity for massive retaliation. This policy was discarded some time 
after 1957 (though formally announced in July, 1962) in favour of a 
1 policy of flexible response. 
What is of interest and relevance at this juncture is the character 
and nature of British defence policy which, until 1968, put her firmly 
on the Atlantic side of the strategic debate. Indeed, given the nature 
of the policy described here, it is impossible to imagine Britain adopting 
any other posture than that which assumed a global balance of power: that 
is (a) a part in NATO Europe; (b) membership of CENTO, the Middle East 
security pact; (c) participation in the South-East Asian Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO); (d) a close strategic connection with the USA: and (e) a "world 
1 
Kaufmann, w.w. Xbe McNamara Strategy (Harper and ROW, New York, 1964). 
This study provides a clear account of how the doctrine of flexible 
response evolved. 
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role" whose scope and function outside the framework of the alliance 
systems often determined the character and nature of the Anglo-
American alliance - in other words that special relationship.l 
This special relationship induced an excessive British dependence 
on America, arising from the advanced weapons connection, which tended 
to undermine her independence and capacity to influence often reckless 
2 US policy in areas outside of Europe. But undoubtedly in the early 
period of the post~war years, and in the 1950s in particular, Britain 
exercised a unique degree of influence over her major ally which can 
be said to be a direct reflection of her strategic importance to the 
security of the USA as well as to her general economic and political 
importance in Europe and the Commonwealth. The process by which the 
close relationship to the USA was established and enhanced can be seen 
in the evolution of British defence policy since 1945. 
Britain in the aftermath of World War II faced a new strategic 
situation with essentially baCKward-looking policies. She perceived 
an immediate and traditional interest in a balance of power vis-a-vis, 
on this historic occasion, the Soviet Union whose armies had swept 
into Eastern and Central Europe in the wake of retreating German forces, 
thus creating an imbalance in the military and political forces affecting 
the states of Western Europe. Given the nature of Stalin's foreign policy, 
and the constantly reiterated ideological ambitions which the existence 
of large Communist minorities in France and Italy had exacerbated~ the 
Labour Government of Clemeat Attlee, under the inspiration of its Foreign 
1 
Bell, Cor~ Tne Debatable AllianceR (Oxford University Press, London, 
1962). This book deals with the nature of the special relationship. 
2 
Rosecrance, R. N, The Defence of the Realm: British Strategy in the 
.Nuclear Epoch ,(Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1967). 
Presents evidence of British subserviency to United States aims. 
- 42 -
Secretary, Ernest Bevin, decided to .put its weight behind a counterpoise 
to over-weening ambition. This .meant a specific commitment to keep 
troops i~ Europe for an indefinite period. Although the NATO treaty 
was for a minimum of twenty years, the British considered at the time 
that 50 years was much the likelier period for such deployment. 
The NATO commitment was a dramatic departure from traditional policy~ 
{or in the past the interest in a European balance of power had not 
involved a specific military commitment to a continental strategy. Now 
within the framework of a multi-national alliance Britain had, at a time 
of peace, committed herself to the defence of Western Europe and, in the 
words of the 1962 Defence White Paper, "stationed large forces (in 
Europe) for the last sixteen years in complete contrast with our previous 
military dispositions".l The transition, all the same, from soldiers of 
occupation to militarily-committed allies was smoothly accomplished, 
2 The Berlin Crisis of 1948 and ~~e Korean War saw to that. 
Fear of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe was widespread. It was 
of such dimensions as to compel America to abandon any thought of a return 
to her traditional policy of isolationism and to compel Britain, 
furthermore, to compromise the nature of her traditional maritime 
strategy. The critical step in playing a part in the land defence of 
Europe came in 1954. France's rejection of a European Defence Community, 
to the secret relief of Britain, led to the Churchill Government's 
undertaking to maintain in Europe for 50 years a force of some four 
army divisions and an air division. Though in the event the military 
1 
Statement on Defence, 1962: The Next Five Years, H.M. Stationery 
Office, London, February, 1962, Cmnd. 1639 Part I, Ch. I, para.2, p.3. 
2 
Rees, David,The Age of Containment (Macmillan, London, 1965). This 
book describes western reaction to perceived Soviet aggression. 
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contribution on the ground· was more modest than this, the . "unprecedented 
commitment", as Sir Anthony ·:Eden (the ' late Earl of Avon) described it, 
was essential if "an effective defence system in Western Europe" was 
to become a reality. Indeed, "by giving this new cOmmitment, we may 
succeed in bringing the Germans and French together, and keeping the 
Americans in Europe", Sir Anthony was giving obvious expression to 
1 the classic requirements of British policy. 
Yet this policy meant that Britain was about to over-commit 
herself to the defence of Western Europe at a time of considerable 
involvement elsewhere. Why Britain with a population of 50 million, a 
desiccated economy and larger overseas responsibilities should have 
been expected in early NATO planning to provide four divisions when 
an enormously wealthy USA, with a population four times as large, should 
have been expected to provide only five divisions was one of those 
questions th~ divided opinion within the Labour movement. Why Britain, 
moreover, and not the Americans, should have been left to make the long-
term commitment of troops to West Germany in order to placate French 
fears about German rearmament was not very clear either to Left-Wing 
critics of Britain's over extended commitments. 
Even the commitment of 80,000 men was a considerable undertaking 
and proved beyond Britain's manpower resources. Why? Because it was 
erroneously assumed that the formation of the Strategic Reserve and the 
Strategic Nuclear Force would diminish the need for manpower. With a 
1 
Avon, Lord (Memoirs of) , Full Circle (Cassell, London, 1960; 
Hough ton Miffin, Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 11..l.. 
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strategic reserve, smaller overseas bases would be maintained, it was 
asserted, and with the Strategic Nuclear Force the incidence of limited 
war would diminish. The 1954 Defence White Paper, for example, said 
that the Strategic Nuclear Force "should have an increasing effect upon 
the cold war by making less likely such adventures on the part of the 
Communist world as their aggression in Korea. This should be of benefit 
to us by enabling us to reduce the great dispersal of effort which the 
1 
existing tension has hitherto imposed upon us." The implication of 
this was clear enough: that overall manpower reductions would become 
possible. This was mistaken. The assumption that Britain's NATO commitment 
could be fulfilled by virtue of the release of manpower from overseas 
areas turned out to be over-optimistic. It was also soon discovered 
that a strategic nuclear capability was irrelevant to the needs of 
internal security which comprised the major challenge to British interests 
and resources outside the European theatre. 
Hoist by her own petard, Britain found herself in the position of 
wanting for the defence of Europe the very troops now required for 
overseas security. With her large conscript army, the competing 
commitments could be met, but only just. Moreover, the 1957 White 
Paper announced the end of conscription by 1960. It was increasingly 
obvious, therefore, that both the overseas commitment and the British 
Army of the Rhine (BAOR) faced further reductions. The BAOR was, in 
fact, to be reduced in twelve months by 13,000 men to a strength of 
1 
Statement O~ Defence, 1954: Annual White Paper (H.M. Stationery Office, 
London,)February 1954, Cmnd. 9075, Part I, Ch. 2, para. 3, p.5. 
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45,000 while the Second Tactical Air Force was to be reduced in size 
by one half. Only strong pressure by the USA forced the British to 
maintain the strength of 55,000 men in the BAOR which, since 1958, has 
been reduced by only 2,000 men. The foreign exchange cost of the 
BAOR, which in the early period averaged E50m a year, was a factor in 
determining the diminished contribution to the defence of Western Europe, 
but there was also an overt strategic reason. Britain began to argue 
that NATO needed a relatively small ground force component in a situation 
where nuclear weapons would be deployed early in a conflict in which the 
Soviet Union had committed large numbers of troops. Indeed, over-large 
conventional forces were seen as possibly weakening the credibility of 
the predominantly American strategic capability. 
This interest in strategic warfare was rational and logical for the 
British who realised the difficulties they were in and seized hold of 
the concept of "interdependence", devised by NATO in late 1957, as a means 
to revert to a modern version of maritime strategy in which their sea, air 
and land components played a part in the collective defence of the West 
-
outside Europe. According to the government maintenance of "independent 
overseas responsibilities" prc.;vided "unquestionable benefits to the common 
cause". With the Strategic Nuclear Force, upgraded in the 1957 Defence 
1 White Paper, Britain was well placed to play a world role of some importance. 
Interdependence in the British book of strategic thought was inevitably 
Atlanticist and not Europeanist. The strategic dichotomy was taking shape; 
London preferred Washington at the intergovernmental level to a possible 
supra-national European arrangement. 
The Royal Navy had been assigned virtually to NATO. By 1961, in 
fact, 85 per cent of its strength was committed there. The navy had 
1 
Statement on Defence, 1957: Report on Defence , (H.M. Stationery Office, 
London) February, 1957, Cmnd. 363, Part I, Ch. I, para. 2, p.4. 
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become involved in backing-up an essentially continental strategy in a 
decisive way. Naval missions, " though, were much the same; that is, 
maintenance of shipping and ocean communications and the blockade of 
enemy territorial waters. But the context of policy was different. 
Hitherto the continental strategy had been as an alternative 
policy which was sometimes combined with that of the maritime 
strategy. The 1914-1918 war, for example, brought both strategies 
into play. The conflict itself, it is true, was primarily a land war 
whose outcome did not essentially depend upon the Royal Navy, though it 
did play a big part in enforcing an economic blockade and in deterring 
Germany's fleet from putting to sea. Moreover, Germany was not defeated 
until America appeared on the scene with fresh troops and an enormous 
industrial-technological capability which meant that the allies would in 
1 the end prevail. Despite the Great War, and. the French demand for security 
guarantees from Britain, a definite European commitment was not given 
until 1938. After World War II, as already seen, Britain formulated in 
1949 a commitment to a continental strategy, which in time, under the impact 
of nuclear weapons and ballistic-missiles, meant that in any future war 
an enemy could not be brought to its knees by economic blockade. 2 Yet in 
the early days of NATO the naval strategy was traditional in the sense 
that - as it perhaps largely still is - the preoccupation was with anti-
submarine warfare and mine-sweeping activities. This was to be expected 




But the basic British maritime strategy, relying on geography and a 
Williams, Geoffrey. The Eurooean-American Partnership, Sijthoff, August 
1977. This study examines the historic intervention by America to 
restore a European balance of power. 
Snyder, W.P. lbe Politics of British Defence Policy (Ernest Benn, 
Columbus, Ohio, 1964). An interesting account of political factors 
affeCting assessment of traditional strategic interests. 
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strong diversified navy to buy time to mobilise against a continental 
foe, was no longer adequate. Defence had come to depend upon NATO 
and" interdependence" . That is to say, if deterrence should fail then 
such defence as remains would depend on a collective effort located 
east, not of the Channel, but of the Rhine. The Royal Navy busily 
co-operated with other allies and, since 1950, almost all manoeuvres 
in the Atlantic and Mediterranean have been joint exercises. 
The development and composition of the Strategic Nuclear Force, 
together with Britain's external role, constituted for at least ten 
years the real source of British influence over the USA, as well as the 
source of independent military power upon which Britain's independence 
itself relied. In the strategic nuclear relationships between Britain and 
America lies the real motive force of the Atlanticist solution to security 
and, too, a striking indication of the meta-political relationship 
between the two English speaking nations whose interests, over basic 
issues, more often than not converged. 
The ~attan Project, under which from 1942 to 1946 the atomic bomb 
was successfully produced, was based upon the two wartime agreements of 
August, 1943, signed at Quebec, and the Hyde Park Agreement of September, 
1944. This Anglo-American collaboration was breached by the McMahon Act 
of 1946 which ran in the face of the solemn agreement of 1943 and 1944. 
But by January, 1946, the independent nuclear programme was initiated 
and the decision to proceed with the actual making of weapons was announced 
in May, 1948. 1 Meanwhile, under the Blair House Agreement, negotiated 
1 
Attlee, Clement. As it Happened (Heinemann, London, 1954). The 
statesman who was the Prime Minister of ' the day makes it clear that 
the British decision to become an atomic power was taken almost 
casually. 
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in January, 1948, and which sought to establish areas of research 
(none having any relation to weapons), some degree of Anglo-American 
collaboration was restored. All the same, the brilliant research 
programme initiated by the Attlee Government resulted in the first 
British atomic bomb being built by 1952, the appearance of which gave 
greater substance to the reality of the American commitment to defend 
Europe. The often expressed British fear that the USA might be less 
than reliable was one important, though not decisive, reason for 
acquiring atomic weaponry. When the decision was taken to acquire atomic 
weapons, the weapons base of the UK was still that of a great power. 
Since the British armed forces built their own equipment, a capacity 
equalled only by that of the USSR and the USA, the decision not to 
proceed with nuclear weapons would have been surprising in the post~ 
. d 1 war per~o • 
In the Defence White Paper of 1955 was disclosed the decision to 
acquire thermonuclear weapons and these were first tested in May, 1957. 
When the thermonuclear programme was announced, the justification 
advanced by the Prime Minister of the day, Sir Winston Churchill, was 
based upon a counter-force strategy: counter-force in the sense that the 
main justification was military as well as political. The independent 
nuclear programme, said Churchill in the defence debate in the House of 
Commons in March, 1955, enabled a British scheme of priorities, as opposed 
to an American scheme of priorities, if war should come. 2 
1 
2 
Churchill argued that relative priorities in targeting had been, 
Beaton, Leonard and Haddox, John. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Institute 
for Strategic Studies, Chatto and Windus, London, 1962). This study 
presents a reasoned argument explaining the emergence of the British 
deterrent. 
Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 537, March 1, 1955, c.9S7. 
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and would remain, a vitally important subject, especially in the 
light of past actual experience. ' For example, in the closing stages 
of World War II the Royal Air Force had attacked the V-l and V-2 
mi~sile sites, which in the alliance scheme of priorities might not 
have been removed at all. Indeed, the old war-time leader might well 
have referred to his 1940 decision to withhold fiqbter aircraft for 
the defence of' Britain, the outcome of which determined ti.e Battle 
of Britain and the course of the war itself. Decisions of that kind 
depended upon military capability together with the will to commit 
its use in the supreme interests of national security. 
Interest in a strategic nuclear force went back to several earlier 
policies, as Churchill made plain, and in particular to the war-time 
effort to effect strategic air bombardment. The interest in the efficacy 
of strategic bombardment had been a much earlier pre-occupation which had 
been propounded by Lord Trenchard, the Chief of the Air Staff from 1919 
to 1929 . He had articulated the doctrine that aerial bombardment can be 
1 decisive. Even so, the actual contribution of strategic bombing to 
World War II has been subjected to analysis which suggests that aerial 
bombardment had not deCisively harmed the civilian-industrial base of 
Germany. Only in the last year of the war did strategic bombing really 
2 hurt the German economy. 
Nonetheless, the development in 1945 of atomic weapons seemed to 
herald a technological break-through which, in ~~e fullness of time, 
would vindicate the devotees of Trenchard who had supposed aerial 
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This development coincided with the development in 194,7, by the RJ\F, of 
long-range bomber aircraft which included the VuZcan and Victor 
subsonic bombers that were due for service in 1956. These were later 
augmented, as "further insurance", by the VaZient, procured in 1953 
for the creation of a "Strategic Air Command" model for the RAF. An 
interim aircraft, the Canberra tactical strike reconnaisance aircraft 
(the "TSR-l", as it were), was brought into service in 1950. By the end 
of 1958, the "V" bombers were reaching their peak of effectiveness as 
the strategic means to deliver nuclear weapons, based upon either a counter-
force or a counter-city strategy. In fact, in terms of capability the 
Victors and VuZcans possessed better heights and speeds than the 
American B-52, the chief delivery vehicle of the time. 
With the announcement in the 1957 White Paper that the inter-
continental ballistic missile (ICBM), BZue Streak, would be in the 
service by 1960, the scene was set for the next leap forward, to the 
requirements of complex retaliatory deterrent systems. Then came the 
great pay-off: joint strategic planning with America's Strategic Air 
Command. This least considered aspect of joint planning enabled Britain 
to help determine the targets actually to be attacked and, in political 
terms, may be considered Atlanticist, rather than Europeanist, in orientation. 
The real significance, however, is that this joint planning was the prelude 
to the restoration of the pre-McMahon Act situation permitting exchange 
of nuclear information, confirmed in the agreement of October, 1957, 
which restored to good health the Anglo-American connection on advanced 
weaponry.l 
1 See Pierre, Andrew, Nuclear Politics: The British Experiment wi~~ 
an Independent Strategic Fo~ce 1939-1970. 
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From 1957 onwards a speedy build-up of nuclear stocks took place 
and, given the excellent means of delivery, the British ueterrent was then 
both credible and independent. The "V" bombers gave a brilliant showing 
when, in 1955, the RAF flew them in the US Strategic Air Command bombing 
competition, gaining ninth and twelfth places respectively out of 164 
1 
crews. The US Administration had every reason to consider that Britain 
was a strong and dependable ally. Her Suez aberration was soon forgotten. 
At the first post-Suez encounter, when President Dwight Eisenhower . 
and Mr. Macmillan sought to defuse overcharged diplomatic relations, 
it was agreed to have installed in Britain sixty Thop liquid-fuelled 
intermediate range rockets, each with a two megaton warhead. This move 
was actually to increase the influence of the British Government over 
its super-power ally and was further evidence of the Anglo-Saxon 
preference for Atlanticist solutions to their jOint security. An earlier 
antecedent had been the stationing of US B-29s in East Anglia in 1948 
at the request of Attlee. And, indeed, the decision to help the USA 
develop the ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) was confirmation 
of this fact. 
The critical issue was, nevertheless, for the British Government, the 
future of the BLue Stpeak, which was to supersede the "V" bombers as 
the major means of delivery (the "V" bombers themselves having had their 
performance enhanced by the development of the BLue Steel, "standoff" 
weapon enabling the attacking aircraft to launch its attack 100 miles 
from the target out of range of a local air defence). Cost escalation, 
the realisation that the liquid-fuelled rockets had been rendered 
1 Williams, Geoffrey, ~atural Alliance for the West~ Atlantic 
Trade Study, 1969, p.19. 
2 
Williams, Geoffrey, The Permanent Alliance: The European-American, 
.Partnership 1945-1984" A. W. Sijthoff, 1977, pp. 187-188. 
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obsolescent by the solid~fuelled variety and the search for credible 
second strike retaliatory systems, made cancellation of the project 
inevitable. Skybolt, an airborne ' and air-launched missile system, 
was the logical replacement. The cancellation of Blue Streak 
however, raised the whole issue of the future of the deterrent system 
itself, and it signalled an end to Britain's technical capability to 
construct a long-range ballistic missile system at an acceptable costf 
Britain's deterrent force was considered to be essentially "second-
strike", even though it would be more effective as a first-strike 
force; and its joint role with US Strategic Air Command, in the context 
of alliance policy, made it a powerful addition to the West's retaliatory 
system. 
The credibility of the British force would nonetheless be enhanced, 
it was considered,by the attachment of Skybolt, a two-stage air-to-ground 
rocket. The US Administration was prepared to sell the rocket and the 
British Government wanted to buy it to extend the life of the manned 
bomber over the late 1960s and 1970s. President Eisenhower saw no 
objection to the prospect, if it was technologically possible, of supplying 
the RAF with a weapon the US Air Force was going to take into service 
anyway. But it was not technologically possible at an acceptable economic 
cost. Two years later this fact was faced. 
Following the liquidation of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 the 
Kennedy Administration decided to forgo the Skybolt project. The 
decision was related, in the American consideration, to the so-called 
1 
2 
Williams, Geoffrey. The Strategy of the TSR-2, International Journal, 
Canadian Institute of Inter~ational Affairs, Vol. XXV, No. 4, 1970, 
pp. 727-744. 
Wi11iams, Geoffrey, Wi1liams, Alan, Crisis in European Defence, 
Charles Knight, 1974, pp. 52-53. 
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McNamara thesis on nuclear strategy propounded by the US Defence 
Secretary at Ann Arbor, in the University of Michigan, earlier that 
1 year. This analysis of Mr ~ McNamara' s was the pristine version of 
Atlanticist strategy. It is worth recalling its central features: (1) the 
construction of an invulnerable second-strike capacity ~ (2) the implementation 
of "graduated deterrence" in which "controlled escalation" would limit 
the chances of an outright nuclear exchange, (3) the concept of "centralised 
control" in which the notion of the flexible response was geared to a 
process of rational decision-making largely in the hands of the USA within 
the context of alliance policy, and (4) a counterforce strategy directed 
2 towards disarming the enemy and sparing his cities as a hostage to fortune. 
The thesis was a sophisticated concept of a self-denying ordinance in which 
great restraint would be the order of the day . on~disturbing corollary, 
... 
from the British point of view, was that the idea of a "centralised control" 
3 
meant, in effect, an end to "secondary deterrent systems. Labour frankly 
welcomed this part of the McNamara t;hesis and under a Lal:;our Government the 
-deterrent would be phased out in line with the party's declared policy. That 
is the British deterrent would be committed irrevocably to NATO. But this . 
is to anticipat'y 
_______ ~: .. l 
British defence POliCY,[in so far as it had to cope with competing 
commitments, in Europe .and beyond Europe, relied very heavily on a 
strategic capacity that was supplied by the Strategic Nuclear Force and 
the Strategic Reserve. This accordingly meant an overt reliance on 
sophisticated weapons-systems which were because of their inherent 
complexity largely dependent on American technological expertise. 
Nuclear deterrence came to rest increasingly on a credible means of 
delivery, which SkyboZt might have made possible. Beyond Europe, in 
1 See general discussion of doctrine in Tarr, David. American Strategy 
!n the Nuclear Age (Macmillan, London, 1964). 
2 See Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass. ,1960) for a discussion of overt communication 
3 with an adversary as part of a deterrence posture. 
Hartley, An thony. "The British Bomb", Encounter I London, August 1964. 
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situations East of Suez, a British capability required. a high 
performance tactical strike reconnaisance aircraft, such as the projected 
TSR-2. The demise of both these projects therefore made an enormous 
impact on British defence policy. 1 
The crisis over the SkyboZt project was an important episode in the 
history of Anglo-American relations. Yet it, too, was further evidence 
of the Atlanticist solution to security. A brief description of the 
crisis is necessary. For the cancellation of SkyboZt raised an acute 
problem for the Macmillan Government; namely, how to keep Britain in 
the nuclear business. One obvious solution would have been to find an 
alternative weapons-systems. And one did exist. On the other hand, 
perhaps, the US Administration might be persuaded, it was thought, to 
develop SkyboLt with a heavier British share of the research and 
development programme. This suggestion was eventually made. In the 
end President Kennedy offered PoLaris, the nuclear Mi~ l ,on 
acceptable terms, but not before a crisis in relations between the two 
2 
respective governments. 
What the Nassau Agreement provided was a weapons system actually 
superior to that originally sought by Britain. It made explicit the 
Atlanticist option and this the communiqU! confirmed as spelt out in 
articles 6, 7 and 8. Article 6 sought to place the British PoLaris 
echelon under a multi-national force (MNF). Article 7 carried a 
commitment to place (later) the British force in a multilateral force 
(MLF). And Article 8 envisaged a commitment to either force. Now it 
is perfectly clear that, although in a situation of extreme national peril 
1 See detailed study of TSR-2 cancellation decision in Williams, Geoffrey, 
et. al., _Crisis Procurement; a case study of the TSR-2, RUSI, London, 1969. 
2 Williams, Geoffrey and Alan, Crisis in European Defence, op. cit., 
pp. 54-55. 
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(the escape clause) the British had the right to withdraw the force 
from eithercommitment (that is, either to the MNF or the MLF, as the 
case may be), the Nassau Agreement was an expression of Atlanticist 
policy. 
Indeed, President de Gaulle was widely understood to have vetoed 
the British application to join the EEC, in the winter of 1963, largely 
because of the above agreement (although there may have been other 
important reasons as well). But the agreement itself was largely 
advantageous to Britain. The cost of the PoZaris centre-sections, to 
be emplaced in five British-built submarines, was E350m which, spread 
1 
over five years, worked out at E70m a year. This was a very modest 
investment for the most durable and sophisticated of second~strike 
retaliatory systems then available. The cost to Britain of the 
SkyboZt project had been expected, on the other hand, to be in the region 
of £500m and since, in any event, that weapon would have had to be replaced 
later by the PoZaris system, or something like it, the total cost of 
both systems would have been close to £l,OOOm. The Nassau Agreement 
was a triumph for Mr. Macmillan and a striking indication of the American 
regard to the importance of the Anglo-American alliance. The concept of 
interdependence had been dramatically endorsed. Labour took a different 
view. The Nassau agreement was to be re-negotiated if Labour came to 
power. 
Early in 1957 the decision was taken to procure a low-flying tactical 
and reconaissance strike-bomber which was to replace the Canberra. .This 
decision marked the beginning of a long-drawn out controversy about the 
shape and size of the RAF in the years that lay ahead. 
Mr. Duncan Sandys, the then Minister of Defence, had declared that there 
was to be no replacement for the Lightning (an interceptor aircraft) and 
. 1 Beaton, Leonard. A Nuclear Policy for Britain, The Manchester 
Guardian Weekly, Manchester, February 14 and 15, 1963. 
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had ruled out a successor to the "V" bombers. In accordance with this 
decision, in March 1957, Mr . . Aubrey Jones, the Minister of Supply, issued 
"General Operational Requirement 339". Several companies were approached 
1 for their views on the design of an aircraft to replace the Canbe~. 
This move, however, was complicated by a row between the RAF and the 
Royal Navy. They both required a low-flying strike aircraft. Could 
they share the same plane? The RAF perceived the need quickly to find 
a sophisticated strike aircraft if they were to remain a formidable 
force. And the Royal Navy was equally determined to possess the best 
strike aircraft that the British aircraft industry could provide. 
Mr. Sandys decided though that one aircraft could not fulfil both 
service roles. The decision was critical. For it limited the number 
of planes over which the TSR-2 I s development co~ts could be spreau. 
The number of aircraft eventually ordered was modest; namely, a 
"development batch" of nine "pre-production aircraft" amounting to 
production of a super-prototype. But the real difficulty lay in selling 
the aircraft which, at this stage, only Australia was likely to require 
for a price within E3m each. Cost escalation turned into the most 
important factor. The Chiefs of Staff divided over the project. Inter-
service rivalry became rampant with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Mountbatten, 
a convinced opponent of the aircraft, and Air Marshal Sir Thomas Pike, 
the fighter expert, its combative RAF proponent, in open conflict over 
th ' 2 e proJect. 
1 
2 
The RAF seemed to be fighting for its life and, although it was 
See detailed history of the TSR-2 project in Hastings, Stephen. 
The Murder 0: the TSR-2 ,(MacDonald, London, 1966). Also see 
Williams, Geoffrey and Simpson, John op. cit. p. 18-23. 
op. cit., p. 27. 
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shortly to be th~ tu~n of the Fleet Air Arm, the Royal Navy watched 
the expected death-throes with equinimity. With no replacements in 
the offing for either the "V" bombers, or the prospect of a new 
generation of interceptors, the RAF was determined to get the TSR-2, 
or its equivalent, and replacements also for everything else they 
flew, meaning BeverZey transports and Hunter fighters as well as 
Canberra bombers. A powerful ally came to hand: Mr. Julian Amery. 
His appointment as Minister of Aviation in July, 1962, was the prelude 
to a heavy investment in air power. Just under a year later, the 
Government, at the behest of Mr. Amery, ordered a further eleven pre-
production models of the TSR-2, only four months before Australia 
opted with shattering effect for the US swing-wing F-lll. The decision 
of Sir Robert Menzies' Government, a vital blow at Commonwealth 
interdependence (not that there had been much consultation between 
London and Canberra), dashed the hopes of the TSR-2 proponents and, 
so it then appeared, all but put paid to an expanding and dynamic 
British aircraft industry.l 
Britain was out of the race. For she could hardly expect to compete 
on a cost-basis with the large number of F-llls (some 1,700 models) 
about to go into production. Australia, by not placing an order made 
it certain that only a hundred TSR-2s would be built which meant that 
the spread of production costs would rise steeply and thus price the 
aircraft out of world markets. Development costs were estimated at that 
stage to be around £2S0m and this figure had yet to take into .account 
production expenditure.2 
1 ibid. I pp. 28-30. 
2 
See Chapter VII for analysis of cost of this project and of 
cancellation charges. 
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Despite the cost-escalation factor, the Douglas-Home Government 
pressed ahead. Between February and March, 1964, it placed orders 
for the P-ll54 vertical take-off aircraft and the Hawker Siddeley 681 
short take-off transport. In addition to this ESOOm order, the British 
Aircraft Corporation was authorized to spend what was needed to get 
d . 1 the TSR-2 into pro uction. Thirty models were ordered and, with 
consummate timing, on September 27, 1964, only four weeks before the 
Conservative Governments's election defeat, the aircraft climbed 
majestically into the sky. Labour was shortly to face some difficulty 
procurement decisions. The TSR-2 cancellation decision was quick 
to follow. 
Some Conclusions: Britain's Military Capability 
Taking the period under review, with major poli tico-mili tary 
crises occurring at the rate of one a year over the entire period, 
the number of occasions in which Britain was involved in military 
incidents was relatively few. Certainly, British experience confirmed 
the length, and costliness, of counter-insurgency operations, on the 
one hand, and the relative shortness of intervention operations, on 
the other. Although this was not surprising, Britain's effort contrasted 
dramatically wi th the scale of France's effort and that of the USA. 
France used 263,000 men in Indo-China and 400,000 in Algeria. From 
1961 down to 1966 and beyond the Americans had a deployed maximum of 
464,000 in South Vietnam. By constrast the Bri-tish, in admittedly more 
favourable circumstances, deployed 44,000 soldiers and airmen in Cyprus 
and 51,000 in Malaya. 
A brief historical account of overseas operations would be 
incomplete, however, without reference to the two means whereby such 
1 
Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 688, February 5, 1964, cc. 148-9. 
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operations were to be launch~d. The first method to be devised in 
the mid-l950s was the air-lifted Strategic Reserve. The second was 
the build-up of the Naval Task Force with its organic ground combat 
units, supporting transport and a limited logistic re-supply 
capability. This maritime capability appealed to Labour in Opposition 
and constituted, as we shall see, the core of Labour's defence policy as 
formulated between 1960 and 1964 (see Chapter IV). 
Air-lift capability before 1956 was very limited. It amounted to 
only fifteen C-123 transports. Any increase was hampered by competition 
for resources between Bomber Command and Transport Command. But the 
aircraft that entered the service after 1956, namely the BeverZey 
freigh ter, Bris to Z Bri tarrnia and Comet 2, were all Hmi ted in regard 
to equipment and operational requirements. ' Neither the Britannia nor 
the Comet could operate from unimproved tactical airstrips for air-
drops of troops and equipment. And the three-fold expansion in air-
lift capacity between 1955 and 1960 was found to be "counter-productive" 
because of the so-called" air-Barrier" which, especially in the Middle 
East and South Asia, threatened the viability of speedy interventions. 
Fortunately, this handicap never did become critical and, of course, 
before 1956 it was of no particular significance.l In any event, stock-
piling at strategic points was the only real answer. For example, the 
flight to Aden, should a quick replacement be necessary, involved an 
indirect route. Flights to the entrance of the Red Sea involved going 
via Malta and Libya (El Adem). This posed the whole problem of over-
flying and landing rights. 
Singapore also became a stockpile, the importance of which was 
diminished, though never removed, by the better air-lift capability 
1 Synder, W., 00. cit. 
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achieved by 1962-63. This was the result of the coming into service 
of the long-range turbo-jet Britannia and the Argosy transport aircraft, 
both being a type of aircraft designed to carry bulky· equipment or 
paratroopers. Additionally, the ten BeZfasts were .. in service by 1965; 
1 
and in 1967 they were replaced by the C-130. It was realised that a 
more rapid response would compensate for smaller forces and fewer 
bases. The strategic air-lift mission was then given top priority. 
The Naval Task Force comprised the commando ship, the carrier and 
supporting logistic vessels, which amounted to a self-sufficient 
force strong enough to deal with "brush-fire" type incidents. The commando 
ship was developed by the Royal Navy after the 1956 Suez affair. For 
during the Suez operation, HMS Ocean and HMS Theseus were used to transport 
marines even though they were aircraft carriers. The use of helicopters 
at Suez was illustrative of the helicopter-borne landings which the 
Americans made much use of in Vietnam. Experience of Suez as a limited 
war, and the increasing number of intervention operations, heightened 
interest in the carrier (which was declared to be the capital ship, the 
"core of the modern navy", according to the White Paper of 1955) and 
confirmed the belief in the growing importance in an air and sea 
capability. Increased "afloat support" was the essential pre-requisite 
of limited operations. The way the commando ship meshed with the carrier 
group and afloat support ensured greater mobility for the task force. 
And this amphibious task group became, despite the cut in the 1957-58 
Royal Navy estimates, an established part of the operational fleet and 
was first to be in operation in the summer of 1958 in Jordan and, later, 
in Kuwait in mid-1961.2 
1 
Nat~al Alliance for the West, op. cit., p.30. 
2 ib ' d ), . 
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But~ the air-lifted Strategic .Reserve and commando ships were 
not in the event to replace the army as principal component of 
military capability. For the built-in limitations on the size of forces 
that could be deployed by these means made it impossible for them to be 
a substitute for the permanent base which is necessary to maintain 
control of a given geographical area. Britain nevertheless had the 
ability ~emplOY small combined farces in the arc from 
Aden to Hong Kong. 
The question of the need for tactical air support beyond the radius 
of RAF aircraft operating from land bases meant that the decision to 
build a new aircraft carrier, announced in July, 1963, was a recognitian 
of the fact that limited wars, or intervention operations, required 
carrier-based aircraft. This requirement remained an important and 
valid part of British power outside Europe for over a dEcade. And Labour's 
decision in 1966 (to be examined later) to phase-out the carrier was 
an early indication of the intention to reassess the nature of Britain's 
1 
commitments East of Suez. 
While tactical reaction was greatly facilitated by the use of 
helicopters and transport aircraft, strategic reaction had been greatly 
enhanced by the build-up of air-borne and amphibious forces. PoH tico-
strategic factors had required Britain in the post-war period to have 
forces deployed in the Indo-Pacific theatre. The composition of her 
tri-service effurt had been influenced accordingly. 
The Royal Navy had been acquiring smaller but more complex ships. 
1 
,Statement on Defence Estimates, 1966. (H.M. Stationery Office, 
London, February, 1966, Cmnd. 2901, Part I. 
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The British Army's balance between fighting arms had remained singularly 
constant. And the RAF, although uncertain about its future, following 
the cancellation of the TSR-2, the cancellation of the F-lll order and 
the cancellation of the AFVGA project, had revealed up to 1966 and later 
a marked increase in the proportion of transport aircraft, with a 
corresponding decrease in fighters. The diminished importance of the 
manned defensive fighter, and the expected growth in importance of the 
rocket at the expense of all tactical air power, were also trends 
discernible in procurement policy. 
Superimposed on the tri-service composition came the major 
strategic change of responsibility for the nuclear deterrent force. 
From being an exclusive RAF role it became an exclusive Royal Navy 
responsibility. It might be suspected though that tactical nuclear 
weapons ear-marked for RAF use could be discovered to have a 
prospective strategic role. All the same, the deployment and composition 
of British forces reflected the strategic and tactical roles required 
of them. The greater involvement in the Far East had of course meant 
participation in operations very much at the lower end of the spectrum 
of violence. In order to test what has been most used at the "sharp 
end" of warfare, a general evaluation of each of the 22 major operations 
would produce the following conclusion: All the operations were land 
campaigns with naval and air support; and no major challenge was made 
upon the sea or in the air to Britain's exercise of power during the 
seventeen years. 
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The army made great use of infantry, lesser use of artillery and 
armour. As regards the navy, it is at times difficult to distinguish 
between, on the one hand, deployments designed to maintain a naval presence 
and, on the other, those connected specifically with actual operations. 
But it appears that every type of ship was used and put to uses for 
which they were not primarily designed. The built-in flexibility 
of the Royal Navy enabled them to rise to the occasion although the use 
of all available operational units, and often for long periods, created 
some strain. l In examining the navy's role, three tasks can be 
distinguished: (1) amphibious operations, (2) off-shore work and (3) in-
shore patrol work. With off-shore patrols accounting for the lion's 
share of the work, and in-shore patrols also playing an important part, 
2 the Royal Navy found plenty to do. 
The RAF was not required to establish air superiority. It played 
a deterrent role in a wider range of operations. But as in the navy, 
every type of aircraft has been used and, of course, in tasks for which 
they were not procured to perform. With the increasing use of transport 
aircraft, particularly helicopters (especially after 1963), the tactical 
reaction was improved enormously. In the 1950s, for example, fixed-wing 
transport planes constituted the second largest service function: in 
fact, second only to fighter aircraft whose dominance was rivalled after 
1963 by that of the helicopter and fighter function. The bomber and 
maritime functions declined after 1960, although between 1951 and 
1954, and especially at the time of the Suez operation, the bomber 
1 Statement cn Defence Estimates, 1966. OPe cit., Part I. 
2 
Natural Alliance for ·the ~qest, OPe cit., p.32. 
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function, with that of the maritime role, was a considerable one. 
The helicopter and fighter function increased at the expense of the 
1 
bomber and maritime function. 
What can be said about what had been used most? The most used 
component of British military power has been the infantry. No 
conflict had ever necessitated a fight to establish naval or air 
superiority. This is partly a reflection of the primitive nature 
of the opposition. But much more strikingly, it is a tribute to the 
success Britain had in deterring a threat to her interests by using, 
or threatening to use, violence in all three spheres. The challenge 
had come on land, and in this environment the challenge had been met. 
It was perhaps paradoxical that Britain's traditional overseas policy 
should be upheld in the nuclear-missile age by the least sophisticated 
component of military power: the infantry. The soldier on the ground, 
however, depended upon the navy and air force for his 
sustenance and protection. The East of Suez role had 
in military terms but the era of overstretch was about to dawn. Labour 
was to grapple with the problem of overstretch once it came to power 
with its own version of Britain's imperial role. That controversy both 
in OppOSition and in office proved dangerously divisive for Labour. 
Yet the ideology of Labourism was perfectly consistent with the idea 
of the maintenance of Britain as a great power. 
1 
See Annex C, D and E relating to U.K. Emergency Operations 1950-19661 
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C H A PT · E RIll 
THE LABOUR PARTY AND BRITAIN'S GLOBAL ROLE: 1951-1964 
A general and periodic criticism of Britain's foreign and defence 
policy is that re-appraisal and re-definition of policy have occurred 
largely as reactions to fortuitous developments in the international 
environment. A response has usually come in relation to short term crises. 
This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Britain's East of Suez policy. 
However, within the domestic environment such shifts in policy can be 
resisted by those groups which adopt an a priori approach to external 
policy as revealed by Labour's Left Wing, which conSistently perceived 
the East of Suez role in more overt ideological terms. The East of Suez 
role was, however, part of the foreign policy orthodoxy which the Left 
found periodically unacceptable. However, the Labour Government of 1945-51 
had in no way violated continuity in foreign policy. Mr. Attlee's government 
pursued a traditional and well-established foreign policy. It was exactly 
this continuity, this foreign policy consensus, that the 'utopian' and 
1 
'scientific socialist' Left wanted to break. In its view a socialist 
foreign policy would be fundamentally different from the one pursued by the 
Labour Cabinet. 
Labour's Left Wing, divided between the 'utopians' and the 'scientific 
socialists', however, were split over their attitude to the Commonwealth. 
The Left were more ideologically motivated than the majority of the Party 
both inside and outside the parliamentary party. The Left disliked the 
1 
Ernest Bevin reiterated the continuity of British . foreign policy when 
he argued with the Conservative Opposition's spokesman that, in the 
coalition Government during the war, he had never differed on any 
important issue of foreign policy. Vol. 413. H. of C. 20th August, 
1945. Col. 312. _ 
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unequal and exploitative nature of the Commonwealth epitomised by the 
concept of a 'mother country'. According to this section of the Left, 
the Commonwealth was not socialist, and could never be so until Britain 
itself was socialist. They regarded themselves as internationalists, 
and therefore exponents of true socialism. 
The Social Democrats and the Labourites, whom we can identify 
as in the mainstream of the Labour Party, on the other hand, saw the 
existing Commonwealth as something wholly admirable and viable. This 
attitude was strengthened with the manifest failure of Western Europe to 
embrace socialism and with Europe becoming divided both territorially 
and politically in the cold war. The Commonwealth was perceived as 
that potential ~ird force' which would make unnecessary a choice between 
unreformed capitalism and totalitarian communism. It was hoped that a 
strong and viable Commonwealth would help prevent" the splitting of 
the world into two blocs" and would thus make" ••• the One World of U.N.O. 
1 
a reality". The Bandung Conference of 1955 even gave a certain 
respectability to this view by strengthening its own part in the 
transformation of the Commonwealth of the old dominions into the New or 
Afro-Asian Commonwealth under Mr. Attlee's post-war administration. And 
yet the Commonwealth, so admired by the 'utopian' and 'scientific socialist' 
Left never existed as a viable political force in international politics. 
The Commonwealth remained a loose assembly of nations. 
Despite the markedly different ideological stance between the Left 
and the Right and centre, there existed no major disagreement over the 
ultimate futility of an East of Suez presence. The Labour Party as a whole 
1 Keep Left. 1947. p.42. 
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foresaw an end to it, claiming that the end of colonialism should mean 
the end of military involvement. Clearly, the arguments which related 
to India, Burma and Ceylon were also relevant elsewhere; that the 
countries in the area would never achieve genuine independence while 
Britain retained a military presence and that Britain by supporting 
unrepresentative fuedal elites simply imposed neo-colonialism on notionally 
independent states. 
It was the social democratic Left, together with the solid right 
of the parliamentary party, though, rather than the Marxist intellectuals, 
which tended to gain support from within the extra-parliamentary party. 
It achieved this by maintaining a distinction between Soviet expansionism 
which it would oppose and indigenous communism which it insisted on 
" .•• had much better come to terms with".l This opposition to Soviet 
imperialism, combined with a determination that f.vdalism and corrupt 
foreign capitalist or neo-capitalist regimes should not be sustained, 
aroused some sympathy within a Party which itself had struggled to change 
the status quo. There remained, however, substantial areas of disagreement 
between the Marxist and social-democratic Left over foreign and colonial 
policies. 
These areas of ideological disagreement had grown as a result of 
the erosion of many of the traditional socialist principles and beliefs. 
So-called I revisionism I had carried the day with the triumph of the 
values of social democracy. The principle of collective security had 
been undermined by the feeble opposition of the League of Nations to 
Hitler and Mussolini due to lack of support from the Anglo-French 
1 Crossman, R.H.S. Socialist Foreign Policy 1951, p.lS. 
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governments for tough league action. In addition, the belief that 
working class loyalties would transcend national boundaries had been 
undermined by the unhesitating support given to nation-states in 
both world wars. And finally the belief that capitalism as such 
explained the cause of international conflict had been invalidated 
by the subsequent belligerance and expansionism of 'socialist' Russia. 
The erosion of these principles, ,however, progressed at different levels 
within the Party and led to conflicting attitudes towards the cold war. 
Whilst the Right of the Party both inside farliament and the 
€abinet expounded the value of self defence and underlined the menace 
of the Soviet Union, the Left both inside and outside parliament 
continued to champion collective security and to sympathise more with 
the Soviet Union than with the United States. It also retained its 
faith in traditional socialist principles, the primary factors being 
economic determinism and the related notion of imperialism. This 
analysis revealed that tI ••• all the policies of a nation are directly 
determined by its economic system" and it consequently pinpointed the 
U.S. as the main enemy to socialism. According to the Socialist Union, 
a body of moderate socialist opinion, the Leftist belief in economic 
determinism had led it to " ••• the rigid view that there are clear cut 
economic systems obeying immutable laws. Compared with these,all that 
might spring from the different political, social and cultural institutions 
of a country is of small moment. It matters not if America has free 
institutions; the fact that she is capitalist has been enough to damn her; 
and the contrary in the case of Russia'!. 1 
The conflicting interpretation of the politico-strategic intentions 
1 
Foreword by Noel-Baker, P. Socialism and Foreign Policy. 1953, p.3l. 
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of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., made for very different analyses of the 
cold war, and Britain's role East of Suez was increasingly related to 
this wider analysis. It was said, by the marxist or far-left that 
Britain's world role would increase her reliance on the United States 
by making her economically dependent or even a mere client of that 
country. It complained that the U.8. army was, in 1947, half the 
size of the British one in proportion to population,land that the 
inevitable consequence of pursuing a Conservative type foreign policy 
was that Britain would become " a pensioner of America, earning its 
living by 2 fighting America's wars overseas". Britain could become an 
auxilliary of the United States. 
The Left emphasized the dangers inherent in such a policy. "If 
America supported by the Labour Government, organises 'collective 
security' against Russia and uses dollar loans to prop up anti-Communist 
regimes around her frontiers, the Communist leaders can draw only one 
conclusion. They will assume the worst and stand stubbornly on the 
defensive until their scientists have made sufficient atomic bombs to 
3 
redress the balance of military power". If the Labour Government allowed 
this strategic error to occur, so the critics maintained, an unbridgeable 
dichotomy would develop between East and West, and any chance of a 
diplomatic understanding with the U.S.S.R. would be unredeemably losr. 
Aneurin Bevan in fact resigned from the Shadow Cabinet on the 15th April, 
1954 ov Labour's support for U.S. policy -in South East Asia, and Harold 
Wilson, later to lead the Party, was in total agreement with his colleague's 




A further statistic used by the Left was that Britain had one million more 
troops in May 1947 than in pre-war days, "In effect Britain at the moment 
has these large forces in order to keep up appearance, she is maintaining 
something which is beyond her means and every other power knows it." 
Keep Left, 1947, p.30. 
~ee~ Left, 1947, p.33. 
Keep Left« 1947, pp. 33-4. 
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Both the utopian and Marxist Left, moreover, found the support of 
non-democratic regimes by the West, simply because they were anti-communist, 
ideologically and morally repugnant. Harold Wilson, a tactical member 
'\'~\~ ; S\a~ ,~ t-
of the Left, but in reality a reconstructed re:i4!:~l(elli'ee, in an impassioned 
speech, articulated the Left's reservations about the existing policy. 
"We must not join with, nor in any way encourage the anti-Communist 
crusade in Asia, whether it is under the leadership of the Americans 
or anyone else. We must remember that the road to peace in Asia is the 
1 
way of Nehru, not the way of Dulles". This posture became known as the 
'New Statesman, London, New Delhi' axis. 
The Left thus believed that 'Britain's East of Suez role revealed 
a much wider and more dangerous tendency than Britain's wish to remain a 
residual imperial power; namely it involved becoming a subordinate partner 
to the united States in an attempt to build up anti-Communist regimes 
around Russia's frontiers. Such a policy, it was said, would reduce 
the scope for a third force mediatory role between the superpowers by 
relating all international conflict to the cold war. The result would 
be that" ••• every small people has to choose between the bleak alternative 
of anti-Communism and Communism. We shall sharpen the conflict instead 
f h li . ,,2 o ea ng ~t ••• Accordingly the Left virtuously insisted that "The 
task of British Socialism must be, wherever possible, to save the smaller 
nations from this futile ideological warfare and to heal the breach between 
3 the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. This could not though be achieved if Britain 
were herself committed to an elaborate global anti-Communist alliance 
system. This was the overwhelming objection to East of Suez role. 
1 Foot, P. The Politics of Harold Wilson, 1968. p.203. 
, 2 
Keen Left, 1947, p.34. 
3 Keep Left, 1947, p.35. 
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It was even supposed that a third World War could be prevented if 
Britain broke with America. 
The Left, anyway, argued that communism could not be confronted 
or defeated by military means. It saw the Soviet threat as " ••• in 
th f ' tit "1 d ' d 1 . 1 ,,1 e ~rs ns ance econom~c, soc~a an ~ eo og~ca •• • and argued 
that "The most valuable allies of the Soviet are those elements in society 
which fight against social reforms.,,2 According to the Left, it was the 
general lack of grasp concerning social and economic factors that 
accounted for Soviet successes. It complained t.'lat while "The underfed 
masses yearn for material aid; we send them guns". Aneuran Bevan put 
the classic view most emphatically. "The answer to social upheaval is 
social amelioration, not bombing planes and guns; yet we are making the 
latter on such a scale that we have no resources left for the provision 
of industrial equipment which the underdeveloped areas of the world must 
have, if they are not to go on bubbling and exploding for the rest of the 
century".3 
The foreign policy advocated by the Left then called for the 
rejection of the belief that British security depended on the 
military power of the United States, and urged an acceptance of the 
" ••• accomplished fact that the defence of the Middle East, as well as 
of India, Burma and Malaya, is no longer a responsibility of the British 
4 people". It was argued further that" ••• a break with old fashioned 
imperial tradition ••• " was necessary " if we are to bring our foreign 
commitments into a true relationship with our economic strength and with 
1 Bevan, A. In Placlil of Fear f 1952. p.l23. 
2 Bevan, A. °E' cit. , p.124. 
3 Bevan, A. °E· eit., p.137-138. 
4 Keep Left, 1947. p.45. 
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our Socialist principles" . l The Left, of course, over-simplified the 
East of Suez issue, but their analysis and prescription positively 
reflected basic values and was not therefore an attitude likely to 
change in the light of international environment. Ideological 
commitment to the Left preceded and .superceded political realities 
as understood by the Social Democratic Left of the Labour Party. 
It was to be expected that the classic case for social and economic 
priorities over military ones, based as it was on traditional Socialist 
principles, would gain considerable support and significance from within 
a Party which, when reverting to opposition had always reinforced and 
emphasised the role of ideals and downgraded the influence of environment 
upon declaratory policy. 
The official Party line was however still very different from the . 
one advocated by the Left. The Labour leadership's assessment that 
the turmoil in South East Asia was due to local nationalist forces 
seeking to overthrow European rule and to an 'economic revolution' born 
out of the Asians' newly found realisation of their wretched poverty was 
a conclusion which the Left had no reason to controvert. 
However, the Labour leadership argued that a British presence 
East of Suez could not be regarded as a residual method of discharging 
post-colonial responsibilities, because the Soviety 'threat' in the area 
had increased. It was this presumed threat which tended to confuse 
the distinction, for the Labour leadership, between non-belligerent 
reactionary and non-belligerent progressive regimes. If a friendly state 
were being undermined by Soviet action, overt or covert in character, 
1 ib; ~ -~ 
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then Labour tended to resist it regardless of whether it held much 
ideological sympathy for the regime being threatened. Whilst the Labour 
leadership declared its support for working with liberal and progressive 
governments, it argued that it was sometimes compelled to accept '! ••• dubious 
1 
alliances with reactionary fcrces", when Britain's security was 
threatened. The ambiguity in the situation, though, was never really 
resolved and led to great dissension within the Party. The eternal 
conflict between those who wished things to change and those who 
recognised unchanging realities. 
In the Middle East too the Party leadership insisted that a 
precipitate withdrawal was unrealistic. It held the view that "Since 
none of the Middle Eastern countries possess armed forces capable of 
protecting themselves, their security against Soviet attack can only be 
2 
assured by outside powers". This did not amount to the belief by 
the leadership that Britain should retain her presence in the Middle 
East at all costs or irrespective of other considerations. In fact it 
argued that "If she (Britain) tries to maintain her position there 
without the consent of the local peoples the cost of doing so will soon 
become prohibitive. In any case it is doubtful whether the forces Britain 
can afford for Middle East defence, would be adequate should war come 
3 to that area." 
Nevertheless, in the main, it was clear that whereas post-colonial 
considerations dictated to Labour a policy of a phased and relatively 
rapid withdrawal, Eold War consideration, it was said, made such a 
withdrawal impossible. 
1 Foreword by Noel-Baker, P. Op. cit. , p.22. 
2 Problems of Foreign POlicy , 1952, p.l3. 




The cold war in fact had the effect of dramatising the evident 
di visions within the Party. During periods of world tension both 
wings were likely to fallout with considerable venom. The Right of 
the Party, including the Shadow Cabinet, favouring the creation of a 
universal balance of power, the Left, including the vocal elements in 
parliament and in the Party, believing that the only way to prevent a 
confrontation between the superpowers was to build up a block of neutral 
powers. While these different approaches were not clear-cut when the 
international situation was quiescent, an international crisis invariably 
inspired considerable lobbying on the Right in an effort to attract 
support for the West, and on the Left to mobilise those moral forces 
that supported a third force or neutralist line. These approaches 
were plainly irreconcilable and consequently clashes over Britain's East 
of Suez role were most acute at times of greatest international tension. 
One reason for the abrasive nature of the conflict between Left 
and Right in the foreign policy field in general, was that there prevailed 
within the extra-parliamentary wing of the Party, the conviction that 
socialist principles were more operationally relevant within the domestic 
context than was the case in relation to the external environment where 
they would inevitably have to be diluted in order to accommodate the 
interests of other nations. This domestic introspection was justified by 
~gthat a socialist Britain could serve as a model for the rest of the 
world. As the socialist union in its publication entitled Socialism 
and Foreign Policy, argued, there existed within the Labour Party no 
real agreement about the relevance of socialist principles in foreign 
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affairs, and concluded that "The struggle for socialism has become 
increasingly to mean the struggle for socialism at home; in foreign 
affairs the problem has been to survive. ,,1 The Left was horrified 
by the logic of this. 
Neither would the left condone the use of military power in 
support of Labour's foreign policy conducted in a hostile environment. 
This became not only a major bone of contention between the wings of 
the Party, but it also carried overt and far-reaching implications for 
the East of Suez policy. 
Labour's acti vis t Left unswervingly adhered to the belief that 
" military alliances and armaments were •••• the sinister pre-occupation 
2 
of Capitalist Governments" , but experience of coalition government 
between 1940-45 had indicated that if Labour gained power, or even if 
it were to behave as a responsible opposition, it could " ••• less and 
less dismiss the realities of foreign policy as the concern of Capitalists 
3 alone". As a result "Armaments, military alliances and power strategy 
could no longer be rejected out of hand. The weapons condemned by earlier 
socialists were now - short of a new world order - perforce part of the 
4 Socialist armoury as well". This realistic attitude and conversion to 
'capitalist' ways were never accepted by the ultra-Left in both the 
extra-parliamentary and parliamentary wings of the Labour movement. 
Labour in opposition could be expected to become less concerned with 
cold war power politics and more concerned with socialist principles, but 
this change of emphasis was only partially realised. The Korean War, however, 
1 Foreword by Noel-Baker, P. OQs ci t., p.ll. 
2 Foreword by Noel-Baker, P. DE· ci t., p.l3. 
3 Foreword by Noel-Baker, P. Q,I;2. ~it. , p.1S. 
4 ibid. 
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was seen by the Labour Leadership not only as evidence of aggression by 
a small communis t state, but also as a sharp reminder of the willingness 
of two great communist powers to support aggression by proxy. Moreover, 
the challenge in Korea could be the prelude to a Soviet attack in Europe. 
There was thus a reaction against any half-hearted commitment~ this 
time collective security would have to be supported by the judicious use of 
armed force. 
The Korean War also underlined the 'problem of China', and the 
Labour leadership took the view that "If China does attack Indo-China 
with immediate retaliation by the U.N., the whole principle of Collective 
Security will be destroyed, causing fatal damage to the prestige of the 
U.N. Moreover, a Chinese victory in Indo-China would leave the road wide 
open for further aggression in areas of great concern to Britain, like 
Burma and Malaya, with India to follow somewhat later". 1 Although the 
view that the principle of collective security would be destroyed by a 
Chinese intervention might not be self-evident, this argument represented 
Labour's realisation that the traditional imperial commitment had become 
a strategic necessity in the new post-colonial situation. Of course, 
this time national self-interest coincided with the genuine national 
aspirations of the oppressed masses struggling for post-imperial independence. 
That is Britain could help newly independent states retain their sovereignty 
and independence by guaranteeing their national security. 
There are clearly two factors which affected the Labour Party's 
foreign policy in the early 1950s which ensured that these did not 
diverge all that much from that of their main political opponents. 
1 Problems of FOreign Policy. 1952, p.1S. 
2 zroblems of Foreign Policy, 1952, p.2. 
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Firstly, because the Conservatives' basic analysis of the cold war and 
of Soviet intentions were not noticeably different from those of the 
outgoing Labour Goverrunent, for Labour now to have taken a 'soft' view 
would have been to contradict its own decisions taken when in power. 
Secondly, in this period the threat to national security was perceived 
by both rival political elites to be such that it demanded national and 
bipartisan policies. During the early 1950s a bi-partisanship consensus 
on foreign policy thus existed without any formal agreement ever being 
overtly necessary. Both major party leadership elites shared the same 
basic values and beliefs . 
Labour leaders, then, saw foreign policy problems in much the 
same way as the Conservative Party. Ernest Bevin, in his day, had talked 
about 'power vacuums' and 'Russian expansionism' in a strikingly traditional 
Tory mar.ner; and now, in opposition, Labour continued to echo the Bevl.nite 
doctrine. It is true that the Party was still committed in principle to 
its paramount aim " ••• to replace the international anarchy by a world 
order and to build a system in which disputes between states would be 
settled by arbitration, under the rule of law and not by the clash of physical 
force"!' but it did not deny the stark reality of the cold war, even 
though it continued to articulate its basic and fundamental socialist 
ideals. The external environment, however, had to determine policy and 
not ideology. Indeed ideology counted for less than the objective 
situation that the country found itself in. 
Despite the Left's belief that the Labour leadership had abandoned 
socialist foreign policy prinCiples, the parliamentary Left Wing was not 
1 Problems of Foreign Policy,. 1952 2 
- - , p •• 
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very active over the East of Suez issue during the 1950s. This was due 
to concern about other international issues like German rearmament and the 
ongoing war in Korea. At the 1952 Party Conference, a grass roots 
resolution called on the Government n... to withdraw all British troops 
1 
and administrators from Malaya". A similar, though more general 
resolution was called at the 1954 Conference, demanding n ••• the immediate 
2 
withdrawal of all British troops from foreign occupation". 'nle following 
year a resolution was moved asking that, "This Conference, recognising that 
war is incompatible with socialism, declares its adherence to a policy 
3 
of pacifism in foreign affairs". And finally in 1956 Mr. G. Scott of 
the E. T. U. called for "the withdrawal of all armed forces from colonial 
territoriesl~4 Rejection of colonialism was combined with an emphatic 
denial of the utility of military force. 
These resolutions were clearly doomed to failure. The reason for the 
singular lack of support for the withdrawal of British forces from 
colonial areas related to the attitude of the centrist Trade union 
leadership towards the Commonwealth connection. They wished to strengthen 
commonwealth ties where possible, and not only at the inter-governmental 
level, but with the Labour movement as a whole. 
Moreover, fortuitously a large part of that faction of utopian 
socialists who were morally opposed to the use of force, and as such 
might be expected to oppose the East of Suez role, were also that element 
most attracted to the ideals underpinning the New Commonwealth. Th:s led 
to a marked degree of ambig~ity in the attitude of much of the Party; a 
1 
Mr 0 J. K. Stocks (Edinburgh West C.L.P.) Labour Party Conference 1952 p . \l~. 
2 Mr. J. R. pye (Harrow East C. L.P . ) Labour P·arty Conference 1954, p.129. 
resolution lost. 
3 
Mrs. B. K. Lowton (Epping C.L.P.) Labour Party Conference 1955, p.l80. 
resolution lost. 
4 
Mr. G. Scott (E.T.U.) Labour Party Conference 1956, p.163, resolution lost. 
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toleration of, rather than an enthusiasm for, the use of military power 
to sustain the Commonwealth was shared by the trade union movement, then 
under the influence of right-wing leaders, and was born more out of economic 
logic than political idealism. The trade union support for the East of 
Suez role was based on enlightened self-interest because of the belief 
that on balance the Commonwealth connection, not least because of the 
potential markets it offered, was essential to the balance of payments, 
full-employment and economic growth. However, this attachment to the 
Commonwealth was enormously strengthened by a suspicion of the trade 
union structure in Europe, and by a greatly exaggerated fear of cheap 
European labour. The trade unions in France were regarded by the moderate 
and orthodox British trade union leadership as ideologically aligned with 
the communists; and where they were not so aligned, as in the case of West 
Germany, they were regarded as acting in collusion with the employers, in 
a bid to discipline recalcitrant labour. British trade union leaders 
like Ernest Bevin and Arthur Deakin had considerable reservations about 
trade unionism on the continenti this somewhat spinsterish attitude 
towards their colleagues in Europe also reflected the insularity and 
conservative nature of the Labour movement towards issues in Europe which 
involved greater de facto collaboration with European trade unionists. 
The failure of the trade union movement to find in Europe a 
source of inspiration, or indeed a market area where economic growth 
of considerable magnitude could bring up the living standards of the 
British working class, reinforced the persistent idea that British 
living standards depended on Commonwealth trade and investment. , It was 
not until it was realised with incredulity that the French and certainly 
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the West German workers, were having a much better deal from their 
employers than their British counterparts; that superior welfare 
provisions and sickness benefits existed in those countries; and that 
wages and productivity were vastly better than in Britain with a much 
lower rate of inflation, that this anti-European attitude slowly 
diminished. However, it did not decrease significantly even when Britain 
took an official attitude towards the Treaty of Rome; (but that was, 
of course, over ten years later) and so in the 1950s the trade union 
leadership loyally supported the Commonwealth and the use of force in 
order to sustain it, if this proved necessary o Both Attlee and Gaitskell 
could rely upon the trade unions' block vote to sustain an orthodox 
policy East of Suez. 
The official party line, though, did not get support only for 
economic or trade advantage. The main body of the Party - and this 
included the trade unions who under Arthur Deakin's tough leadership 
became a strong influence on the Labour leadership - knew even if 
somewhat intuitively that two major socialist principles, democracy 
and self-government, were involved East of Suez and that they could 
only be realised if Britain retained a military presence in the area 
during the post-colonial era. While certain ultra-Left wingers, as 
we have seen, wanted the latter principle pursued at almost any cost, 
the majority of the Party perceived the antithetical nature of the two 
principles and therefore accepted that there was a need to retain a 
military presence in colonial countries if the democratic process was 
to flourish, if self-determination was to mean anything. Labour's 
leadership feared that without British military support newly independent 
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states would succomb to predatory neighbours. Also a fear of a 
communist takeover was often expressed as well as a possible military 
takeover by ultra-nationalists. 
Clearly the traditional socialist belief that 'nations would rather 
rule themselves badly than be ruled by outsiders' still persisted, but 
it was reluctantly recognised by a large majority in the Party that the 
politics of the colonial areas were rather more volatile and violent 
than this somewhat simplistic alternative postulated. The Labour leadership 
could agree that it was possible for a nation to gain formal independence 
" ••• while the individuals within it are deprived of the ordinary human 
rights - perhaps by a minority of 'another race within their midst, perhaps 
through a drastic deterioration of living standards, perhaps - if the country 
1 is weak - through being left defenceless before some new interloper". 
This fear found recurrent expressions at party conference. 
Those who wanted to withdraw from East of Suez were challen+ged in 
1952 by James Griffiths, Labour's former colonial secretary, representing 
the National Executive, in a typically aggressive speech. "Let me ask 
all those delegates"l he said, "who talk about leaving; if you leave, what 
do you leave behind? We could leave, and when we have left there is a 
vacuum •••• If we left Malaya tonight it would not mean independence 
2 
and democracy, but terrorist government." Four years later Griffiths 
returned to his theme on the subject of Malaya. "Suppose we withdraw 
the troops, what do you think would happen? Democratic feedom? Socialism? 
What we want?" He left the Conference in no doubt about the answers to 
those questions. "The country would be overrun by a minority". 3 They 
1 Foreword by Noel-Baker, P. °12· cit· c p.47. 
2 J. Griffiths (Nat. Executive) Labour Party Conference 1952, p.l4l. 
3 J. Griffiths (Nat. Executive) Labour Part;r Conference 1956, p.l69. 
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faced, of course, that fate anyway since majorities rarely determine 
the behaviour of political elites but his point was strongly 
put that majority rule was the basic aim of Labour's policy. 
The justification for the Malayan campaign was not then simply 
because it was in Britain's strategic interest, but because Britain 
was morally committed to create stable and viable independent nations 
out of the passing of the Empire. Moreover, the vast majority in the 
Labour Party at all levels considered that something rather special was 
being created . Dr. Hugh Dalton, a towering figure in the Labour 
leadership, spoke for this majority when he argued that " ••• Britain should 
put the Commonwealth before all other regional groupings, because this 
Commonwealth of ours has a number of unique and most valuable characteristics 
1 found in no other grouping, short of a world wide organisation." A 
strong ideological commitment under-pinned the Commonwealth connection in 
Labour's ranks; the leaders of the Party shared this commitment as well. 
These altruistic arguments were not propounded simply to gain 
support. The belief in an inherited debt, rather than self-interest, 
ran throughout the entire Party and reflected residual socialist 
values. Indeed throughout the intra-party debate on East of Suez it 
( 
was clear that some embarrassment existed over talk of Britain's national 
interest~ and most of the rhetoric by way of compensation centred rather 
uneasily on the interests of the incipient nation-states which Britain 
was self consciously creating in the name of self-determination. 
There can, however, be no doubt that the Parliamentary critics of the 
~ 
East of Suez role were concelrd about the 'national interest.' They firmly 
believed, for instance, that Britain could not afford the role, or at 
1 . 
H. Dalton (Nat. Executive) Labour Party Conference 1952, p.113. 
- 83 -
least should invest its diminishing resources more sensibly elsewhere. 
They could not however expect to get the same degree of influence over 
the Party in the 1950s as they had exerted in the 1930s. A socialist 
foreign policy based on pacifist opposition to armaments was, after the 
experience of appeasement, the collapse of collective security and the 
subsequent world war, now impossible. In Opposition, however, Labour 
could perhaps encourage a return to a more ideological foreign policy, 
but Bevin's ghost, and Labour's experience of office still cast a shadow -
his traditionalism was by now the Party orthodoxy. It was clear also 
that Bevin's policy was the preferred one because the Labour leadership 
took the view that the ideology of social democracy was now under as 
grave a threat from totalitarian communism as had ~een the case when 
Hitler threatened the peace of Europe. However, the development of 
weapons of mass destruction, the nuclear missile arms race between the 
superpowers, also reinforced the utopian and marxist Left's critique of 
Labour's foreign policy consensus. 
Therefore during the late 1950s there was a great upsurge in 
foreign and defence policy affairs within the Labour Party. This 
interest centred on the issue of nuclear war, but it carried far-
reaching implications for the East of Suez role also. 
It is not difficult to perceive why the fear of nuclear war 
increased in the late fifties. But fear of such a war forged an alliance. 
within the Labour Party which included pacifists, neutralists, trade 
unionists and 'fellow travellers'. The great strength of the anti-war 
movement was its eclectic character: it was all things to all men. To 
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the pacifist it was a tentative step towards a disarmed world and the 
heady ground of world grovernment, to the neutralist it was rejection 
once again of the cold war and a display of sentiment of neither 
attachment to the U.S.A. or U.S.S.R., to those who feared the growing 
anarchy of world politics this anti-nuclear lobby was a means of contracting 
out of entanglements and obligations, to those fellow-travellers in the 
Party whose sympathy lay with the U.S.S.R., it was the critical first 
step towards the dissolution of N.A.T.O., and of all military blocs,", 
and to the trade unionist it was an acknowledgement of the importance 
of domestic affairs. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, a vast 
umbrella organisation, was not only of relevance for Britain's defence 
policy. There were far-reaching foreign policy issues at stake in the 
debate. 
'h 
The Campaign was concelfd with the future nature and character 
of Britain's foreign policy, for it attempted to re-define where 
Britain's interests and allies lay. The utopian and socialist Left's 
enthusiasm for the C.N.D. lay in the hope that the Labour Party would 
pursue a neutralist policy. If this had happened in the mid-sixties 
and Britain had become more aloof from the cold war, then the logic 
of an East of Suez presence would have been fundamentally weakened, and 
the withdrawal from East of Suez greatly accelerated. 
Surprisingly, though, even in a rising climate of protest and 
dissent apparently so conducive to radicalism, the Labour Left never 
really launched a coherent or frontal attack on the world role. This 
was all the more perverse since all those on the left who supported the 
nuclear pacifism of the C.N.D. were likely also to support the anti-power 
logic of a 'socialist' foreign policy, and that included the abandonment 
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of the East of Suez role, together with rejection of the Anglo-American 
alliance, N.A.T.O. and the cold war. There was, though, an almost total 
obsession with nuclear strategy and consequently the Left's direct 
influence over the East of Suez issue was not as great as its position 
at the Labour Party Scarborough Conference appeared to infer. Yet one 
strand of the C.N.D. critique of Labour's policy was the argument 
advanced by Ted Hill of the Boiiermakers' Union that- the Commonwealth 
could institute the core of a third force in world politics led by a 
non-nuclear Britain. The Left in fact concentrated their efforts on 
the great domestic debate over socialist principles, and then became 
concerned with the nuclear controversy. In consequence the world role 
never became, for any length of time, a major controversy as between 
the wings of the Party because d~mestic politics together with 
concentration on the winning of political power through elections tended 
to defuse passionate interest in concerns affecting the external environment. 
Nevertheless, while the Left was decidedly reluctant to concentrate 
its energies on dismembering the East of Suez role, it was clear that if 
the Party leadership itself showed any tendency to question that role 
it could count on considerable leftish support. This was important, for 
by the mid-fifties there began within Labour's higher echelons, almost in 
a conspiracy of silence, a questioning which over the next few years was 
to lead to a full re-appraisal of the world role, but not before significant 
changes in the external environment forced upon Labour leaders a new 
perception of realities. 
This re-thinking involved some analysis of strategic, political and 
economic factors. The main strategic questions being posed were whether 
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Britain's presence East of Suez made her interests mare secure; whether 
military farce was in fact relevant to the problems facing that area; 
whether the threat to the status quo and local stability East of Suez 
had been correctly perceived and whether Britain had the capability to 
act East of Suez anyway. Moreover, there was a more crucial consideration 
arising in fact from the cost to Britain's balance of payments of a large 
presence East of Suez. However, the economic costs were difficult to 
calculate and could not yet prove decisive in determining policy. 
Politically there were increasing doubts about whether Britain 
gained diplomatic kudos through her presence East of Suez and whether 
that presence was consistent with socialist morality which rejected so-
called neo-colonialism. Did Britain's presence help to preserve her 
economic investments in the area (amounting to a considerable sum) and, 
if sa, did such inv~stments exceed the cost of their preservation? 
These questions related prinCipally to the Middle East which 
had traditionally been of enormous strategic significance for Britain. 
They had first been raised in the early 1950s when the Left as a whole 
had shown implacable opposition to the retention of a costly presence 
in Egypt, but they were more frequently posed after the abortive and 
tragic Suez operation in 1956. As a result of limited military operations 
in the area during 1957 and 1958, more general criticism of Britain's 
role in the Middle East were made. It was in fact a right-wing member 
of Labour's top echelons, the Right Hon. Kenneth Younger, who initiated 
the reassessment of that role. He argued that "Operations by Western 
Powers in Arabia are extremely invidious and have repercussions well 
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outside the local area •• o and I am not sure that it is justifiable, 
in these days, that purely British troops should be involved in this 
kind of operation". 1 His Cbubts were widely shared. 
It was not long before the Labour's right-wing joined forces on 
the issue in the shape of the most persistent and persuasive critic of 
Britain's role East of Suez, Christopher Mayhew. His analysis carried 
influence because it was not advanced in doctrinaire terms, indeed he 
stressed a non-ideological stance, and it appeared to be a dispassionate, 
objective review of a part of British foreign policy that had remained 
largely unchallenged over the previous decade. His analysis was not in 
terms of the specific'national interests'of Britain and of those nations 
whose independence Britain was supposed to be furthering. 
Mr. Mayhew used, in 1958, the same arguments that he was to 
develop to much greater effect a decade later, and he sought to include 
Asia as well as the Middle East in his critique. In July of that year 
he insisted that "Those people do a bad service to their friends who lead 
them up the garden path into thinking that in certain circumstances they 
will support them with troops when it is not practicable to do so. I am 
talking not only about the Middle East, but of Asia as well". 2 Mr. Mayhew 
also questioned whether it was wise for outside powers, however powerful, 
to have forces in the Middle East. "The influence of the Soviet Union has 
grown immense'1.y in the area" he argued "not because the Russians have 
landed troops anywhere, but, on the contrary, because they have not done so. " 
In more liberal-democratic fashion, with residual respect for the 
doctrine of the non-interference in the ·affairs of small states, Mr. Mayhew 
1 Younger, Vol. 577, of C. 8th K. H. November, 1957. Col. 555. 
2 Vol. 592, H. of C. 22nd July, 1958, Col. 313. 
3 Vol. 592, H. of C. 22nd July, 1958, Vol. 314. 
3 
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also referred to the potential immorality of the world role. "There 
are certain situations" he said "in which the sending in of troops 
is neither a moral obligation nor, in many cases, have we a moral right 
1 
to do so." This moral judgement was based on the traditional concern 
felt in the Labour Party, that British troops were being used in a 
reactionary role in trying to halt social progress. In the words of 
Aneurin Bevan "British troops ought not to be expected to risk their 
lives in order to maintain unpopular kings on their thrones".2 
Mr. Mayhew, then, attacked Britain's world role on three distinct 
but inter-related levels. In the first instance he contended that 
Britain's presence could be counter-productive to her local allies by 
inducing a complacent attitude towards their security, secondly he 
questioned the relationship between a permanent military presence and 
the securing of diplomatic influence; and thirdly, he doubted the morality 
of military action East of Suez, given the far from disinterested British 
concerns for her economic investments and the colour of the skin of her 
soldiers. 
However, despite Mr. Mayhew's forthright and wide-ranging critique, 
there existed a reluctance amongst Labour politicans to generalise about 
Britain's world role, and policy discussion centred mainly on particular 
operations in the Middle Easto However, it is still perhaps possible 
despite such pragmatism to trace a distinct Labour view even at this 
early stage of the debate, through the party's often passionate reaction 
to certain overseas crises where Britain, under a Conservative administration, 
had become involved. 
1 
Vol. 592 H. of C. 22nd July, 1958, Col. 313. 
2 
Vol. 594, H. of Co 30th October, 1958, Vol. 334. 
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The Labour Party, to put it no higher, showed a marked reluctance 
to condone the use of force in Suez, Jordan and other military operations 
prior to 1960 0 This reluctance was frequently expressed in frenetic 
language as Labour spokesmen vied with each other in a bid for greater 
moral virtue in condemning Tory policies. During the deployment of 
British troops in Jordan, HQgh Gaitskell however approached the issue 
dispassionately and argued that ••• "he would be a bold man who would 
1 
claim that the internal security of that country is any greater" 
because of the presence of British troops seeking to maintain stability. 
Not only did the Labour leader doubt that this intervention in Jordan 
had done any good, but more generally argued that " ••• in trying to back 
some Arab States against others all that we do is to turn all of them 
against us" 2 
Mrs. Castle, whose emotional feelings put her to the left of 
3 Labour's leadership, also opposed the British deployment into Jordan> 
and Mr. Mayhew was convinced that "When regimes like those in Jordon or 
the Lebanon •• :. cannot maintain themselves in their own countries, we 
4 
only make bad worse. by sending in our troops to ·prop them up". 
While ROY Jenkins, the spokesman for Eurocentric policies in the 
pa.rty doubted" ••• that there is any advantage in having client regimes 
5 in that part of the world", Phi lip Noel-Baker, the ardent advocate of 
controlled and phased disarmament, was of the opinion that intervention 
in the Middle Eastern affairs only reinforced the " ••• Arab belief that 
1 Vol. 594£ H. of C. 28th October£ 1958 l Col. 17. 
2 Vol. 594, 18th 1958 l H. of C. October l Col. 18. 
3 Vol. 592, H. of C. 22nd JU1l' 1958, Col. 294. 
4 Vol. 592, H. of C. 22nd Jul:r:, 1958 t Col. 313 . 
5 
vol. 594£ 30th October l H. of Cl 1958, Col. 405. 
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we are against their uni ty'~ and made them think that" ••• we are ready 
to use force to keep in power Governments which we favour, however 
1 
unpopular those Governments may be". A suspicion that Britain backed 
reactionary regimes for strategic reasons rather than for the defence of 
democratic ideals appeared well-founded when later on, in July, 1961, 
Labour politicians expressed similar reservations about the operation 
in Kuwait. 4 This operation again appeared to Labour a good example 
of Britain's penchant for upholding the position of reactionary regimes. 
While it is obvious that these reservations were no more than 
reactions to specific crises, a kind of crisis-management dialogue, 
when taken together they seemed to indicate a marked disenchantment, 
if not with the whole of Britain's world role, then certainly with a 
Significant part of it. This changing mood was neatly expressed by 
the mercurial George Brown, .the Party's spokesman on defence, who ruefully 
observed that: "It will obviously be true now that the old imperial 
commitment of which we talk so much ••• will undergo a ·change. I 
believe that the effect of Suez and of the Congo, the effect of what 
immediately happens is to make a great change in the extent of the old 
imperial commitments. The chances of doing anything are so very much 
reduced because other forces come into play. World opinion comes into 
play. Other powers come into play, and one would have far less opportunity, 
even if one wanted, to carry out this old commitment in the future than 
one has ever had in the past. The second consideration which must be in our 
minds is that unless we got there extraordinarily quickly, .whatever we 
wanted to do, other things would be there before us". 3 Although this passage 
1 
vol. 594, H. of C. 30th October! 1958, Col. 446. 
2 VoL 645, H. of C. 31st July, 1961, Cols. 1048-9. 
3 Vol. 627, H. of C. 20th July, 1960, Col. 510 . 
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of his speech was uncharacteristically obscure, the drift of Mr. Brown's 
argument was unmistakable. He saw the Suez and Congo operations, 
different in character though they were, as scenarios, even an admonishment 
that imperial powers could be confronted with new and abrasive environmental 
parameters which might seriously inhibit any military action contemplated 
in the future . 
Mr. Healey, something of an academic strategist with a flair for 
analysis, who had already played a major role in the formulation of 
-
Labour's pos t-war foreign and defe-nce policies, and who was later to 
become Shadow Defence Minister, jcined the redoubtable Mr. Brown in this 
re-evaluation of the military and political assumptions which underlay 
Bri tain' s world role. "The more one travels about the world") he said> 
lithe more convinced one becomes that a large number of so-called commitments 
which the U.K. now carries outside the Continent of Europe are out of 
date and do not make sense in 1961 in either military or political terms. 
If we look at the military problem, I think we must agree that it ~s 
doubtful whether by 1970 this country will have any land bases abroad 
except in the white countries of the Commonwealth. It is probable that 
there will be a barrier to the flight of military aircraft stretching from 
the Soviet Union through the Middle East, through Africa, to the 
Atlantic".l He then went on, in a statement somewhat prophetic in 
character in the light of his own decisions nine years later, to look 
at the politico-strategic assessment . He concluded that in the light of 
Britain's experiences between 1956-58, " ••• there will be very few 
potential situations in which British military intervention would be 
1 Vol. 635 H. of Ct 27th February, 1961, Col, 1234, 
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likely Lo produce political advantages greater than the certain 
disadvantages attending it".l 
Mr. Healey also questioned the assumption on which he claimed 
Western policy, as a whole, was based, namely " • • • that we can 
prevent change by buttressing the status quo through alliances and 
2 1C 1 1 ' 1' , " d 1 d ith h arge sca e m~ ~tary a~d. He ec are w c aracterist hyperbole 
that the experience of the previous decade had shown that to be a 
'fatal illusion'. In a similar vein he argued 11 that the old 
Dulles concept of protecting South East Asia from Communism by a 
military alliance of Western Governments and South East Asian 
3 Governments has grave weaknesses". It was ironically on just such 
grounds that Aneurin Bevan, the chief left-wing intellectual and major 
dissident, had resigned from the Shadow Cabinet seven years previously. 
Although it is true that Mr. Healey regarded that resignation as having 
little to do with strategic analysis and rather more than personal 
ambition, Bevan's departure did dramatize the anxieties within the party 
about Britain's reliance on alliance politics. 4 
Christopher Mayhew too continued in the early 1960s with the 
kind of analysis he had been making,to some effect, in the late 1950s. 
But by now he was getting a rather better hearing from the utopian and socialist 
Left as well. He argued that there were certain political and strategic 
factors which had made some aspects of the East of Suez role obsolete, 
as well as dangerous, and he declared that "The argument that the mere 
presence of British troops in those places contributes to internal security 
1 ibid. 
2 Vol. 640, H. of C. 17th May£ 1961£ Col. 1408-2. 
3 Vol. 648£ H. of C. 2nd November I 1961£ Vol. ~!21. 
4 See Bevan's own account in his_In Place of Fear. 
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and defence against aggression may have been true in past years, but 
it is not so self-evident today." "With emergent nationalism", he 
explained, "and with a vigorous anti-colonial crusade throughout the 
world it is no longer a safe assertion that the mere presence of 
British troops in a former Colonial Territory contributes to either 
1 
internal security or defence against aggression". Imperial nostalgia 
was.now a silly Tory game, and therefore Mr. Mayhew chided those people 
who enjoyed looking at those maps showing " .•. our soldiers, sailors 
and airmen dotted round the globe, keeping these old imperial stations 
2 
like their fathers and grandfathers before them." Such maps while 
"heartwarming" did not, Mr. Mayhew asserted "belong to the realities of the 
world situation as we have it now." °He believed that far-flung bases 
undermined Britain's efforts to win the trust of nationalism in Asia 
and Africa and answered"... the prayers of much Communist propaganda". 3 
Communist subversives could become the chief beneficiaries of such British 
folly. 
Mr. Mayhew spelt out the kind of pertinent questions to be answered~ 
"What is the present role of the garrison based on Singapore? Is it 
the internal security role? If so, what are the likely political 
repercussions of the appearance of British troops in the streets of 
Singapore in support of the present P.M. Mr. Lee? Is the role that 
of defence of Malaya and Singapore? If so, how real is the immediate 
threat of external aggression on those territories? Does it justify 
a vast and expensive garrison base and installations? Would it not be 
1 Vol. 648, H. of C.! 1st November! 1961! Col. 296. 
2 Vol. 635, H. of C. , 28th February, 1961, Col. 1412. 
3 
vol. 635, H. of C. , 28th Februa~, 1961, Col. 1413. 
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better to do much. more to shift the responsibility for the local defence 
'''J. to local shoulders in Malaya and Singapore? 
The policy proposals which Mr. Mayhew recommended were bereft of 
coherence and detail, but he did, though, suggest that" ••• in a planned 
and phased manner, these commitments 2 should be wound up" and that it 
was plain that they " ••• must change over the ahead". 3 When years 
asked to say from where Labour would withdraw British troops. Mr. Mayhew 
adroitly referred to a speech made by Dennis Healey, and emphatically 
agreed with his colleague that by 1970 "there would be no bases outside 
4 the whi te parts of the Commonwealth." 
Britain's presence in the Middle East was also questioned on 
economic grounds, with Mr. Bevan insisting that Britain would "only be 
able to get oil from the Middle East safely and smoothly by commercial 
5 
methods and by wise diplomacy and not by strong arm methods". Thus even 
by 1961 it had become obvious that there was to be a protracted debate 
wi thin the Labour Party over the East of Suez role which the Labour 
leadership had initiated in a fit of introspection, rather than in a 
determined bid to find as yet new policies. This debate was not a 
straightforward disagreement between the left and right wings of the party 
and raised a multiplicity of complex issues. Britain's role East of Suez, 
and particularly in the Middle East, was to be subject to further attack 
on political, strategic, economic and moral grounds. And in this debate 
socialist ideology became in a vague sense the yard-stick by which the 
left at least sought to establish the party's priorities. And yet though 
1 Vol. 648, H. of C. , 1st November£ 1961, Col. 296-7 I 
2 Vol. 635, H. of C. [ 28th Februa~! 1961£ Col. 1413. 
3 j"bid., 
4 Vol. 635£ H. of C. ! 28th Februaryl 1961[ Col. 1414. 
5 Vol. 594[ H. of C. [ 30th October, 1958, Col. 337. 
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this debate was not highly politicized, it did reveal a growing concern 
with environmental factors. 
Indeed, these criticisms of the East of Suez role were not the orthodox 
ones, about overstretched resources, which opposition parties traditionally 
make. Those speeches of Mr. Healey, Mr. Brown and Mr. Mayhew, and even 
Mr. Bevan, seemed to indicate that Labour might propose and implement 
quite radical changes in foreign policy because it did not accept the 
bi-partisan consensus based upon an unchanging view of the external 
environment upon which hitherto policy had been based. These leaders 
called for change, substantial change indeed, it seemed, because they 
perceived changed political and military circumstances, rather than or as 
well as because they considered Britain's defence capability to be 
intrinsically deficient and overstretched by the demands of both a 
continental and maritime strategy. That had indeed always been so anyway, 
an historical hang-up of some standing which had divided political and 
military elites since the age of the Tudors. 
These statements, then, seemed to indicate more a growing suspicion 
about the value of a world role, than concern about Britain ,'s ability to 
sustain such a role. A piece of strategic analysis rather than an 
example of cost-benefit analysiS which was now the greatly valued technique 
of any well-run defence Ministry. They related not to whetller Britain 
co~~d economically sustain the East of Suez role but to whether a 
military infrastructure overseas resulted in more tangible diplomatic 
influence, to whether such a presence upheld the status quo, and to 
whether Britain wished to uphold it. It would, though, be wrong and 
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facile to regard this fragmented dialogue as marking Labour's 
disillusionment with the East of Suez presence entirely. Indeed, to the 
contrary, it soon became plain that: the greater threat to the World 
Role was precisely Labour's fear that Britain was overstretching herself 
at a time of growing and protracted crisis in Europe. It was not the 
changing evaluation of the East of Suez role which was crucial, but the 
changing perception of the strategic scene on the continent. The growing 
concern with the Berlin crisis raised anxieties amongst Labour's 
moderate parliamentary leadership at the level of the Shadow Cabinet. 
The Labour Shadow Cabinet genuinely felt that certain events East of 
Suez had diminished the value of the World Role, but it was never thought 
that these events in themselves ordained a precipitate withdrawal. The 
salient Labour criticism was not of the Worle Role itself but of the 
way it had been applied in specific crisis situations. It appeared 
therefore that if and when Labour came to power, the role would be defined 
and implemented in a different way, but would not be abandoned altogether. 
The Commonwealth might yet become a socialist club. 
The truculent Russian diplomatic offensive in Europe 1958-61, however, 
put the imperial role in jeopardy, for there was no obvious disquiet 
that Britain might be bleeding her forces on the continent by meeting her 
inherited obligations East of Suez. It is perhaps too simplistic to 
assert that Labour's growing anxieties about East of Suez affairs were little 
more than a rationale for policy decisions taken because of the menacing 
European crisis, yet it was natural enough for those, on both the left 
and right of the Party, who wanted to buttress European security, to justify 
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a withdrawal of troops from East of Suez with the seductive argument 
that their presence in that area was no longer necessary. The near-
panic the European crisis produced in Labour's divided ranks is 
perhaps evidence enough that this was in fact the case. 
The Party's temporary concern for strategic issues, however, was 
at best blatantly spasmodic and could soon with rapidity lapse 
into periods of frightening indifference and prolonged inactivity. 
Indeed, even during the Russian political offensive over Berlin which 
carried both superpowers to the brink of disaster over Cuba (which was 
perhaps related to Khruschev's European strategy) in October 1962, it 
was right-wingers like Younger, Brown, Healey and Mayhew who managed 
to sustain a continuous and vigorous assault on the orthodox belief 
that Britain could fulfil all her commitments, both overseas and on the 
Continent. The remainder df the Party uninterested in, or unable to see, 
the relationship between defence and foreign policy, remained, except 
for the occasional flurry, largely bored or indifferent to the debate. 
It may be that if the Party had taken a greater and informed interest in 
defence policy, with the inevitable leftish inclined party conference 
prone to seek cut-backs in the field of defence, the move away from the 
East of Suez would have been more rapid, more far-reaching and less 
painful. 
The ebullient but far-seeing George Brown was perhaps more deeply 
concerned than anyone else with the folly of what he termed the " .•. 
deployment of forces in peripheral wars". Wars which he clearly regarded 
as of secondary importance as compared with a continental commitment. 
"The British Army" he said "is not equipped and is not mobile enough 
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for peripheral wars ...• It is no more in a position to fight a peripheral 
1 
war than it is to do its job in Europe". Mr. Brown's assessment of 
Britain's 'national interest' was clear. As long as 'peripheral' 
operations did not lead to a dereliction of European commitments they 
could be met, but in any serious conflict with European interests, those 
objectives East of Suez were clearly expendable. This contention was 
reinforced by the drift of external events as the situation in Europe 
deteriorated. 
The ultra or neo-Marxist Left, too became more critical of the 
East of Suez role, for its fear was that the overstretch of British 
forces might lead to a dangerous reliance on a first-strike nuclear 
capacity or to a disagreeable return to conscription. Mr. Crossman, 
a critic of the right-wing leadership, and par excellence an 
iNs intellectual, that is to say, ~ relat .. his socialist beliefs to 
realities in an empirical fashion, warned that "If we do not want 
conscription to come back we shall have to cut our overseas commitments 
faster even than the P.M. is doing ..•.. because if there is one thing 
worse than cutting a commitment it is theoretically keeping it but not 
being able to fulfil it".l Indeed, commitments should never exceed 
capabilities because manifold weaknesses made Britain's " •.• promises 
valueless". Mr. Crossman advanced his prescription. "As a socialist", 
he said, "I see no difficulty in getting rid of a number of what I 
might call 'fag end' imperial commitments. I do not say all of them, but 
in my view a great many of these commitments bear no military reality at all. 
1 Vol. 635, H. of C., 28th February,196l, Vol. 1436. 
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I do not believe that in any future war the security of Australia and 
New Zealand would be assisted from this country by a base in Singapore. 
I do not see us playing a role in Far Eastern strategy with the kind of 
forces the Government intend to have. It makes no sense at all".l 
If such a strategic posture made no sense in early 1961, before a 
major shift occurred in the central power balance with the Soviet Union's 
attempt to achieve strategic parity, it was to make even less sense as the 
situation in Europe became more serious. 
As the European crisis reached its height the demand for a review 
of Britain's overseas commitments increased. Mr. Brown in a speech 
emphasizing the weakness of B.A.O.R., was emphatically clear about what 
should be done. "We must both cut some of our commitments out" he said 
"and we must alter the method of covering others. One could in fact 
cover the Far East commitments as easily seaborne as landborne ••.• 
We have 20,000 soldiers or thereabouts in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
A lot of these would be an enormous help in other problems. We have 
blocks of soldiers elsewhere, and it is very difficult to see what 
their real purpose would be if they had to do the job which, one assumes, 
they are there to do .... My view is in the present political 
2 
circumstances that the European theatre must have first place." In 
Mr. Brown's view a continental strategy came first in Britain's defence 
priori ties. 
It must be remembered that this speech was in response to the 
Government's proposals revealed in the Queen's speech to hold back 
national servicemen for an extra six months. Mr. Brown vigorously 
1 
vol. 635, H. of C. 28th February, 1961, Col. 1437. 
2 Vol. 648, H. of C. 1st November, 1961, Col. 186-7. 
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opposed this solution to the defenca manning problem. He maintained 
strongly that B.A.O.R. was poorly equipped and undermanned because 
of the " ... clear failure to answer the question about commitments, 
1 priorities and purpose" According to Mr. Brown the situation could 
only be eased if the Government " ... bring in some of the large garrisons 
2 
which are sited in quite inappropriate places". When asked if he was 
referring to Hong Kong, Mr. Brown replied that "We have too many forces 
3 there" . 'Ib the £urocentric right of the party the open-ended commitment 
East of Suez had become a dangerous liability. 
Mr. Paget, the hard-line Shadow Minister for the Army, having 
already expressed his conviction that Europe was Britain's first 
4 priority, also attacked those who allowed the East of Suez role to make 
such a severe drain on Britain's resources. He was quite specific where 
he would make savings. 5 "The first place I would look at is Hong Kong". 
"Next we come to Singapore, which is really a garrison masquerading as a 
base .... Singapore is entirely dependent on a local labour force; and 
in that force I am told that at the lowest estimate there are 5,000 
dedicated Chinese Communists and it is quite impossible to identify 
which is which. I do not know how we can work, how we can perform 
treaty obligations directed primarily against the Chinese, with that sort 
of set-up. In any event, I do not believe that we shall be there for very 
much longer. Malaya has been developing her own army, and we shall not 
have to be there for internal security reasons. In relation to these new 
1 Vol. 648 H. of C. 1st November, 1961, Col. l8l. 
2 Vol. 655 H. of C. 6th November , 1962, Col. 324. 
3 iQid . 
4 VOl. 655 H. of C. 8th March, 1962, Col. 672. 
5 Vol. 655 H. of C. 8th March, 1962, Col. 622. 
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1 
emergent countries, the sooner that sort of thing happens the better". 
Mr. Brown clearly meant by "that sort of thing "the development of an 
indigenous mi l itary capacity which allowed Commonwealth countries to 
free themselves of a dependance upon Britain. In fact, a dramatic 
escalation of British force levels in the Far East was taking place, 
as confrontation with Indonesia assumed menacing proportions. 
Nor was Aden spared. Mr. Paget refused to accept the argument 
that oil made Britain's presence necessary and concluded that it was 
11 highly important that as these new nations emerge we should go".2 
Christopher Mayhew also returned to the charge when he too insisted 
that "We (Britain) must, if we are to have an effective Rhine Army, 
3 
review our commitments outside Europe". He explained the manpower 
shortage, by accusing the Conservatives of taking the " ••• popular and 
easy" measure of abolishing conscription, but not the " unpopular and 
hard job .•. " of cutting down overseas commitments. It was, he argued, 
because the Conservatives shirked this action that Britain was " ••• in 
4 this mess now". 
The deep contradiction between Britain's maritime and continental 
roles, in the form of a competition for seriously limited resources, had 
become an incotrovertable fact in the late 1950s. It is nevertheless 
true that each role had its own advocates, within the Labour movement, 
throughout that period and that it was not always a straightforward 
disagreement between the left and the right. 
1 Vol. 655 H. of C. 8th March, 1962£ Col. 625. 
2 Vol. 655 H. of c. 8th March, 1962l Col. 626. 
3 Vol. 648 H. of C. 1st November £ 1961£ Col. 295 . 
4 Vol. 648 H. of C. 1st November, 1961, ~ol. 2a:l • . 
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Throughout the 1950s, the heirs of the Bevinite tradition within the 
Labour Party had consistently upheld the notion that the nation's 
prestige would be enhanced by sustaining a world role, and that if 
Britain wanted to minimise the risk of United States' irresponsibility in 
Asia she must maintain a presence in that area. Another faction within 
the party, the very influential Eurocentric group centred on those in 
favour of British membership of the E.E.C. while agreeing that the United 
States, although dependable in Europe, might be reckless in Asia; argued 
that the way to retain influence over the United States was to engender 
closer ties through defence integration with Europe and to have Britain's 
independent nuclear deterrent absorbed into a N.A.T.O. structure. These 
early adherents to Europeanism, but not a third force Europe, concluded 
that, if Britain performed a specialist function in Europe, her standing 
in the United States would also improve. In addition, there existed both 
a latent but very real fear of Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as 
a growing awareness of the dynamic economic impact of the European 
Economic Community, which had now emerged as a major factor in international 
politics. 
Although the influence and balance of strength between the 
Europeanists and Atlanticists seemed in the late 19505 to be moving in 
favour of the former, this did not mean the search for pur&ly European 
solutions as the parochial nature of French Europeanism was not yet 
apparent. In any event, the pro-European faction in Labour's ranks 
were generally anti-Gaullist in outlook. EVen if Labour wanted to 
circumscribe the World Role and to re-define the Anglo-American connection, 
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a universal balance of power with particular emphasis on N.A.T.O., would 
still remain as the core element for the leadership. Indeed, apart from 
the neutralist Left, those members of the Labour Party clustered around 
the leadership on the National Executive Committee and in the Parliamentary 
Party, wanted to limit the East of Suez commitment, and desired to do so 
largely to strengthen N.A.T.O.s capabilities against a possible rampant 
Soviet advance into Western Europe. Why, though, had there been no 
Significant conflict between European and Atlanticist policies previously 
within the Labour movement? This question relates to the nature of the 
external environment rather than to different ideological interpretations 
of policy on the British left. 
It had not been too demanding for Britain to pursue both maritime 
and continental roles before 1958. She sabotaged E.D.C. by diplomatic 
stealth in giving it luke-warm support which made it certain that the French 
National Assembly would reject the idea. . Then Britain was ready with the 
idea of a loose Western European Union (WEU) which enabled Britain (and 
Germany) to make a contribution to European defence under the Paris 
agreements. Britain preferred an inter-governmental arrangement to a 
possible supra-national one. The re-arming of Germany, although making 
a British commitment to Europe necessary, also released resources and 
men for a more credible continental strategy if any real desire existed 
to develop one. Conservative Governments, however, during the 1950s, 
moreover, did not appear too anxious about being unable to fulfil Britain's 
'unprecedented commitment' to the continent. This attitude was quite 
traditional. There were, after all, not only good economic reasons for not 
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observing this commitment beyond that of a two-division Rhine Army, but 
also the strategic rationale that deterrence would be weakened if 
conventional forces were increased. The nuclear threshold must be kept 
as low as possible because Britain had no wish to contribute a large 
army to the defence of Europe. In any case, although Britain did not 
reach the proposed force levels in Europe, which the NATO Council recommended 
at Lisbon in 1952, European security continued intact. l The Russians 
seemed pre-occupied with events outside Europe and the United States' 
deterrent policy remained feasible while her homeland could not seriously 
be threatened. This position lasted until at least 1960 when the flexible 
response strategy replaced the doctrine of massive retaliation as set out 
2 by Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara at Ann Arbour in 1962. 
Britain's continental role during the early 1950s was not, then 
beyond being met by the deployment of existing resources, and the same 
was true of East of Suez, where commitments had rarely become simultaneously 
active. The Chiefs of Staff, in the thirties, and, now in the fifties, 
feared that both commitments might one day be activated together, but the 
intrinsic dichotomy between these two roles could persist for the time 
b . 3 e~ng. However, as this analysis has made clear, the Labour Party both 
in Opposition and power, though divided over the question of Britain's 
external role, was generally predisposed towards accepting the imperial 
commitment. Labour took the view that existing responsibilities could 
and should be met. The overwhelming impression emerges that both the left 
and right within the Labour Party accepted that Britain was still a great 
1 Ismay, Lord NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954, pp. 20-56. 
2 See McNamara, Robert. The Essence of Security, New York, 1968, pp.51-67. 
3 
See general discussion of this historic problem in Howard, Michae1, 
.The Continental CommitmentJ 1971. 
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power,albeit one in decline. The nation's role East of Suez was not 
to be disavowed by Labour. The ideology of Labourism was now strongly 
influenced by the revisionist doctrine which associated with the social-
democratic wing of the Party, proved decisive .in shaping the Party's 
foreign and defence policies. 
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C H APT E R IV 
EXTERNAL/INTERNAL FACTORS: THE "LEVEL OF PERCEPTION IN 
LABOUR'S SEARCH FOR A DEFENCE POLICY CONSENSUS IN OPPOSITION 
It was strange that the most determined opposition to the East of Suez 
role should break out between 1960-62, at a time of comparative British 
inactivity overseas and consequently at a time when the East of Suez 
role appeared nominal. Apart from assisting the U.N. in the Congo, and 
the operation in Kuwait, British troops were only involved in helping 
populations stricken by floods or hurricanes. 
It is difficult to account fully for this lull in operations 
overseas, but there were five possible explanations. Firstly, the 
Soviet Union was pre-occupied with events in Europe. Mr. Krushchev's 
political offensive was at its height. Secondly, Duncan Sandys' 1957 
Defence White Paper had placed a greater reliance on nuclear weapons. 
This reliance on the doctrine of massive retaliation made possible by the 
deployment of the 'V' bomber force was a calculated bid to deter the 
Soviet Union from any sort of aggression. This tended to subdue great 
power relations by inducing extremeties of cautious or diplomatic brink-
manship which although alarming to see were actually vicarious means 
through which actual conflict was avoided. Thirdly, conscription had 
been abolished in 1957 and the last conscripts were called up during 1960. 
Thus an attempt was made in terms of staff planning in relation to conflict 
situations, to scale down the operations which might demand the use of 
scarce troops. Fourthly, the experience of Suez had encouraged Britain 
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in a more moderate if not more liberal policy towards her colonies 
and clearly the colonies themselves were impressed with the 'wind of 
change' mentality that was sweeping through British politics. Fifthly, 
there was a growing doubt at the level of the Chiefs of Staff about 
operations based on sea transport supplemented by air, and this was only 
slowly giving way to more optimistic assessments about the possibilities 
1 of operations using air transport supplemented by amphibious forces. 
All these factors, were responsible for the welcome lull in 
British overseas operations. However, because or despite of this 
interlude in military operations overseas Labour attacked the East of 
Suez role with a growing abrasiveness and coherence which even approached 
a degree of party unity on the subject. 
Clearly, an anti-East of Suez impetus had been built up within the 
Labour Party since the Suez operation of 1956. The Suez operation in 
the autumn of 1956, together with the outrage of the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary had made a vivid and lasting impression o~ Labour, which even 
exceeded the feelings generated by the Munich agreement some eighteen 
l ' 2 years ear ~er. 
Yet, Labour's growing opposition to the East of Suez, role also 
expressed its concern that the East of Suez presence was absorbing 
too large a share of the defence budget and the wrong deployment of 
conventional forces which were badly needed in Europe. It had been 
partly in a desperate bid to avoid a vast build up of arms 
1 
2 
See Williams, Geoffrey and Williams, Alan, OPe cit. p.59. 
The Labour Government returned in March 1966 reluctantly rejected 
backbench pressure for a parliamentary inquiry into Eden's handling 
of the Suez crisis of October 1956. 
- 108 -
and men, and to get defence 'on the cheap', that N.A.T.O. Europe in 
1953 had embraced with alarm and concern th.e American doctrine of 
massive retaliation. However, Labour's parliamentary spokesmen 
increasingly came to perceive that the real weakness of this doctrine 
was that it had not in fact deterred Soviet backed aggression and, in 
Korea in 1950, or elsewhere since, for Britain particularly, was largely 
irrelevant as she was mainly faced with the task of keeping internal 
peace for nations East of Suez, rather than with deterring external 
. 1 aggress~on. 
The continued credibility of massive retaliation, moreover, was 
dependent on the relative and absolute invulnerability of the United 
States' homeland. This invulnerability ceased to exist afte~ 1957. 
Consequently, in the late 1950s there was a move towards a new strategic 
2 doctrine based on a flexible response which Labour officially welcomed. 
This new doctrine, however, seemed likely to put even more strain On 
Britain's dwindling resources. The official Labour leadership agreed with 
the government's assessment that the West must now have sufficient 
conventional forces to meet, at a corresponding level, any degree of 
Soviet aggression in Europe. Labour thus welcomed greater reliance on 
non-nuclear forces and at the same time endorsed the ending of conscription 
in Britain with real enthusiasm. 3 
Ironically the decision to abolish conscription in the White Paper 
of 1957 was just beginning to have an impact at a time when the strategic 




See general discussion in Brown, Neville. Arms Without Empire, 1967. 
Arguably the Labour leadership had been persuaded by John Strachey's 
Study en the Prevention of War, which warmly endorsed a change in NATO's 
local strategy in favour of a more flexible capacity to respond to 
aggression. 
See, Policy for Peace, statement endorsed at Blackpool Conference 1961, 
quoted in _twelve Wasted Years t Labour Party Research Department, 1963 
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This contradiction in Labour's position was not acknowledged by its 
spokesmen and yet there was, it seemed, a high probability of a gross 
manpower shortage at a time when conventional, and not nuclear, forces 
were to form the basis of a new strategic doctrine. Labour anyway had 
for some time been sceptical about the use of nuclear weapons as well 
as anxious about their impact on exposed populations, and by 1960 it 
appeared utterly convinced about the impossibility of threatening a 
first strike against anyone. "There is no territory or power so small 
or unimportant today that cannot invoke powerful friends",l warned 
George Brown. 
The passing of massive retaliation and the decision to abolL~~ 
conscription, then inevitably put a premium on conventional forces. 
Moreover, the painful but necessary transition to an all regular 
force coincided with exploding tension in Europe which culminated with the 
sudden erection of the Berlin Wall in late 1961. At the Blackpool 
Conference in October 1961 Labour passed a motion which inter alia 
condemned "the action of the Communists in arbitrarily closing the 
"',2 frontier between East and West Berlin .' The Europeanist case for a 
positive response hardened as the situation on the continent grew more 
grave, although in fact N.A.T.O. 's response was confused and appeared 
even weak. At a time when the West had decided to ensure that it could 
meet any Soviet military moves in a flexible manner, it was now being 
called upon to react to a prolonged European crisis. This crisis 
conceivably took the world to the brink of nuclear war. Labour's belief 
1 Vol. 627 H. of C. 20th July, 1960, Col. 508. 
2 Labour Pa~ty Conference Report, 1961, p.218. 
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however in the need for European defence based upon greater non-nuclear 
component reflected not merely changes in the external environment as 
well as changes in the technology of modern warfare but anxieties about 
the risks of mass obliteration. 
The Left became even more concerned with the dangers of nuclear 
war in Europe. The Labour movement lurched towards a dangerous split. 
In passionate speeches in the House of Commons Labour's leadership opposed 
the purchase of Polaris and Skybol t on the grounds that it might lead 
to a vast and uncontrollable proliferation of nuclear weapons. General 
Norstad, as N.A.T.O. Supreme Commander, insisted upon a buila up of 
missiles in Europe capable of delivering nuclear weapons. This call 
brought forth a flood of pent-up anger giving expression to intense 
anxiety within the Party. According to Dennis Healey, Norstad's argument 
was 'lunacy', an assertion which caused great consternation in N.A.T.O. Labour, 
in a rare show of unity, spoke with great feeling and conviction on the 
need to raise conventional strength in order to down-grade a dangerous 
1 
and stupid over-reliance on nuclear weapons. It was thus not surprising 
~~at some Labour spokesmen looked anxiously at those troops being 
'squandered' East of Suez, and whose presence in Europe could ensure the 
peace of the world. Labour's strategic analysis concerning the use and 
deployment of nuclear weapons was combined with its growing reservations 
about Britain's role East of Suez. 2 
There was after 1958 a certain inevitability in the tension between 
Britain's maritime and continental roles. While there was no common 
1 Twelve Wasted Years, OPe cit., p.396. 
2 ibid., p.398. 
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explanation for the fact that the factors that made for tension 
occurred simultaneously, there was sufficient coincidence after 1957 
J 
to undermine Britain's attempt to pursue both roles. None of these 
factors was more critical or significant than the marked and irreversible 
trend towards greater Soviet military capability, which provided not 
only the springboard for her political offensive in Europe, though 
prematurely since Soviet strategic power was still deficient when 
measured against the United States, but at the same time, impaired the 
credibility of the existing American nuclear commitment to the continent. 
Moreover, as important as' the pressing need for Britain to find more 
conventional forces in accord with the new American strategic doctrine 
was , the psychological consequence of Soviet pressure, which encouraged 
political elites in the West to look exclusively at the European crisis 
and seemingly ignore the Middle East and South East Asia where in fact 
even greater turmoil was threatened. 
The crucial debate within the Labour leadership on the respective 
meri ts of the East of Suez and European roles took place against an 
emotional backcloth of unilateralism and widespread fear of a nuclear 
1 holocaust. Though Hugh Gaitskell ensured that unilateralists, after 
their spectacular victory in 1960, suffered a dramatic setback in 1961, 
they remained throughout the early 1960s an emotional force to be reckoned 
with in left-wing politics and, in fact, underscored,in an obvious way, 
both the character and extent of Britain's participation in the cold war.2 
In the eyes of many of the anti-nuclear pacifist left within the Party, 
the East of Suez role was inextricably bound up with the cold war and was 
1 
2 
The Pursuit of Peace, op. cit. p.1-3. 
See Taylor, A.J.P., The Great Deterrent Myth! CND Pamphlet, 1960 for 
a lucid discussion of the case for a neutralist foreign and defence 
policy. 
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an offence to their anti-American sensibilities because it appeared 
that Britains and Americans were acting in collusion in the Far East. 
The East of Suez role was thus, in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
under attack from both right and left, though for entirely different 
and contradictory reasons. While the right criticised the role for 
absorbing valuable resources of men and weapons which could otherwise be 
deployed in the more strategically significant and more seriously threatened 
European theatre, the Left opposed the role because it was convinced that 
it was both the cause and effect of the cold war, and that the post-
imperial commitment was essentially a fraudulent exercise whose real 
purpose was to shackle the indigenous masses to a corrupt alliance of 
capitalist powers. 
Labour's shrill insistence that British forces in Europe should be 
augmented by a cutback in overseas commitments, led the Conservative 
Minister of Defence, Mr. Watkinson, abrasively to declare that Labour's 
policy was one of " ••• retreat from our overseas commitments, except 
for N.A.T.O. lIl There was, however, no question of the need for an early 
withdrawal from East of Suez. For while Patrick Gordon Walker, Labour's 
spokesman on defence, rather dryly observed that he could not see n ••• the 
strategic relevance of troops in Hong Kong" the future leader of the 
opposition and later British Premier, Harold Wilson, was pontificating 
about withdrawing from that colony in tones which indicated a different 
approach ", " •.. we could cut down".,he conceded)"on our commitments East 
of Suez, but I should like to enter a personal caveat and a personal 
warning,from my own little knowledge, against going too far in Hong Kong. 
1 Vol. 655 H. of C., 6th March, 1962, Col. 336-7. 
2 Vol. 655 H. of C., 5th March, 1962, Col. 69. 
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This is not because of the danger of invasion, where our eXisting forces 
would be derisory but because of the danger of communal riots, perhaps 
Communist-inspired" •.• l Mr. Wilson at any rate did not consider that 
" .•. British soldiers are far too precious today to be used as policemen".2 
And here in this speech was neatly encapsulated another strand in Labour's 
pre-occupation with imperial concerns - the contribution to local 
stability. It was to be an argument about which a lot more was to be 
heard. 
Whilst Labour's anxieties about the East of Suez role between 
1958-61 had been induced by concern over whether Britain had sufficient 
military and perhaps economic strength to maintain both a European and 
a World role, after 1961 the East of Suez presence was subject to a 
fundamental assessment resulting from a value change in regard to 
these roles. The political and economic consciousness of Europe was 
growing at the expense of the Commonwealth in the minds of Labour's top 
leadership even though Hugh Gaitskell had considerable personal reservations 
about the political character of the E.E.C. 
A political shift in favour of Europe manifested itself in 1961 
with the application to join the E.E.C., but which in reality started 
much earlier. It originally began in 1959 when the Conservatives won a 
brilliant landslide electoral victory on the strengh of the 'never had it 
so good' slogan. With the economic situation suddenly deteriorating 
shortly after Mr. Harold Macmillan's triumph and with the nation eager to 
sustain the newly found affluence of the late 1950s, a number of new 
economic options were eagerly examined. The British Treasury's attention 
1 Vol. 655 H. of C., 6th March, 1912, Col. 226. 
2 Vol. 655 H. of C., 5th March, 1962, Cel. 69 
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immediately settled on the Common Market. They urged immediate British 
membership. 
The record of the E.E.C., in marked contrast to the gloomy 
predictions of successive British governments was spectacularly good 
and there was growing influential support for the view that strong 
and sophisticated economies had a good deal more in common than they 
had with developing economies. Even the Labour Party, despite its 
traditional suspicion of continental government, and of powerful 
economic groups clustered round vast private enterpises, seemed likely 
to submit to the 'irresistible logic' of joining the E.E.C. 
The Party had major reservations. The activists on the marxist 
and utopian left were particularly concerned about the right wing orientation 
of continental politics, about the potential threat to collectivism and 
economic planning and about the fragmented political culture of Western 
Europe. While the Trade Union Congress wer.e apprehensive about whether 
a British Government would be allowed to take measures to ensure full 
employment and guarantee restrictive practices, those in the centre of 
the Party, including some elements in the social democratic ranks of the 
P.L.P., while sharing many of the above anxieties, were also concerned 
about parliamentary sovereignty inside Europe (the ending of 'a thousand 
years of history') and about Britain's freedom to conduct a separate 
f ' l' 1 orel.gn po l.cy. 
The Common Market debate clearly 
within the Labour Party at any rate at 
unions expressed anti-European feelings 
influx of labour from Italy and France 2 
cut across orthodox divisicns 
the outset. While certain 
- a concern at the potential 
and a hope of ~reserving the 
1 See National Executive's statement of September 1962 which laid down 
2 
five essential conditions for entry of which item two insists upon 
"freedom as at present to pursue our own foreign policy." 
Gooch, E., M.P., (Nat. Union of Agricultural Workers) Labour Party 
Conference, 3rd October, 1962, p.177. 
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Commonwealth, " .•. this unique politically priceless multinational 
system of ours ••. ", other unions had for some time supported the idea 
of closer economic ties with the continent. Even the Left Wing was 
divided, a split occurred between the anti-monopolist and the utopian 
internationalist pacifist left, for while it consistently opposed the 
extent of Britain's military commitment to Europe, it was undecided 
on the Common Market question. 
The official party line, brilliantly underlined by Hugh Gaitskell 
at the 1962 Party Conference in a powerful anti-market speech, was 
equivocal. Britain should enter Europe, only if a number of safeguards 
for her agriculture, economy, Commonwealth, parliamentary institutions 
and E.F.T.A. friends were met. The T.U.C. was similarly cautious; it 
too had conditions which must be fulfilled. Both the political and 
industrial wings of the Labour movement were uncertain and confused 
about Europe and Britain's role East of Suez. 
Nevertheless, in spite of these widely held reservations, the 
Europeanists within the Party seemed to be a rising force. Mr. Roy Jenkins 
and Mr. George Brown, completely abandoning their earlier caution, were 
the main protagonists of the need to re-define the Commonwealth connection. 
"For all that sentiment and all that Commonwealth emotion" said Mr. Brown 
"they (Commonwealth countries) are not slow in looking after their 
economic interests even at our expense when they need to •••• But it is 
a wee bit hard ••• for them then to use the Commonwealth emotion to deny us 
the opportunity seriously to consider our economic interest. ,,2 Mr. Jenkins 
also shrewdly warned " against the danger that by taking up too rigid 
1 
2 
C. Jenkins (A.S.S.E.T.) Labour Party Conference, 5th October, 1961. p.214. 
From resolution 321 calling for a rejection of the Common Market on the 
basis of the Treaty of Rome, and for greater trade with the Commonwealth •. 
Labour Party Conference, 5th October 1961, p.226. 
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an attitude now we might in a few months time find ourselves more 
pro-Commonwealth interests than the Commonwealth itself."l 
Those nagging negative fears about the continental commitment 
apparent between 1958-61, were now being transformed into positive 
hopes for an expanding and unified European Common Market. This 
growing conviction was just as serious, and perhaps as enduring a threat 
to the world role as the fear for European security. The twin goals 
of national security and national prosperity are inextricably intertwined. 
Whereas, prior to 1961, Labour's conviction, that Britainwas powerless 
to defend her vital national and alliance interest in Europe, had led to 
the call for a cut in commitment East of Suez, after 1961, it was clear 
that the call for greater economic growth was the major determinant of 
policy. The growing importance of Europe and the diminishing importance 
of the Commonwealth logically and inevitably led to calls for an adoption 
of a Eurocentric defence policy with demands for a withdrawl from East 
of Suez. Thus, while in the first case, prior to 1958, Labour's defence 
policy documents reflected a domination of foreign policy issues, 
after 1961 there existed a marked tendency for foreign policy documents 
to dominate defence policy statements. The result was the same though. A 
move in emphasis from East of Suez to Europe. A sea-change was occurring. 
The reassessment of Britain's East of Suez role by the Labour 
Party achieved not through the Transport Houseresearch department but 
tentatively begun by Kenneth Younger in 1958, seemed to be in its 
terminal stages by 1962. A change of policy seemed so inevitable and 
desirable that most of the Party's Leaders felt able to embrace the new 
1 Labour Party Conference, 3rd October, 1962, p.173. 
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line with growing conviction and enthusiasm. Messrs. Brown, Je.nkins and 
Healey, Crossman and Mayhew and Gardon Walker, had all expressed far 
reaching criticism of the World role in one context or another. So much 
so, in fact, that Mr. Watkinson, the Minister of Defence, remarked, no 
doubt genuinely, on his astonishment in listening " ... to speech after 
speech from Opposition benches apparently implying that we can now 
lightly abrogate our treaty responsibilities everywhere in the world 
1 
except in Europe." Mr. Wilson's position though remained noticeably 
ambivalent. His stance remained devious. 
The period 1963-64 demanded greater internal self-discipline 
and cohesion from the Labour Party than at any time since 1931 and yet 
it was one of great upheaval. An old leader had tragically died and a new 
one somewhat hesitantly chosen. It was to be expected, though, that the 
period of debate and unrest and indeed great passion within the Party 
would cease, that ranks would stolidly close behind the new incumbent 
and that new and specific policies would be produced before the eagerly 
awaited general election was upon the Party. The choice of Harold Wilson 
as Leader of the Party however reinforced those within the party anxious 
for whatever reason to keep Britain East of Suez, an issue on which he 
felt · so vehemently and on which he plainly had differences with his 
colleagues. 
Throughout the early part of 1963 however, the assault on the 
world role continued unabated. While Denis Healey thought that Britain's 
2 
overseas interests were " .•• less than vital" , Mr. Brown believed there 
to be " ... fewer and fewer places left in the world - shortly no place 
1 Vol. 635 H. of C., 28th February, 1961, Col.1S08. 
2 Vol. 673 H. of C., 4th March, 1963, Col. 57. 
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at alL .. 11 where Britain would play a" .•. role as an individual nation. III 
Mr. Wilson, who was to become leader of the Party in February, 
in fact the second leader since the departure of Attlee, however, 
2 took a very different line from that of his colleagues. He reminded 
the House how a year previously he had warned " ••.• against the facile 
assumption that we can solve our problems by depleting our garrisons 
3 in other parts of the world". He also made it clear that if Britain 
were to sacrifice any role it should be the nuclear and not the East 
4 
of Suez one. However, while Harold Wilson's personal position was 
gaining in clarity, and strength, the Party's naturally enough, was 
becoming more confused and muted. 
During 1964 Mr. Wilson decided to push his own view. He wholeheartedly 
supported the pledge given to Malaysia by the Conservatives, and in a more 
general statement on East of Suez, having repeatedly emphasized that he 
was only expressing a personal view, he said that he would " ••• regard 
5 1000 men East of Suez as preferable to another 1000 in Germany 11 , an 
astonishing piece of strategic illiteracy according to his critics. 
The difference between Mr. Wilson and most of the other top labour men 
was that while they all feared that Britain's existing military effort 
was largely irrelevant to the kind of threats posed to British security, 
the resonse they advocated was very different to that advanced by their 
new Leader. Mr. Wilson emphasized the need to alter and raise capability 
to meet obligation, however open-ended that obligation appeared to be, 
while others placed more emphaSis on the need to decrease commitment 
1 Vol. 673 H. of C., 5th March, 1963, Col. 325. 
2 Mr. Wilson had become Labour's spokesman on foreign affairs in the 
autumn of 1961 when he moved from the shadow chancellorship. 
3 vol. 670 H. of C., 31st January, 1963, Col. 1244. Later on Mr. Wilson 
dereonstrated his approval of a speech made by Edward Heath which expressed 
fears about Chinese aggression in S.E.Asia. Vol.680 H. of C. 2nd July 
1963, Col. 223. 
4 Vol. 670 H. of C., 31st January, 1963, Col. 1244. 
5 Vol. 687 H. of C., 16th January, 1964, Col. 450. 
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and if necessary decrease it further stil l . It was Mr. Wilson's view 
that prevailed if not his folly. This is demonstrated by the marked 
contrast in statements made by Labour leaders in 1964 compared with tho~e 
made a year or two earlier. No longer was the emphasis on cutting 
commitments but on re-shaping a conceivably greatly expanded capability. 
The justification for this change in emphasis was that the danger of 
war outside Europe was growing. An assertion often made without ": strong 
evidence being produced unless it "was the fear of encroaching insurgencies 
in Asia which could have a domino effect on the survival of pro-Western 
states in the area. Mr. Wilson was indeed of the opinion that "if India 
and Malaysia go under or fail to make the breakthrough they seek in 
democratic economic development, then Asia goes under with them, beyond 
tt.e hope of Western intervention". 1 
Nr. Healey elaborated on this explanation. "All of us believed", 
he said, "that Britain's military commitments overseas would be reduced 
by the end of our old Empire and the creation of an independent Commonwealth, 
but in f&ct, the military burden falling on us has, if anything, increased 
2 in recent years" Whether the apparent policy change could be attributed 
to the prospect of a general election; to the dramatic and largely 
unforseen events in Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Malaysia and 
India; to growing con~ern about the strategic position in Europe, or to 
Mr. Wilson's own somewhat traditional but certainly idosyncratic 
views pervading the Party, is difficult to determine, but the change 
was as dramatic as it was relatively sudden. Overnight explicit opinions 
were disavowed. Mr. Healey, who it can be remembered had earlier seen 
1 Speech at Bridgeport University, U.S.A., 3rd March, 1964. 
2 Vol. 696 H. of C., 17th June, 1964, Col. 1287. 
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political and military changes which would soon make British action 
overseas unfeasible, now argued with considerable emphasis and aplomb 
that " •.. the main weight of Britain's military efforts should now be 
1 
overseas -•.. " and that the number one defence priority was " ••. in 
providing mobile, conventional forces to assEt in maintining stability 
in Africa and in ASia •.. ,,2 Even more surpising was that he welcomed 
the fact that Britain was " ... the only country in a position to fulfil 
such responsibilities ... ,,3 Labour's new-found enthusiasm for local 
stability in Asia and Africa constituted the core of the moral commitment 
to a role East of Suez. 
It was noticeable that Mr. Mayhew, a critic of the East of Suez 
role, took no part in the defence debates of 1964, and Mr. Brown an 
ardent Europeanist directed his gaze in the direction of nuclear policy. 
Harold Wilson, who initiated and indeed inspired the new policy, Qnd 
Denis Healey,because he found it relatively easy to adapt it to the requirements 
tL. 
of Labour defence strategy, now became Labour's main spokesmtn on the East 
of Suez issue. These two policy-makers however retained a marked attitude 
towards this so-called new contribution to the defence of British national 
interests and repeatedly condemned on moral, political and economic grounds 
4 
the use of troops in pursuit of mere economic interests and argued instead 
that Britain should continue her world role, not, in the main, to support 
unique British interests, but as a contribution to world peace. Peace-
keeping became the euphe~ism best calculated to express the new-found 
ethusiasm for an imperial role. A British presence said Mr. Healey 
1 Vol. 696 H. of C. , 17th June, 1964, Col. 1299. 
2 
vol. 687 H. of C. , 16th Janua£if 1964 f Col. 545" 
3 ibid. 
4 See speeches by Healey, D. Vol. 696 H. of c. 17th June, 1964. 
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" can act as a deterrent to local conflicts, and can reduce the 
risk of war; and if war breaks out, the commitment of British troops 
can prevent avoidable human suffering and, above all, can help to prevent 
a small war turning into a large one in which the world powers become 
1 directly engaged". This scenario came close to an assertion that 
Labour would insist upon the maintenance of a great power status for 
Britain in all circumstances. 
On another occasion, Mr. Healey even more enthusiastically 
exclaimed that " •.• Britain is great and it will continue to be great 
and a world power by performing this immensely important service to 
world peace and to world order by using her capacity and experience 
in the~e parts of, the world to prevent misery, to prevent avoidable 
2 
suffering and that is the real role for Britain in the years ahead". 
The Shadow Minister of Defence with strident tones of a man certain of his 
mission even conceded that British intervention overseas was likely to 
increase and that there was " •.• no real prospect of a diminution in our 
3 
overseas responsibilities", as far as he could " •• look ahead". 
The Conservatives appeared confused but were quick to recognise 
the change in Labour's policy. Mr. Thorneycroft then Minister of 
Defence commented that " ..• it was thought at one time that the policy of 
the Labour PartY, was to give up the wider role and try to bring the troops 
back to Europe. They were always criticizing us for not doing something 
4 
about that." Nevertheless, to friend and foe alike, it was as yet 
uncertain whether the ostensible change in Labour's policy was a temporary 
1 Vol. 696 H. of C. [ 17th June! 1964 f Col. 1290. 
2 
vol. 690 H. of C. 26th February, 1964, Col. 470 
3 
vol. 690 H. of C. 26th February , 1964, Col. 470. 
4 
vol. 687 H. of C. 16th January, 1964, Col. 553. 
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aberration made possible by the determination of the party's new 
leader to keep Britain in the top-power League, or the beginning of 
a more profound and lasting commitment to the East of Suez role. It is 
impossible to see in Labour's thinking the influence ,of a coherent 
doctrine. 
It was not too difficult or complex for Mr. Wilson to successfully 
press his view upon his Party. Labour had no real defence policy to 
speak of and after 1961 the tension in Europe, caused by the Russian 
diplomatic offensive, eased, until the dramatic events in the 
Carribean in the following Autumn, and while the habit of questioning 
the East of Suez role remained after that date, it lacked the appalling 
sense of urgency of the late 1950s and of 1961 in particular. Moreover, 
the Labour leadership now thought that the capability required for its 
European defence policy could be sustained not by diminishing or abolishing 
the East of Suez presence, but rather by 'phasing out' the nuclear 
deterrent. The pressure on the nation's defence policy would thus prove 
transitory: the moral dlscredit of possessing a nuclear deterrent 
could be removed and thereby a massive shift of resources to non-nuclear 
role made possible. 
It also happened, by a quirk of fate, that Britain's diplomatic 
advances towards Europe had been rebuffed, just one month before Mr. Wilson 
became Labour's leader. This rejection encouraged a re-kindled distaste 
for an out and out continental strategy and a resurgent enthusiasm for 
the Commonwealth and the maritime role. 
In fact, the Labour leadership, despite American pressure strongly 
exerted by the Kennedy administration, had never become entirely 
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convinced about the merits of membership of the E.E.C. This was certainly 
the view of Denis Healey. He wrote:"It is a question of ensuring that 
the strain on Britain's relations with Continental Europe, while her present 
exclusion from the Common Market is held to threaten, is not reproduced 
on a far larger scale by strains between the North American continent and 
a European community which includes Britain". 1 The Labour leadership 
shared this view. It still tended to see the E.E.C. as a parochial 
essentially capitalist and perhaps nationalist 'white man's club' 
made up of a constellation of parties of the right, hell-bent on dismantling 
welfare and social security provision for the masses. Moreover, while 
the American pressure had only a limited impact on the Conservative 
Party which had decided in favour of a European strategy, it had even 
less on Labour, despite the leadership's respect for Kennedy, which was 
traditionally less influenced by American strategic views and in any 
case, as an opposition party, did not feel the full weight of that 
pressure. But even then Labour was more atlanticist than Europeanist 
in orientation when it came to political issues. 
It was almost inevitable that Conservative disillusionment with 
the Commonwealth would be greater than that of the Labour Party. It was 
the Conservatives, by virtue of being in power, that had to deal with the 
vagaries of Commonwealth politics; while Labour on the other hand from 
the more remote position of the Opposition benches could reasonably 
believe that when it gained power Commonwealth affairs would once again 
flourish, and that Britain, as a result, could be restored to a position 
of pre-eminence in international politics. 
1 Healey, D., International Affairs, Vol. 38, The Crisis in Europe, 
April 1962, p.l54. 
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The Conservative Government, in fact, by' 1964, had little real 
confidence in the Commonwealth or in Commonwealth Governments. It was 
critical of their political and administrative effiCiency, the overall 
lack of stability and the growing extremism of their indigenous 
ideologies. Above all, though, the Conservatives were now conscious 
of the Commonwealth's failing as a source of political strength to traditional 
British diplomacy. There had existed little Commonwealth solidarity in 
the U.N. for most of the time and Britain had sometimes been forced to 
line up with Portugal and South Africa in the face of bitter Commonwealth 
denunciation. 
The Conservatives, unlike Labour, never saw the Commonwealth 
an alternative to Europe. The Commonwealth was a hetrogeneous loosely 
defined body lacking the homogeneity of the European Community. For 
the Tories there were no ideological barriers obstructing closer ties 
with the continent: the pragmatic approach of Conservatives made for 
greater flexibility in defining the national interes~. On the other 
hand, while Labour's attitude towards Europe softened after 1960, the 
core of the Party's ideology still supported the Commonwealth connection. 
Labour, moreover, being more of an ideological party, but not however 
COmmitted to an absolute ideology, finds it more difficult to embrace 
a new policy unless some ideological justification can be expounded. In 
1961-64 no such ideological justification existed for a Eurocentric policy 
and one has not been discovered since which unites the Labour movement 
in relation to long-term goals. 
Not only then was Labour pro-Commonwealth, but more important it 
remained anti-European. This feeling was of course reinforced by the 
French veto and more espeCially by the manner in which President de Gaulle 
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exercised it. The Party's attitude towards the Common Market was 
volatile, like the state of public opinion which depended very la.rgely 
on the chances of a successful application. The veto reinforced and 
deepened former suspicions and encouraged the long held belief that 
there was now little hope that Britain could secure an entry on 
reasonable or any other terms to the Community. In consequence, the Labour 
leadership resolved that it seemed largely irrelevant for British foreign 
policy makers to concentrate on European affairs, and they should seek 
a new and dynamic perspective. 
Labour, in fact, underpinned the East of Suez role less because of 
a strong ideological attachment to the Commonwealth than because of a 
negative disregard for the alternative of closer ties with Europe. However, 
Labour's ties with the eommonwealth were real and Significant. In contrast 
to the Conservatives, the majority in the Labour Party saw the Commonwealth 
not as an instrument of international power politics for it lacked the 
essentials of a power-bloc, but, in itself, something of real merit. 
They had always seen Attlee's historic decision to quit India as more 
of a Party design than a national one. 
Labour also genuinely felt constrained to promote overseas aid 
in the hope that just as it had markedly expanded Commonwealth trade 
after the war, it could do so once more some twenty years later. No 
one in the Labour Party held this conviction more strongly than Harold 
Wilson. He retained tr.e view, held so vehemently in his stay at the Board 
of Trade in the post war Labour Government, that the Commonwealth was 
1 
"the cornerstone of economic recovery". 
1 Cited Foot, P. _The Politil:s of Harold Wilson 1968, p. 238 _ 
referring to a speech made by Harold Wilson to the House of Commons 
in 1950. 
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Another assumption made by Labour leaders, especially by those 
associated with the Attlee Government, like James Griffiths for 
example, was that it understood the Afro-Asian mind better than the 
Conservatives and, by virtue of its own history, had more sympathy 
for the problem of the under-privileged. The poor throughout the world 
, 
were members of the Labour Party's universal constituency and in consequence, 
it was said that Afro-Asian suspicion of a Labour Government would be 
substantially less than that of a Conservative one. A scintilla of truth 
Can be found in this proposition until Mr. Wilson actually became 
prime minister. ;-
Of even greater importance was Labour's comforting belief that 
the Commonwealth or their Western educated elites reflected marked 
socialist principles in their bid to construct new post-colonial 
independent societies. It was a multi-racial club, it was the seed 
bed of self government, and it was " ••• the only great political 
confederation which links the people of the advanced countries to those 
1 
of the developing ones." Labour had given independence to India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon, and had brought together into the new association, 
nations with different languages, races, relgions, cultures and ideals. 
It was thus Labour's political elite who took credit for the " ••• only 
instance of the transformation of an Empire built up by a powerful 
state in which that state has, through deliberate policy, divested 
itself of its power and transferred sovereignty to units of that 
2 Empire which were formerly subordinate". It was Labour that was 
setting the record straight, righting the wrongs of history, undoing 
1 
Labour Party Research Department, Twelve Wast~d Years, 1963, p.341. 
2 Labour Party Resear~ Department, Twelve Wasted Years, 1963, p.403-4. 
~ 
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the evils of the past, while it was the Conse::vatives, so the argument 
ran, who had irresponsibly through cyn~cism and ill-will undermined the 
goodwill fostered by the Attlee government between 1945-51. Labour 
characterized the 'twelve wasted years' following Attlee's administration 
as a series of disasters variously described as the "Cyprus tragedy", 
"the Suez debacle", the Commonwealth "sellout" at the 1961 Common 
Market negotiations and for general mismanagement of African affairs. 
Labour, however, remained convinced that it understood the problems of 
the newly emergent Commonwealth. 
A substantial degree of inchoate Commonwealth idealism, then, 
still existed within the Labour Party. Nevertheless, those Europeanists 
bent upon a change in policy and striving f0r an equally idealistic 
commitment to the Treaty of Rome, and other opponents of the East of Suez 
role did not cease to exist because of the new-found enthusiasm for the 
Commonwealth that followed De Gaulle's veto. Instead they entered out 
of common prudence or cowardice a period of self-inflicted tongue biting 
made even less enviable by what they thought to be the self-evident 
nonsense of those seeking a big world role for a truncated Britain. They 
were to be revived some years later. The secular impact of the external 
environment would prove too great for ideological arguments however 
compelling they appeared to be. 
In many respects Labour's renewed almost euphoric enthusiasm 
for the Commonwealth and the East of Suez role after 1963 can be 
attributed to the Party adopting a policy in deference to its leader's 
wishes. This proved possible because Labour is a vast coalition of 
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interests and for the time being it s erved those interests to defer to 
their new leader. Certainly Harold Wilson never tired of speaking of 
the Commonwealth in the most glowi?g and compelling terms. In one 
important speech shortly after his election as leader of the Party, he 
firmly and dramatically insisted that "The future of Britain is in the 
re-creation of our links with the commonwealth".l The imperial vision 
had not yet ended. 
The notion of Harold Wilson's Commonwealth romanticism appeared 
to many oddly inconsistent with the rathe~ dour puritan image usually 
associated with him. Yet Mr. Wilson's commonwealth sympathies resulted 
frem an entirely pragmatic and overwhelming conviction that he held, 
namely that if Britain were to exert influence in the world, above that 
of other middle powers, it was because of her unique Commonwealth 
connection. As Mr. Wilson argued that "in terms of modern economic and 
military strength, Britain alone can never exert the influence which Britain 
in the Commonwealth can exert".2 Moreover, this identification with 
the Commonwealth centred en his aspiration that he was intellectually 
equipped to lead and inspire Commonwealth governments to collaborate in 
solving world problems. Harold Wilson's enthusiasm for the Commonwealth 
was based on an ideological premiss, on personal ties with Commonwealth 
countries, on his Board of Trade experience in the post-war Labour 
Government. Moreover, his feeling for the Commonwealth was more marked 
even perhaps more passionate than most of his colleagues and his influence 
was therefore decisive in the formulation of Labour's East of Suez 
policy after 1963. 
1 Wilson, Harold. I Labour and the Commonwealth~ The Guardian, 23 February 1963. 
2 
Labour Party Conference Report, October, 1964, p.116. 
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Mr. Wilson I s personal influence on Labour's foreign policy 
must not be exaggerated. His pro-CoDUDonwealth speeches would not have 
been as well received by his closest colleagues had they not touched 
a sympathetic chord within the main body of the Party both on its 
industrial and political wings. That the~l! did was largely due to a 
marked 'little ~nglander' suspicion of Europe in general, a Germano-
phobia bordering on the unhinged, a genuine belief that strategically 
speaking there had been a relative decline in the efficacy of forces 
deployed in Europe compared with those serving in turbulent areas 
East of Suez, and a doctrinal attachment to the new CODUDonwealth which 
revealed itself in constant nostalgia and primordial flashbacks to its 
origins. 
It was evident that once the European crisis had passed into the 
limbo of an incipient detente, and the veto had been cast, by the 
Grand Charles at his famous Paris press conference, Labour returned 
to a more ideological orientation in its policy-making. 
Labour in Opposition: the tension between realpolitik and socialist 
ideology 
The Labour Party, despite its realtively modern birth from the 
womb of the industrial revolution and mass democracy, and its nineteenth 
century ideological roots articulated a largely traditional foreign 
policy in its published or official documents, and showed an early post-
war willingness to continue with most, if not all of Britain's traditional 
or so-called permanent commitments. Labour voters had always put nation 
before class. The Labour Party did likewise. Indeed, the inherent 
traditionalism of the nation's foreign policy was reinforced by Labour 
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which had an ideological sympathy towards Britain's main traditional 
interest - the Commonwealth. Moreover, the built-in British suspicion 
of Europe was exacerbated in the Labour Party by ideological considerations 
about the alleged right wing nature of European politics, and by the 
insularity of organised Labour and of their leaders in Britain. A 
salient reason for Labour's orthodoxy, during th~ greater part of the 
1950s and its attachment to traditional policies in general, and of the 
somewhat byzantine East of Suez role in particular, was that it had 
neither the propensity nor the intellectual need to question foreign 
policy assumptions. It was as always pre-occupied with domestic policies, 
the modernisation of Party thinking, the projection of a favourable image, 
the struggle for the Party leadership and the stinging electoral defeats 
of the 1950s. Foreign policy matters could only encroach on this intense 
domestic introspection if they were seen to be of critical importance to 
influential and ideologically motivated elements within Labour's vast 
coalition as was sometimes the case. The great CND debate was really 
about defence policy but since the unilateralists wanted a Labour 
government to pursue a neutralist line it had wide foreign policy implications 
as well. Yet the majority in the Party was unconcerned about the foreign 
policy consensus, but rather more concerned with questioning the consensus 
over the commitment to the management of a mixed economy. 
Moreover, even within the foreign policy field, Labour was fundamentally 
concerned with the issues which directly related to the 'national intarest', 
a difficult concept to define. Indeed the national interes~ could be what 
the foreign policy makers declare it to be. l It is easy enough to agree 
with Professor Frankel ' that the "national interest' is a singularly vague 
1 
Seabury, P. Power, Freedom and Diplomacy: the Foreign Policy of the 
United States of America, 1963, p.86. 
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concept. It assumes a variety of meanings in the various contexts in which 
it is used and, despite its fundamental importance, these meanings often 
cannot be reconciled; hence no agreement can be reached about its ultimate 
~ 
meaning. " Labour could well argue with Frankel's description of the 
national interest. But the top Labour leadership believed that it was 
possible to discover what was in the national interest by achieving a 
consensus about it. The issues of international disarmament, German 
rearmament and re-unification, the cold war, european disengagement, 
s great power summi~, arab-Israe~li conflict, Suez, Berlin, Cuba, Indo-
China, the united nations, nuclear strategy, N.A.T.O. and the European 
Community were the chief preoccupations of Labour in its search for inner 
party consensus. Most of these issues caused much bitterness . and great 
controversy while the East of Suez role appeared relatively undemanding 
and as such remained largelyuncontentious and therefore unexamined. 
There was never, certainly before 1958, rarely sustained long-term 
attention given by the Labour movement to the East of Suez role to put 
its continuance or its character in real doubt. The only time its 
strategic political value was cast in doubt independently of the European 
situation was when a cold war crisis blew up within the area itself, and 
at those times the British presence was unquestioningly taken by the 
Labour leadership to be self-evidently justified. Even the Keep Left 
group perceived the Commonwealth as a possible basis for a 'third force' 
led by Bri tain. They urged the leadership to accept "Socialis t planning 
on foreign affairs" and collaboration with all nations (including the 
2 U.S.S.R.) in "order to secure a socialist policy." 
1 
2 
Franke~, J. National Interest, 1970, p.lS. 
Keep Left statement, September 1947 quoted in Wil~ot, Edward. 
The Labour Party a short History, 19( 8, p.Sl. 
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The world role also mai~tained both Labour and Conservative support 
because neither party appreciated the fundamental changes that were 
occurring in the external environment, or worse, just how severe the 
strain on Britain's defence forces and national economy was likely to 
become. The Labour Party, to a lesser degree than the Conservative 
Party, though still to a significant extent established the parameters 
of its foreign policy on the basis of power-politics and the pursuit 
of national goals; on a determined pursuit of national security; and on 
an ongoing search for economic well-being, and finally, on a robust 
defence of national values of liberal democracy. These factors were 
real and their pursuit a legitimate concern of national government 
acting on behalf of the nation-state, but to the extent to which they 
were allowed to influence foreign policy thinking during a period of 
revolutionary change they inhibited perception of realities. It was 
thus traditionalism in Labour's thinking, as reflected in its declaratory 
foreign policy statements, in respect of its acceptance of and definition 
of subjective national interests and to its narrow assessment of national 
power, which allowed the East of Suez role to go largey unquestioned and 
unexamined (with the notable exception of Mayhew, Paget and Healey) prior 
to 1958, and even beyond. Scarcely any real in-depth review of defence 
policy was attempted before 1966 and that was part of action taken at 
the governmental and not parJty level. 
Yet whatever the view of the residual 'utopian' and 'scientific 
socialist' left within the Party about the nature of foreign policy 
there is no real evidence to suppose that the Labour leadership - largely 
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composed of Social-democrats of left, right and centre had failed to come 
to terms with power politics (See Chapter I). Indeed, 
Francis Williams' complaint that democratic socialism"had not even yet come 
fully to terms with the generic element of power in foreign affairs" has 
1 
no evidential support in the post-war period. Labour clearly believed 
in national power and in its relevance to international politics. 
There existed moreover sentiments of obligation and considerations 
of national security of an overriding nature which also helped to 
convince Labour of the wisdom of an East of Suez presence. This was 
perfectly wholesome and understandable, but it imposed a great stress 
on the disparate elements within the Party. While the Left Wing of the 
Party wanted to limit the scope of Britain's foreign policy, believing 
it to be largely misconceived and irrelevant, the great bulk of the 
Parliamentary Party accepted that Britain's world role was both necessary 
as a post-imperial responsibility and as an indubitable component of 
Western security. There was the belief that an international security 
system might emerge from the welter of Britain's imperial past. Although 
in favour of Britain divesting itself of some imperial responsibilities 
after the war, Labour still maintained that deployed military forc~ 
was necessary mostly in a deterrent role to protect newly formed states. 
It did not support aggressive military actions overseas, and notably 
Suez, but even the Suez debacle left the essentials of Britain's foreign 
policy more or less intact - this continuity in policy was accepted by 
Labour with more than equanimity. This benign acceptance of the continuity 
of foreign policy was advocated by Ernest Bevin in 1945 who called for 
1 
See Williams, Francis. Ernest Bevin: portrait of a great Engli shman, 
1952, p.252. 
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11 foreign and defence policy to be put on a different footing outside the 
party confli ct ... I 
And yet the East of Suez role was apparently not as deeply 
embedded in Labour's external perspective as it had seemed during those 
first disappointing few years of Labour opposition. By the late 1950s 
the role was under considerable attack. In fact, the entire traditional 
commitment to a bi-partisan approach to foreign policy was under attack. 
Of course, the imperial link was the weakest link and one which aroused 
the scepticism of the 'utopian' and 'scientific socialist' Left. This 
was simply because it was never really considered either the most vital 
part of the 'national interest' or the most central facet of the Party's 
' d 2 ~ eOlogy. It followed, therefore, ti.at if Britain's defence policy were 
to be revised, the East of Suez role could well expect on both economic or 
ideological grounds to be curtailed, if not completely dissolved. Of 
course Labour's defence policy came under attack from the Left. And 
given the diversity of the Labour Party such attacks proved to be of 
importance because the Party is essentially a coalition of interests. 
By 1958 Britain's defence policy was indeed under strain. The 
European crisis of that year exposed to the Labour leadership the dangers 
of over-commitment. The apparent discrepancy between capability and 
cOmmitment pointed inexorably towards a necessary curtailment of the 
East of Suez role. Moreover the increasing tension after 1957 between 
the continental and maritime roles coincided with a far reaching and 
historic debate within the Labour Party on the merits of a neutralist 
1 
2 
Gardon, M. _Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy, 1969, p.92. 
While no precise definition of the national interest is ever possible, it 
appears that the Labour leadership could accept the Brookings Foundation's 
description of the national interest as .. the general and continuing ends 
for which the nation acts, it encompasses the purposive element of foreign 
policy". See External Be] ations. Decision making in Britain VII. The 
Open University, 1972, p.59. 
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and non-nuclear foreign policy. For a very brief period it appeared 
likely that there might be a radical change in the content and style of 
Labour's foreign policy. That a major disavowal of collective security 
through N.A.T.O. could push the next Labour government into disarmament 
and n=u·tralism with the prospect that this would weaken the West vis-a-vis 
the Soviet bloc. The Scarborough Conference of 1960 perhaps revealed the 
first tentative sign by Labour's leadership that continuity in Foreign 
policy only made sense if Britain's power position remained constant. 
Mr. Gaitskell's robust defence of continued commitment to N.A.T.O. carried 
with it also the recognition that those basic principles which were relevant 
when Britain was a great power, were likely to be less appropriate to a 
middle power's foreign policy. Many Labour members of parliament were 
convinced that Britain was a middle rank power and as such should have 
regional and not universal interests; that conversely if she were to 
assume the posture and commitments of a superpower she must have the power 
of one. Generally speaking individual members of Labour's Shadow Cabinet 
and the party leadership as a whole perceived that attitudes towards 
Britain's imperial role were changing even if implicitly and that a value-
change was also occurring in relation to the idea that Britain was still 
a great power. Moreover, it was also perceived, however vaguely, by some 
Labour leaders - like Kenneth Younger for example - that the belief in the 
United Kingdom's world role was no longer shared by influential groups 
within Britain itself. l That by the mid-sixties no explicit set of beliefs 
of doctrine existed which j~stified a continued presence East of Suez. It 
is therefore all the more remarkable that Labour between 1960 and 1964 
acquired a renewed commitment to stay East of Suez. 
1 
See Younger, Kenneth. Britain's Role in a changing World,. 
Fabian Tract No. 327 pp. 5-16. 
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The European crisis also underlined the interelationship of the 
East of Suez role with other aspects of British foreign policy. 
Increasingly, during the 195Cs, it became painfully obvious that any 
change in one part of Britain's foreign or defence policy would inevitably 
initiate a kind of chain reaction throughout the entire policy. Such was 
the inter-dependent relationship between a continental and an extra-
continental commitment that the abandonment or modification of one was 
bound to affect the structure and viability of the other. Labour leaders 
were forced to articulate a distinction between vital and non-vital or 
peripheral interests which all defence planners have in the end to make. 
Europe by virtue of its close geographical proximity, and by the very 
nature of Soviet military capabilities, was considered vital, while East 
of Suez, being physically and psychologically more remote, was considered 
less vital. In consequence, the Party's attitude towards the East of 
Suez role showed a certain volatility which was consistent with the 
ambigUity the nation had always revealed towards expendable strategic 
commitments. Singapore had never been as strategically important to 
Britain as the Channel or the Rhine. Britain as ever was therefore 
dependent on a European balance of power. 
The spatial variable was thus of utmost significance for Labour 
1 in its consciousness of foreign policy matters. Manifestly in the case 
of the East of Suez-European dichotomy ~ distance was the decisive and 
expected variable, and it prevailed over histor.ical, cultural and even 
sentimental attachments. Certainly ideology was no compensation for it. 
1 
Even after the relaxation of European tensions in 1962, the 
Howard Michael, Britain's Defences, Survival, lIS, vol. 3, No. 1 ~ 
January-February 1961, p.35. Dr. Howard noted "the chronic schizophrenia 
from which Britain suffers as an off-shore island, at once part of the 
continent of Europe and detached from it." 
I 
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scope and content of Labour's foreign policy looked more and more 
as though it would be circumscribed by a Eurocentric posture. However, 
the secular trend towards a restriction in the scope and content of 
Britain's interests did not reach fruition while Labour was in opposition. 
Even if Hugh Gaitskell had lived it is doubtful whether the change 
1 
would have taken place for he too appeared rooted to an East of Suez role. 
The appointment of a new pro-Commonwealth and anti-European leader of 
the Party in 1963, who believed that the overwhelming danger to inter-
national security was local instability East of Suez, coincided with the 
2 
ostensibly sudden French veto of Britain's Common Market bid. Moreover, 
the European crisis over Berlin had ended before the liquidation of the 
Cuban-missile crisis. The crisis of British over-stretch in defence 
policy was eased, while her foreign policy initiative was stultified. 
Thus in 1964 there seemed to exist neither the incentive nor the 
opportunity for Labour drastically to alter Britain's foreign and defence 
policies. Indeed, Britain was now heavily engaged militarily East of 
Suez in stark confrontation with Sukarno's Indonesia which was on collision 
course with the ill-starred Malaysian Federation. A relatively big 
military build-up proved necessary. 
Labour's shifting and sometime bewildering evaluation of the East 
of Suez and European roles had a multitude of strategic, political and 
economic dimensions. During the 1950s the strategic dimension was most 
salient for the cold war was at its height. Moreover, it was only around 
1960 that the strategic dimension was given an overwhelming European focus. 
Before then the East of Suez role - the global focus - had appeared almost 
1 
2 
Death of British Democracy, op. cit., p.102. 
Harold Wilson was relatively free to shape Labour's East of Suez strategy 
because no political or party constraints restricted his freedom of action 
(see next Chapter) His attutudes, values, images were widely shared (or 
simply not disavowed) by his parliamentary colleagues. For a discussion of 
this phenomenon see Verba, Sydney, .AssumPtions of Rationality and Non-
Rationality in the Models on the International System, World Politics, 
XIV, pp. 93-117. 
\ 
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equally important in the fight against communism. Moreover, the Anglo-
American alliance extended in those days beyond Europe, Britain ~~d 
America were global partners. 
This strategic dimension though began to diminish in importance at 
the beginning of the end of the first post-war decade. This was due to 
several factors. Firstly, Britain was forced to admit in 1957 that she 
could no longer defend herself against ballistic-missile attack. The 
Channel had been overcome by technology. Secondly, in the same year, the 
Soviet Sputnik underlined the fact that United States could no longer, 
with impunity, from the safety of an almost invulnerable homeland, 
threaten massive retaliation on the U.S.S.R. Total nuclear stalemate 
between the superpowers was in prospect. Thirdly, in 1960 the failure 
of the Blue Streak missile system indicated that Britain could not 
sustain much longer a totally independent deterrent. Britain's deterrent 
was to become part of the deterrent forces committed to N.A.T.O. as set 
out in the Nassau agre~ment of December 1962. 1 And fourthly, after 1962, 
the perceived threat from the Soviet Union seemed to be slackening, with 
the ending of Mr. Kruschev's forward policies. The process of East-west 
detente was now well advanced. 
This diminishing concern with strategic matters militated in 
favour of Europe and against the imperial deployment of British resources. 
As detente between East and West emerged, the relative and absolute 
importance of the East of Suez role sensibly decreased. Indeed, by the 
early 1960s it was becoming plair. that unlike in the thirties, when 
Britain's defence policy was under pressure in Europe, the World Role appeared 
1 
The Permanent Alliance, op. cit. p. 
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the most expendable part of that policy. And curiously when that 
policy was not under pressure the role seemed for many in the Party either 
a needless extravagance, or even worse, shabby neo-colonialism. The 
European crisis as in all such crises revealed the essential brittleness 
of British defence policy which had extended British resources beyond that 
which they could properly sustain. As the cold war slackened in intensity 
there arose in the sixties an increasing concern and feel for economic 
matters. 
This growing concern with economic matters, and the important shifts 
in Labour's political attitudes at the turn of the decade, were 
irreversible and secular trends affecting the whole of British Society. 
Yet all three variables, strategic, economic and political, tended to 
point decidedly to a move from East of Suez towards Europe. The only 
possible impediment could be Labour's ideological attachment to the ideal 
of the Commonwealth which might one day become a community of democratic 
socialist states. 
The European-East of Suez dichotomy was however developing in 
opposite ways in Britain and the U.S.A. and this was a factor of considerable 
importance because of the inter-dependent relationships within the Western 
alliance. The Americans in the light of the Laotian and Vietnamese 
crises and the growing Soviet political and strategic interest in the 
Middle East, were in fact moving from a European to an East of Suez 
posture while Britain was moving in the opposite direction. 
This change in the focus of British interests sprang, before 1962, 
from considerations of strategic necessity and only after that date from 
wider foreign policy factors. That the initial move in Labour's thinking 
away from the East of Suez role can be attributed to defence requirements 
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is of crucial importance however perverse it appears, for the Party 
was notoriously unconcerned usually with British defence problems in 
, 1 t' f l ' 'd ' 1 1S0 a 10n rom wide foreign po 1CY conS1 erat10ns • Moreover, foreign 
policy issues tend invariably to dominate opposition thinking (especially 
if that Party is self-consciously ideological), for opposition parties 
are usually oblivious to or consciously myopic about environmental 
limitations and tend to believe that sufficient capability can always 
be developed to pursue goals which are thought 'necessary' to the national 
interest. That this was not so is almost certainly due to the extent and 
nature and close proximity of the European crisis. Britain whether socialist 
or not could not ignore a possible military threat emerging from within 
Europe. The problem of Britain's military overstretch becoming more and 
more obvious to all those engaged in establishing domestic priorities 
within a party largely concerned to meet the needs of a changing society 
in a bid to transform that society into a democratic-socialist one. 
Nevertheless, neither considerations of defence nor foreign policy 
proved absolutely conclusive, for the period of- severe defence strain 
soon passed even if only temporarily)and Britain's efforts to join the 
Common Market were for the time being vitiated by the French veto. 
However, these two alternate periods of domination first by defence and 
then by foreign policy (defence of course, always being considered as the 
servant of foreign policy) were indicative of the kind of pressure generated 
by the East of Suez role. 2 This revealed how existing commitments 
1 
2 
However Professor James Barber takes a different view when he contends that 
"some of the great conference debates and divisons have come on foreign 
policy issues". I do not disagree but would argue that detailed interest 
in and grasp of defence issues within the Labour Party is much less marked. 
See Barber, James. Who Makes British Foreign POlicy? 1976, p.Sl. 
It may be objected that in principle the distinction between defence and 
foreign policy is almost impossible to draw, but in practice,since the advent 
of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles,a fundamental distinction has 
emerged. This results, I think, from the application of deterrent theories 
to inter-state behaviour which do not seek to remedy or remove qrievances 
between states. Therefore attempts to ~€medy or remove grievances between 
states are likely to be a part of foreign policy rather than of defence. 
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invariably pre-determined the nature of the national priorities that 
governments and opposition parties felt oonstrained to establish. 
A final and very important but suppressed element in Labour's 
shifting attitude towards the overseas presence was the role of socialist 
ideology. That is to say, those values embodied in the concepts of 
social and racial equality, co-operation between peoples and the presumed 
fraternity of nation-states. Indeed, the East of Suez debate between the 
Left and Right reflected the much larger internecine political disagreement 
about whether basic socialist ideals shou~d or could be pursued in their 
pure form or whether they should be substantially adapted to domestic and 
international realLties. Could such socialist values or for that matter 
any values be relevant in a world living in a state of nature? 
The debate on international affairs though bitter and often 
primitive at Party Conference and at N.E.C. meetings was never so traumatic 
as the domestic struggle within the Party as epitOmised in the clause four 
debate which centred around the leadership struggle between Hugh Gaitskell 
and Aneurin Bevan. l The Labour movement nevertheless witnessed some 
fairly spectacular blood-letting and such , controversies largely derived 
frcm the utopian Left's implacable paSSion for a more articulated and 
wholesome foreign policy based on such values as unaggressiveness, 
benevolence and a disinterestedness in power. While Labour's neo-marxist 
or 'scientific socialist' left appeared equally bent on taking Britain out 
of N.A.T.O. and into the delights of neutralism or even, as Hugh Gaitskell 
2 
once alleged, into the Warsaw Pact. 
1 
2 
Mr. Bevan described Hugh Gaitskell as "a dessicat€.:d calculating machine". 
Quoted in Wilmot, Edward, gp. cit. p.aa. 
Private remark made to the author's twin brother Alan Lee Williams, M.P. 
by Hugh Gaitskell in October 1960. Mr. Williams was then National Youth 
Officer of the Labour Party. 
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Because the Party failed to arrive at any consensus as to a 'socialist' 
approach to the East of Suez role or even the basis of its ideological 
rationale for its foreign policy, agreement on specific issues was only 
periodic. Even worse, the East of Suez role was more ideologically 
ambiguous and potentially loaded with 'moral issues' than most other 
aspects of Labour's foreign policy since it cut across so many Party 
values. 
Moreover, the Party as a whole was not untouched by the contagion 
of pragmatism which had for so long dominated British political culture. 
Of course pragmatism is a method of deciding issues, which is not value-
free. It constitutes 'trial and error' which is the basis of liberal-
democratic ideology. As a result there was no real perceived need to 
fit the East of Suez role into a new formulated and purposive foreign 
policy or to discard it because it was not in accord with the pure milk 
of socialist ideology. Labour's thinking as expressed in official 
policies suffered from the belief that its foreign policy should not be 
wholly directed towards the 'national interest', but neither was the 
Party agreed on what socialist values should or could influence policy. 
Clearly a variety of factors impinge,including constraints, perceptions 
as well as the so-called national interest~l The resulting synthesis 
of socialist values and 'national interests' not surprisingly led to 
ambivalent attitudes towards foreign policy. Many within the extra-
parliamentary Party denied the existence of tne 'national interest' 
2 
altogether. No distinctively socialist foreign policy ever emerged 
from the Labour Party. Only a chimerical hope remained that a 
1 
2 
See Northedge, F. S. in External Relations, Decision Making in Britain VII 
(Parts 1-7) , 1972, Open University Press, pp. 95-113. 
RaymondAr~n would also agree that no rational national interest can 
be discovered. See International Journal XXI, 1967, p. 194. 
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a 'socialist foreign policy' was ever likely to be practicable. 
While a 'pragmatic' approach to foreign policy avoids the rigidity 
associated with an overtly ideological foreign policy, and indeed 
avoids the absurdity of supposing that ideology alone can be the main 
spring of foreign policy, it also tends to preclude th~ grand unswerving 
pursuit of a high purpose. It can lead to inconsistencies and contradictions 
as its fragmentary nature encourages the review of partial re-ordering of 
some aspects of the policy in isolation from the whole. The policies are 
acquired incrementally and are not referred to a central purpose. For 
no guiding purpose can emerge from such an unreflective process and the 
policy when it emerges is no more than the sum total of a series of compromises 
between entrenched interests. 
Thus, a pragmatic foreign policy in the sense of a policy being 
determined by trial and error can become a policy without a core: a 
policy with a large perimeter but no centre - a traditional reflex devoid 
of a genuine rationale. l Although all foreign pclicy must be derived 
in a general sense from political ideology Labour lacked an explicit 
set of beliefs which could explain reality and thereby prescribe goals 
for political action. In the final analysis Labour accepted and practised 
the Liberal approach to politics which assumes politics to be a matter of 
trial and error. Labour adopted the empirical approach to politics and 
categorically rejected the myth of a 'socialist' solution to the 
viCissitudes of international politics. Foreign policy under Labour was 
derived from a pragmatic frame of mind (trial and error) which established 
foreign policy goals in very broad terms. A definite lack of coherence 
or focus disfigured foreign policy because policy goals and actions were a 
1 
See Holsti, K. J. International Politics, 1967, p.132. 
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response to domestic and external conditions which different governments 
perceived differently. Only in the 1960s was there an attempt to provide 
in Britain's foreign policy a European core to either support or displace 
perceived peripheral interests. Thus, because the East of Suez role 
was not part of a coherent foreign policy, though one not devoid of 
liberal-democratic ideology in regard to the articulation of the image 
of political stability, it was peripheral in terms of what the political 
elites agreed to be 'national interest', it was unstable. This policy 
was threatened after 1958 by capability diminution and by fluctuations 
in more vital areas of Britain's foreign policy arising from changes 
in the external environment. 
It is not quite true and never can be so that the official Party 
line was totally devoid of ideological objectives - this it certainly 
was not, but it was free of a commitment to an absolute ideology like 
that associated with avowedly marxist-socialist regimes. But Labour had 
a 'grand design' even a sense of mission that Britain by its example 
could save mankind. This belief led Aneurin Bevan once to remark that 
'There is only one hope for mankind, and that hope still remains in this 
little island,.l This sentiment lay at the centre of much of the Left 
Wing's critique of official Labour Party policy, that Britain possessed 
through the Labour movement an incomparable asset for the promotion of 
2 
world peace and that the whole of Africa and Asia was awaiting its lead. 
This called for bold domestic policies and dramatic foreign policy 
gestures. This approach was rightly castigated by the right as utopianism 
of the worst sort. Indeed, the Rightist contention was that Labour 
1 
2 
Quoted in Bell, Coral. The Debatable Alliance, 1964, p.2. 
This santiment lay at the heart of Mr. Kingsley Martin's editorial 
bias as revealed in Jhe New Statesman and Nation (as it then was) 
in the early and mo-fifties. 
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would have to accept an overt compromise on her foreign policy principles 
since it could never control the external environment to the same extent 
as the domestic scene. 
. 
I 
The Left Wing, however, retained its ideological reslience and 
~ 
cOmmitment. It continued to see the East of Suez policy as a means of 
changing the international environment, the beginnings perhaps of a third-
world neutralist bloc, led by Britain seeking a solution to war. The 
Ultimate goal for the 'utopian' and 'scientific socialist' Left was a 
socialist world order. In the final analysiS a socialist commonwealth 
or world order could not be reconciled with 'capitalism and imperialism.' 
However, perhaps bec~use of this Unwillingness to compromise, the Left 
Wing's aspirations became remote from actual Labour policy and its influence 
only marginal. Moreover, the Left was never a monolithic bloc and attitudes 
to the imperial role varied a great deal. The Left Wing aspirations 
represented the more radical and militant attitude of Party activists 
who believed in the class-war and readily accepted that a choice had to 
be made between supporting 'progressive' or 'reactionary' regimes. The 
Party's immediate objectives as defined by the parliamentary leadership 
were notable for their lack of ideological pretentiousness. However, 
within the Labour Party as a whole there persisted a strong emphasis 
on ideology which always revealed itself at the annual conferences often 
to the chagrin of the Parliamentary leadership. 
Without any doubt the period 1951-64 reveals that the subsequent 
decision to withdraw from East of Suez was not simply the result of 
Britain's economic crisis but had its birth pangs long before January 
1968.1 Indeed, during this formative period the World Role was 
1 Indeed the economic consequences of Britain's world role were 
deliberately exaggerated according to Professor Wilson. See Wilson, 
Thomas, What Can we Afford? Britain's Sham Poverty. The Statist, 
London, February 4, 1966. 
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noticeably undermined by a number of variables which received a response 
from Britain's foreign policy makers - the European-East of Suez 
dichotomy, the growing discrepancy between capability and commitment, 
the problems of alliance politics, the balance of payments situation, 
the concern over whether Britain should be a regional or a world power, 
the question of economic growth and of technological innovation, and 
the doubts about whether political, economic or strategic considerations 
should or even coulddommate foreign policy making. 
Dilemmas of this nature were not easily solved by the Labour 
Party in opposition because its attitudes and values were varied and 
conflicting. Moreover as Professor Barber contends, fo~eign and defence 
issues within the Labour Party have proved critical to intra-party 
1 
conflicts because they also related to domestic issues. Traditionalism, 
a great concern with domestic affairs, a commitment to Liberal-democracy 
and parliamentarianism, basic socialist values, antithetical assessments 
of the cold war, trade union concern about trade, inflation, incomes and 
unemployment and many other attitudes, all interacted to give Labour's 
foreign and defence policies before the constraints imposed by the 
responsibilities of office a distinctive lack of precision and somewhat 
rhetorical character. These attitudes were all taken forward from the 
opposition benches into Government. We can now examine the pOSition once 
~A~~~ w~~ I in office and see how the Wilson Labour government grappled with the 
realities of power and with particular reference to the decision in 1968 
to withdraw from East of Suez by 1971. 
I 
Barber, ~op. cit. p.Sl. 
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C H APT E R V 
LABOUR'S GRAND DEFENCE STRATEGY ON THE EVE OF POWER 
Mr. Wilson's first Labour Government took office on a t'lave of hope 
and calculated optimism. Hope was based on the expectation that stop-
go economic policies would end; calculated optimism, on the feeling 
that with a modicum of planning the problems of society would be responsive 
to orderly and civilised change. A rational defence policy not only 
appeared likely. It seemed almost certain under the brilliant and well-
informed Mr. Healey. The new Defence Secretary was the master of his 
subject and no subject was fraught with greater moral, intellectual and I 
technical complexity than that of defence in the nuclear age. He was 
the first 'defence intellectual' to become defence minister since the war. 1 
Already the formidable catalogue of mistakes during the Conservative 
period of rule made depressing reading. According to the Labour Party, 
the Conservative record had been one of waste and miscalculation on a 
truly monumental scale. Conservative Governments "had failed to come 
up with a real defence policy, failed to fulfil pledges to NATO, failed 
in their proclaimed intention to maintain the British nuclear deterrent, 
failed to provide balanced forces to honour Commonwealth and other 
treaty commitments, failed to overcome anachronistic inter-service 
rivalries and failed to spur progress to international disarmament - the 
only sure defence in these times.,,2 The Labour Party complained also 
about the cost of defence which, running at around El,500~ or more a year, 
meant expenditure "on schemes predictably fitted only for the scrap heap". 
Criticism of the number of Ministers of Defence since 1951 (nine in all) 
played a large part in the Labour Party's case against the 
1 The Policies of Power, op. cit., pp. 130-143. 
2 
Twelve Wasted Years, op. cit., p.389. 
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Conservative record because it has resulted in the annual Defence White 
Paper becoming" landmarks of folly, full of pretentious claims and over-
statements, but each contradicting its predecessors and lacking in 
any consistent l rational POlicy."l All this was to end. Mr. Healey 
had a policy. In "Policy for Peace" three crucial paragraphs stood out: 
7. We seek the banning of all nuclear weapons everywhere. But the west 
cannot renounce nuclear weapons so long as the Communist bloc possesses 
them. 8. Britain, however, should cease the attempt to remain an 
independent nuclear power, since this neither strengthens the alliance 
nor is it now a sensible use of our limited resources. 9. The west 
must never be the first to use the H-Bomb. The NATO armies, however, 
are at present perilously dependent on nuclear weapons. The aim should 
be that they need never be the first to use nuclear weapons of any kind. 
For this would be to turn a conventional conflict into a nulcear war. 
With this end in view Britain should press urgently for the following 
objectives: To make it possible for NATO to halt a local conflict with 
conventional weapons alone. To stop the spread of nuclear weapons to 
individual countries inside the alliance. To establish satisfactory 
collective political control of Wes.tern nuclear weapons and military 
2 
strategy. " 
This was a coherent policy and in relation to (1) NATO, (2) overseas 
bases, (3) the Royal Navy, (4) the RAF and (5) defence organisation was 
a traditional and pre-eminently Atlanticist policy. 
1. NATO: The Labour Party endorsed the strictures of General Lauris 
Norstad, NATO's Supreme Commander in Europe until January, 1962, who 
repeatedly criticised the manpower weakness of the BAOR and other 
1 ibid., p. 389. 
2 ibid., p.396. 
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1 European contingents in Europe. This Atlanticist criticism related 
to the appalling choice confronting NATO if it remained too weak to face 
a Russian conventional challenge except by nuclear weapons. John Strachey, 
one of the Labour Party's leading intellectuals, pointed out that this 
2 meant literally the choice between surLender or all-out nuclear war. 
Labour defence specialists noted the views of President Kennedy, and 
his decision to expand US conventional resources in order to achieve 
a system of flexible response free of dependence upon massive retaliation 
or abject surrender. Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker, the party's spokesman 
on defence, said in 1962 that British resources should be spent not on 
a nuclear contribution to the defence of Western Europe but "on really 
3 
good mobile and well-equipped conventional forces". This, he further 
argued, would give Britain greater influence within the NATO alliance and 
this mattered more to her than remaining an independent nuclear power. 
The BAOR could thereby make up for its severe deficiencies as regards 
means of transport, modern conventional weapons and equipment of almost 
every kind. Mr. Healey had often complained about the deployment of the 
BAOR which seemed ill-prepared for combat with some of its units located 
over lOG miles from their planned battle positions. The remedy lay 
in finanCing new accommodation in appropriate areas and in an effort to 
4 deploy well-balanced conventional forces in those new areas. 
2. Overseas Bases: Labour took the view that although the 1961 Defence 
White Paper contained an attractive world map, revealing British armed 
forces deployed on a world scale from Hong Kong to the West Indies, 




On the Prevention of War, op. cit., p.113. Mr. Strachey admitted with 
commendable modesty that "It is much easier to criticize the present 
policy and military doctrines of NATO than to suggest a viable alternative". 
~Nleve Wasted Years, op. cit. p.392. 
ibid., p.398. Labour even complained that "in 1957 and 1958, the Tories 
steam-rollered the allies into accepting the withdrawal of 22,000 men. 
~~s ~day (1964) BAOR, reformed into seven Brigade groups, has an 
abhshed strength of only 55,000 mE;n." 
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this grand commitment - "in penny packets" - made little sense militarily 
or politically. The real need was for the "curtailment of standing 
overseas garrisons, with coverage of our commitments by strong, highly 
mobile strike forces poised, with the best conventional equipment, for 
instant deployment, in any trouble spots where they may be required". 
This suggestion appealed very much to Harold Wilson who believed in a 
maritime strategy. 
3. Royal Navy: In regard to the navy, the policy was most explicit -
a maritime strategy. Labour extolled the virtues of sea-power. A 
sufficiently strong amphibious force required the capacity to mount 
more than one operation at a time and they were dependent upon the big 
commando ships. In 1963 only two were in service: the Bulwark and the 
Albion. But the Labour Party seemed ready to pledge an increase in 
amphibious capability. The 1962 White Paper set out a typical 
"amphibious task force" designed for overseas emergencies. l Labour 
admitted the value of such forces and went on to indicate a readiness 
to increase the number of ships afloat. For it was conceded that 
Bulwark and her escorts had operated efficiently in the Kuwait landings 
of 1961. The essential criticism, though, on which the Conservative Party 
remained silent, was that Britain would then have been incapable of 
handling a second emergency at the same time. 
The Labour Party criticised the Nassau Agreement (under which 
Polaris was acquired for the Royal Navy). It declared itself against the 
agreement because "Admiralty planners, anxious to build up the badly 
needed ambibious conventional forces, will be forced to ciivert 
1 
ibid., p. 399. Labour was anxious to press for bigger amphibious 
strike-forces over overseas emergencies. 
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1 funds to the pointless venture of a mythical seaborne deterrent", 
which was a rather curious way of describing what others would describe 
as the most perfect invulnerable deterrent system yet devised. 2 
4. Royal Air Force: Over the RAF the Labour Party's attitude was 
markedly equivocal. It was perceived by the party that the day 
of the manned bomber was short-lived. In future, party spokesmen 
4 
rei~ated, the use of strategic nuclear bombers would be doubtful; 
rockets were, in any case, taking over increasingly the anti-aircraft 
role of fighters and also the tactical bombing role on, or near, the 
battlefield. It was confidently asserted, with particular irony, 
that air support for commando task forces was likely to come increasingly 
from the Fleet Air Arm. The vital function of RAF Transport Command (as 
it was then) had been critically affected "by bungling and the starving 
3 
of requisite financy by the Tory Government." This lack of foresight had 
resulted in Transport Command seeming nearly obsolete and in no 
position, without assistance from requisitioned civilian aircraft, to 
airlift quickly service personnel and equipment to trouble spots 
as the occasion arose. Endless delays over procurement - over the provision, 
for example, of the long-range Belfast heavy freighter - had severely 
handicapped Britain's global role. 
5. Defence Organisation: Drastic rationalisation was required in the 
Ministerial structure and service commands. The plans presented in the 
1963 White Paper were regarded as disappointing because th~ further plan 




ibid., p. 399 • 
On Prevention of War, Ope cit. p.62, John Strachey regarded the sea-
borne deterrent rather more sympathetically. 
Twelve Wasted Years, Ope cit., p.400. Labour cautiously 
"the one vital function still fulfilled by the Air Force 
transport command". 
conceded that 
is that of RAF 
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opportunities for the staking of individual service claims. And it was 
the singular failure of the Conservative Government to quell "the inter-
service rivalries and empire-building which had led to duplication of 
effort, both in employment of manpower and commissioning of expensive 
weapons and equipment.,,4 The Labour Party approvingly endorsed the 
view that "until a single ministry is given full responsibility for 
operations, plans and intelligence throughout the defence forces, until 
there is a central defence budget instead of separate estimates for each 
service, and until the Admiralty, the War Office and the Air Ministry 
are reduced to the size and scope of administrative headquarters, 
defence policy in Britain will continue to be bedevilled by inter-
service politics and prejudice". 1 
Such was the Labour Party's policy at the outset of the first 
Wilson Government and it can be said to express a workable policy 
based upon compromise. Its general formulation was acceptable to the 
US Administration and was in accordance with an Atlanticist view of 
Western security. Moreover, the policy, taken as a whole, was a reasoned 
attempt to enhance both Britain's capability and influence in the world. 
It suffered from over-generalisation and from an equivocal attitude to 
nuclear weapons which Hugh Gaitskell, the party's leader, sought to combat 
2 
at the Scarborough conference of 1960. 
There were three major assumptions underpinning Labour's defence 
policy. Firstly, that whatever the circumstances defence savings must 
be achieved; secondly, that a sustained and sophisticated European role 
should be given high priority; and thirdly, that an improved capability 
1 
2 
The Times '. 9th January 1963, Basis for a Logical Policy. 
During the 1960 Annual Conference of the Labour Party held at Scarborough 
between 3rd and 7th October, Mr. Hugh Gaitskell paSSionately defended 
the traditional defence and foreign policies of the Labour movement. 
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for the imperial role should be achieved through better planning and 
resource allocation. It was an ambitious policy and lacked a central 
doctrine, but contained a number of possibilities which pointed towards a 
re-emphasised role East of Suez. Labour's marked inclinations towards an 
East of Suez role however seemed to be indicated by the intensity of 
interest not expressed with regard to Europe or towards the fate of 
both NATO and the EEC. 
The real question was whether these three policy declarations 
contained in Labour's defence policy were compatible or whether 
Labour's commitment to make defence savings diminished any hope of 
improving Britain's grand stategic objectives. Clearly, Labour's 
resolve to play a significant role on the continent ran counter to a 
desire to expand Britain's role East of Suez. 
AS we have seen,>by the time of the General Election Campaign in 
1964~ the general drift of Labour's external policy was clearly established. 
This policy was essentially traditional and even conservative in character. 
There were many factors which explain this conservatism in 
Labour's foreign policy - Harold Wilson's own preferences, a resolve that 
Labour should line-up as a responsible alternative government, Lhe 
structure of the Party with its parliamentary-centred deciSion-making 
1 
orientation, and a domestic pre-occupation. The relevance of this re-
endorsement of traditional interests soon became evident. It helps 
explain Labour's definition of the East of Suez role and makes explicable 
the somewhat expansive character of Labour's foreign policy. 
The conservatism in Labour's foreign policy was reinforced noticeably 
by Mr. Wilson's predilection for the pursuit of means rather than ends. 2 
1 
2 
See interesting inside account of the differing pressures on Harold Wilson 
both as leader and Prime Minister in Williams, Marcia , Inside Number la, 
1972. 
Perhaps Mr. wilson preferred a de-ideologized or non-socialist foreign 
policy rather than a non-ideological foreign policy which is strictly 
speaking impossible. 
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Policy was to be constructed on a workable compromise rather than on the 
basis of principle. Harold Wilson's leadership style - his dislike of 
confrontation - made for ambiguity in policy and consequently to a 
somewhat contrived peace between the left and right wings of his Party. 
The Left within the party was quiescent because of an electoral need 
inseparable from the need to gain power, but Mr. Wilson's ability to 
balance or indeed to neutralise the two Wings was also an essential and 
central feature of the acceptance of a non-ideological foreign policy.l 
The traditionalism inherent in Labour's foreign policy cannot, 
though, be simply ascribed to the political primacy of Mr. Wilson. In 
fact, Labour's traditionalism had been asserted throughout its history, 
and particularly in the late 19405 by Ernest Bevin, Labour's most 
esteemed foreign secretary, and reiterated by Hugh Gaitskell in 1960. 
There were also certain so-called permanent interests which made 
for traditionalism. The structure of the Party institutionalised a 
certain rigidity because it tends to ~eflect a slow decision-making process 
which is influenced by a complex voting procedure in many different organs 
of the party.2 In addition, there was a tendency toward domestic 
introspection which was a separate tradition on the left reflecting a 
more general feeling of apathy if not rejection of foreign affairs. As 
a result there was no dynamic element within the Party seeking change, 
and hence no far reaching re-definition of national interests'. The 
main feature of Labour's foreign policy was, then its inherent 
traditionalism. This led to a broad foreign policy consensus and to 
the articulation of traditional commitments. The assertion of ideological 
claims simply receded. 
1 
2 By non-ideological in this context is meant a non-socialist foreign policy. 
See excellent analysis . of the distribution of political power within 
the Labour Party in McKenzie, R. British Political Parties, 1964. 
pp. 485-578. 
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Yet this tendency toward a broad foreign policy was counteracted 
somewhat by the traditional insularity of the Labour Party. Mr. Wilson 
revealed a parochialism shared by many of his colleagues. Despite rather 
vague allusions to the manifest need to sustain a 'Socialist Commonwealth I 
Mr. Wilson's speeches reflected a decidedly narrow perspective. He 
admi tted that his "vision" had" •.. a certain nationalist streak in it ••• " 
and that one " ••. might call me a little Englander in consequence"l 
This he indeed remained. 
It would be wrong to suppose that Harold Wilson was indifferent to 
foreign affairs: indeed some of the problems about which he felt most 
passionately - the Commonwealth, the Common Market and the German problem, 
particularly in the mid-fifties - were foreign policy issues of resounding 
importance. It was clear that if ever he became Prime Minister he would 
attach importance to both his own and Britain's diplomatic esteem in 
international politics. 
In line with Harold MacMillan's style of personal diplomacy in 
his visit to Moscow in 1964, Mr. Wilson emphasised to Mr. Khruschev 
the value of annual summit meetings which he saw of importance in 
helping to maintain international stability. 
Mr. Wilson's distrust of continental politics led to a strong 
personal ideological commitment to the Anglo-Ame~ican alliance. Well 
before the October 1964 election, though, it was clear beyond reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Wilson took the view that the Anglo-American connection 
was paramount in his assessment of the national interes~. 
Mr. Wilson's gritty determination to uphold the alliance with the 
u.s. revealed his attachment to another of Britain's traditional links, 
1 Wilson, H. Listener, Vol. 72, 29th October, 1964, p.656. 
- 156 -
1 the Commonwealth. This attitude reflected has marked anti-European, 
and particularly anti-German stance which the Atlanticist concept in his foreign 
policy orientation basically reflected. Britain must therefore continue 
her role East of Suez, with the U.S. as her foremost ally, and with 
full participation in N.A.T.O., but refusing to get involved in any 
attempt to integrate the economies of Western Europe through the European 
community. It was clear that under Wilson's leadership Labour would 
retain the inherited weight of Britain's traditional interests. 
It became apparent that if defence savings were achieved they 
must be realised through a more efficient defence structure and not 
through a diminution of the nation's commitments. This hope rested on 
a more cost-conscious approach to the management of defence expenditure 
' which was seen as the real answer to the problem of meeting existing 
2 
cOmmitments without a massive reduction in capabilities. 
Labour's attitude therefore towards the East of Suez role must 
be seen in the context of a wider defence spectrum, since the inter-
relationship between different facets of defence policy is a complex 
one. Labour's European, overseas and nuclear policies were, for example, 
so inter-related, and were all dependent on limited resources, that a 
change in the priorities attached to one was certain to result in a change 
in attitude towards the other. The East of Suez policy did not, and could 
3 
not, operate in isolation. 
When the painful decision to withdraw was reluctantly made in 




See Paul Foot's savage biography, The Politics of Harold Wilson for 
an assessment of his Commonwealth commitment. 
The Policies of Power, Ope cit. pp.167-19l. 
See Zinkin, Maurice. The Commonwealth and Britain East of Suez, 
Internation«l Affairs, Vol. 42 No. 2, April 1966 pp.207-229. Mr. Zinkin 
asserted that "'It is still the need to protect Commonwealth interests 
which makes it so difficult for Britain simply to sign the Treaty of Rome." 
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the value of the East of Suez policy: nor was it the result of any 
ideological objections to the World Role. It was that once again 
external factors compelled an appraisal of the role East of Suez. 
The question became clear: how strongly did Labour want to stay East 
of Suez, and to what extent were other priorities worthy of sacrifice 
so that the imperial posture could be sustained? 
Of course Labour could not notionally accept that in opposition 
it had to choose between priorities, but it was clear that the ambitious 
nature of Labour's defence posture eventually made a choice inevitable 
when Labour was in power. The three basic elements of defence savings, 
an effective perhaps even bigger East of Suez presence, and a greater 
European capability, induced the very bleak conditions that drove the 
formidable wedge between Britain's maritime and continental strategies. 
It is arguable that this contradiction has lain at the heart of British 
foreign policy for some years. It can be argued that in many respects 
foreign and defence policy have never in fact been very closely related 
since 1945. 1 This was the central contradiction in Labour's defence 
policy in opposition, and it was to become very apparent after they won 
the October election. In fact, despite Labour's premises to cut back 
defence expenditure, it became clear beyond peradventure that Labour 
was committeed to a defence posture that was the most ambitious it had 
ever advanced. Perhaps no political party this century had urged upon 
the British people such an ambitious programme for national prestige and 
recovery. 
Labour's defence plans were certain, if pursued, to erode the 
central assumption that defence savings could be achieved. It was 
1 
See Darby, Philip, British Defence Policv East of Suez, 1947-68( 
1973, pp. 16-21 and pp. 135-42. 
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almost certain if not entirely predictable that Labour would have to 
abandon its declaratory defence policy. However, what was not so clear 
or predictable was the direction and extent of the modification likely 
to occur. That modification would seriously undermine the nature of 
Labour's foreign policy, and in particular, that it would compel, a 
complete pUll-out from the East of Suez role, seemed remote in 1964. 
Labour's defence policy faced inevitable readjustment in the light of 
the realities of the external environment and in the light of economic 
Hmi tations. 
Labour's commitments to the East of Suez presence was dramatically 
underlined by a commitment to a maritime strategy. Labour's 
attachments to the World Role was emphasised by an overt reliance on 
naval power to fulfil that role. It also revealed how the naval 
contribution was to be financed given its somewhat expansive nature. 
"I believe" said Mr. Wilson, "that in the remaining years of this 
century our historic role as a naval power is going to find a new 
fulfilment both in helping newly established nations and in moving 
rapidly and effectively in fulfilling an international police role. 
This means naval forces, and these cannot be afforded if we are spending 
1 
our substance on the pursuit of illusory nuclear status". 
A revitalised period for the Navy was in prospect. Mr. Wilson 
made this clear durin-g the election campaign in Britain. "The Navy 
has been run down to a dangerously low level", he said, "and is now 
pathetically inadequate in numbers of ships in commission, in manning 
2 
and in most modern types, such as nuclear powered hunter-tracker submarines." 
And then, in a bid to underscore a positive commitment, Mr~ Wilson argued 
1 
2 
From a speech at Bridgeport University, Connecticut, USA, 3rd March 1964. 
Cited by Vickers, Dame Joan, Vol. 704, H. of C. 14th December, 1964. 
Col. 127, referring to Mr. Wilson's election speech in her Devonport 
Cons ti tuency. 
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that "We believe that in the 'present condition of the world, we need 
a stronger and more effective Navy. Later, he expostulated on the 
qeustion of how Labour was to finance this re-vamped role. "We shall 
need an expanded naval ship-building programme. How are we going to 
pay for it? Out of the savings made through stopping the wasteful 
1 
expenditure on the politically inspired nuclear programme". This 
analysis found wide support from his colleagues. 
Labour also castigated the Conservative Party for accepting a 
truncated Navy which was able only to mount one amphibious task 
force. This meant that the government was incapable of dealing with 
two emergencies, "of the Kuwait type"!-€imultaneous~ should they 
arise~e problem was diagnosed by Mr. Healey with great force. 
"Most difficult of all we may have to face eight or nine or a dozen 
simultaneous actions in different parts of the world. This is the 
2 
really serious and dangerous problem we face". The stra tegic position 
was even more suspect because of the difficulties of keeping l a rge 
,f 
bases, the problem of OVe~Ying rights and the extraordinary care needed 
for acclimatising troops who might be needed East of Suez yet were training 
in Europe or were stationed in the bracing climate of Rhine Westphalia. 
The solution Labour advocated was quite simply to build " •.. a modern 
amphibious warfare squadron which can stay at sea much longer and hover 
round th " i ,,3 e cr1S1S po nt ••. 
Labouris intention to improve the navy was very much r e lated to the 
wider objective ·to make Britain's forces more mobile. The requirements 
1 
Harold Wilson, Forum Cinema, Plymouth, 27th September 1964. 
2 
Healex, D. Vol. 690, H. of C. 26th February! 1964! Col. 472. 
3 Taverne, D. Vol. 690, H. of C. 27th Feb ruary , 1964, Col. 739. 
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of 'mobility' were seen to be critical for the success of the whole 
policy. It was considered as the most likely method of decreasing the 
disparity between capabilities and commitments. Increasing mobility was 
seen as popular escape from painful decisions about the curtailment of 
commitments. 
Transport command, Labour contended, had been recklessly neglected 
by the Conservatives and was in urgent need of strengthening. Mr. Healey 
also emphasized the increasing role for helicopters and suggested that 
they were more relevant than " .•• weapons which we are unlikely ever to 
1 
use and could certainly never use alone". This was more than the 
obligatory reference to nuclear weapons. Mr. Healey, though, also admitted 
that "Nothing costs more than mobility, particularly the sort of mobility 
that makes us less dependent on fixed bases ••• It is no good imagining 
that we can do all these things and go on doing all the other things we 
have been trying to do and still keep the defence costs at anything like 
2 7% of the total national wealth." Unhappily, this admission failed 
to constitute an actual prediction. 
Labour's emphasis on mobility was expressive of a determination that 
Britain's presence East of Suez should be less dependent on costly bases, 
which were believed to be of diminishing value. Labour's East of Suez 
policy amounted to the belief that it would be politically more sensible 
to rely less on bases and more on a sea and air presence. Certain bases, 
it was said, with Aden as a case in paint, had become unwieldy commitments 
3 themselves rather than the means of fulfilling commitments. 
1 Healey, D. Vol. 687, H. of C. 16th January, 1964, Co. 6547. 
2 Vol. 690, H. of C. 26th February, 1964, Col. 475. 
3 Aden " i 1 . was seen as .•• an essent a stag~ng post in our communication with 
the East, particularly India and also Malaysia, to whose support against 
external aggression we are fully committed as the Government". Wilson, H. 
Vol. 696, H. of C., 17th June, 1964, Vol. 1403. 
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The inevitable conclusion for the R.A.F. of Labour's proposal 
to run down a number of unspecified overseas bases, was that air 
support for commando task forces was likely to coma increasingly 
from the Fleet Air Arm. It was then not unreasonable indeed a dead 
certainty that Labour would want a new carrier, and indeed Mr. Healey 
argued that " •.• if we are to have a really effective military 
capacity outside Europe, we must provide air cover for it in the form of 
naval aircraft. It is no good having just one aircraft carrier floating 
around because there is no guarantee that it will be in the right place, 
or indeed not in dock, at the time when it is needed".l This was indeed 
to be one aircraft carrier which was destined never to sail. Two years 
later that decision had to be faced. The carrier was not even built. 
Once Labour had decided that its defence policy should be based 
on mobility it then had to decide which projects were really necessary 
and could be afforded. Under the Cons~rvatives, the navy had been 
promised a new carrier and a Sea-Vixen replacement: the Army, a long range 
strategic troop carrier, the HS681: the RAF a replacement for the 
Canberras and Hunters. Mr. Healey, believing Mr. Thorneycroft's 
aircraft programme to be recklessly extravagent, argued that a future 
Labour government ••• cannot possibly do all those ~lings and keep the 
defence budget within more or less 7% of the G.N.P •••• ,,2 He went on to 
say that " ••• it is quite impossible for us to carry all these projects 
to completion". 3 This qualification of course did not preclude the 
pursuit of some of these projects. However, as we have seen, even if 
Labour's opposition to the3e projects implied future contraction of the 
1 
Healey, D. Vol. 690, H. of C. 26th February 1964, Vol. 475~ 
2 Vol. 687, H. of C., 16th January, 1964, Col. 539. 
3 ibid. 
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Tory aircraft programme, Labour was still proposing an extensive 
improvement in Britain's East of Suez capability. Not the least of 
these was Labour's plan to grapple with the manpower situation. 
Mr. Wilson was particularly concerned with the presumed inadequacy 
of the strategic reserve. He argued somewhat sardonically that Britain 
could not run a strategic reserve on the principle " ••• of a stage army, 
where half a dozen minor actors moving quickly behind the scenes Can 
represent the whole of Ceasar's legions ••• " He concluded that it " ••• may 
be alright for a second-rate repertory company, but it is not a sound 
basis for Britain's defence pOlicy ... l Mr. Healey too took up this 
theme and said he was concerned about the extent of the manpower shortage. 
" •.• if public order breaks down in British Guiana •••• if there is trouble 
in the Protectorates, or if there is even a marginal increase in guerilla 
activities in Borneo, it will be absolutely impossible for us to meet 
these additional commitments without defaulting on some of the commitments 
which we have already ... 2 The problem of overstretch clearly concerned 
Labour's future defence secretary. 
Labour's defence plans for the East of Suez area showed how 
emphatically the Party was committed to improving Britain's ability to 
handle her imperial commitments, but it also indicated the enormity of 
demand that the East of Suez role would make on Britain's limited defence 
resources. A close examination of Labour's European policy revealed that 
the continental commitment also, was likely to make serious demands. Labour 
could scarcely expect to make defence savings there; indeed the foreign 
exchange loss would continue. 
1 Vol. 670, H. of C. 31st January, 1963, Col. 1243. 
2 
Vol. 687, H. of C., 16th January, 1964, Cols. 
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Labour, in line with all post-war Governments, saw Britain's 
commitment to N.A.T.O. as the centrepiece of its defence policy. 
Labour appeared determined that the B.A.O.R. ~hould not be reduced 
by activities outside Europe, but it was committed to finding another 
3,000 men to bring the figure up to the promised level of 55,000. 
According to Mr. Wilson, "Labour's main point of difference with the 
Conservative Government is a feeling that Britain is not making a 
sufficient contribution to N.A.T.O. in conventional terms."l Labour had, 
in fact, consistently criticised the Tories for allowing a run down in 
agreed force level in Europe. 
Labour's commitment to a conventional build up in Europe was 
consistently advocated in policy documents. PoZiay for Peace insisted 
2 that "The West must never be the first to use the H Bomb", and even 
that N.A.T.O. should never find it necessary to " ••• be the first to 
3 
use nuclear weapons of any kind". Consequently, the logical objective 
for the West was "to make it possible for N.A.T.O. to halt a local conflict 
4 
wi th conventional weapons alone". It was apparently only by a build up 
of conventional forces in Europe that Britain could avoid " ••• the choice 
5 between surrender or world nuclear war". Labour feared nuclear 
escalation more than a relatively large conventional build-up in Europe. 
This statement of the stark alternative resulting from the existing 
European policy, ~ndicated beyond peradventure that a Labour Government 
would consider the European situation of vital importance for Britain's 
security and, of the nuclear threshold could be raised, ' worthy of 
1 Cited by Foot, P. Op. cit., p.209, comment by Mr. Wilson in1Ehe New York 
Times, 1st April, 1963. 
2pOlicy for Peace 1961. Cited Twelve Wasted Years, 1963, p.396. 
?Ibid. 
4 
Policy for Peace 1961. Cited Twelve Wasted Years ~ 1963, p.396. 
5 Ibid. 
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considerable resource allocation. Nor was the problem only one of manpower. 
B.A.O.R. it was said was n ••• not merely undermanned .•• " but " ••• seriously 
lacking in means of transport and modern conventional weapons and equipment 
of almost every kind. ,,1 Not surprisingly Labour concluded that " ••• 
drastic remedial measures" were urgently required, because under Labour 
Britain's conventional forces would become a sophisticated instrument 
for the pursuit of strategic interests. There was then a strategic 
motive behind Labour's thinking. This was made clear by Mr. Wilson when 
he asked the House " ••. how far can we take these decisions to run down 
the numbers in Germany at a time when the U.S.-German special relationship 
2 
is just beginning to develop in the way it is?" Mr. Wilson's argument 
was that if Britain, like France, became an irresponsible ally, then the 
Western alliance would be transformed by the growth of a Washington-
Bonn axis. Moreover, in military terms Labour was worried about the 
dangers of Germany dominating the continent, since it had traditionally 
seen N.A.T.O. as a means of constraining, as well as of defending, the 
Federal Republic. Labour's plan to improve the manpower situation in 
Europe w'ould have proved a huge financial undertaking, but it is 
significant that it was not based on conscription or selective service, 
but on voluntary recruitment, suitably attracted by economic incentive. 
Even, therefore, in the unlikely event of a significant qualitative 
improvement, under Labour, in the conventional capabilities of Britain's 
defence force, the East of Suez role would have to share with Europe, though 
not necessarily in equal proportion, any new defence resources. However, 
despite the fact that Europe was Britain's primary security interest, the 
1 
Twelve Wasted Years, 1963, p. 398. 
2 Vol. 687, H. of C., 16th January, 1964, Col. 4~. 
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continent was strategically-speaking in a state of milita~~ deadlock 
and therefore, Labour's anxieities centred increasingly on the role 
Britain could play in those turbulent areas East of Suez. Mr. Wilson 
emphatically declared to an American audience that Britain's contribution 
would "... be more and more in Africa and Asia". 1 
While Labour's declarations on the European and East of Suez roles 
was confusing, it was not inconsistent. The European role was considered 
the more critical, but in 1964 Labour was more concerned with equipping 
for an East of Suez role where the threat to British interests was less 
severe but more immediate. Clearly, if Britain's defence plans under 
Labour prospered the East of Suez role would gather more momentum and 
resources than Europe; while if a defence cut-back were found imperative, 
East of Suez and not Europe would be the area to feel the chilling wind 
of any economic sqeeze. 
The question of whether East of Suez or Europe would be adversely 
affected by a defence squeeze, raised the acute and overriding problem 
of whether defence savings could be made elsewhere. In Labour's pre-
election view this was indeed possible and such hopes revolved around the 
nuclear deterrent. This weapon-system could be phased out of existence 
and Labour appeared determined to implement its pledge to do so. 
The Labour Party, since 1961, had raucously accused the Conservatives 
of suffering from a nuclear illusion. This illusion had resulted, Labour 
claimed in the run-down of Britain's conventional forces and was epitomised 
by the 'massive retaliation' doctrine which " ••• ignored the manifold 
dangers arising from possible limited aggression in Europe, or elsewhere, 
in which purely conventional challenge might be encountered".2 
1 
2 
From a speech at Bridgeport University, Connecticut, U.S.A., 3rd March, 
1964. 
Twelve Wasted Years, 1963, p.390. 
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Harold Wilson jocularly underlined the futility of Britain's nuclear 
policy, but likening it to an effort to kill /la mosquito with a hand 
1 grenade". His humour on such a subject no doubt compensated for the 
rhetorical passion nuclear weapons often excited on Labour's back benches. 
According to Labour, Britain's nuclear independence was exposed as 
a national fraud by the scandal of missile misadventures funded by the 
Conservative government after it had become apparent that long range 
bombers would soon be obsolete. The misadventures, Labour catalogued, 
were Blue Streak, which was" •..• hopelessly vul&erable to a first 
strike,,2, and whose failure; cost the nation £300 million; and the 'missile 
that never was' - Skybolt - a weapon which Labour doubted could be 
described as prolonging Britain's nuclear independence since it was to be 
" .... developed and manufacturers wholly in the U.S. 1I3 Labour also 
opposed further" •..• pointless expenditure on the stand-off flying 
4 bomb, Blue Steel", and pledged itself to 'de-negotiate' the Nassau 
Agreement. The Polaris deal that MacMillan had negotiated in December 
1962 was anathema to Labour and had to be reversed. 
Labour spokesmen never tired of attributing Britain's defence 
weakness to the nuclear deterrent. Mr. Wilson argued that" ••• the vast 
expenditure of money and resources upon the deterrent has undermined 
our ability to deploy urgently needed , resources, both on manpower and 
5 
equipment and on mobility." Further on in the same speech he strongly 
repeated this charge. "I believe also, that our expenditure on the nuclear 
effort has had, and will have if it is continued, serious and limiting 
1 
012' cit. , 
2 Op e cit. p. 391. 
3 Twelve 
F' Wasted Yea,rs, 1963, p. 391. 2 
4 
:rwelve Wasted Years, 1963, p. 393. 
5 
vol. 68?l H. of C. 16th JanuafY [ 1964, Col. 440,. 
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1 effects on our ability to build up adequate conventional forces •.. " 
Labour believed that cost-escalation was a function of the nuclear 
deterrent. 
It was however uncertain just what Labour would do with the 
independent deterrent. Even by Labour's elaborately contrived. standards 
of obscurantism on defence, Labour's nuclear policy was a remarkable 
piece of double-think. 
Mr. Wilson told the House of Commons nine months before that 
1964 election that Labour would "re-negotiate this agreement to end the 
proposal to buy Polaris submarines from the u.s.,,2 This view fired a 
passionate response from his colleagues. 
Mr. Healey warmly supported his leader's views on the deterrent. 
When referring to the then Minister of Defence, he said, "1 cannot help 
feeling that, in his attachment to a force which could never be used 
alone and is most unlikely to be used at all, the Right Hon. Gentleman 
is tying up a percentage of the defence vote and defence manpower which 
will make it totally~ssible for this country to carry out its obligations 
3 to the Alliance or its role in the world". Even more emphatically 
Mr. Healey contended that "The question is whether we not have adequate 
conventional forces for our commitments, and I do not believe that it 
is possible to have adequate forces unless we give priority to them at 
4 the expense of the nuclear deterrent". If this were correct, then 
Labour's subsequent decision to retain the deterrent, by definition 
would result in greatly weakened conventional forces and renewed tension 
1 Vol. 687 l H. of C. f 16th Janua£i, 1964, Col. 443 •. 
2 Vol. 687 L H. of C., 16th Janua£ll J.264 I !:;;s;2l. !H~. 
3 Vol. 690 l H. of C. L 26th Februa£iL1964L Co!. 483. 
4 Vol. 687! H. of c .• 16th Janua£ll 1964. Col. 548. 
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between her European and East of Suez roles. And that is exactly 
what happened, although ~.e explanation for this was not what Healey had 
supposed. 
The relevance, conceptually at any rate, both for the East of 
Suez and European policies, of Labour's proposed abdication of nuclear 
independence was obvious. An enhancement of Britain's ability to 
pursue these roles, according to Labour, depended on the abandoment 
of nuclear pretensions. Indeed, Mr. Healey promised n •••• more affective 
conventional forces if we spent on mobility, fire power and conventional 
equipment the 200 million pounds a year which we are now spending on the 
1 
nuclear deterrent". The Manifesto, too, clearly reflected Labour's 
attachment to conventional fon:es, "Our stress will be on the strengthening 
of our conventional regular forces so that we can contribute our share 
to N.Ao.T.O. defence and also fulfil our peace-keeping commitments to the 
2 Commonwealth and the U.N." The unresolved question that remained, however, 
was whether the European or East of Suez role would derive most from 
this nuclear abstinence. 
Labour's heady expectations of making defence savings were not based 
entirely on potential nuclear economies. Apart from the savings which 
were expected to flow from the dissolution of the independent nuclear 
deterrent and perhaps through the closure of certain unspecified bases, it 
wa& confidently expected that further savings could be made by removing 
the duplication in service structure. Labour's answer was "Drastic 
•• n 3 rationalisation and reorgan~sat~on •.••. It appeared the logical 
1 Vol. 687, H. of C. 16th January, 1964, Col. 546. 
2 The House of Commons, 1964, p.281. 
3 Twelve Wasted Years, 1963, p. 400. 
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solution for Labour now much impressed by cost-benefit analysis. 
This determination to rationalise and reorganise defence, 
neatly encapsulated the great faith Labour placed in scientific or 
technical solutions to Britain's intractable problems. It was the 
modern or new frontier image which was proj ected through the "let's 
go with Labour" slogan. It carried conviction too for another reason as 
well. The substitution of science for socialism indicated a disillusionment 
with traditional socialist principles. Labour offered the voters" 
1 
not a crusade but a better computer". 
The scientific approach, it was thought, was markedly relevant 
in the defence field where so much waste had occurred. This emphasis 
on technology was in part seen as an electioneering asset since it 
empties " .•.• socialism of divisive politics within or outside the party".2 
The sterile debate about the bomb and Clause 4 was lost in the neutral 
vocabulary of technological data, but nevertheless, 'science' was not 
just an expendient, it reflected a very real hope within the Labour Party 
that modernisation could be carried forward into Britain's industrial 
infrastructure. 
The forward-looking image of the Labour Party was embodied by its 
leader who was seen as a pragmatic man, a good economist, a man deeply 
steeped in modern technology and convinced of its role in a tech~tronic 
SOCiety. He was no ideologue. Moreover, Mr. Wilson was to become the 
youngest Prime Minister of the century and this stimulated a comparison 
with President Kennedy. The Labour leader was packaged as a facsimilie 
as any middle-aged English Prime Minister could be, to the virile and 
1 Economist, V91. 212, 11th July, 1964, p.127. 
2 
Fairlie, Henry, Sunday Timesi 4th July, 1964. 
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the dynamic, self-confident, young American who had before his tragic 
death resided so resplendently in the White House. Mr. Wilson was 
notoriously impressed by the image building process that was~id to 
explain John Kennedy's successful bid for the Presidency and Labour's 
leader now a matured leader himself 10 ••• introduced the Kennedy 
rhetoric of dynamism and change. ,,1 
The analogy between the Wilson and Kennedy administrations 
had another dimension as well. There developed within the Labour 
Party, a desire to emulate the American political process. The ethos 
of science and technology displaced socialist values. Cost effectiveness 
superceded the class-war Clause 4 mentality. Moreover, Mr. Healey 
emerged as a thoroughly good imitation of Mr. McNamara, a man capable 
of implementing scientific methods to defence administration. 2 But the 
real test that Mr. Healey faced was the problem "of reconciling past 
images with the hard realities of the moment".3 
It soon became plain how Labour intended to reconcile its plans 
to make defence savings while simultaneously improving Britain's 
European and overseas capabilities. It was to be accomplished by 
abandoning any notion of nuclear independence and by a new cost-effective 
approach to defence which, amongst other things, would avoid the 
procurement of defence projects which might later prove unviable or 
obsolescent. 
While such an analysis looked plausible, it was, of course based 
on a questionable assumption: that Britain's nuclear weapons were a vast 
1 
Foot, P. Op. cit., p.1l6~ 
2 The Policies of Power, op. cit. p. 277. 
3 
Baylis, John, et. al., Contemporary Strategy~ 1975, p.266. 
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financial albatross and that Labour would still want, and be able, to 
abandon them when it gained power. Other assumptions were also made: 
that there existed a great amount of waste in Britain's defence system. 
Indeed waste similar in relative size to that found in 1961 by Kennedy 
and MacNamara were presumed to exist. 
However, even accepting that Labour's assessment of nuclear 
costs and the benefit of cost effectiveness were almost right, it 
appeared an inevitable conclusion that Labour's defence proposals 
in Europe and East of Suez would conflict with the economic realities 
of Britain's position and with Labour' a own decision to make defence 
economies. Even the less ambitious Conservative policy of 1964, working 
on a budget of 7% G.N.P., had not taken into account several proposed 
new weapons programmes. Mr. Healey, in fact, argued that in the 1964 
Defence White Paper there had been" ••• no allowance for major projects 
over the whole field of defence other than £l8~ million for the first 
Polaris submarine, but the Government have committed themselves in 
principle to start in the next three years four major new weapons projects, 
each of which has a cost running into hundreds of millions of pounds". 1 
Moreover, Mr. Healey was quick to point out that a significant 
proportion of any increase in G.N.P. would be taken up by " •••• natural 
i' ,,2 ncreases ~n pay and allowances ••. In addition he also argued that 
" ... owing to the fantastic speed of weapons development the cost of 
weapons is riSing about ten times as quickly as is G.N.p. 1I3 , and claimed 
that the result was that" ••• as the cost of weapons systems rises one is 
faced not only with a choice between commitments but a choice between 
strategic roles. 
1 Vol. 690 l H. of 
2 Vol. 69O! H. of 
3 Vol. 6B7 l H. of 
4 ibid. 
4 One may even be faced with a choice between Services .•• " 
C. 26th Februaryl 1964! Col. 467. 
C. l 26th Februarvl 1964 l Col. 467. 
C. , 16th Janua!y, 1964, CQl. 536. 
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Given the enormously ambitious nature of Labour's defence policy, 
the inevitable absorption of a bigger budget in pay and allowances and 
the inherent escalation in defence costs, it was not improbable that 
Labour would have to retreat from at least one of its main defence 
objectives on assuming office. The future of Britain's East of Suez 
role was thus questionable even before Labour came into office. This 
was indeed ironic given the importance of the overseas presence in 
Labour's foreign and defence thinking. 
It is certainly a dubious business to deduce definite conclusions 
from the defence policy of an opposition party in the run-up to an 
election. At such times spokesmen of all parties tend to favour 
statements that are as generalised and as obscure as electoral considerations 
allow. However, Labour's 1964 Defence Policy was more distinctive and 
more specific than in any previous post~war campaign. Labour's 1964 
Defence Policy was a classic example of overcommitment. It was compounded 
of folly and wisdom. The folly of trying to sustain existing commitments 
with what appeared to be existing capabilities and the wisdom of 
advocating reliance on NATO and a close strategic relationship with the 
United States. 
The Conservatives own projected defence policy would have made 
necessary a budget in excess of 7% G.N.P., yet Labour, while still 
demanding that defence costs must be cut, proposed improvements across 
the entire defence spectrum. Its policy demanded improvements in 
manpower, amphibious and submarine capability, transport command, fleet 
air arm, helicopters, tanks and other army equipment and conventional naval 
I 
weapons. According to the Spectator, Labour's emphasis on improving 
1 See Wi1son, H. Vol. 687, H. of C., 16th January, 1964, Col. 445. 
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Britain's conventional forces" may conceivably mean conscription 
but it will certainly mean an increased expenditure on conventional 
arms which cannot be borne without a larger total defence budget or 
cuts in nuclear defence". 1 In the event, with unfortunate consequences, 
Labour only marginally cut its nuclear defence, while quite substantially 
cutting its defence budget. 
The enormous breadth of Labour's foreign and defence policies was 
due in part to the need of presenting a manifesto worthy of a potential 
government as well as the normal procedure of election auctioneering, 
to' the need to impress different sections of the Party and to the Party's 
limited interest in and knowledge of defence matters. The tendency for 
opposition parties to dwell on aspirations and to arrive at "perfectionist" 
policies, was well illustrated by the Labour Party in October 1964. In 
Labour's case this tendency was greatly strengthened because it had 
been compelled after 1961 to respond to the arguments of the nuclear 
pacifists within the Labour movement with an articulate and comprehensive 
defence policy. In order to refute the unilateralists there was a greater 
effort to formulate and explain specific policies and as a result Labour 
acquired its ambitious politico-strategic programme. The Labour leadership 
felt compelled to respond to the C.N.D. challenge and in the process 
over-responded by producting an over detailed defence programme. Moreover, 
these policies had to be radically different from those pursued by the 
2 Conservatives. The traditional image of Britain as a Great World Power 
and the reality of her much reduced status confounded those responsible 
for making important foreign and defence policy decisions. Labour hoped 
1 
2 
Spectator(, 6th March, 1964, p. 301, Vol. 212. 
See discussion of this problem of ,relating changes in power to 
decisions in Sprout, Harold and Margeret1 Retr'eat from World Power. 
Processes and consequences of readjustment~ -,World Politics L 1963. 
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to do rather better than the Conseratives in this respect. Labour set 
out to formulate a consistent, comprehensive and alternative defence 
policy irrespective of economic conditions. They succeeded. 
Nor is it easy for an opposition party to take account of the 
nation's immediate economic position while formulating its defence policy, 
since a policy evolves over a period of time that may span many periods 
of stop-go economic strategies. When Labour took up the responsibilities 
of office its more extravagent policies slowly gave way to more 
realistic if not objective assessments. However the abandonment of 
idealistic perfectionist objectives for more realistic and objective 
goals was not easily made and the early post-election optimism, as 
epitomised by the 'hundred days' mentality, was not deflated for some 
time. Facing intractable realities was to prove a painful business. 
In the peculiar drama of the 1964 election campaign it was not 
surprising that Labour had devised a broad policy which provided that 
no doors should be shut until power had been gained and new information, 
available only to a government party, studied. This tendency for an 
opposition party to erect a policy devised to give itself a free hand when 
it is elected was less apparent in Labour's case than is customary, because, 
for reasons already discussed, Labour had found it necessary to be more 
specific about its policies. Nevertheless, it was still a factor. 
Labour was after all seeking power after thirteen years of Conservative 
rule. Labour in finding issues to berate the Government of the day, was, 
in fact, in the very process of criticism, embracing new commitments 
itself. The Conservative failure to honour its pledge on the European 
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force level became an issue over which Labour could condemn the Tories. 
However, by accusing the Conservatives of breaking this pledge Labour 
was in fact committing itself to do better. They felt confident enough 
that Tory pledges dishonoured would become Labour's honoured commitment. 
Labour was confronted by a particular problem that the Conservatives 
were never expected to face. The Conservative Party traditionally was 
not obliged to defend its policy as other than in the 'national interest'. 
This was not so with the Labour Party, which not only 'realistically' 
accepted the traditional'national interests~ as Attlee's Government 
had made clear, but found it expedient to extol some socialist values, 
or at least to respect some ideological commitments inherited from the 
past. Ideology is functional to Labour in Opposition; it becomes a 
definite liability in office. This tendency to relegate socialist 
ideology when in power is most marked in the field of defence and foreign 
policies. The opposite tendency to elevate socialist ideology when in 
opposition to the point of its becoming the chief determinant of policy 
becomes almost but not quite so marked. 
The interdependence between realism and idealism in Labour's 
policy formulation leads to a contradtctory and confused outcome. 
Labour's obsession with nuclear weapons could not be exorcised solely 
by advocating the scrapping of polaris, or by advocating a non-nuclear 
club; realism demanded that this could only be done by also giving 
N.A.T.O. the capability to wage a full-scale conventional war in Europe. 
It was this special combination of idealism and realism that led the 
Labour Party of 1964 to pledge itself to build up conventional forces, 
simply because an enhanced conventional capability would indubitably 
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restore Britain's credibility after a Labour Government had given vent 
to .its deep anti-nuclear revulsion and abandoned Polaris. 
The Labour Party at the level of its parliamentary leadership 
found itself in the unhappy position of having to play down party 
idealism and ideological commitment. Labour, certainly on this occasion, 
felt constrained to erect grandiose defence policies as a counterbalance 
to its own suspect pacifist tradition, and so-called Utopian prcpensities, 
to the argtunent that it was fundamentally 'unpatriotic', and to the claim 
that it was opposed to adequate defence measures for the nation. Despite 
the absurdity of the notion that Labour governments tend to neglect 
defence - for ·.which there is no real evidence - the myth still persists, 
perhaps because Labour emphasizes social and economic goals rather more 
emphatically than the search for national security. 
Polaris in fact epitomised the clash between Party idealism and 
the reality of international politics. In Opposition, labour had 
calculatedly put Party idealism first by promising to abandon Polaris, 
and subsequently, in its bid for an alternative strategy, it wanted to 
increase conventional forces on the strength of the expected Polaris 
cancellation. In the event however Polaris was not scrapped since 
realism dictated that it should be retained as a political instrument 
in alliance bargaining. Consequently, in 1964, Labour found itself with 
the most elaborate of defence policies - pledged to build up conventional 
strength in order to abandon a weapon that in fact it could no longer afford 
to relinquish and still less relegate for the possible tender use of less 
squeamish powers. 
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Labour's plans to improve Brit~in's European and East of Suez 
capability meant in terms of manpower and equipment that defence 
savings were unlikely to be achieved. It must be emphasized that 
Labour's defence policy was premissed on a very doubtful equation, that 
a non-nuclear policy and increased cost-effectiveness would permit 
improvements in Britain's East of Suez and European capabilities, but 
would also allow for substantial defence savings. Labour hoped that 
the economy would grow and thus allow the lifting of the defence ceiling 
but probably preferred that there would be room for much greater 
efficiency within the existing budget which the new policies would 
facilitate. Nevertheless, Labour's defence spokesmen genuinely felt that 
stringent re-organisation and economic advance could be achieved. 
Clearly it was in a sense inevitable that Labour's hopes were to be 
limited to re-organisation. 
There was a certain enevitability that, on coming into office, 
Labour would soon have to re-cast its defence policy. This was to be 
all the more regrettable because almost for the first time in its 
chequered history Labour had drawn up a totally comprehensive programme, 
whereas in the past it had only vague sentiments encapsulated in slogans 
reflecting ideological as well as national commitments. In Opposition, 
Labour had constructed a rational and indeed ambitious defence policy 
allowing greater flexibility and efficiency in executing both in 
Europe and East of Suez, a variety of strategic tasks. The major concern 
had been to formulate a defence policy which would underpin foreign policy, 
rather than to formulate a defence policy which would be consistent with 
1 Labour's economic strategy. Clearly Labour also lacked a theory of 
political economy and this too weakened its projected defence and 
foreign policies. 
1 See C. H. Bartlett, The Long Retreat: a Short History of British 
Defence Policy 1945-1970, 1972, p.ll. 
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C H APT E R VI 
DEFENCE AND ECONOMIC CONSTRAINT: LABOUR'S DIMINISHING OPTIONS 
On 15th October, 1964, Labour won the General Election, albeit 
by the narrow margin of five seats. For most of the Labour members 
returned to Parliament by that election campaign after thirteen years 
1 in the political wilderness, the mood was one of exhilaration. The 
Party's optimism hovered on the euphoric and, in rather more subdued 
terms, it aroused a similar response from the electorate. Even some 
traditional Conservative voters were not unimpressed by promises of 
"a second industrial revolution", and the prospect of "a dynamic 
hundred days". 
However, regardless of whatever the future held, the nation in 
October 1964 faced an economic crisis. Mr. Wilson later observed that 
"grimmest of all, there was the economic news, the monthly trade returns 
for September showing a serious continuing deficit had been published 
that morning. There had been talk in the last hours of the Conservative 
Government of raising bank rate by a point to stem any selling of 
sterling as a result of the trade figures. But it was decided to take 
no action. Worse, there was the Treasury's assessment of the forward 
balance-of-payments position. Prepared as is the practice before every 
election for a possible new Government, it showed a position still m~e 
serious - to judge from the ex-Chancellor's subsequent statements in the 
House of Commons, where he was talking of much smaller figures - than the 
last assessment prepared a month earlier for the Conservatives. 
In the face of all this, there could be no question of '1ow-
profile government' or of having a period of three months or more in 
1 Dalton, H. Memoirs 1945-60, High Tide and after, 
described an earlier electoral victory in ringing 
dedicated, walking on air, walking with destiny". 
the mood in October 1964 but a spirit of optimism 
excited ranks. 
1962. Dr. Dalton 
terms. "We felt exalted, 
This was not quite 
did pervade Labour's 
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which no decisions needed to be taken. 
The pattern our first hundred days would have to take was set 
in the first hundred minutes". In its electoral campaign, Labour 
has consistently pointed out the country's economic plight and even 
when the election was won, Labour, perhaps already aware of the 
need for an early dissolution, continued to dwell on Britain's 
structural weakness. The situation was indeed bad, for the new 
Government had been left a crippling legacy of an E800 million balance 
of payment deficit. 
Although many economists pressed hard for devaluation, both the 
Treasury and the Bank of England opposed it. In fact what proved 
decisive was American pressure against devaluation and Harold Wilson's 
own obsessive fear (remembering 1949) that Labour might get a wretched 
reputation as 'the devaluation party'. The pound was to the Prime 
Minister a national virility symbol and he was determined to defend 
it to the bitter end; moreover he had long held the view that British 
industry must be made more efficient. l However, if devaluation were 
ruled out from a potent brew of economic and political motivation, and 
deflation rejected for electoral reasons, the new Government was left 
'th 1 ' 2 W1 no c ear econom1C strategy. But Mr. Wilson saw it differently 
and explained in his own account of these decisions that "I was convinced, 
and my colleagues agreed, that to devalue could have the most dangerous 
consequences. 
The financial world at home and abroad was aware that the post-war 
decision to devalue in 1949 had been taken by a Labour Government. There 
would have been many who would conclude that a Labour Government facing 
difficulties always took the easy way out by devaluing the pound. 
1 See Wilson, Harold. The Labour Government, 1974 c pp. 26-29. 
2 Wilson, Harold, op. cit . , p.27. 
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Speculation would be aroused every time that Britain ran into even minor 
economic difficulties - or even without them. For we were to learn over 
the years that it was all too easy for those so minded to talk the 
1 
pound down on the most frivolous pretexts." 
The initial economic measures introduced just eleven days after 
gaining office were doubtful as regards economic benefits to the nation, 
but dramatic in terms of the international repercussions they precipitated. 
On 26th October, Labour introduced a 15% import surcharge and offered 
rebates to exporters. This totally unexpected package greatly upset 
Britain's partners in E.F.T.A. and condemnation of the measures was 
widespread. Moreover with consummate ill-timing, the haples Patrick 
Gordon Walker in New York promised that the Government had " ••• no 
intention of raising the Bank Rate". 2 
On 3rd November, the gold reserve dropped to their lowest point 
since 1961. Just a week later came the first of a long and mediocre 
series of Callaghan mini budgets. This particular one was mildly 
deflationary, including as it did sixpence extra on income tax and 
petrol. The deflationary nature of the budget however, placed the 
Chancellor in a rather exposed position. He wanted to restore confidence 
in the pound and yet he did not want to cause anxiety to the left-wing 
within his own party. To his credit he nearly reconciled these two 
apparently incompatible objectives. However, his effort to obscure the 
deflationary effect of the budget from his ever watchful back-benchers 
was so successful, that it also apparently escaped the noti~e of the 
international bankers. 
1 ibid., p.28. 
2 Cited Foot, P.,_ Op. c1<:., p.lS6. 
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As a piece of economic psychology the budget was doomed for it 
gave priority to plans for an increase in pensions and announced the 
abolition of prescription charges at a time of crisis. 
Money continued to pour out of London and yet the suggestion by 
the Governor of the Bank of England (Lord Cromer) that Bank Rate 
should be increased by 1% met with a cool response. The Government 
believed that to adopt such an increase would both break an electoral 
pledge and provoke the United States. This was certainly the case. 
It was Washington alone that influenced Labour. The Party 
was sensitive to the views of central bankers, left wingers, trade 
unionists and the City, and was anxious not to offend any of these 
centres of influence. It followed, according to the Eoonomist, that 
from the " ..• five possible remedies for basic imbalance - devaluation, 
sizeable export incentives, high interest rates, capital controls or 
full scale deflation - the Government initially made a determined choice. 
This was that it would choose none of them".l 
Thursday, the day on which Bank Rate is normally altered, passed 
and the run on the pound grew more severe. Gold Reserves were used to 
support the pound, but millions were lost. It was now that Mr. Wilson 
performed a violent manoeuvre. On the following Monday, the 23rd 
November, Bank Rate was finally, but reluctantly raised. The economic 
situation still took a plunge. The monthly gold reserve returns on 
2nd December showed a fall of £39 million to the lowest point for 
several years. 
In spite of appeals to 'the Spirit of Dunkirk', the Government 
1 Economist, 28th November, 1964, p.944. 
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itself seemed to lack urgency. Perhaps it comforted itself in the 
well-founded assumption that the U.S. would underpin the pound, and 
together with the 'Basle Club', the Americans came to Britain's assistance 
to the tune of £3,000 million. For the moment the speculators were 
thwarted and the New Year came in on a spirit of qualified optimism. 
The Government's optimism sprang, not only from the American loan, 
but also from the introduction of its income policy in December, 1964. 
Mr. Brown was able to wave triumphantly a 'declaration of intent'. 
This proved to by a pyrrhic victory. 
The economic crisis inevitably provided a volatile and intimidating 
climate in which to formulate foreign policy. And yet Labour's foreign 
policy orthodoxy, as pronounced in the election campaign, remained the 
basis of future planning. The Government was convinced that it had found 
the right formula and essentially the proper priorities. 
As in practically all areas of government, so in the foreign 
policy field, the Prime Minister balanced off the different wings of the 
Party. Messrs. Gordon Walker, Healey and Bottomley were offset by 
Mr. Greenwood at the Colonial Office and Mrs. Castle at the Ministry of 
Overseas Development. Mr. Wilson explained this balance as instrumental 
in bringing about 'creative tension' - to many it looked like a deliberate 
attempt to reduce tension by a policy of 'divide and rule.' At any rate 
the balance of the foreign affairs team made it extremely remote that 
any radical re-think in Labour's foreign policy was now possible. 
It was not surprising, therefore, that Labour retained the East 
of Suez bias that had been so marked prior to the election. Mr. Wilson, 
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a month after that election, argued that " ..•. in a world where the 
centre of gravity is shifting more and more to areas outside Europe, 
we need; not only ourselves but with our allies, particularly the 
Commonwealth, to ensure that we have the strength and mobility to move 
quickly to stop small troubles from escalating into bigger ones, 
1 
especially where the interests of our Commonwealth partners are involved." 
Britain under this prescription intended to play a major role East of 
Suez. This speech provoked some astonishment in Europe because of its 
emphatic endorsement of Britain's world role. 
Not only did the new Government appear pro East of Suez, but it 
also seemed unresponsive if not hostile to Europe. While it wanted to 
strengthen and improve N.A.T.O. it remained noticeably wary of any 
clear involvement with its continental allies. This was especially 
true at the nuclear level. "We believe" the Prime Minis.ter said, "that 
a mixed manned surface fleet adds nothing to Western strength, is likely 
2 
to cause a diSSipation of East-West agreement". Earlier Mr. Wilson had 
said that he rejected " •.•. categorically any idea of a separate 
3 European deterrent". These statements and the Prime Minister's 
subsequent well-publicized trip to Washington, seemed to confirm the 
importance and relevance of the 'special' relationship' in British foreign 
policy. In comparison Labour's insistence that it was interested in overt 
moves on political union in Europe lacked real credibility. 
The line of Labour's pre-election foreign policy thus hardened in 
those first few months of office. The policy so thinly sketched in 
1 Vol. 702, H. of C. , 23rd November, 1964, Col. 938. 
2 
vol. 702, of H. C. , 23rd November, 1964, Col. 943. 
3 Monday, 17th November, 1964 at the Guildhall. 
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outline was now given concrete substance. The pro United States feeling 
was refl ected in an Atlanticist determination to strengthen the alliance 
through greater nuclear co-operation; the anti European sentiment 
manifested itself in stubborn opposition to the Europeanist Itf .L. F. , 
even in the face of American and German pressure; and the marked East 
of Suez bias was reinforced in continuing help for Malaysia in its 
confrontation with Indonesia. There was then, no direct challenge 
1 to the East of Suez role. If it were threatened, it was not by any 
change in values since the election, but by another of Labour's defence 
objectives - the one to make savings. 
Despite the obvious attraction of defence cuts for left wingers, 
and some, but by no means all, trade unionists and foreign creditors 
alike, there was no great pressure on the Government to make such cuts. 
It was assumed that the economic difficulties were temporary and things 
would soon improve. The prevalent mood was that once the inherited 
dislocation had been dealt· with Labour could promote a period of planned 
and spectacular growth. 
The Chancellor, in fact, was as complacent as anyone and 
consequently did not press the Treasury line as forcefully as he might 
have done. Perhaps Mr. Callaghan's ministerial innocence and the dual 
economic management under Labour were also factors which could account for 
2 the lack of Treasury dominance in the 1964 economic crisis. At any rate, 
Mr. Callaghan was not strongly disposed to press for immediate and far 
reaching defence or social service cuts. Although he exerted some 
pressure in favour of defence savings, he believed, rather like the rest 
1 Professor Michael Howard (then Professor of War Studies in the University 
of London) wrote in April 1966 that "To the question, what specific long-
term national interests does Britain retain East of Suez commensurate with 
her military expenditure in the area, the answer may be, virtually none." 
But Labour obviously intended to meet short-term commitments. International 
Affairs, op. cit., p.182. 
2 .., 
Economic Affairs were divided between Mr. Callaghan's Treasury and 
George Brown's D.E.A. 
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of the Cabinet, that to painfully save a few shillings in 1964, would be 
foolish, and largely irrelevant, in view of the impressive growth rate 
that was inevitable during the next few years. 
Furthermore while it was clear that Labour's first concern was 
to diminish the pressure on the pound, of almost equal importance was 
the need to ensure that no irreversible decisions were initiated in the 
short term, which might undermine Labour's long term policy. And an 
integral part of that long term policy was that defence savings could 
be made without disturbing the efficiency and balance of British forces. 
Neither did Mr. Brown press Mr. Healey very hard, for he was largely 
concered with the , need for long term economic planning and anyway, 
despite being a pro-European, he also accepted the value of the East 
of Suez presence, because of his concern for international stability 
1 
upon which Britain's economic recovery heavily depended. 
Even the Left, despite the ideological erection that it always 
experiences when defence cuts are mentioned, refrained from pushing the 
Government too vigorously during this short-lived honeymood period. 
Moreover there existed for the Government, one unexpected bonus for 
having such a wafer-thin Commons majority, and that was that any dissident 
Labour back-bencher who voted against his Party in Parliament might be 
responsible for putting the Conservatives back into power. This desperate 
notion alone was sufficient to persuade most Labour M.P.s of the value of 
unquestioning fidelity. In any case the Government had diluted the 
militancy of the Left with promises of social legislation and with 
2 positions in Government. The parliamentary ambitions of the left were 
1 
2 
Mr. Brown deals at length with his view of Britain's contribution 
to international stability in his book, In My Way. 
Mr. Wilson sought to maintain a political balance between the right 
and left in his administration. Left-wing members of Parliament were 
as ambitious as the So-called career~st 
• right. 
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recognised by the Prime Minister as important elements in maintaining 
Government unity. l 
Neither was there great pressure for defence cuts from overseas. 
The United States did not encourage cuts which would threaten Britain's 
East of Suez role, and the European Governments felt that cuts were no 
substitute for the orthodox monetary means of coping with an economic 
crisis. 
The Government, then, was in no way forced into making defence 
cuts. Indeed the Labour movement was unusually harmonious. The Party 
itself was willing enough to wait and see what the promised major 
defence review would bring, and it was, at this stage, confident that the 
Government would in no way compromise or abandon those 'socialist 
measures' it had waited thirteen years to introduce. 
Even as the economic situation worsened still further it remained 
curiously apparent that "an extraordinary optimism still pervaded 
Whitehall".2 While speculation about economic crisis grew, Mr. Wilson 
continued to plan for costly methods of Atlantic co-operation in his 
search .. for a nuclear depository i there was no move to shelve Polaris; 
and Mr. Healey gave his assurance on the fleet aircraft carrier " ••• that 
all' preparatory work •.. is going ahead at sufficient speed to enable 
the order to be placed as planned in 1966".3 
Nevertheless, defence savings were still the central part of 
Labour's plan and they soon came to dominate defence policy. Slowly 
the Government's plans for more public expenditure began to impinge 
on all aspects of policy. There was no increase of domestic demands, 
but only an acceptance that the Party's social service commitment was the 
1 
2 
Sunday Times, 6th March, 1966, p.28. 
The expenditure on overseas operations was according to the Economist 
heavier" in eighteen months then that of the whole Polaris project up 
to its completion". Economist, Vol. 213, 21st November, 1964, p.799. 
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top priority and would inevitably entail sacrifices being made elsewhere. 
On the 21st and 22nd November the Labour leadership turned its mind 
towards defence. The deliberations of that now famous 'weekend of the 
crunch'were noted apparently for a " ••• refreshing spirit of cost effectiveness 
1 
and value for money". The defence weekend at Chequers was later described 
by the P rime Minis ter as "the mos t thorough ever undertaken by the Bri tish 
Government. We began on the Saturday morning in the Hawtrey Room, which 
was laid out for a screen 'presentation' of Britain's defence commitments, 
posture and deployment. Each area of the world where British troops were 
stationed was set out in slide after slide, with full statistics - each 
type of eqUipment, military, naval, air. These, together with the 
presentation - MalaYSia, Hong Kong, the Caribbean, the South Atlantic 
and South Pacific, Cyprus, Aden, the Gulf, the NATO forces by land, sea 
and air - confirmed our long-held view, so forcibly expressed by 
George Wigg in our years of Opposition, that Britain's defence forces 
were over-stretched almost to breaking-point. There was an excessive 
strain on the troops themselves, especially unaccompanied service. 
Somethinghadto give: it had to be commitments." Yet the curious fact is 
that cOmmitments were retained and capabilities were to be diminished. 
However Richard Crossman noted in his diary that Labour's electoral pledges 
in regard to the abandonment of the nuclear deterrent had been dishonoured. 
He noted that the Prime Minister was "trying to get a mandate for proposing 
a British alternative to the American M.L.F. when he got to Washington. 
What interested me was the implication that we intended to retain nuclear 
weapons, not only the means of delivery but also the warheads, and that 
- 188 -
heY 
Harold Wilson and Denis Healey WOUldn1rt:Lregard this as incompatible with 
our election pledges because they would claim that our Government was 
consciously giving up the attempt to have an independent deterrent. 
Indeed, what they were keeping the weapons for was to try to persuade 
NATO that in return for our providing weapons as a contribution to the 
NATO nuclear deterrent we should be permitted to cut down the British 
Army of the Rhine. I must say I felt extremely dubious about whether 
1 
our allies would take this proposal very seriously". In the House of 
Commons debate that immediately followed that weekend meeting, the 
Prime Minister spoke sympathetically of the Chancellor's '~ •.• need and 
2 intention to enforce retrenchment". According to the Eaonomist, the 
government was brooding over the fact that Britain was the only European 
3 
nation with a serious role both inside and outside the continent. On 
28th November, the British Ambassador in Bonn, Sir Frank Roberts, reminded 
his German audience that the foreign exchange cost for the British Army 
4 
of the Rhine was E285 million a year. Mr. Wilson simply r~ferred to 
the loss of foreign exchange as " ••• an 5 impossible situation". 
Harold Wilson, in fact was amongst the firs t to see a link 
6 between high defence costs and national insolvency. On the very day 
Bank Rate was raised he underlined " ••. the relevance of the high costs 
7 
of certain sections of the defence programme to our economic situation ••• 
1 Crossman, Richard. The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. I, 1975, p.73. 
2 
vol. 702, H. of C. , 23rd November, 1964, Col. 940. 
3 Economist, Vol. 213, 5th December, 1964, p. 113. 
4 ibid. 
5 Vol. 704, H. of C., 16th December, 1964, Col. 421. 
6 Mr. Wilson resigned in 1951 because the programme imposed a strain on 
7 
Labour's economic and social policies. Harold Wilson's interview with 
the Observer. 
Vol. 702, H. of C., 23rd November, 1964, Col. 940. 
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Mr. Callaghan also caused great political consternation with his 
statement" . • . a strict revie~ is taking place over the whole range of 
Government expenditure including overseas defence commitments in order 
1 to secure a reduction in the burden on our balance of payments". In 
similar vein the Chancellor argued later on, that " .•. the release of 
'resources of skilled manpower' will follow from the Government's 
2 
review of their defence commi tments, including those overseas." 
Mr. Healey,. too, reiterated the Government's bid to make cuts, 
but he also made it plain that he could not be expected to make the 
cuts entirely off his own bat - the foreign office too must take part 
in the surgery. liThe first basic fact, "said Mr. Healey "is that, 
unless we are to allow our defence expenditure to rise continually not 
only in absolute terms but also as a percentage of our rising national 
wealth, we must be prepared to reduce the calls on our military resources. 
There may be cases - I believe there are - where we find ourselves 
inheriting commitments from an imperial past which have lost their 
relevance in the modern world. There may be others where our commitments 
are based on the false belief that it is still possible, or worthwhile, 
to use military force against foreign countries purely to protect our 
national economic interest". 3 Healey looked to the Foreign Office for 
a lead. He looked in vain. Mr. Healey declared that "in 1964 our foreign 
4 policy was much more ambitious than we could afford". 
The Prime Minister adopted a neutral position between the Foreign 
Office and the Ministry of Defence. "There is built into our defence 
system", he declared, "an unavoidable rate of increase - in the absence 
1 
vol. 702 l H. of C" 26th November l 1964 l Col. 1477 r 
2 Vol. 702, J. of C" 26th November, 1964, Col. 1479 
3 Vol. 702, 23rd November, H. of C. , 1964, Col. 1028. 
4 The 
-
Policies of Power, Ope ci t. , p . 16S. . 
. 
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of changes of policy ~ which will mean, year by year, a crippling 
increase in the call on resources." 1 In regard to both manpower and 
equipment Mr. Wilson concluded that " .•• the plain fact is that we have 
been trying to do too much". 2 He went on to emphasise the dangers in 
spending on defence 7.1% of the G.N.P. and warned that the Labour 
Government could not do all " ••. that so far has been thought ideally 
desirable, without fatally weakening our economy and correspondingly, 
ak ' 3 we en~ng our real defences." The Prime Minister promised" ..• to look 
again at our weapons programme •.• ,,4 and Mr. Healey accepted that, in the 
role outside Europe, it might be possible, " ••• after rigorous analysis 
5 to rule out certain types of sophisticated weapons altogether". Be 
moreover promised to see "... whether we can assure better value for money 
by examining possible suitable changes in the role, deployment, ,tactics 
or equipment of the forces which we have".6 
Apart from its desire to implement savings through a less wasteful 
defence policy, Labour also placed much emphasis on the sharing of more 
defence commitments with Britain's allies. Mr. Healey explained that 
"Until we make some progress towards disarmament we must therefore see 
whether we can share the defence burden more effectively with our friends 
and allies and also with the United Nations. Otherwise, we shall find 
ourselves compelled by facts to an involuntary and unplanned abdication 
of responsibilities, perhaps in a moment of crisis, an abdication which 
would be disastrous not only for our influence in the world but 
indeed, perhaps for peace itself".7 Mr. Healey could scarcely have 
1 
vol. 704, H. of C., 16th December, 1964, Col. 420., 
2 
Vol. 704, H. of C., 16th December, 1964, Col. 419, 
3 
Vol. 704, H. of C., 16th December, 1964, CoJ 423, 
4 ibid. 
5 
Vol. 704, H. of C., 17th December, 1964, Col 615 
6 
Vol. 704, H. of C., 17th December. 1964. Col. 616. 
7 
Vol. 704, H. of C., 13th November, 1964, Col. 1029. 
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perceived at that time, that an "unplanned abdication of responsibilities" 
was only three years away. 
Of course, the complex issue of defence savings was bedevilled 
by the economic crisis and, it was the decision to make defence savings 
that was to dominate Labour's future defence policy. 
Labour found the balance of payments deficit somewhat inhibiting, 
but it would certainly be unwise, despite the coincidence of economic 
crisis and talk of defence cuts, to argue that it was just the economic 
problems facing Labour which provoked the plan to cut defence spending. 
This was clearly not so. Labour, after all, had threatened such a cut 
in its election campaign. 
Clearly one reason for the delayed impact of the economic situation 
on defence' planning was that there existed great difficulty in making 
quick defence cuts as a response to economic difficulties. Christopher 
Mayhew, the Minister of Defence for the Navy, argued that a defence review 
was a n ••• problem of enormous complexity, with all the factors interdependent, 
involving £2000 million and hundreds of thousands of people's jobs all over 
the world and with repercussions in foreign policy, industry and home 
1 politics in every possible way". Defence cuts, then, were not seen as 
a means to be used in the short term for dealing with the economy. There 
could be no quick-fix programme of severe cuts, but only the long term 
-implementation of a modern, more efficient, yet cheaper, defence 
structure. 
The economic .. situation only marginally affected defence policy 
because the Labour leadership, if anything, failed to grasp the 
2 
seriousness of the run on the pound. The Cabinet did not propose 
1 
2 
Vol. 704, H. of C., 14th December, 1964. Col. 15Q~ 
Mr. Wilson admitted later, on 23rd November, 1967, on the ITV programme 
'This Week' " that the Government had underated the power of speculation 
at home and abroad to put the pound in jeopardy and force the government 
to resort to short-term measures. Cited Foot, P., Op. eit., p.196. 
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defence economies as an answer to the currency speculation. The 
Government in fact believed that the position could be restored by 
incremental measures such as the import surcharge and the deferment of 
specific social legislation. Postponement of legislation, rather than 
curtailment of commitment, seemed much the most likely outcome. 
A far greater influence on Labour's defence policy than the 
imponderable economic situation was the widespread conviction that 
Britain had for some time allocated too much of its gross national 
product on defence to the detriment of its domestic priorities. It 
was not the short term balance of payments crisis that was the crucial 
factor, but the assessment that permanent damage had been done to the 
essential fabric of the Welfare State by allocating too high a percentage 
of the G.N.P. to defence. 
There were though clear and obvious motives for Labour in 
attributing any defence cuts to the economic hiatus. In this way, the 
Catinet might rid itself of any discredit and also - a greater gain -
dispel growing anxieties about Labour's determination to manage the 
economy. The Government thus seized hold of the promise of defence cuts 
in the course of its struggle to save the pound. The Cabinet in fact 
reasoned that, if there were going to be a detailed review of defence 
policy which would almost certainly end in cuts, then those cuts might 
as well be advertised at a time when it was desirable that foreign 
creditors should be reminded that Labour was bent upon upholding the 
existing parity of the pound. 
This thesis became compelling through the tortuous events of late November. 
On the very day that Lord Cromer was arranging a massive loan from the 
world's central banks, Mr. Callaghan made a surprisingly blunt speech in 
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favour of defence economies. It was also at the height of the run on the 
pound, that other Cabinet Ministers suddenly discovered the virtue of 
advancing the case for making severe defence cuts. In so doing they 
skillfully steered Labour away from the use of short-term deflationary 
measures which were so repugnant to the Party. 
In fact it became a feature of the Labour Government that, in 
a crisis, it promised to take special measures some time in the future, 
in the .expectation that such promises would immediately ease short-term 
difficulties: in other words to use long-term economic measures to gain 
a short-term effect. Thus, corporation and capital gains taxes were 
promulgated in advance, but the critical detail of the levels at which 
they would work was not revealed. Public statements on the necessity 
of defence cuts were not yet ready to be introduced and the effects of 
which often, in th e event, were quite superficial in character. 
The Prime Minister, though, did not let this procedure get too 
well established. Once the promises of defence cuts had realised their 
purpose he nullified their impact in case Britain's real pOSition might 
be misunderstood. Clearly the last fortnight in November and the first 
two weeks of December were used to reinforce the impression of the 
possibility of substantial defence economies, just as the remainder of 
December, with the crisis over for the time being, became a period for 
quietly telling allies that Britain would after all be honouring her 
world-wide responsibilities. l 
While it 'may have been appreciated abroad, in view of the 
Government's re-affirmation of the importance of an overseas presence, 
1 On his Washington visit of December 1964 Mr. Wilson explained to 
the American President the nature of the "special role we could play 
in Africa, through our close relations with Commonwealth countries". 
The Labour Government, op. cit. p.78. 
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was impervious to the Government axe, this was not necessarily the case. 
The crucial dilemma still persisted: could labour make defence cuts and 
yet honour all " its commitments? This seemed remote for savings would 
not be conjured out of thin air. 
While Labour could manage some saving by making a robust cut in 
capability, this could only be achieved by a diminution of diplomatic 
commitment. It had, after all, already undertaken to get manpower and 
equipment improvements across the whole defence spectrum. It was 
moreover a fact that in the face of the escalating costs of weapons 
systems, Governments had to make cuts in order to stabilize the defence 
budget. If genuine economies were to be made, then, a substantial cut 
1 in weapons procurement would be an absolute necessity. 
The opportunity of making economies was further fudged by the 
decision to retain polaris, and by the need to fund those projects 
started under the Conservatives which were in 1964-65 reaching completion. 
Mr. Mulley, the Minister of Defence for the Army, pointed out that "Even 
in the equipment field the long interval between research and development 
and the acceptance into service means that the opportunities for revision 
are much more limited than is supposed. It is difficult to influence 
costs in the short run. During the next year or two we shall be meeting 
the bills for equipment ordered by the Right Hon. Gentlemen opposite -
often which should have been delivered and have been in service several 
2 years ago". 
Mr. Wilson, too, in a precautionary allusion to defence economies, 
openly pontificated that "It would be wrong and unrealistic to raise 
1 The strategy of the TSR-2, op. cit., pp. 726-728. 
2 Vol. 704, H. of C., 14th December, 1964, Col. 40. 
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too many hopes for this coming year, because the 1965-66 estimate 
largely reflects decisions taken a year or many years before ...• and 
there are sometimes more costs in re-adjusting a programme than even 
continuing it unchecked ... l Mr. Reynolds, the Under Secretary of State 
for Defence for the Army, also reinforced the argument that it would be far 
from easy to make equipment economies; "We have got to the position where 
it can no longer be done and the bill must be paid". 2 These statements 
expressing a rather jaundiced view of the chances of making defence cuts, 
contrasted dramatically with those made by the Chancellor in the middle 
of the economic crisis just over a fortnight before. 
The possibility of making defence economies was also lessened by 
a natural reluctance to cut or cancel projects already started under a 
previous administration and now far ad~anced. The case of the TSR-2 
was a classic example of this phenomenon. Mr. Wilson had this aircraft 
in mind when he admitted that some projects had nearly gone past the 
point of return" ... that point in a production programme where it would 
be more costly to scrap it and replace it by a cheaper equivalent than 
th b ' d ,,3 go on to e ~tter en • •• Mr. Wilson regarded the TSR-2 with 
scepticism and admitted in his account of the Labour Government that this 
aircraft was marked for stringent review. He accepted that "Its costs 
were escalating out of all relation to earlier estimates, and it was a 
favourite Treasury target for cancellation under both the Conservative 
and the Labour Governments. Although it had flown successfully as an 
empty shell, it had not yet incorporated the expensive and untried avionic 
1 Vol. 704, H. of C. l 16th December, 1964, CQ11 426-7 1 
2 VOl. 704, December l 1964 l H. of C. , 14th Col. l4~ 
3 VOl. 704, H. of C. l 16th Decemb a:' l 1964, Col. 426. 
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equipment on which one of its principal combat roles depended, its 
contour-flying capacity, flying just above ground level, too low for 
detection by hostile radar screens. The impossibility of forecasting 
the cost of getting this equipment right made further cost escalation 
a virtual certainty".l 
Another important consideration emerged against making cuts 
in capability, and this was the one so often referred to by Mr. Healey 
himself - that the existing forces were overcommitted anyway. To 
reduce capability would only worsen the overcommitment and destroy 
morale in the services. It was left though to Mr. Mulley to spell out to 
the Commons the really insurmountable obstacle in making capability cuts. 
He insisted that it was a misapprehension that" there are a great 
number of options open to Governments in the defence field ••• ", and 
claimed " ... that the room for manoeuvre is a great deal less than 
2 
supposed". This was because there was " ••• a 'hard' element which 
was a figure which has to be accepted as broadly predetermined by the 
size of its army - its civilian backing and equipment which it already 
has and which, therefore, is not suscaptible to reduction in the short 
term .... It means that there is relatively little to play about with 
as regards new equipment". 3 This observation raised the basic dilemma. 
If Labour could not cut capability directly, could it do so indirectly 
by cutting commitment first? Mr. Healey, for one, made no bones about 
it. He did not believe that Britain could sustain her roles as an 
independent nuclear power, as a major contributor to allied defence 
in Europe and as a military power overseas. He argued that " .•• unless 
1 Wilson, Harold, The Labour Government « 1274..( p.72. 
2 Vol. 704 l H. of C. « 14th DecemQ~;:« 1.~2~, CQ1. ~Q. 
3 
vol. 704, H. of C. , 14th December, 1964, Col. 40~ 
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we are to impose unacceptable strains on our own economy and to carry 
a handicap which none of our main competitors in world trade has to 
bear, Britain too must decide which of these three roles should have 
priori ty" . 1 
There were, however, truly formidable problems in cutting 
commitments. Labour had promised to fulfil Britain's obligation 
to Europe and supply the full quota of 55,000 troops to the Rhine 
Army. Nor could there easily be a sudden withdrawal from the bases 
East of Suez. Mr. Wilson had earlier put in a"... personal plea ••• " 
for Hong Kong, and has also pledged his support for Malaysia against 
Indonesia. As that confrontation was if anything likely to get worse, 
Singapore was obviously vital. Labour also emphatically continued to 
show a gritty determination in regard to Aden " .•• to retain the base in 
agreement with the Government of Southern Arabia for so long as it is 
required to serve the interests which we have in common~'. 2 
Of course while Labour articulated a strategic philosophy of 
both a European and a world role, savings would be excruciatingly 
difficult to find. In fact it could make cuts only for a short time 
before the philosophy itself would be rendered negatory. The superfluous 
capacity in Britain's defence structure was perhaps not as excessive as 
Labour had argued, and the difficulty in making defence savings was 
certain to heighten the already acute tensions created by the pursuit of a 
basically unworkable policy. Moreover, even if commitments were cut the 
Government could not necessarily expect a cut in manpower. A lower 
commitment would still justify the existing manpower and only a very 
substantial cut in commitment would make a cut in capability at all 
I Vol. 702, H. of C., 23rd November, 1964, Col. l03~ 
2 




significant or relatively painless. 
Labour's entire defence policy was then already beginning to 
rest on its own dubious assessment that it could as efficiently 
defend Britain's interests on a defence budget some way below 7% of 
G.N.P., as the Conservatives could when working on a defence budget 
perhaps even in excess of 7% G.N.P. Yet put in the starkest terms, 
how could Labour introduce defence cuts to a point considerably below 
7% G.N.P. without restructuring its foreign policy, when the highly 
predictable escalation in defence expenditure would within a short time 
take it scar:ing to yet greater heights? How could Labour make defence 
cuts when a very costly and not to say dangerous Malaysian commitment 
had become volatile and was growing daily more onerous? How could 
defence cuts be reconciled with election hyperbole about improvements 
for the navy, transport command and B.A.O.R., and with the retention of 
nuclear weapons. Moreover, Mr. Wilson had declared that " ••• we need 
most, if" not all, of the bases we now hold ... ,,1 
In view of the difficulty of making cuts it was not surprising 
that the Economist struck a cautionary note. "In sum, it seems that 
Mr. Wilson and his advisers will find sadly little scope for cuts in 
defence expenditure ••.. they can trim the costs of a base or two here 
(Hong Kong and Libya and perhaps Aden, are obvious examples) and maybe 
cause the soldiers and airmen to co-operate more efficiently there. But 
they cannot get rid of any major obligation nor can they, without 
introducing conscription substantially change the structure of forces 
which they inherited".2 
1 Vol. 704, H. of C., 16th December, 1964, Col. 425. 
2 Economis~ Vol. 213, 21st November, 1964, p.800. 
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If it were unreasonable to see the fulfilment of spectacular 
cuts in commitment of capability, then Labour's defence strategy would 
have to rest insecurely on the assumption that economies could be 
achieved through stripping out a large amount of waste in the defence 
budget. Yet even this central assumption was repudiated by Mr. Mulley 
himself when he admitted that "The costs are high and, short of reducing 
commitments and hence reducing manpower, they will continue to be high, 
but defence costs must be understood for what they are. Even if all the 
waste and muddle ... is eliminated, the costs are bound to be high. 
1 Indications are that they will get higher". 
As 1964 drew to its seasonal close, then, no real answers had been 
given as to where the defence economies were to come. It was clear that 
Labour had promised more cost-effectiveness and 'planning' but while these 
pentagon inspired concepts may have caused some consternation in certain 
ministries, its meaning in the context of defence policy was as yet 
2 
unclear. However, the example of planning, programming and budgetary 
systems (PPBS) in the US Defence Department had inspired similar 
procedures in the Ministry of Defence. This was well under way by the 
time Denis Healey took over. 
The Defence White Paper of F.ebruary, 1965, was impatiently awaited 
to give preliminary substance to Labour's new policy. In his preparation 
of that policy statement, one intractable problem faced Denis Healey -
how could he, in all conscience, cover'foreign policy commitments as 
large as those proudly sustained by the Conservatives, on a defence 
budget considerably more modest? 
1 Vol. 704, H. of C., 14th December, 1964, Col. 40. 
2 See Burt, Richard, Defence Budgeting: The British and American Cases, 
IISS, 1974, pp. 2-8. 
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There was, then, in the short interval in the post election period 
the barely concealed beginnings of a headlong retreat from Labour's 
exposed pre-election defence posture. This was due to the explicable 
effects of the winning of parliamentary power and to the inevitable 
contradictions in its own defence policy, than to a change in basic 
values or indeed their betrayal. 
The retreat from Labour's over elaborate defence policy (a 
headlong retreat th.at certainly would have occurred independently of the 
ongoing economic crisis) was, however, not so acute as to overwhelm 
the overall stance of Labour1s grand strategy. It became clear that 
the dichotomy between the Atlanticist and European defence postures grew 
more obvious and severe, but there was no sudden or even more considered 
move to abandon one in favour of the other. 
While the parliamentary Left, largely in fact the Tribune Group, 
might have hoped in a great rush of ideolo.gical or pious hope that 
economic events were about to do, what years of passionate oratory on the 
iniquity and futility of the world role had failed to do, Mr. Wilson made 
11 ••• it quite clear that whatever we may do in the field of cost 
effectiveness, value for money and a stringent review of expenditure, 
I 
we cannot afford to relinquish our world role ••• II • 
Even amongst all the speculation of savage defence cuts the Prime 
Minister, unashamedly waxed eloquent about the great value of the 
imperial commitment. He mused about the successful niilitary moves made in 
the early months of 1964 and expressed with obvious feeling that, if 
Britain gave up her world role, she would 11 ••• be abdicating from what 
I regard as our duty to the Commonwealth and to world peace and we should 
I Vol. 704, H. of C., 16th December. 1964, Col. 423 t 
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be abdicating from any hope of real influence in the world .•. "l 
Mr. Wilson had not become Her Majesty's first Minister to preside 
over the liquidation of the British Commonwealth. 
Despite Mr. Wilson's resignation from the Attlee administration 
in 1951, on the hoary issue of excessive defence expenditure, he was, 
in fact, often at his most effective, if not eloquent when insisting 
with emphasis that Britain should not deny her defence responsibilities 
in securing peace, " ... which is beyond all price and beyond all 
measurement of economic cost".2 He was ponderously aware that Britain 
3 had a "... unique opportunity to play such a role". While he conceded 
that, in Europe, Britain was no more powerful than other countries, 
he noted, with mounting pride that " ••• none of our continental N.A.T.O. 
allies, nor any of our associates in the Middle East or Asian alliances 
can compete with us in the range of the contribution we can make in those 
4 
vital areas beyond Europe". According to the Prime Minister the East 
of Suez role was "... one which no one in this House or indeed in the 
country, will wish us to give up or call in question". 5 There was no 
clearer, or more emphatically Kiplinesque statement uttered by a Prime 
Minister since the death of Churchill. 
Labour's foreign policy philosophy of a strong Atlantic alliance 
and a World Role thus remained constant during those first few months in 
office, even if certain details of that philosophy, such as Aden and the 
M.L.F., needed definition. In fact, the problems which most obviously 
pressed themselves upon the now faltering British Government, were raised 
1 
Vol. 704, H. of C., 16th December, 1964, Col. 422 •. 
2 Foot, P. , op • . ci t. I p. 96 ~ 
3 




Vol. 704, H. of C., 16th December, 1964, Col. 421. 
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by the sale of arms to South Africa and U.D.I. in Southern Rhodesia, 
and yet all of these were only peripheral to the central doctrine so 
warmly advocated. 
However, even if the overall policy were not immediately in 
danger the future looked unpromising. Mr. Wilson in a statement which 
neatly established the interrelationship between economics and foreign 
policy, unconsciously gave a warning of what fate the external 
environment had in store when speaking to the trade union congress 
- "... yes we can borrow you can get into pawn, but don't then 
talk about an independent foreign policy or an independent defence 
POlicy".l His oratory was to prove ironically prophetic. 
1 
Trade Union Congress Report, 1964, p. 383. 
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C H APT E R VII 
THE INTRODUCTION OF DEFENCE ECONOMIES AND 
THE MAKING OF DEFENCE POLICY 
Of the Cabinet I s principc\.I.. defence objectives in 1965, the most 
iIIlr.lediately pressing was the one to make defence savings. The 
widespread view was that if Labour was to i~plement its ambitious 
legislative programme without facing recurring economic difficulties, 
then the spiral in defence costs must be arrested. Mr. Healey was 
to comment some time later that " ••.• in the early years everybody 
1 
saw defence cuts as the answer 'to the economic problem. 11 The economic 
situation in Britain continued to deteriorate, and, policy apart, the 
question of how much could be spared for defence remained unanswered. 
Healey had committed his Ministry to saving £400 million by reducing 
defence expenditure to £2,000 million at 1964 press by 1970. 
In the short run, the savings envisaged by Labour looked rather 
modest, but in the long term they were expected to be substantial. 
2 This would represent only 5.9% of the G.N.P. The Prime Minister went 
even further, 11 If we can get below that £2000 million we shall certainly 
do so". 3 These figures compared favourably with Conservative estimates 
which stood at £2176 million for 1965/66 and which, according to the 
Prime Minister, " ••• would inevitably escalate at 1964 prices to 
4 £2,400 million and more than that if no changes are made. 11 
In July 1965, however, the run on the pound became once ,again a 
question of great concern to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. James 
Callaghan turned to Denis Healey for an assurance that cuts would be 
1 
Denis Healey and the Policies of Power " op. cl t. P .187 • 
2 
J0l. 707. H. of C., 23rd February, 1965, Col. 87. Written answers. 
3 
Vol. 717, H. of C., 3rd August. 1965, Col. 1265. Oral answers. 
4 Vol. 713, H. of C., 3rd June, 1965, Vol. 1949. Oral answers. 
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effectively and quickly achieved. Denis Healey responded by announcing 
at a press conference on 4 August that he was halfway to his target 
of £400 million in cuts, having so far achieved a total of £220 million. 
Public opinion was generally behind him. Most Labour Members of 
Parliament were interested only in spending less on defence - provided 
the country did not become defenceless. ~ Healey accpeted that "in the early 
.::A 
years everybody saw defence cuts as the answer to the economic problem. 
The tragedy was that the money I saved on defence was squandered on 
1 increases in consumption and civil expenditure". (There was little 
real attempt to curtail civil expenditure until 1969, when Jenkins was 
Chancellor) . 2 
At his press conference Healey said that 'the only real hope of savings 
lies in the possibility that commitments can be revised'. 3 On 5th 
August he told the Commons: "I readily confess that to bri.dge the 
remaining gap to the target will require redeployment of our forces and 
a smaller total of manpower in the services".4 
The Government's determination to make savings, without adversely 
affecting the security of Britain's supposed interests, largely rested 
upon the degree of superfluous capability and commitment that existed, 
and on Labour's ability to pick out and remove any excess. If the 
Government failed to uncover substantial and indeed appalling waste, 
it would be forced to examine a number of uniformly unpalatable options -
to disregard the £2000 million figure, to give up some commitments it 
would prefer to continue, or to compel the Services to carry out their 
duties with insufficient or inferior capability. 
1 Remarks made to author during a lengthy interview. 
2 See Beckerman, W. The Economic Record of the Labour Government, 1964-70. 
3 ' Denis Healey Press interview, 4th August (Transcript made available 
by M.O.D.) 
4 
Denis Healey and the Policies of Power, OPe cit., p. 187. 
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The Prime Minister was optimistic, but nevertheless conscious 
of " .•• the enormous difficulties, in terms of our commitments, in terms 
of weapons programmes and the rest, of cutting the defence programme 
from £2475 million to £2000 million". 1 On the other hand, the 
Economist was unequivocably pessimistic, " .•• there are just not very 
2 
many cuts to be made, at any rate big ones, at any rate soon". 
One of the Government's main frustrations, and perhaps the 
biggest disappointment as well, was the continuing indispensability 
of Britain's costly bases. The long-awaited review of Britain's 
. " b i ,,3 1 11 comm~tment .•. base by base and garrison y garr son .•• , on y a 
too clearly confirmed the already apparent advantages of the bases 
over any 'alternative strategy'. 
The 'alternative strategy' that had caught Labour's interest 
while in opposition had been based on air trooping and a greater 
amphibious capability. However the attraction of this 'alternative 
strategy' was soon scuppered in the face of a mass of Ministry of 
Defence statistics about its cost. While Mr. Healey continued to 
accept, in a conceptual sense, the 'general proposition' that a 
greater amphibious capacity made good sense, with an air of 
4 finality he emphasized" •.. how enormously costly such a force can 'be". 
Mr. Mayhew also expressed reservations about air trooping. He warned 
that "... although the Strategic Reserve is a very fine thing, we do 
not get it free of charge. When working out any savings from running 





Vol. 713, H. of C., 3rd June, .1965, Col. 1949, Oral Answers! 
Economist ~ Vol. 215, 17th July, p. 216~ This judgement in part was 
presumably based on the fact that the winding up of commitments and 
the reduction of personnel after allow no saving at all while severance 
pay and aid have to be paid. 
Mayhew, C., Vol. 705, H. of C., 19th January, 1965,· Col. 62 • . 
Vol. 705, H. of C., 19th January, 1965, C 1 65 
_ _ o. . 
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fed, paid, equipped and housed, just like the rest of the forces. 
1 Moreover, it has to be transported". 
These arguments about the cost of mobility were devastating. 
As the British economy declined it hardly seemed feasible to make 
redundant those bases which, over many years, had absorbed so much 
of the nation's gross national product. Also, according to Labour's 
Left Wing, fixed bases abroad were largely retained in order to appease 
the Americans who were in need of par~ers in strife in the developing 
world. 
Moreover, unlike Mr. Wilson, many Labour ministers remained 
according to Mr. Richard Crossman, unconvinced that the World Role 
would survive into the seventies, and these men were strongly 
critical of the wisdom of building up a new and expensive strategy 
to fulfil a doomed role. He wrote that at a Cabin et meeting "I then 
asked about our world-wide role: 'If the Americans like us to have 
a world-wide role what does this mean for us in terms of military 
commitments?' Healey replied that what they wanted us to do was not 
to maintain huge bases but to keep a foothold in Hong Kong, Malaya, 
the Persian Gulf, to enable us to do things for the alliance which they 
can't do. They think our forces are much more useful to the alliance 
1 
outside Europe than in Germany." Mr. Mayhew summed up the Government's 
pOSition, "I do not want to get into the position of suggesting that 
bases are cheaper in all circumstancs .••. For some purposes it might 
be cheaper to use the Reserve, for others not. The mix will vary, 
2 but as far as I can see there will always be a place for both". 
1 
2 
Crossman, Richard. The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. I., p.9S. 
Mr. Crossman was, of course, concerned with the utility of bases rather 
than with their cost. 
Vol. 705, H. of C., 19th January, 1965, Col. 66., 
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This balanced statement would clearly have had a less than 
enthusiastic emphasis some months earlier. 
The Navy Minister also emphasised some of the difficulties 
inherent in giving up bases. "We have to assess the possible loss 
of local confidence as a result of our going, the possible uncertainty 
of the alternative means of reinforcement due to the shortage of 
overflying rights, difficulty in protecting the point of entry, the 
1 problems of acclimatising troops, the time taken and so on". 
Mr. Mayhew more probably than not had the Malaysian operation in mind 
when he spoke to the Commons. It was the British operations in Malaysia 
that finally persuaded the Government that, while a sea and air 
presence was sufficient for an 'intervention' operation, it was not 
suitable for the necessarily prolonged handling of an insurgency. 
The indispensability of the bases was a compelling reason why 
the Government found it nearly impossible to make defence savings. 
The defence review was not entirely successful even at the level of 
a public relations exercise, for it painfully laid bare, for all to 
see, the acute weakness of Britain's position. While the jargon of 
cost control, and of functional costing, value analysis and cost-
effectiveness derived from the activities of the Pentagon was novel, 
these cosmetic terms - an obsession with the costs of feedi,ng alsatiQn 
police dogs in Singapore, accommodation for other ranks in Gibraltar 
and the R.A.F. 's ceremonial dress - seemed the petty concerns of 
nation in imperial decline. Ironically after centuries of magnificence 
and splendour, the protection of the realm and its imperial interests 
had come to depend upon pettyfo,9gi,ng economies that ostentatious displays 
1 Vol. 705 H. of C., 19th. January, 1965, Col. 66 ~ Britain was unable to 
overfly Egypt, Syria or Iraq. , ' Her troops had to go e1 ther north via 
Turkey, Persia and Bahrain or to the south via Libya, ~le Sudan and 
Aden. Even the southern corridor became unsuitable because of 
Sudan's and Libya's opposition. 
--
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of Empire, such as ceremonial costume, could cost unless the . Ministry 
of Defence acted decisively to prevent such profligate expenditure. 
Despi te the difficulty of making defence cuts, the Government's 
demand for economy remained central to its defence strategy. The 
Chancellor, in particular, would not be deprived of his pound of flesh, 
" ••• I say quite clearly to the Committee that I am by no means 
satisfied with the amount of cutting that has taken place so far. We 
are determined to cut it (overseas expenditure). I would say that in 
some ways it has been allowed to develop into a lush and extravagant 
growth over the last five or six years. It must be pruned, and 
1 pruned back hard". Mr. Callaghan was convinced that Britain could 
not ".... be expected to go on shouldering the burden she is carrying 
at the present time", 2 and he promised that "The review is going on 
and the cuts will and must come, because this is an essential part 
3 
and an essential way of balancing our overseas payments". 
The question of defence expenditure on the British economy, 
both its general impact and the direct loss of foreign exchange, 
was also raised by the Chancellor on his visit to Washington in 
June. Mr. McNamara is reported as having instruc·ted him - "increase 
productivity at home and make your military establishment more cost-
efficient, then I'm sure you couJld avoid cutting your commitments 
4 East of Suez". It was unclear whether Mr. Callaghan flew to London 
entirely convinced of the merits of the likely impact Pentagon thinking 
had on the British deEence establishment. 
1 Vol. 710 L 1965, H. of C. , 12th AEril, Col. 1078. 
2 Vol. 710, H. of C. ! 12th AEril, 1965! Col. 1079. 
3 ibid. 
4 Sunday Times, 13th March, 1962. ~. .21. 
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It was, however, not Mr. callagh1an, but curiously enough, 
Mr. Healey who made the most convincting analysis of the . relationship 
between defence spending and economic weakness - "If our defence 
spending imposes unacceptable strains on our economy", he said, "then 
it will weaken and not reinforce our influence in the world. When we decide 
the size and pattern of our defence, we must watch with extreme 
vigilance the impact both on our balance of payments, and even more 
important on our productive resources, particularly in scientists and 
1 
skilled manpower". 
Mr. Healey clearly more than any other post-war Defence Minister 
was aware of his duties not only to define the country's strategic 
interests, but also to ensure that it was not expected to carry an over 
large defence burden. While this showed a robust concern for the 
I • , nat~onal interest in the broad sense, and revealed Mr. Healey as a man 
concerned with the wider implications of defence, it was arguable, 
especially in the view of the Chiefs of Staff, whether it was in the 
best interests of Britain's defence policy. It reflected a built-in 
conflict of interests in the mind of the Defence Minister - as all 
subsequent Defence Ministers will confirm - caused by an ever present 
need to relate his defence programme to a volatile financial situation 
reflecting a secular economic decline. The balance of payments deficit 
became the major concern of Mr. Healey and every passing month appeared 
to undermine his position. 
While Labour could not get the savings on the bases that it had 
expected to realise, and perceived that the new cost-effective methods 
were difficult to operate, there was one environment in which the 
Government was justifiably hopeful that savings could be made, and that 
was in the procurement of aircraft. 
1 
Vol. 702, H. of C., 23rd November, 1964, Col. 1028. 
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As soon as the Labour Party assumed office in October 1964 the 
question of continuing the TSR-2, Pl154 and HS. 681 projects were raised. 
Dismissed contemptuously, as a prestige project in some quarters, it 
was only with difficulty that breathing space was won for the TSR-2. 
In February 1965 the Prime Minister told the Commons, 11 the original 
estimate which I can get today for research, design and production 
is £750 million, Which, on an order for 150 would cost £5 million/plane, 
or 25 times the cost of the Canberra which it was designed to replace. 
We have therefore decided, first against the background of our 
long-term commitments and requirements, that we need to have the immediate 
evaluation of the future of TSR-2 to which I have referred, which we 
have not yet got in terms of some of the technical problems I mentioned. 
Secondly •.•. we shall have to have fixed prices, guaranteed, with 
penalty clauses on delivery and the rest if we are not to put the time 
scale still further back ••.• We must have that before we can decide 
Thirdly, we need more information that we have at present about 
the certainty, capability and cost of certain possible alternatives." l 
The Prime Minister mentioned not only a strict review of the TSR-2 
project but also that an alternative, the United States F.lll could 
be bought instead of the TSR-2. 
The various figures given for completing research and 
development and for producing about 150 aircraft for service have continued to 
cause considerable confusion. Estimates by the main contractors 
B .• A.C. and B.S.E. of some £400 million seem to conflict with the 
official figure of E 750 million. However, it must be remembered 
that B.A.C. and B.S.E. did not include in their estimates the 
1 Vol. 705, H. of C., 2nd January, 1965·" Col. .934. 
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expected costs of other work under contract to the Ministry of 
Aviation. Therefore the official, estimated, total cost of 
£750 million was not unreasonable. Further, official estimates 
had to include considerable contingency allowances for the costs 
that might be incurred during the flight and avionics development 
programmes. These development programmes were expected to be 
lengthy and a fully developed TSR-2 was not expected in some 
quarters to enter the squadron service before 1969. Finally, there was 
a growing feeling, in official quarters, that the servicing of the 
1 TSR-2 might prove a significant .long-run cost. 
Before considering the actual decision to cancel it should be 
noted that two complementary lines of thought on TSR-2 existed in 
the Ministry of Defence. One had accepted the cancellation because of 
the existence of an alternative aircraft, the F.lll; the other 
considered that there was no longer a requirement for TSR-2 or an . 
alternative type of aircraft. In fact the final decision was very 
nearly 'TSR-2 or nothing'. The press speculated on this in early 
April,2 and speaking on B.B.C. T.V. Mr. ROY Jenkins, the then 
Minister of Aviation had said, referring to the F.lll "I think 
there is a good chance we may not need to order it".3 
It appears that cancellation itself took place before the 
extensive review called for by Mr. Wilson had actually been 
completed. The official announcement was made during the course 
of Mr. Callaghan's Budget Speech, on 5th April, 1965. During 




For a discussion of the methods of estimating the costs of servicing 
aircraft and how servicibility . is assessed see: 'RAF Aircraft Reliability', 
by Air Cdre. T. Wharton, CBE, in Fligh~ International, 29.2.68, pp.299-302. 
See for example reports in Daily Express, 3rd April, 1965 and the 
Sunday Telegraph" 4th April, 1965. 
Reported in Daily Telegraph, 9th April, 1965. 
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a fixed price contract in January 1965, as demanded by the Prime 
Minister. 
However, they had swiftly withdrawn this offer and replaced it 
by a target-price contract, under which the Government would have 
to hear all costs over £9 million above the target price. B.A.C.'s 
reluctance to quote a fixed price was understandable as much research 
and development work had still to be done. 
Nonetheless, when TSR-2 was cancelled the Government justified 
the decision mainly .because the cost of completing TSR-2 exceeded the 
, 
cost of purchasing American F .llls. This argument was backed up by 
reference to American offers of 'offset' deals to help the British 
Balance of Payments. The Obsel"Ver, commenting on Tory accusations 
that Labour had given in to U.S. sales pressure, said, "But the facts 
were that Denis Healey had moved into the Ministry of Defence, where 
Hardman, Permanent Secretary since 1963, was waiting for him, with 
clear ideas on cost-effectiveness. These were as effective in killing 
1 TSR-2 as Jim Callaghan's insistence on saving money". As Mr. Healey, 
the Defence Minister, told the Commons, liThe fundamental reason for 
our decision on the TSR-2 was that the cost of the pr.ogramme we 
2 inheri ted was out of all proportion to the aircraft~ s military value". 
The Government's view on the future size of the aircraft industry 
and its place in their economic strat.egy for the country may be seen 
as f~rming part of the background to their cancellation decision. In 
this context the Government had instituted the Plowden Enquiry into the 
1 !he Observer, 11th April, 1965'. 
2 Vol. 710, H. of C., 14th April; Col. 1190. 
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1 Aircraft Industry. The enquiry and the general trend of some of the 
related public discussions suggested that Britain should not attempt 
to maintain a full range of aerospace industrial capabilities. In 
particular, it was suggested that the TSR-2 project was too costly when 
related to the lack of a large domestic market and export prospects 
for it. 
An example of Plowden period thinking was indeed provided by 
K. Hartley in an influential article written before the report was 
published. The general points behind the type of 'thinking' stem 
from alarm at the rising costs of aircraft production and Britain's 
comparative lack of opportunity to achieve the economies of long 
production runs. Setting out the ideal theoretical basis for the 
aircraft industry Hartley argued that "The view that Britain should abandon 
military design and development work and concentrate on produci.ng U.S. 
aircraft under licence must be taken as a serious policy proposal. 
Ideally, the British and American aircraft industries should specialise 
in developing and producing those aircraft types, both military and 
civil, in which each industry has the greatest comparative advantage. 
Thus, the British industry might specialise in developing and 
producing those aircraft types, both military and civil, in which each 
industry has the greatest comparative advantage. Thus, the British 
industry might specialise in developing and producing medium and short-
range civil aircraft, VTOL aircraft and aero-englnines, whilst the 
U.S. industry might concentrate on building long-range aircraft, space 
vehicles, helicopters and all varieties of missiles - then each could 
buy from the specialist producer - and the specialist gain the advantages 
of large-scale production".2 
1 
Report of the Committee of Enguiry into the Aircraft 1964-65 
(Cmnd. 2853, HMSO - cited as 'Plowden Report'). 
2 
Hartl~y, K. The Future of British Aircraft Industry, The Bankers. 
Ma azine, Vol. 199, 1965, p. 335. 
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Referring to the basic problem of improving the relationship between 
sales, development and initial production costs Plowden recommended in the event 
that the U.K. should collaborate on a comprehensive range of military 
and civil projects with overseas partners; that these projects should 
be those for which development costs are reasonable in relation to the 
expected market and that where development costs are disproportionate, 
for example, on the largest and most complex military aircraft and guided 
1 
weapons, essential needs should be met by purchase from the U.S.A. 
It seems unlikely that TSR-2, having as it did the problems 
of rising research and development costs, the likelihood of a 
small production run and uncertainty as to its actual place in a 
changing strategic environment, had much chance of surviving the 
economy axe. However, axing the TSR-2, HS.681 and Pl154 did not 
lead to a better future along the lines Plowden recommended. First, 
Britain did not have any real equal-partnership relation with the 
American aerospace industry because British industrial capacity (as 
opposed to technical expertise) was irrelevant to the American industry. 
Second, collaboration with Europe had not proved that easy. The A.F.V.G. 
was axed, the M.R.e.A. project had some way to go before it came into 
full production, and then there was doubt concerning the future of the 
Anglo-French helicopter projects. 
It was fortunate for the Labour Government that the de'cision to 
cancel TSR-2 was not complicated by the existence of foreign orders 
for the aircraft. Had such orders been placed not only would the 
international political implications of a cancellation have had to be 
taken into account but also the potential economies of large-scale 
1 
Plowden Report! op. cit., p. 38. 
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production. The latter might have made TSR-2's unit cost more comparable 
to that of the F.lll. However, the only potential customer was the R.A.A.F. 
France was trying to develop the Mirage range and the U.S.A. had its own 
designs and rarely bought foreign military aircraft in quantity, 
preferring to licence-produce instead. An order from the R.A.A.F. would 
have made delivery of R.A.F. TSR-2's more certain and cancellation 
much more difficult. 
The R.A.A.F. had been involved in planning the requirements 
for a TSR aircraft since its inception as it was rightly felt that that 
type of aircraft could perform an important role in the saf,eguarding 
of Australian strategic interests. l When looking for a new aircraft, 
during the 1960s, the R.A.A.F. had considered either the Vigilants 
of Phanton F.4C as its next generation of combat planes. However, the 
Australian Government told the Air Board to think of a type of aircraft 
which would not be so soon obsolete. The chdce was thus between TSR-2 
and TFX. An Australian technical mission under Air Marshal Sir Valston 
Hancock, Chief of Air Staff, R.A.A.F., went overseas in 1963' to evaluate 
both aircraft. This mission reported in favour of the TSR-2 to the 
2 Australian Government. 
The reasons for the Australian official announcement that the 
mission favoured the F.lll and the subsequent decision to purchase 
twenty-four F.llls are not clear. One important consideration was 
probably the growing Australian/United States link in the field of 
defence equipment. For example, in addition to F.llls the 
Australians had opted to purchase United States 'Charles F. Adams' 
missile armed destroyers. As T. B. Millar wrote, 'As far as Australia 
is concerned we cannot afford to build small quantities of enormously 
1 
Eaily Telegraph, 4th November~ 1963. 
2 C .. r~s~s in Procurement, op. cit. 
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expensive military equipment, and the United States can guarantee 
to supply in bulk when needed, whereas the United Kingdom cannot. 
This would seem to have been an important consideration in the decision 
1 to purchase the F.lllA rather than the TSR-2". Comparative costs 
may also have played a part, it is possible that the United States 
offered a more 'cut-price' deal than the United Kingdom could. Mr. 
Healey, answering criticism that Labour's attitude to the project 
helped to lose an Australian purchase said, "I have had the advantage 
of discussing the Australian decision with members of the Australian 
Government since I have been in office .••• they were absolutely 
certain, when they looked at the comparative cost of the two aircraft, 
th t th th ,,2 a ere was no alternative to em ••. But some of the official 
and unofficial 'anti-TSR-2' lobby may well have auded a note of uncertainty 
as to the project's future which in~luenced the Australian Government. 
Finally, Australia's need for a TSR-2 type of aircraft was questioned. 
It was suggested that the TSR-2 with its nuclear delivery capability 
was not suited to Australian requirements, as Australia does not possess 
3 
nuclear weapons. However, in this context, Mr. Charles Gardner, the 
B.A.C. Publicity Manager, said that in the Australian area the importance 
, 4 
of TSR-2 was its ability to survive modern defence systems. Anyway, 
the F.lll has the capability to carry nuclear weapons and the Australians 
have never precluded their possession of nuclear weapons. 
The 1966 Defence Review (discussed later) envisaged that for at 
least a decade British forces would remain East of Suez and that 
the 50 American-supplied F,llls, supplemented by the 'V' bombers, 
1 
Millar, T. B., Australia's Defence (Melbourne UP, Australia 196'5), p.40 
2 
Vol. 710, H. of C., 15th November, ,1965, Co. 1194. 
3 
The Economist, 2nd November, 1963. 
4 
ibid., 23rd November, 1963. 
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and ultimately to be replaced by the AFVGs, would prove to be, 
with the use of friendly airfields, a substantial 'pres~nce' and 
an effective 'deterrent' to untoward or covert aggression. Mr. Healey 
indicated in the subsequent Commons defence debate that the review was 
something of a definitive statement. This clearly established that 
the cancellation of TSR-2 in the previous spring was not the prelude 
to dramatic changes in defence policy of the kind that eventually 
Occurred. Mr. Healey asserted that 'the major decisions were now 
taken' and that the review had been 'an exercise in political and 
military realism,.l The Government took the view that Britain was 
in a position, and would remain in a position, 'to carry out all our 
treaty commitments, particularly those for NATO, CENTO and SEATO We 
shall be able to carry out a large range of peace-keeping tasks like 
that in East Africa .. two years ago, entirely on our own, while maintining 
a powerful deterrent against intervention by others while carrying 
them out, and we shall also be able to make a powerful contribution 
to allied operations if we so decide,.2 Speculation, however, that 
the TSR-2 cancellation decision was the thin end of a very substantial 
wedge about to be driven between Britain's European, and extra-European, 
commitments did not seriously arise until after the Sterling Crisis 
of July 1967, the liquidation of the AFVGA project and after France's 
request to withdraw forces from NATO. 
However, 'In-House' debate about the implications of the 
cancellation of TSR-2 may well have involved assumptions about 
an early termination of Britain's world role. But this dabate, if 
it occurred, could only have affected government policy after:I - the 
Cabinet had decided on a change in policy. 
1 
Vol. 725« H. of C.« 5th March« 1966« Col. 2044-5. 
2 ibid. 
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It would be an error to suppose that the TSR-2 cancellation 
decision was the occasion for a major change in Britain's strategic 
perspectives, even though the passing of the resolve to bu~.ld 
independently a costly and sophisticated tactical strike reconnaissance 
aircraft largely, of course, for our own use, did signally mark yet 
another step towards a significantly diminished military status. It 
thus appears that in all probability the TSR-2 cancellation decision 
was not a product of a change in Britain's strategic perspectives but 
rather one taken purely on the basis of economic and financial factors. 
Three issues remained outstanding when TSR-2 was cancelled on 
5th April, 1965. First was the question of cancellation costs even 
though no final figure has ever been given. Second, there was the 
question of the specially produced tools, jigs and fixtures. These 
in fact belonged to ~~e Ministry of Technology and BAC was ordered to 
scrap them. The cost of jigs and tools was E12 million, but their 
1 
sale value was only £53,000. Also the existing airframe parts, apart 
from two prototypes and one completed aircraft, had to be cut into 
very small sections: presumably for security reasons. Finally, on 4th 
June, 1965, Mr. Roy Jenkins stated, ItI have examined very carefully the 
possibilities of the flying of the TSR-2 during the next few years 
in aid of our research programme, using the 3 aircraft with engines 
and the spare parts which are now available. I have regretfully concluded, 
however, that the information we shall be likely to derive from the 
flying would be the minimum cost involved in maintaining and operating 
these complex aircraft. ,2 
1 
Vol. 764, H. of C., 6th May; 19'68, Col. 11« oral answers. 
2 Vol. 713, H. of C., 4th June, ' 1965, Col. 274. 
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The Pl127, the subsonic version of the vertical take off Pl154 
was, though, to be developed. 
The significance of the aircraft cancellations for the East of 
Suez role soon became apparent because they allowed Labour to make savings 
which wholly, or in part, might otherwise have been made elsewhere, 
and of course, they affected Britain's ability to operate in the 
East of Suez area. And yet in the event it proved that, on. balance, 
Britain's capability to act East of Suez was only marginally impaired 
by the cancellation. Indeed curiously enough the role might even 
have benefitted, since the planes ordered by Labour would come into service 
before those that were cancelled; that is if the new aircraft ever came 
into service. It was also clear that in one sense the substitution of 
the F . llLA for the TSR-2 was a complement to the East of Suez role, since 
the aborted British tactical strike aircraft with its residual nuclear 
capability seemed well suited to ~entral Europe, while the new American 
aircraft with its enormous ferry r .cmge appeared to be a plane 
specialising in the sort of problems likely to face Britain in the Far 
East as well as having a residual nuclear strike role which might also 
prove useful.l 
However, Mr. Crossman noted what he regarded as the inter-
relationship between the TSR-2 cancellation and Britain's role 
East of Suez. He recorded his impressions of a Cabinet meeting on 
Thursday February 11th which had been dealing with defence and related 
both the TSR-2 issue and the imperial role to the Anglo-American 
alliance: "I am alarmed" he confessed, "at the feeling that we have 
1 
Art, Robert, The TFX Decision, McNamara and the Military, 1968, 
p.19. 
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put ourselves in the hands of the American politicians - an uneasy 
feeling which I share with Frank Cousins. Nevertheless, I have to face 
that in all this Harold Wilson has played the leading role, and that 
Denis Healey and Roy Jenkins have really only acted as Lieutenants. 
Harold has shown a solid determination to recreate the AnglO-American 
axies, the special relationship between Britain and America, very much 
along Bevinist lines. The more I think of this gamble the more 
I dislike it. We are cutting back the British aircraft industry in 
order to concentrate on maintaining our imperial position East of 
Suez. And we are doing that not because we need these bases ourselves 
but because the Americans cannot defend the Far East on their own and 
need us there".l 
The suspicion that Britain had over-committed herself to the 
Americans appeared strengthened by the decision to purchase an 
American replacement aircraft, the FllIK, for the now cancelled 
TSR-2. But an even worse suspicion emerged on the Left of the Party 
that the FlllK had been ordered for a strategic nuclear role. 
It was certainly clear that in April 1965 Operational Requirement 
343 was still regarded as valid. 2 And insofar as this was so the 
argument that TSR-2 was cancelled because of its possible strategic 
nuclear role ignores the capability in this respect of the F-lII. Mr. 
Healey in dealing with the minimum specification for the FllI made 
it clear that this was so when he asserted that "on the question of the 
operational requirement for the Flll, in all respects it is lower 
than the requirement for the aircraft ordered for the United States 
I 
2 
Crossman, R., Vol. I., Ope cit., p.156. 
This requirement specified the need for an essentially tactical and 
reconnaisance aircraft with a sophisticated capability. This gave 
it a residual strategic role. 
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Government which gives us a substantial "buffer" in case of any chop 
in the performance of the American aircraft. In almost every respect 
- I would not be prepared to hold to everY single one: there are many 
possible parameters - the requirement is substantially the same as for 
the TSR-2. In all respects the performance of the F-lll is superior 
to the requirement for the TSR-2." Labour left-wingers were, however, 
suspicious and when asked by Mr. Michael Foot if the F-IlIK was required 
to carry nuclear weapons, Mr. Healey said: "The role of this type of 
aircraft is as a tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft, carrying 
conventional weapons."l 
That this aircraft had a "strategic bonus" was not admitted 
offiCially, but it may be presumed to be correct. However, the case 
for either the TSR-2 or the F-lIIK lay in its use over the battlefield 
to give long-standing cover for troops and/or produce supersonic flight 
at low level for striking against well-defended targets. This capability 
was still though necessary in 1965 when the government decided that 
Britain's role east of Suez took a much higher defence priority than 
subsequently appeared to be necessary. Even when this role was put in 
doubt and later abandoned, when first the Carrier and then military 
commitments were cut back, the justification for replacing the TSR-2 
aircraft with the FIlIK, and later the Anglo-French variable Geometry 
Aircraft (AFVG) was that it was of greater value in the European theatre. 
Subsequent to cancellation, before the adoption of a reason for opting' 
for the F-lllK and then AFVG because in his view Operational Requirement 343 
had to be met: "the role of this aircraft, as we envis,age it, is very much 
2 
the same as the role of TSR-2 ' which the ' previous government planned". 
He continued: "the central role of this variable geometry aircraft and 
1 Quoted in Williams, Geoffrey, ~he Strategy of the TSR-2, op. cit., p.740. 
2 ibid. 
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The FlllK .. • is to provide this type of intelligence by ~erial 
reconnaisance," referring to the need to have good area cover over 
a wide distance where reliable information of enemy troop movements 
needed to be known. Then with a reference to the need for similar 
cover at sea, he retorted: "a lot of questions have been asked ••• 
about our plans for replacing the capability of strike carriers in 
the maritime air strike role. The AFVG will do this. To some extent, 
so will the FlllK. The aircraft and the FlllK were not intended only 
for East of Suez commitments ••••. The last government planned the 
TSR-2, which the FlllK and AFVG will replace, eventually for a role 
i E " 1 n urope ..•.. Though whatever the characteristics the FIIIK 
possessed, the development of a variable geometry aircraft with the 
French, agreed to in December 1966, was complicated by the fact that 
the French version seemed likely to be a short-range bomber rather 
than the strike reconnaissance aircraft envisaged by Operational 
Requirement 343. But eventually the AFVG project was cancelled, too, 
as was the purchase of the FIIlK, which signalled an end to the British 
deployment of a sophsticated tactical aircraft. Today the RAF uses the 
United States Phantom in both strike and interceptor roles. This aircraft 
has a capability well below that of the FIILK. 
What was then the significance of the decision to cancel the TSR-2 
in relation to the imperial role? Two conclusions seemed reasonable. 
First, the coming of the strategic nuc~ear stalemate between the United 
States and the Soviet Union had by a process of attrition and technological 
innovation undermined the relevance of an exclusively independent British 
nuclear deterrent which, by the time Skybolt was cancelled, had been 
rendered virtually obsolescent by the solid-fuelled second-strike 
1 ibid., p. 741. 
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retaliatory systems deployed on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This 
meant that the development of a sophisticated tactical strike reconnaissance 
aircraft, capable of a strategic role in dire circumstances, must be 
related to battlefield activity well below the nuclear threshold. 
The TSR-2 was more in demand east of Suez than in NATO-Europe where 
the nuclear threshold was not particularly high; limited operations 
in Europe below the threshold were therefore definitely circumscribed. 
This being so, any effort to meet the operational requirements must 
relate to effective aircraft performance and, of course, rightly or 
wrongly, Mr. Healey, in the end, preferred the F-lllK. It seems reasonable 
to conclude that the decision to cancel the TSR-2 could later be justified 
by the fact that its role in Europe was not a critical one as the 
subsequent cancellation of the F-IllL order appears to confirm. 
Secondly, the operational requirement for the TSR-2 clearly 
envisaged a role outside of Europe where a supersonic, low-level 
strike bomber could give the RAF the general all-round capability 
inherent in a world role. The political assumption behind this policy 
was that the world had been made safe by the strategic nuclear deadlock 
and that as a consequence the main danger to peace lay outside of 
Europe, in an area where Britain had considerable obligations. Indeed, 
the subsequent military operations conducted outside Europe by the British 
may be said to have justified the assumption made that it must continue to 
possess the capacity to dispose of a rapid provision of force on request 
which could, and perhaps actually did, prevent small local conflicts 
from deterio.rating into a general war or anarchy. The TSR-2 as a concept 
was very much the product of 1957 when Britain still stood on the world 
stage as a great power. 
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There is perhaps something in the feeling, which was barely 
articulated, that after the sad Suez affair, Britain needed to be strong 
enough militarily to deal effectively with the residual problems of its 
colonial and post-colonial obligations in the face of American hostility. 
In fact American sympathy for Britain in its period of imperial decline 
actually increased and the United States discovered that Britain's 
enlightened colonial policy was not to be confused with the somewhat 
uncharacteristic reactions to President Nasser's precipitate seizure of 
the Suez Canal in July 1956. 
Britain had sought to meet its considerable colonial responsibilities 
by the creation of the Strategic Reserve and the organization of the Naval 
Task Force, which undoubtedly facilitated the discharge of limited 
1 
operations. And it was with that in mind that the parameters of 
Operational Requirement 343 were largely fixed. Alliance commitments also 
played a part in its determination but since the TSR-2 was the next 
generation of the Canberra type of aircraft, it could be described as 
CENTO-orientated, as well as suitable for operations in fulfillment of 
SEATO commitments. As for the. grander task of confronting the Soviet 
Union in NATO-Europe, its low-level characteristics could be useful in 
fooling the Soviet guided-weapons systems. Given an exclusively 
European role for Britain there is little doubt that the TSR-2 would 
be difficult to justify; it is worth reflecting that, given Mr. Healey's 
view of the local strategy of NATO, in which large-scale military 
operations were unlikely, his decision to cancel the project seems both 
logical and inevitable. 
Clearly the problem with the TSR-2 was that it was designed in 
one type of strategic environment but was expected to survive in quite 
1 
See Chapter II and Annex A, Band C. 
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another. But like a giant dinosaur, it became overloaded with equipment 
which alone could ensure its survival in the age of a sophisticated 
guided-weapon system. This over-loading made it a costly piece of 
investment for the British taxpayer whose financial outlay seemed unlikely 
to bring either commercial or mili tary dividends. 
The TSR-2 story is also a classic example of military folly 
leading to commercial disaster for an industry, if too many of its 
resources are tied u~ in one major project. Fortunately, Denis Healey's 
decision to axe the project in April 1965 helped the British aerospace 
industry successfully to surmount a crisis. Yet the great tragedy is 
that a much less ambitious TSR-2 type aircraft might have been commercially 
viable if the Air staff had had the good sense to order a more modest 
I 
prototype. Earlier submissions to the general operational requirements 
indicated the potential existence of a number of realistic projects 
which might have more satisfactorily met Britain's military requirements 
in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
The essential lesson, however, of the whole affair was that 
aircraft only make sense today in relation to battlefield requirements 
and must be ordered for the performance of tactical and not strategic 
tasks. Had this been realized earlier, the RAF might have found its 
adjustment to the role of a tactical air force less painful and odious. 
The TSR-2 was ordered by the RAF (which was reluctantly facing up to 
the realities of the nuclear-missile age) in the classical tradition of a force 
that was determined to remain capable of independent operations. That 
was an illusion. 
On the other hand, the Conservatives made the valid point that 
1 
The Strategy of the TSR-2, p. 742. 
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the Pl154, the HS68l and the TSR-2 were interdependent, and that if the 
nation were to continue with the V/STOL force, then her fighting 
and transport aircraft could then n ••• be dispersed in penny packets 
over a number of small strips into which and out of which they can 
operate".l 
However, while the Conservatives had perceived a manifest 
contradiction in the Government's aircraft programme, and while it 
was especially obvious that on balance those decisions were detrimental 
to Britain's military capability and also threated the viability of 
the RAF as a strategic airforce, there can be no doubt that they 
enormously diminished the pressure on the Government in its 
persistent search for defence economies. 
The savings and hoped for restructuring of the economy that 
Labour expected to flow from its aircraft decisions, were evidently 
impressive. The Prime Minister confirmed in the United States that 
nOn present estimates of the cost of the three aircraft we have 
cancelled, there will be a saving in the next ten years of £1,200,000,000; 
that is £120,000,000 worth a year of real resources so far as the 
British industrial production is concerned. This is one of the biggest 
industrial deployments undertaken in peace-time ••. and it is directly 
deSigned to assist export industries which at the present time are 
unable to make their full contribution through a short.age of skilled 
labour and other resources n • ~ 
Mr. Healey dealt with a more attractive and in the domestic 
context more ideological, aspect of the cancellations. He argued 
that to have accepted the aircraft projects would have entailed 
t ne, 5t1,a"\""~'1 of ~e TsR-1. I of!. C.'l et p . 74''}.. -
. ~ . ~ From speech given to the Economic Club of New York, 14th April, 1965. 
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important sacrifices in the social and economic goals of the 
government; " .•. if we had been prepared to accept this pulge in 
defence expenditure, we would have faced a choice between drastic 
cuts in the social services or no less drastic cuts in other vital 
items of military equipment for all three Services throughout this 
period" .1 This was the kind of speech that the Party's left-wing 
warmed to, and it made an even bigger impression because it was the 
Defence Minister's analysis coming into line with what they regarded 
as the Socialist objectives to which the Party was formally committed. 
The approach adopted in a bid to make savings involved another 
more traditional device which was made clear in the February Defence 
White Paper which emphasised that the " ••• steadily increasing economic 
pressure on the Defence Budget will face Britain ••• with the choice 
between renouncing certain options altogether and increasing still 
2 further her reliance on military co-operation with her allies". 
This facet of the Government's policy revealad a fetish for 
an optimism which bordered at times on utopianism. The U.S. could 
hardly, in view of her growing involvement in Vietnam,. give strategic 
assistance to Britain in Malaya, and this was also manifestly the case 
in retard to the Australians and New Zealanders, who had no real 
incentive to spend very much more on defence. Similarly, it was clear 
that the European nations were no more willing to either take on more 
of N.A.T.O.s costs or indeed push for European defence integration. 
The French were growing increasingly disenchanted with the alliance, 
and although West Germany undertook to purchase more from Britain, 
the Federal Government continued to place. greater emphasis on appeasing 
1 
yol. 710, H. of C., 13th April, 1965, Col. 119l. 
2 . 
The Defence White Paper, February, .1965, p. 6., Cmnd. 2592. 
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the U.S. ~ver support costs. 
While Labour's dream of making savings through greater co-operation 
with allies had always been a pious hope, the opposite could be said 
of Labour's aspirations in the nuclear field. It had for Labour been 
an article of faith that 'here was an area of Britain's defence policy 
that offered almost limitless economies. The Labour Government's 
optimism was ill-founded. But a most remarkable change in attitude 
was about to occur. 
In 1960, Mr. Healey, having made a rapid assessment of the 
United States' nuclear armoury, asked "Is anybody suggesting that 
with America already in possession of this type of strategic fighting 
force there is any need whatever for a contribution in this field from 
any of her Allies?" Later in the same speech he made this point once 
more: "... nobody can deny for a moment that the deterrent force of the 
West is more than adequate for its basic purpose of deterring deliberate 
aggression against the West. Why on earth are the Government planning 
to make a contribution to this type of deterrent force? Let us look at the 
1 
cost of it to Britain". Predictably perhaps, the Labour Manifesto of 
1964 had claimed that "The Nassau Agreement to buy Polaris know-how and 
Polaris missiles from the U.S.A. will add nothing to the deterrent 
2 
strength of the western alliance". 
In the light of these sentiments, the doctrine spelt out in 
1the Defence White Paper, that Britain's proposed contribution 
under the A.N.F. scheme constituted " ••. a massive British contribution 
3 to the alliance" was really quite extraordinary. Mr. Mayhew heightened 
1 Vol. 627, H: of C. t 20th July, 1960, Col. 602, 
2 
House of Commons 1964, p. 281. 
3 Defence White 1965', Pai2er, Februafy: 12· 8, Cmnd! 2~~2. 
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the confusion by designating Britain's nuclear fleet " ••• a force of 
tremendous pmY'er and significance". 1 The prospective saving from 
scrapping nuclear weapons thus suddenly evaporated into thin air. On 
February 15th, the fifth Polaris subma=ine was cancelled, and a saving 
of only £45 million, minus cancellation charges, was made. After all 
Labour's specific commitment to phase-out the deterrent and its bold 
words about financing a massive conventional force with the money saved 
on nuclear weapons, this was an almost preposterous outcome. 
The dramatic reversal in Labour's nuclear policy was not merely 
the result of inheriting a Polaris programme far advanced when it gained 
power, but also perhaps to a sudden fear that British defence policy 
would look very unimpressive devoid of a nuclear element. Polaris gave 
that policy some credibility, however flimsy. The overwhelming reason 
for the change however, was simply that in opposi.tion Labour had fallen 
for its own rhetoric and exaggerated the savings that could be made 
from abandoning Polaris. 
The inability of the Government to make significant savings through 
ei ther cuts in the nuclear prog'ramme or through greater alliance 
co-operation was no mere set-back; it was a major reversal, because 
if savings could not be made in these areas then the Government's 
endeavours would almost certainly centre on the World Role. Moreover 
this was not the only threat to the overseas presence - it was being 
more directly challenged by events in the East of Suez area itself. 
Despite Labour's resolve to make defence savings, the Government 
was unwilling to sacrifice, or even significantly restrict the East of 
Suez role. It is clear that the hard-pressed Chancellor related the 
1 Vol. 708, H. of C., 11th March, 1965, Col. 663. 
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cost of the overseas presence to Britain's economic situation on 
every conceivable occasion, but the Prime Minister was on balance 
less willing to do so. While supporting the contention that defence 
costs should be lowered he never escaped the logic of suggesting " 
that a start must be made in relation to our very heavy costs in 
1 Germany" . This pointed to the preference for a extra-European 
posture; it was clear that a Eurocentric policy was to be denied. 
For Harold Wilson, at any rate, the irresistable appeal of the 
overseas presence did not noticeably decline with the attainment of 
office. He continued to speak almost passionately about it. It was 
to him " ••. a role related to our Commonwealth responsibilities, a role 
derived from our history and maritime traditions, a role related to the 
special contribution we can make both within ~e Commonwealth and 
our several alliances and in our role of contributing to the peace-
keeping work in the U.N." 2 With particular reference to the Far 
East, the Prime Minister claimed that " ••• Britain had a very important 
role to play, not only in the peace-keeping operations there, but also 
- as in the recent critical situation on the Indo-Pakistan borders -
as a mediator to help avoid serious difficulties between Commonwealth 
3 
countries". 
Mr. Wilson gave the singular impression that he also saw the 
World Role as an essential part of the special relationship and, rather 
in a parallel way to that which the Conservatives regarded the nuclear 
deterrent, as a diplomatic device to keep Britain at the high table 
of international crisis management. Moreover, as the Chinese nuclear 
1 
Vol. 713, H. of C., 27th May, 1965:, Col. 835, Oral answers. 
2 
Vol. 707, H. of C., 4th March, 1965, Col. 1568-9. 
3 
4 -'V....:;o:..::1:....:.:-....:7-=l:.:2:.J,~H:...:.-.::o:..:f=--=C:..:.~,:.......:2:.:0:..:th::.:.....!.M!:::a~y....!.;:.......:1:.:9~6:.:5:.!,~C:;:o~l:.!.'--.:!l:.!:6~6~4!...!.:....-..!::0~r:.!:a~l=-!:a~n!:s~w!.:::e:.!r:.::s • 
There was, for example, the role played by Britain in the negotiating 
of the partial nuclear test ban treaty in 1963. see~ermanent Allianc~J 
Ope cit., p.224 for an analysis of Britain's failure to have a decIsive 
say in arms-control negotiations. 
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capabilities increased and as Soviet maritime power grew . more 
intimidating, it was natural for the East of Suez role to. gain a 
greater significance. Indeed, the Prime Minister dramatically warned 
against the danger of putting" ••. all our strength into defending our 
1 fron t door while the back door and the kitchen window are left unguarded". 
Mr. Healey,nevertheless, also attached important strategic 
significance to the role and was very concerned about the likely 
consequences of a British withdrawal from East of Suez. "If we simply 
abdicated the responsibilities we now carry", he said, "without making 
any arrangements to share them or to hand them over to anybody, there 
is a grave risk that some parts of this great area would dissolve into 
violence and chaos, for we must face the fact that the main danger 
2 
of war today lies outside Europe and not inside it". 
To support this strategic assessment Mr. Healey went on to give 
the analogy of the East African crisis of 1964, and to reiterate 
the importance of Britain's action in that situation. Without such 
prompt and effective action, he argued, East Africa" ••• might have 
returned by now to the tragic primeval' chaos into which the withdrawal 
3 
of the U.N. forc6s plunged much of the Congo". Further evident of 
the relevance of Britain's East of Suez role, given by Mr. Healey, concerned 
Malaysia. It was "certain", he said, that if Britain failed to meet 
her " ••• treaty obligations to the newly independent Government 
of Malaysia there would be large scale fighting over much of southern 
ASia".4 
1 Vol. 716, H. of C. l 19th July, 1965, Col. 1124. 
2 Vol. 707, H. of C. l 3rd March, 1965 1 Col. J.337. 
3 Vol. 707, H. of C. l 3rd March l 1965·l Col. 1337. 
4 ibid. 
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The Defence Minister emphasised the altruistic content of 
Bri tain I s defence policy. He explained" ••. that the justification 
of our military presence East of Suez is not the building of a wall 
against Communism. Nor is it for the protection of selfish British 
economic interests. It is essentially the maintenance of peace and 
stability in parts of the world where the sudden withdrawal of colonial 
rule has too often left the peoples unable to maintain stability without 
some sort of external aid".l 
In view of this analysis the Eoonomist some time earlier had 
reached the conclusion that "Not only is Britain's main defence effort 
concentrated East of Suez right now; but it is the view of the Minister 
of Defence and his advisers that it will go on being concentrated there 
2 for the next ten or fifteen years". 
It was evident that the Defence White Paper indicated a re-
emphasis of the East of Suez role with a consequential diminution of 
the importance of the European role. This was certainly the view of 
the Eoonomist which warned that the Government was in danger of 
getting ". •• the balance of Britain's defence effort between Europe 
3 
and the Indian Ocean area quite seriously out of kil ter" • 
There was a great force in this assessment. As we have seen, 
even the Government's aircraft cancellations had not significantly 
damanged Britain I s ability to act overseas and even amids t all the 
talk about urgent defence cuts, the Government restated its intention 
to build another aircraft carrier which would "... if anything ••• be 
-+ 
slightly bigger than the Ark Royal or E.agle". This seemed to confirm 
the Navy's East of Suez pre-occupation, a pre-occupation then openly 
accepted by Mr. Mayhew. 
1 
2 Vol. 707, H. of C., 3rd March, 1965, Cols. 1337-8. 
Vol. 214, Economist, 6th February, 1965, p. 512. 
3 Vol. 214, Econo~, 27th February,1965, p. 86~ · 
4 
From a speech made by Christopher Mayhew in Newcastle upon Tyne, 
February, 1965. 
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C H APT E R VIII 
CAPABILITIES AND COMMITMENTS: THE HISTORIC ' DILEMMA AND THE 
AGONIZING RE-APPRAISAL OF POLICY 
In 1965 President Sukarno's new year resolution to crush Malaysia, 
manifested itself in seaborne raids on the Malayan coast and in a 
menacing Indonesian build up in Borneo and Sumatra. Britain readily 
responded by sending reinforcements of troops, warships and aircraft 
into the Far East. During January it was admitted that the 2000 troops 
of the strategic reserve in the U.K. were to be flown to Malaysia, and 
over 80 ships had been deployed in Far Eastern waters by the middle of 
the month. Even the V bombers were on standby to go to the Far East 
if necessary. During February there were further troop reinforcements 
from and by the end of the month there were 50,000 troops engaged in 
Confrontation, the biggest concentration of British troops in the area 
since Korea. On 14th April, there was even a call up of the Ever 
Readies to serve in the Middle and Far East. 
The Wilson Government thus responded promptly and effectively to 
the worsening situation in Malaysia. Moreover, it was realised that 
Britain might be in for a protracted conflict and any optimism that 
existed towards the end of the year was founded somewhat delicately on 
Sukarno's kidney complaint, on Indonesia's acute inflation and on the 
1 
crushing of the 'September movement'. 
Moreover, while it was clear that Labour made no determined effort 
• to reduce her commitments East of Suez during 1965, it was incontrovert&ble 
that the events of that year were extrememly disagreeable to the Government. 
1 
The brutal crushing of the 'September Movement' resulted in massive 
anti-Communist de'monstrations, a deterioration in Sino-Indonesian 
relations and a weakening in President Sukarno's own position. 
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The Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in June proved a great 
disaster over Rhodesia but also over Malaysia as well. As Mr. Wilson 
observes "It was a bitter blow for Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia when 
the cool reception given to his plea for a combined Commonwealth appeal 
for an end to Indonesian aggression was followed by a flat refusal to 
include any reference in the communique other than an agreement to 
1 take note'." 1 It became increasingly obvious during 1965, that while 
-
Britain desired some prestige through her East of Suez presence, she 
also over-invested a great deal in terms of money, energy, manpower and 
anxiety, in continuing that presence. Moreover, the commitment to 
Indonesia could escalate to the point of a general war, but even if this 
did not occur Britain would still remain over-stretched. Not only was 
Britain engaged in Confrontation with Indonesia, but she was well and 
truly landed on the Aden hook. Labour's inherited responsibilities were 
not inconsiderable and constituted a constraint on the options available 
to the government. On 1st September terrorists in Aden murdered 
Sir Arthur Charles, Speaker of the Legislative Council. 
On 25th September the Aden constitution was suspended with the reports 
of street assassinations and of British servicement being shot at from 
roof tops by Arab snipers. Two days before the Labour Party Conference 
2 
"Aden was aflame". Fears of another Cyprus were expressed at Blackpool 
and increasingly there were indications that the Government was divided 
over whether Britain should remain in Aden for very much longer. It was 
clear for instance that the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Greenwood was keen 
"to call it a day". But he tried to delay a tough British response just 
prior to the National Executive elections which could damage his image 
1 Wilson, Harold. Ope cit., p.l80. 
2 Wilson, OPe cit., p.186. 
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as a stalwart of the Left. l 
A majority in the Government, however, continued to see Aden 
as a valuable link with the East and according to the New Statesman, 
Mr. Greenwood ".... came under heavy fire from the Chiefs of Staff, 
2 backed by Denis Healey". It went on to say that" •.• the brass hats 
insisted that Britain must maintain an exclusive sovereign base in 
Aden", and that "the Prime Minister had no hesitation in siding with the 
brass hats (supported of course by the Foreign Office representative 
3 Michael Stewart) ". Richard Crossman confirms that the chiefs of staff 
proved formidable opponents ("of a radical re-think in policy. He 
recorded in his diary that" as we have looked at each of our overseas 
cOmmitments - at Hong Kong, at Malaya, at the Maldive Islands, the 
Persian Gulf and Aden - the Defence Ministers have been overwhelmed by 
the advice of their experts, who say 'Oh, Minister, you can't cut that.' 
As a result we are moving up to the period of the Defence Estimates 
without any serious cut being carried through by Denis Healey and his 
staff. Indeed, it now looks as though in 1964 Harold Wilson was 
responsible for an over-commitment in overseas expenditure almost as 
burdensome - if not more burdensome - than that to which Ernest Bevin 
committed us in 1945, and for the same reason: because of our belief 
that it is only through the existence of this relationship that we can 
. 4 
survive outside Europe". 
Nevertheless, despite the Government's hope of retaining the 
Aden base, it was obviously agitated about its capacity to do so, and 
1 
Crossman, OPe cit., p. 334. 
2 
Johnson, P., New Statesman, Vol. 70, 8th October, 1965, p. 516. 
4 
Crossman ,_.pp •. ~i t., p. 117. 
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indeed about the need of doing so, if Aden's internal situation 
deteriorated. It was therefore imperative for Labour to look around 
for an alternative to the Aden base. Mr. Greenwood announced on 
lOth November, that the Government had decided to set up a new colony 
- the British Indian Ocean Territory - to provide defence facilities 
for British and U.S. forces. The colony would consist of Chagos 
Archipelago, Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches. 
There was also very definite and growing signs that the Government 
were contemplating the idea of an Australian base and was also bent 
upon acquiring an American aircraft carrier. Indeed, Mr. Healey confirmed 
that Britain had approached the U.S. about an aircraft carrier, "We 
have been on consultations with the American Government to the extent 
necessary to enable us to clear our own minds about what would be involved 
in terms of cost, peformance, and so on". 1 It was becoming evident 
therefore that even if Britain were expelled from Aden, and eventually 
Singapore, it did not necessarily mean the end of the East of Suez role. 
The Labour Government was emphatically determined to continue with an 
overseas presence, even, if necessary, without the traditional imperial 
base structure. 
The need for an alternative to the Aden Base was, of course, a 
direct result of events in Aden, but there also existed a more considered 
reason for downgrading the value of the Persian Gulf role. Indeed, on 
television, in 1970, Mr. Healey admitted that "I always •••• thought 
that it was a mistake to stay as long in the Gulf as we planned to. I 
didn't think the advantages were worth the risk". The opposite was true 
of the Far Eastern role. "I would have liked to stay longer than in 
1 
Vol. 718, H. of C., 3rd November, 1965', Col. 1018. 
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fact in the end we had to go", said the Defence Minister. 1 
Even in 1965 it was manifest that the Government regarded 
Britain's presence in the Persian Gulf to be of less strategic 
importance than her presence in South East Asia: there was far greater 
anxiety about Peking than with Cairo. The plight of India, then 
regarded as the world's greatest democracy, had a far greater romantic 
appeal than the fate of Aden,and this became even more acute as 
Cl-
China's belliger~nce towards India grew. The Prime Minister however, 
continued to believe that the defence of India was a unique British 
responsibility. Indeed, the New Statesman announced that Mr. Wilson 
" now proposes to deploy East of Suez the Polaris Submarines he 
once ridiculed".2 
In addition, whilst the traditional and well-established a,rguments 
about the protection of oil interests in the Persian Gulf did not go 
unheeded, they were very clearly given a lower priority than under the 
Conservatives. While the Government was fully conscious that the Gulf 
provided one half of Britain's demand for crude oil and oil products, 
and that Britain had an enormous direct capital investment in the production 
of oil, it was suspicious ' of the argument that a British presence in 
the Gulf seriously diminished the threat from the manifold calamities 
3 that could befall her oil interests in that area. It also seemed 
probable that a political and military balance might emerge in the 
Persian Gulf, since there was no single preponderant power as there was 
in South East Asia. Nasser's failure in the Yemen confirmed this analysis 
and gave some credibility to the calculation that Saudi Arabia could act 
1 
Twenty Four Hours Ca B.B.C. television programme), 5th March, 1970. 
2 
New Statesman, Vol. 70, 24th December, 1965, p. 989. 
3 
The Permanent Alliance, OPe cit. 
- 238 -
as a counter-balance to the United Arab Republic. Indeed a settlement 
between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. over Yemen, was reached in August. 
There was an immediate cease fire and the U.A.R. agreed to withdraw 
all forces by September 1966. 
The dramatic events in Aden and the Yemen also had the effect 
of increasing the concern about whether, in certain circumstances, a 
British presence heightened rather than deterred violence, and whether 
a balance might emerge if Britain withdrew. This was not to contend 
that these reservations were strongly advocated, let alone well 
articulated, but only that there existed less ideological attraction 
for the overall strategic and political relevance of the Persian Gulf 
role. Labour was undergoing its first experience of the great turbulence 
and cost associated with retaining a Middle Eastern presence. Britain's 
Persian Gulf allies could indeed be threatened because as Mr. Brown 
was later to admit that "Though our military protection might help them, 
our treaty and military position also attracted attack to them".l 
Moreover, it was not only the Persian Gulf situation that was 
growing daily more menacing. In addition to the violent upheavals 
in Aden, there was the impending secession of Singapore from the Malaysian 
Federation. Labour was thus simultaneously faced with the seeming impossibility 
of creating a Federation in Southern Arabia and with the final breakdown 
of a British inspired Federation in Malaysia. Even more ironical was 
the Cabinet's fear that while Britain was at some risk protecting the 
MalaySian Federation from external threats, the members themselves 
were fOOlishly subverting it from ~~ within. Mr. Wilson later wrote 
1 
Vol. 748, H. of C., 19th June, 1967, Col. 1129. 
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of this episode as one of 'great anxiety' for the Labour Government. He 
described the events rwming up to the break up as constituting 
"a possible coup against Harry Lee".Then "on the weekend of the 13-15 
August news came through that the Federation had broken up. There had 
been angry scenes between the Tunku and Lee. This had led to Singapore 
being virtually expelled from the Federation and told to set up on its 
own account. Lee was in a desperate state, bursting into tears in front 
of the television cameras and regretting the break-up. Nevertheless, 
1 he determined to make a go of the newly-independent Singapore". 
There was also the mounting fear that the disintegration of the 
Federation could create new strategic problems. Clearly Lee Kwan Yew's 
policy of non-alignment was now compatible with a strong anti-American 
position & even bitter criticism of the British. He affirmed that he 
2 
was "not keen about Britain's power position" , and also that he would 
not allow Britain to use the Singapore base for any military action that 
was not directly concerned with the defence of Malaysia and Singapore. 
Mr. Healey made the comment some years later that he was " ••• very 
tempted when, in the middle of Confrontation - in the summer of 1965 -
the Tunku and Harry Lee gave us an opportunity of getting out, by breaking 
their own Federation behind our backs. 3 But you just couldn't do it". 
And so it was that even after the breakdown of the Malaysian Federation, 
Britain still remained committed to defend Singapore. 
In May the Prime Minister had indicated that he had no plans 
" for changes in the near future in the long term commitments East 
4 
of Suez" , and this was still the Government IS position at the end of 
1 Har01d Wilson,pp. 176-177. 
, 
2 
Press Conference, Singapore, 13th August, 1965. 
3 The Policies of Power, op. cit. p. 
4 
Vol. 713, H. of C., 25th May, 1965, Col. 234, Oral answers. 
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the year. While the crises East of Suez weakened Labour's enthusiasm 
for the East of Suez role, those same crises made it very difficult 
if not unthinkable that Britain could renounce over-night its 
overseas obligations, even if it wanted to. 
Also, of some historical significance was the fact that British 
strategists had for some years ' seen the East of Suez role as a coherent 
whole. This was not the case with Mr. Healey, but on the whole the 
Persian Gulf and Far Eastern roles were r ,egarded as interdependent 
by successive Cabinets. Indeed, the Prime Minister rather brusquely 
dismissed any argument that Britain's Middle Eastern role could be 
divorced from her Far Eastern one, "The Middle East is obviously 
important not only as a base for that area but as a staging post for 
dealing with our obligations further east". l The influence of this 
school of thought was not inconsiderable: it certainly contributed to 
the prolongation of the Middle Eastern role long after the level of 
disillusionment seemed to indicate a withdrawal. 
The Government's acceptance of the East of Suez presence during 1965 
was therefore complex but the comparative silence of the Parliamentary 
Left to the Cabinet's policy is nonetheless remarkable. Even Mr. Paget, 
whose sympathies lay to the right of his party, found the Defence White' 
Paper too cautious by half, claiming that " ••• it is almost exactly 
what I would have expected the Right Hon. Gentleman opposite to have 
proposed ...• I am still waiting for some explanation why the Labour 
Party's defence policy, which we worked out over a number of years 
together, has been abandoned, and the Conservative policy adopted in its 
stead" .2 Mr. Paget found support. The New Statesman also sadly 
1 
Vol. 713, H. of C., 25th May, 1965, Col. 236. 
2 
Vol. 707, H. of C., 3rd March" 1965, Col. l367~ 
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commented that" ..• in the field of defence and foreign affairs Mr. Wilson 
and his colleagues have shown a marked antipathy to the language of 
idealism - which they spoke so freely in opposition - and a positive 
relish for the art of realpolitik". 1 Indeed, the art of the real-
politik had long been practiced by successive Labour Cabinets since 
the war and was not entirely absent either --from the Labour Governments 
of the inter-war period. Socialist ideology was a recessive factor 
when counter-balanced by considerations of power . 
Be that as it may, the silence of the Left was indeed rather 
surprising. However, the Marxist analyst, Dr. Ralph Milliband 
suggested that the Left in 1965 did not feel betrayed, because it had 
never believed that Mr. Wilson would pursue a Socialist foreign policy. 
" •.• There is no point", he said, "in anyone on the Left thinking that 
Mr. Wilson has sneaking 'neutralist' or un-Atlantic sympathies: he 
has never given any sign of it".2 "In fact, Dr. Milliband argued, 
"it would be very remarkable indeed if the Government's performance was 
not marked by orthodoxy, given the programme on which the Labour Party 
fought in the 1964 election, its slender victory, the political and 
economic situation it faced when it assumed office, the known tendencies 
of its most senior members and the conservative pressure to which it is 
subjected". 3 The Left thus consoled itself with the thought that" in 
relation to home affairs at least, the Government's performance could 
4 have been worse". Though not much. 
It must also have been aware that if it brought the downfall of 
the Government it would be responsible for the return of a Conservative 
1 New Statesme.n, vol. 69, 19th March, 1965, p. 425. 
2 The Soc,ialist Register, January, 1965, p. 190. 
3 
Ihe Socialist Register, January, 1965, p. 185. 
4 
The Socialist Reg:ister l January, 1965, p. 186. 
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Administration, and if it undermined Mr. Wilson's position within the 
Party it would in all probability get a more right-wing leader -
perhaps indeed Mr. Roy Jenkins. In consequence the Left contended 
itself with the contrived concessions offered from time to time, such 
as the projected Commonwealth mission to those countries involved in the 
Vietnam war, Harold Davies' abortive trip to .Hanoi and PatricKGordon 
Walker's equally well-pUbicised pilgrimage to South East Asia. 1 
Moreover, even when the Parliamentary Left felt alienated its 
protests were negat~ry because of a lack of coherence and of power. 
The Prime Minister had skillfully ensconced the more prominent left-
wingers in the corridors into the Cabinet, and this manoeuvre, apart 
from having the obvious advantage of silencing the more articulate of the 
Left, also strengthened the residual belief that Harold Wilson was as 
socialist as any candidate that the Left could actually hope might emerge 
as a Party leader and Prime Minister. Only Mr. Cousins remained 
petulantly uneasy and he was a residual member of the utopian Left which 
could offer no real socialist alternative, except that of neutralism 
and great power impotence. Mr. Wilson faced no real challenge. 
This was not to say that the Left was totally inarticulate over 
foreign and defence matters or that its influence could be ignored. 
The P.L.P., in fact, passed a motion on 2nd August, 1965, which said 
"That this meeting of the P.L.P. notes with approval the cancellation 
of the TSR-2 contract and savings on the TA, but believes that no solution 
of the country's economic problems is possible unless drastic cuts in 
2 
arms expenditure are made much earlier than at present proposed. 
1 
2 
Mr. Wilson sent Davies to Hanoi because he had "written extensively 
about Ho Chi-Minh, whom he knew well". See The Labour Government, 
op. cit., p. 167. 
The Times( 3rd August, 1965. 
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This motion, though, was duly disregarded by the leadership. It would 
be wrong to deduce from the absence of substantial overt pressure, over 
East of Suez, from the Left - and indeed from trade unions, industry 
and the Parliamentary Labour Party itself - that the view of these 
power elites were unimportant or simply ignored. The relative calm, 
in fact, was expression of the widespread belief that the Government was 
doing as much as could be reasonably expected in cutting defence costs. 
The Government could only sustain this favourable impression by making 
cuts its prinCipal priority and this is exactly what it did. As a 
result, even when the Left criticised the Government's handling of 
foreign affairs it was not actually over the East of Suez role or even, 
apart from Rhodesia, directly over British action overseas. It was almost 
without exception over the Government's declaratory support of American 
action in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. The American bombing of 
North Vietnam, of course, started in February and the Dominican crises 
in early April. 
The pattern of left-wing activity then was becoming clear. It was 
limited to either domestic issues - to the inevitable ritual of steel 
nationalisation and the emotionally charged disputes over immigration 
and the incomes policy - or to the more dramatic and ideologically 
contentious areas of foreign policy such as Vietnam and Rhodesia. 
The East of Suez role, thus, for the time being was safe. It 
was unlikely that the crises in the area would provoke sufficient 
stress in the decision-making processes of the British government 
to bring about a hasty withdrawal. Moreover, the role seemed invulnerable 
from both the consequences of defence savings and intra-Party criticism 
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However, the continuation of the overseas role, in a curious way, depended 
on the persistent downgrading of the European posture: the possibility of 
a resurgent continental strategy remained a potentially serious threat 
to the World Role. 
Of the United Kingdom's main defence roles under Labour, it was 
the European one which inspired the least political approbation. 
Moreover the approbation it '.did attract was on balance unfavourable. 
Whereas prior to the election, Labour had proposed an increase in 
Britain's conventional commitment to the continent, during 1965, 
troops were, in fact, withdrawn from Europe. As they were taken to 
the Far East, SHAPE began to fear that B.A.O.R. was little more than 
1 
a back-up for East of Suez. _ Indeed, during 1965, the force level 
in Germany stood at 51,000 which was 4,000 below the committed level. 
N.A.T.O. grew concerned lest the stability of Europe was threatened 
by such troop withdrawals. 
The chances of more withdrawal, moreover, seemed likely if the 
British Government could not get the Germans to pay a greater share 
of the upkeep of the Rhine Army. The total cost of B.A.O.R. was 
£200 million of which £85 million was in fact foreign exchange. The 
two year agreement with the Germans on support costs had expired on 
31st March 1964. A new one had been signed on the 27 July 1964, but 
Bonn did not commit itself to a figure. It simply promised "to do what 
it could". 2 In the event it "could only do" £25-30 million annually. 
~eof(-~e..y 
However, Sir de Freitas, the Chairman of the P.L.P. defence 
cOmmittee, told a Western European Union Conference in Paris that 
1 
2 
The author discovered that many senior officials in BAOR regarded 
themselves as constituting an unofficial strategic reserve for the 
East of Suez role. This was made plain during a visit to the Higher 
,Education Centre, Dortmund, where I had organised a strategic studies 
seminar for Southampton University in October 1965. 
The Policies of Power, Ope cit. p. 219. 
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" if the Rhine Army were reduced this would be only for economic 
reasons, or to provide troops for the Far East, and not for lack of 
1 interest in Europe". This was not entirely convincing and was 
predictably seen as further evidence of Labour's myopic attitude to 
European politics. 
Mr. Healey was even more blunt than his back-bench colleagues. 
"I think that, with the best will in the world, it will be difficult 
to persuade the average Englishman to carry the economic burden of 
maintaining the present level of forces in Germany ,,2 Mr. Wilson 
also took a tough line. He told N.A.T.O.s foreign ministers in London 
in May, "I want my colleagues to realise that we cannot and do not intend 
to continue to take this unfair share of the economic burden. Important 
bilateral negotiations are going on in an atmosphere of great goodwill. 
But should they not succeed in their agreed objective, Her Majesty's 
Government will be forced to consider, jointly without allies, whatever 
action is necessary, however unpalatable to reduce this drain upon 
3 
our foreign exchange resources". 
Nor was there any reluctance to contemplate extreme solutions, 
and as a notable contribution to alliance cohesion and goodwill 
the New Statesman suggested that if Britain and Germany could not 
agree on an offset agreement " ••• then Britain should forthwith notify 
its allies that it proposes to withdraw troops from Germany at the rate, 
say, of 1000 a month ••• ,,4 In the event, though, such extreme and 
perhaps even provocative action proved unnecessary. The preliminary talks 
1 
Reported Economist, Vol. 214, 13th March, 1965, p. 1114. 
2 
Vol. 707, H. of C., 3rd March, 1965, Col. 1336. 
3 
Harold Wilson, from a speech at a NATO Ministerial Council meeting 
in London on 11th May, 1965. 
4 liew Statesman Vol. 69, 14th May, 1965, p. 749. 
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between Mr. Wilson and Dr. Erhard led to further talks between Britain 
and West Germany and a settlement was reached towards the end of June. 
The Germans agreed that the offset should total £117,000,000 during the 
first two years up to 31st March 1966 and a further £54,000,000 during 
the third years. This was a good settlement for the British Government, 
but it nevertheless only reinforced the agreement that had been in 
operation between 1962 and 1964. 
The agreement itself was important not only because of the 
economic benefit that Britain derived, but also because ot was achieved 
as a result of some exceedingly tough bargaining by the Labour Government. 
This was particularly significant since the Government's unbending 
attitude to the Rhine Army question would hardly have appeared credible, 
or even comprehensible, let alone moral, if Labour had still pretended 
that a build up of conventional forces in Europe was the over-riding 
defence aim of the United Kingdom. 
From the Government's statements and decisions it was plain that 
this was no longer the case. The arguments in favour of a conventional 
build-up in Europe were now ignored or even repudiated. The Prime 
Minister put forward the view " ••• that the best deterrent is the 
conviction on the part of any potential aggressor that any form of 
calculated aggression entails unacceptable risks of escalation to all-
out war". 1 Denis Healey robustly propounded a similar view at the 
meeting of N.A.T.O. Defence Ministers in Paris 31st May - 1st June. He 
suggested that " ••• if the overwhelming u.s. nuclear strength should 
fail to deter aggression against Western Europe, it is impossible to 
conceive of a long land campaign and it is therefore no longer necessary 
1 
Vol. 707, H. of C., 4th March, .1965, Col. 1563. 
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to plan for a conflict of up to 90 days as hitherto assumed under the 
1 hypothesis to which N.A.T.O. had worked for the past ten years". Large 
numbers of reserves were therefore irrelevant, and what mattered was 
the number of troops actually deployed before hostilities began. The 
size of Rhine army was therefore of secondary importance. 
The Defence White Paper also reiterated this logic. Not only 
was a 'prolonged war', after a nuclear exchange, ruled out, but so was 
a 'prolonged war' prior to a nuclear exchange. - The Government seemed 
determined to disavow all Labour's previously stated principles on 
nulcear weapons. It was now asserting that conventional forces were 
only needed n ••• to deter miscalculated incursions and to suppress 
2 
any ambiguous and unpremediated local conflicts ••• " Rarely can such 
a fundamental tenet of Labour's strategic analysis, as the paramouncy of 
~ 
a conventional force capability in Europe, have been so cooly dispatched 
into the oblivion of electoral promises now to be dishonoured in power. 
It was clear that Labour's first objective was not to increase 
the capacity for a more flexible conventional response to aggression 
but to make defence savings through a limitation of options at the 
conventional level rather in the hitherto much reviled Sandys' tradition. 
Mr. Healey was beginning to generate unparallel~d optimism in regard 
k 
to the European situation. " •.• we can surely dismiss from our military 
calculations the idea of an all-out premeditated attack and concentrate 
instead on organising the forces capable of deterring the kind of attack 
Which might conceivably arise either through pure accident or through 
political or military misunderstandings, in other words a war by mistake". 3 
1 
Keesings, 19th - 26th June, 1965, p. 20809. 
2 
Defence White Paper, February 1965, Cmnd. 2592, p.8. 
3 
Vol. 707, H. of C., 3rdMarch,1965, Col. 1333. 
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According to Mr. Healey, "This is the only real problem we face in 
Europe at present •.• ,,1 
There was, of course, an rlement of fait accompli in Mr. Healey's 
analysis. The Indonesian Confrontation made the abandonment of 
Labour's traditional European policy inevitable if not desirable 
and anyway Mr. Healey was only projecting a European defence doctrine 
that had existed ever since N.A.T.O.s inception. The certainty was 
that Mr. Healey's analysis appeared incontrovertible. He had long 
believed in it and constantly reiterated the Healey theorem: "nearly 
all the strategic problems of the alliance are due to the fact that it 
takes five per cent probability of massive retaliation to deter the 
Soviet attack; but none of America's allies would ever be happy in a 
Situation in which there is a 95 per cent possibility that the 
2 Americans won't respond". 
It was perhaps the inevitability of the collapse of Labour's 
European policy that explains the extraordinary manner in which the 
Party accepted the revelSalin policy. Certainly, Labour's leadership 
was aware that the only way a conventional bias could be attained was 
by abandoning the World Role; although it was possible to build up 
conventional forces by increasing the defence Budget or by re-introducing 
conscription. In the light of such alternatives, it was not so surprising 
that the Party accepted with alacrity Mr. Healey's analysis. This 
attitude was of considerable importance for the East of Suez role, since it 
encouraged the continued diminution of B.A.O.R. in order to reinforce 
the overseas presence. 
1 ibid. 
2 
Denis Healey's Lecture on February 11th, 1961, to the University 
of California. Text supplied to author by Mr. Healey. 
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The evolution of Labour's defence priorities, the inter-
relation between them and the measures adopted to secure them, by 
the very nature carried seeds hostile to the World Role during 
1965. The most critical priority was the Government's pledge to 
introduce savings, but several other perspectives appeared during 
the year. There was the exacting nature of the role itself, there 
were significant indications of growing concern in the Party and 
finally there was the manifest impossibility of any further 
reductions of the European obligation in order to sustain the 
overseas commitment. In four areas of policy - the need for defence 
economies, the exigencies of the Imperial Role, party pressures and 
the growing requirements of European defence - revealed contradictions 
in the East of Suez role which could not be overcome within the framework 
of Labour's defence policy. 
However, the role remained more or less what it had been at 
the outset. This was directly attributable to the growing crisis 
that engulfed the East of Suez area. The events in Aden, Malaysia, 
India and China ensured that Britain was enmeshed whether she liked 
it or not. But in Europe a period of detente since late 1961 had 
encouraged increasing optimism that the military stalemate had induced 
a political one as well. By 1965 the detente was only just beginning 
to reveal some of its own problems, problems which were later to 
direct anxieties once more to the strategic problems of the continent. 
During 1965, Labour had sought to contrive a course whereby 
savings could be achieved without either rendering the East of Suez 
role incredible or destroying stability in Europe. In this endeavour 
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it was remarkably successful. None of the savings it decided to make 
were likely to erode significantly the overseas presence. It did not 
drastically cut down or eliminate the bases, although this at one time 
seemed likely; nor did it reduce Britain's commitments overseas. Instead 
the Government had taken measures that entailed significant savings 
while only marginally weakening Britain's ability to act. 
However, while the East of Suez role looked in fact secure in 
the short term there were definite signs that the role was facing 
re-appraisal. Although Mr. Mayhew promised " ••• the greatest possible 
economy in our spending and the greatest possible fighting effectiveness 
for our forces" ,1 but it was now reasonable to ask whether these 
objectives were compataible and which had priority. This question was 
now being posed because indeed, the Government's avowed objectives, to 
cut defence spending to £2000 million, to continue both European and 
World Roles, and to reduce if not eliminate overstretch, were by the 
end of the year absurdly irreconcilable. No longer could the 
Government take measures to achieve anyone of these objectives, without 
undermining at least one of the other two. The moment was rapidly 
approaching when it would be imperative to choose between, as opposed 
to trying to reconcile, defence goals. The pace of events appeared to 
quicken. 
On 5th August, Mr. Healey gave a progress report to the House 
on the Government's defence review. In it he revealed the extent of the 
savings that had so far been achieved. With some sense of achievement 
the Defence Minister informed the House that the Government " had 
managed to reduce the forecast figure to £2,180 million".2 This was 
1 ~0J,. 705. H. of C •• 19th Janua~£ 1965£ Col. 70. 
2 Vol. 707£ H. of C. £ 5th August£ 1965£ Col. 1882. 
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a substantial achievement and meant that the Government was more than 
1 half way towards its target of £2000 million. The defence review 
therefore had sought out and subsequently eliminated a good deal of 
waste in Britain's defences. 
Mr. Healey's claim that Britain's capability had been increased 
'very substantially', was more difficult to sustain. 
However, the Government had only reached the half way point 
in its defence cuts and additional cut-backs could begin to weaken the 
East of Suez presence. While the Eaonomist conceded that half the 
cuts proposed by the defence review could be made from trimming 
"e f t" k 11 h i th xcess a , with persistent logic it went on to as ••. were s e 
2 other half coming from". 
Even amidst the remarkable euphoria which accompanied the Defence 
Minister's progress report, Mr. Healey still felt constrained to sound 
a warning note. " ...• I readily confess", he said" that to bridge the 
remaining nearly £200 million gap to the target,will require re-deployment 
3 
of our forces and a smaller total of manpower in the Services". 
And then in a remark which carried pregnant implications for the East 
of Suez role the Defence Minister argued " ••. that reductions in overseas 
exchange expenditure must depend on withdrawing individuals from 
4 
service overseas. There is no other way of achieving them ••• These 
statements obviously indicated that in the future the ongoing review 
might indeed impose a very severe constraint on the World Role. 
The growing uncertainty which surrounded the East of Suez Role 
increased because no one knew for how much longer the Government would 
1 Vol. 717 t H. of C. £ 5th August£ 1965£ Col. 1882. 
2 
Economist£ Vol. 216£ 17th Julyi. 1965 l E· 216. 
3 Vol. 717, H. of C. , 5th August, 1965, Col. 1885. 
4 ibid. 
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continue to support it without impairing the European commitment. 
Mr. Healey had no doubt about the inter-relationship between ~~e two 
when he conceded that, while the Goverp~ent intended to bring 
B.A.O.R. up to 55,000 this depended " .•• on our other overseas 
conuni tmen ts •• " I 
Moreover, Labour could not assume that the demands of the European 
role would remain for the rest of the decade at the same level as they had 
done in 1965. What would happen if the detente in Europe collapsed, 
if there were trouble in Eastern Europe or if the United States felt 
she had to withdraw large numbers of troops from Western Europe in 
order to sustain the Vietnam war? These questions were as critical 
for the East of Suez role as the questions about what would happen 
if Confrontation e s =alated or if the situati on in Southern Arabia 
suddenly got out of control. The central question therefore obdurately 
remained - could Britain cover the full range of its commitments on 
a defence budget of £2000 million, and if not, which commitments should 
be sacrificed? 
Of course, senior Ministers felt obliged to defend the Government's 
plan for a defence ceiling. The ceiling was at first provisional, but 
it soon became inflexible and unyielding. Mr. Healey believed that it 
would" ••• enable us to get the right balance between our defence needs 
2 
and what the nation can afford", and the Foreign Secretary pointed 
out that 11 it would be quite useless to make a list of foreign policy 
objectives, then to say that it resulted in a certain defence policy 
and then to find that we could not meet that defence bill without 
3 serious damage to our economy". 
1 Vol. 720, H. of , C. , 17th November, 1965, 
2 Vol. 716, H. of C. , 21st JulY i 1965 l Col. 
3 
~l . Zl2 , HI Qf C' l 20th JulYl 1965 l Col. 
Co. 73, Written answers. 
2l4l Written answers. 
1367. 
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There was overwhelming validity in this thesis, for not even a 
superpower could afford to protect all its interests regardless of 
their importance. Clearly, Governments have to distinguish between 
interests that are vital and those which are not. 
But the Government continued to act almost as if no financial 
ceiling existed. The Government failed to· acknowledge that the decision 
in favour of a defence ceiling was likely to affect the whole spectrum 
of foreign and defence policy. As a result the decisions of l~65 
were taken within the constraints of a foreign policy that had been 
circumscribed by the imposition of a ceiling in late 1964. 
The Review started from the position that considerable defence 
savings must be made; it then produced an arbitrary figure of £2000 
• 
million, above which the defence budget should not rise, and finally 
it deduced, in view of the previous objectives, that commitments 
should be cut. The review therefore was based on an assumption which 
circumscribed its outcome. 
The obvious fact shortly emerged that Mr. Healey's defence 
review was seriously affected by Mr. George Brown's national plan. 
It was Healey's aspiration to contrive a defence policy responsive 
to the economic situation, but it became completely dominated by 
Britain's secular economic decline. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the growing pressure on Mr. Healey to 
reduce defence costs, even by the end of 1965 it was still obscure 
as to which commitments, if any, were to be reduced. Although the 
Defence White Paper took up the issue of the need to line-up commitments 
with manpower and resources, it conspicuously failed to say how this 
- 254 -
was to be done. Indeed, one of the fundamental flaws inherent in the 
defence review during 1965 was its almost reckless disregard for the 
need to cut commitments. This attitude remains almost inexplicable. 
However, the obvious indecision and procrastination over commitments 
during 1965 was such, that even the most patient and loyal of M.P.s 
were showing signs of rebellion as Summer passed into Autumn. 
It soon became clear that the Foreign Office was clearly to blame 
because it was reluctant to re-consider commitments until Denis Healey 
had exhausted all ways and means of making savings in the defence 
budget. In fact, Denis Healey later conceded that this was a serious 
weakness in the whole Government's strategy. "The foreign effice"~ he 
said,"wouldn't agree to look at commitment until we saw how far we could go 
by cutting expenditure on equipment". "We are very much overstretchedl' 
he added, "but unfortunately the foreign Office hadn't established 
any priorities itself in relation to the costs of policies.".l The 
real failure however was that of the Cabinet as a whole. 
By the end of 1965 the Defence Minister rather wistfully observed 
that "The question is not a reduction of garrisons or the closing of 
2 bases but the military tasks which the nation is called on to perform". 
The Prime Minsiter also recognised that the defence review, if it 
were to reduce expenditure to £2000 million, must now look at commitments. 
"It is a question of cutting commitments to a point we can fulfil ••• " 
said Mr. Wilson - and then came the crucial qualification - n ••• the 
commi tments are highly competi ti ve with one another". 3 The cruel 
dilemma confronting the Cabinet was clearly that the defence review 
1 
The Policies of Power, op. cit. e. , ~1 
2 
Vol. 721, H. of C., 24th November, 1965', Col. 493, Oral answers. 
3 
Vol. 707, H. of C., 3rd March, 1965, Vol. 1357. 
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could not ever hope to reach its target if it failed to reduce 
commitments, but even if it cut commitment the Government might have 
to sacrifice objectives as set out in the ambitious defence programme 
and which it valued so highly. 
Mr. Thorneycroft for the Opposition was anxious to expose this 
dilemma. In a trenchant reference to Labour's claims that Britain's 
forces were overstretched he rather shrilly enquired, "If they are 
overstretched, what should we do? We must either reduce the roles or 
increase the numbers, but one reads in vain through the White Paper 
1 to find the slightest indication of either course". Mr. Thorneycroft 
gloomily predicted the consequence of the Government's hope of getting 
defence on the cheap. "If, therefore, the roles are maintained" he said 
"while costs rise •••• the result is that someone will suffer, and that 
someone will be the British serviceman" 2 The logic of this criticism 
was now clear. In fact, the Government did not reveal the slightest 
readiness to cut commitments. There was no influential ex-service 
element in the Party to argue against such cuts, as there was in the 
Conservative Party. Indeed the cuts were acceptable to the Left and 
trade union leaders, and there was the time hallow~d expedient for 
Labour, as a new Government, to make changes, since it could claim that 
the desperate situation left by the outgoing Government made them 
inevitable. 
There were, however, many factors militating against a radical 
defence review. Among the most salient was the influence of 
Patrick Gordon Walker and then Michael Stewart as foreign secretary. 
1 
Vol. 707, H. of C., 3rd March, 1965. 
2 
Vol. 707, H. of C., 3rd March, 1965, Col. 1358. 
I 
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These orthodox politicians reinforced continuity in British fore.ign 
policy. So did the Government's understandable but overwhelming 
concentration on domestic politics. There was the tedious process 
of passing legislation on a small majority. There were the vagaries 
of the year's by-election and the failure of the electorate to allow 
the Government to get Patrick Gordon Walker into the Commons. 
The final, and certainly most important, factor favouring the 
cautiousness of the defence review was that, at this time, Britain 
was deeply involved in military operations. The constraints this 
imposed was later admitted by Mr. Healey.ln a television interview 
he said that it was patently absurd to suppose " that a Government 
in the middle of a war can think realistically about the post-war 
situation. When we got into power in 1964 we had been landed in a 
major war in the East in confrontation which was tying up 55,000 men 
in the jungle. We had a minor war in the Middle East, in South Arabia, 
which was involving I think, at the time, some 10-15,000 men. And you 
cannot realistically think about the post-war situation when that is 
going on".l 
The teno~r of the defence review during 1965 was inevitably 
favourable to the World Role since it left the East of Suez 
commitment intact. However in another sense, it was co~ter-productive 
because, by failing to remove the contradictions in Labour's defence 
policy, it also failed to produce a policy which could effectively 
sustain the World Role over the years that lay ahead. The weakness 
of the Government's unfolding defence policy was that it was neither 
based on a detailed analysis of what had to be done to defend Britain's 
1 
Twenty Four Hours (A B.B.C. Television programme) 5th March, 1970. 
It is not clear from Mr. Healey's remarks why a government cannot 
foresee the consequences of a "post-war situation".Indeed in 1941 with 
the German armies at the Gates of Moscow Joseph Stalin thought of nothing 
else. See Cadogan, Sir Alexander, The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan. 
1938-l945, (ed. by David Di1ks), p. 420. 
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interests, nor on how best to economise on resources. It was instead 
a rather tentative and unreasoned compromise. It was bound to fail. 
This compromise was due to the internal pressure s within the 
Party; it was also because the Government was so involved in time-
consuming cost-effective exercises and other feasibility studies, 
that it failed to perceive the contradictions within its broader 
defence doctrine. But there was no question of Britain being able 
to maintain both an effective role in Europe and East of Suez on 
£2,000 million. The Cabinet could not or did not wish to face that question. 
The inherent conflict in the policy was sagely observed by the 
Economist. "By 1970" it said, "the defence budget will be smaller 
than it would have been if he (Mr. Healey) had not applied the screw, 
but still quite a lot above that nice round figure Mr. Wilson twirls 
aloft. It sounds an anti-climax. But dramatic changes were never 
a POSSibility".l The Government inherited defences wrecked by 'chronic 
overstretch' and yet its defence review· was supposed to be cutting 
defence spending by a further 15 per cent. The contradiction in 
policy had become appallingly obvious. 2 
The Government's rhetoric seemed to imply that a new and 
splendid review of defence policy was under way. The review appeared 
likely to be a declaration of faith in the World Role, though it 
proved to be but the prelude to a different and more modest if 
not realistic policy.2 
1 
EQonomist, Vol. 216, 17th· July, 1965, p. 216. 
2 
see Martin, L. W., The Long Recessional, IISS, November, 1968. 
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C H APT E R IX 
THE DEFENCE REVIEW - ITS RISE 
AND FALL 
The Defence White Paper of February 1966 marked a crucial stage 
in Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez, for the much vaunted Defence 
Review spelt out a significant change in Britain's position in that 
area. 
It achieved this in three important respects; "First, Britain 
will not undertake major operations of war except in co-operation with 
allies. Secondly, we will not accept an obligation to provide another 
country with military assistance unless it is prepared to provide 
us with facilities we need to make such assistance effective in time. 
Finally, there will be no attempt to maintain defence facilities in 
1 
an independent country agains ts its wishes". 
These three conditions seemed quite specific and explicit, but 
they actually encouraged many different interpretations. To some 
Governments it indicated that Britain was a spent force, as a major 
extra-European power and was now a weak auxiliary of the U.S.; to others 
it suggested that no real limitation had been imposed on independent 
British capability.2 
The Review was a Government attempt to set broad objectives with 
depleted resources. The ultimate responsibility lay with the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet; but below them the resolution of critical 
issues was taken in the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee - D.O.P.C. 
as the Ministry of Defence preferred to call it. This had all the 
'heavyweights' - the Prime Minister as Chairman, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
1 
Defence Review, February, 1966", Cmnd. 2901, p. 7. 
2 
See Brown, Nevi11e, Arms Without Empire, 1967. 
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Secretaries, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Home and Defence 
Secretaries, and other senior ministers; in addition the Chiefs of Staff 
attended from time to time. They in turn were supported by a committee 
of senior officials serving on the Defence and Overseas Policy 
(Official) Committee, chaired by the Secretary to the Cabinet, with 
a number of Permanent Secretaries and the Chief of the Defence Staff 
as members. Its job was to see that defence policy kept in line 
with existing commitments and resources and that necessary adjustments 
were made in time, and without exposing the country to military danger. 
It was clear, however, that the 1966 White Paper constituted 
an important phase in the withdrawal from East of Suez, since it 
emphatically declared against Britain acting alone in another Indonesian-
type confrontation. It was also clear that the White Paper indicated 
that the U.K. was even more heavily reliant on U.S. military power and 
political initiative. This position was underscored by the Prime 
Minister who declared that "Not only have we for all time pledged this 
Government against any war - in Europe, out of Europe, West of Suez, 
East of Suez - in which Britain would fight alone, not only have we 
renounced such a war, but our whole defence policy is based on the 
fact that this nation neither can nor should fight any war except 
a collective war, under or for the U.N., or with our allies". 1 
The clear limitations on British action declared in the White 
Paper, was further advertised by the critical decision not to build 
another aircraft carrier? Although the Carrier-Fill debate was essentially 
an in-house debate, with powerful strategic and political a,rguments 
deployed by the entrenched service interests, the financial decision 
1 Speech to Parliamentary Labour Party, 15th June, 1966. 
2 
See Martin, L. W., The Sea in Modern Strategy ~ 1967. 
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reflected a balanced but not necessarily correct assessment of long-
term strategic interests. Nevertheless, it is important to examine 
and isolate the main arguments involved because the decision did 
seriously erode Britain's World Role. 
The pro-carrier lobby was presided over by Christopher Mayhew, 
who, together with Admiral Luce, resigned over the issue. In a 
dramatic personal statement to the House of Commons, Mr. Mayhew advanced 
four reasons why as Navy Minister he had taken the view that the carriers 
were essential in an East of Suez role. The first, was that beyond 
the range of fixed land bases "... only carriers can provide the air 
strike and defence to protect naval shipping or amphibious force •••• " 
The second was that carriers " ••• provide essential re-insurance against 
the loss of land-air bases". Finally Mr. Mayhew emphasized the great 
" .•. deterrent power" of carriers, and finally he emphasized their 
extreme •.••. flexibility •• ". 1 
There can be no doubt about the influence and determination of 
the pro-carrier lobby. But could one aircraft carrier really have 
made much difference to the East of Suez role? Mr. Mayhew evidently 
believed that it would have made the whole difference between a carrier· 
fleet that was viable and one that was not. 
Admiral Sir Frank Hopkins, then Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, and 
a leading supporter of the carrier, remembered the scenarios the Secretary 
of State set for a number of situations which Britain could face in the 
1970s in areas like the Far East and Indian Ocean: 
"The job could be done with the existing carrier force and Naval 
aircraft,but to show that the carrier force could be dispensed with 
1 
Vol. 725, H. of C., 22nd February, 1966, Col. 258. 
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and replaced by shore-based aircraft proved more difficult. 
'Many devices had to be resorted to in order to do so, such as 
assuming the existence of bases that were not there, and never 
likely to be; crediting the F-lll with a performance in which even 
its most ardent supporter could scarcely believe, and in the event never 
materialized; assuming almost super-human achievements in logistic 
support by the R.A.F.; assuming over-flying rights of countries in 
Europe, Africa and Asia which were unlikely to be allowed in the event; 
and even, in one study, moving Australia 600 miles to the North-West 
in order to bring certain targets within range of the al.ready elastic 
1 
radius of action of the F-lll.' 
Mr. Healey repudiated these arguments although he did admit that 
the carrier decision was 11 ••• by far the most difficult problem I 
2 had to settle in the course of the Defence Reviewll • 
The Defence Minister declared that carriers failed to give value 
for money and that they were indispensable only for 11... the landing 
or withdrawal of troops in enemy territory in the face of air attack 
3 
and outside the range of our own land-based aircraftll. To the evident 
astonishment of the Opposition front-bench Mr. Healey gave the Suez 
campaign as an example of where carriers had been needed, but he 
sarcastically reassured the House that a similar operation was now 
unlikely. Moreover, he advanced the thesis that if Britain were to 
get involved in a similar intervention operation she would need at 
least five or six carriers and that the Admiralty Board had already 
admitted 11 that the Navy could not possibly man more than four 
1 
,Policies of Power, Of· ci t. , pp. 198~l99. 
2 Vol. 725, H. of C. , 7th March, 1966, Cols. 1789-90. 
3 Vol. 725 £ H. of c. , 7th March, 1966, Col. 1792. 
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carriers in all and even then only at the expense of important 
1 
elements in the rest of the Fleet". 
Mr. Healey also questioned the air-strike capacity of the carriers, 
asserting that the Hermes had a striking capability of " •.• only seven 
2 Buccanners - the equivalent of three FlllA's". He urged the House 
to remember that" •.. the attributable cost of the Navy's front 
line carrier-based aircraft tends to be between two and two and a half 
3 times higher than that of comparable aircraft based on land." 
According to Mr. Healey it was on this point that the Navy really lost 
its case. "They argued on the wrong grounds" he said, "by trying to defend 
the carrier, not as a protection for the Fleet, but as a sea-strike 
aircraft, where it was ludicrously ineffective compared to land-based 
aircraft. You can't keep a carrier operating at full load . for more 
than ten days at a time - and we could never have had more than one carrier 
4 in one place at a time." 
The Defence Minister declared that" ••• a new carrier could not 
become operational until 1973, when the rest of our carriers would be 
in the last phase of their active life", and he believed that by the 
mid 1970s Bri tain " . .. should be able to reprovide the necessary 
elements of the carriers' capability more cheaply by other means".5 
The mass of detail and technical evidence about the relative 
performance of carriers, the F11l and other weapons systems, supported 
Mr. Healey's thesis. But the carrier issue dominated the defence debate 
since it constituted the central instrument of the Royal Navy. In fact, 
1 Vol. 725 t H. of C. t 7th March, 1966, Col. 1790. 
2 Vol. 725, H. of c. , 8th March, 1966, Col. 2043. 
3 Yo J, . 725£ H. of C. f 7th March ; 1966, Col. 1791. 
4 
bLatlll:a 1 A1l1smce for the w~ , op. clt. p. 30. 
5 yol. 725 l H. of c. , 22nd February, 1966, Col. 241. 
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the death of the carrier provoked a loss of self-confidence in the 
Royal Navy. This loss of esteem was but the prelude to a wider sense 
of national decline. Yet even if the cancellation entailed only a 
"small sacrifice" to Mr. Healey, to many it was another inexorable 
1 
weakening of Britain's East of Suez capability. 
The cancellation of the carrier was only perlaps the first step 
towards one instance of an overall weakening of the East of Suez role.2 
The White Paper also ·proposed that the British presence in Aden 
should be wound-up in 1968 and that Britain's forces in the Middle East 
should then be restricted to the Persian Gulf. The extent to which the 
loss of Aden could be compensated by improvements at Bahrain and a 
greater utilization of 'baselets' was a b.ig imponderable. But in view of 
the fear that Diego Garcia and Aldabra suffered from periodic flooding, 
it appeared a doubtful proposition. 
The extent to which the Government was diminishing Britain's 
East of Suez role however, was nevertheless difficult to assess. What 
would the three conditions in the Defence White Paper mean in practice? 
Although it seemed certain that the Government would in fact be reluctant 
to mount any operation, however minor, for fear of it escalating into a 
major operation. Nevertheless, it was difficult to determine how greatly 
the Government would feel constrained by the three conditions or inhibited 
by the absence of the cancelled aircraft carrier. 
It also remained equally obscure what effect, if any, the 
Governments proposals for savings in foreign exchange would have on the 
World Role. Mr. Healey announced in March that the Government planned, 
when confrontation ended, to " reduce the number of troops we keep 
1 ( , 
Adams, J. H. What Should Britain Do?, The Navy, July 1968. 
2 
Mr. Mayhew regarded the Air Staff's assumptions relating to aircraft 
range, pilot endurance, training, the number of aircraft needed etc. 
required to displace maritime airpower as likely to carry unacceptable 
risks for the Navy. Britain'c, Role Tomorrow, p. 140. 
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outside Europe by over 30 per cent ••. "l, and in July, at the helght of 
Bri tain' s economic distress, the Prime Minister told the House, "We 
have also reviewed the level of military and economic aid which we can 
afford next year. The Government have decided on firm programmes which 
will reduce our overseas Government expenditure, military and civil, 
by at least £100 million". 2 
This statement by Mr. Wilson was pregnant with possibilities. 
He did not say in what proportion the cuts would be military rather 
than civilian; nor did he say whether the cuts merely involved the 
bringing forward of economies rather than an actual increase in 
economies. Finally, it was difficult to determine to what degree the 
proposed savings in foreign exchange were likely to exceed those which 
would have resulted as an inevitable consequence of the end of Confrontation. 
However the actual and potential danger to the World Role came 
from the overall budgetary cut of a further £180 million that the 
Government was pledged to make by 1969/70. The cancellation of the 
carrier accounted for £80 million, but the remaining saving of £100 
million would be plainly difficult to make. Indeed, it was clear that 
additional defence economies of that magnitude could not be made 
without some diminution of the overseas presence. 
It was, moreover, becoming likely that the Government might 
have to settle for a defence bill somewhat lower than £2000 million in 
1969-70. This was because by mid-way through 1966 it had become clear 
that the national plan was a non-starter and that a defence budget 
of £2000 million in 1969-70 would represent 6.5% of Britain's G.N.P. 
1 
Vol. 725, H. of C., 7th March, : 1966, Col. 1778. 
2 
Vol. 732, H. of C., 20th July, 1966, Col. 632. 
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and not 5.9% as planned. Yet, Mr. Callaghan, made it clear in August 
tha t "The poli cy of Her Maj es ty' s Government is to reduce the proportion 
of defence expenditure to G.N.P. to a level not higher than 6% by 
1969-70".1 If this were so, Mr . Healey was going to be forced to 
introduce even greater defence cut-backs than planned in the Defence 
Review and the East of Suez role was in even greater doubt. 
Mr. Healey was not anxious to face up to the situation. The 
February White Paper did not even identify the areas where the cuts 
needed to bring defence spending down to £2000 million were to be achieved. 
The Defence Minister in his first contribution to the defence debate in 
March appeared equally unsure. Mr. Mayhew however gave an ominous 
warning to the House about the proposed defence cuts~ "The House should 
know" he said "that not all these things are specified in the defence 
White Paper. In the case of the Navy, they are much wider than merely 
2 the cancellation of the CVAOl but they are not specified". Mr. Powell, 
the Opposition's chief defence spokesman, meanwhile predicted drastic 
cuts in the Army, and underlined the importance of " ••• well-authenticated 
reports that the Department of Defence are thinking in terms of a 
reduction of the order of 16,000 men in the Regular Army by the ta.rget 
year of 1970".3 
It was only in the closing moments of the defence debate that 
Mr. Healey finally admitted how he was going to save the missing £100 
million. " •.• when we are able to reduce our deployment in the Far 
East", he said "we shall make further reductions in equipment and 
manpower which will save the additional £100 million".4 The worst 
1 Vol. 733, H. of C. , 9th August, .1966, Col. 1385. Oral answers. 
2 Vol. 725, H. of c. , 22nd Februa;:y, 1966, Col. 257. 
3 Vol. March, ,1966', 725, H. of C. , 7th Col. 1753. 
4 Vol. 725, H. of C. I 8th March, 1966 , Cols. 2045-6. 
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scenario of the East of Suez protagonists now seemed within an ace 
of realization. 
In addition to the overt defence cuts foreshadowed in the White 
Paper there was the near certainty that these cuts did not amount to a 
once and for all weakening of the East of Suez role. It was clear that 
they were only the first of a number of decisions. For the Defence 
Review had done very little to remove overstretch, but on the contrary 
had exacerbated it. 
The Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Defence had been 
forced to admit that £2000 million was not a realistic figure around 
which to build a defence policy which included a major commitment East 
of Suez. The £2000 million figure corresponded with no realistic 
foreign or defence policy. The Navy Minister later put the same point 
more concisely, " ••• it is too small if we want to stay East of Suez 
1 
and much too big if we do not". 
Clearly an intolerable contradiction had eme,rged because the 
Government had started to cut the forces' capability while leaving 
commitments substantially intact. "I am in favour of drastic defence 
cuts", said Mr. Mayhew, "but there must also be drastic cuts in 
2 
commitn.ents to match". The Navy Minister then expanded upon the theme 
tha t the proposed cuts in capabili ty were si gni fican t: "... the cuts 
are overwhelmingly in the realm of equipment and weapons and not in the 
realm of administration, pay and pensions, which amounts to one-half of 
, the total budget. Thus one-sixth of the total budget represents much 
more than one-sixth of the budget for arms, weapons and equipment. It 
3 




Vol. 725, H. of C., 22nd February, 1966" Col. 256. 
Mr. Mayhew's resignation statement, issued on the day he resigned, 
19th February, 1966. Keesings Contemporary Archives. p. 21259. 
Vol. 725, H. of C., 22nd February, 1966, Col. 257. 
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gave an apocaly ptic warning "... all the time the challenge is growing, 
the task increases and our resources dwindle. It is quite plain that 
the defence policy set out in the White Paper will open up a vast gap 
in the 1970s between what the servicemen are expected to do and what 
they are given to do the job with."l 
The New Statesman strongly supported this analysis, arguing that 
the cuts in spending were " ••• in no way matched by corresponding 
reductions in our commitments, even allowing for the end of the Aden 
2 
base". The logic of this analysis pointed to the need to cut 
commitments to match capability cuts. And the obvious place to cut 
commitments was East of Suez. 
There was a great deal of force in this analysis. Britain was, 
indeed, in a cleft stick where it must either spend more, do less, 
or rely more on others. The White Paper had however, sought to grapple 
with this problem. It reduced Britain's commitment East of Suez by 
foreshadowing a withdrawal from Aden and placing limitations on the 
scale of operations in which Britain would in future become involved. 
In addition the White Paper promised to reduce substantially the 
deployment of forces in the Mediterranean and also, within a few years, 
to. give up a fixed-base in the Caribbean and in Sothern Africa. All 
these measures possessed merit and would ease the contradictions in 
Labour's defence policy and allow the Government to retain a residual 
imperial role. 
3 
Nevertheless, in spite of the February White Paper, the Government 
was compelled before the year was out, to contemplate making further cuts 
1 
Yol. 725, H. of C., 22nd February, 1966, Col. 260. 
2 
New Statesman, Vol. 71, 25th February, 1966, p. 245. 
3 
Mr Michael Stewart argued "we have neither the wish nor the intention to 
abandon the world east of Suez". A statement made in July 1966. See 
T h.t-Times 'A 1st July, 1966. 
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East of Suez: indeed, there is some evidence that the Cabinet even looked 
at the dramatic prospect of a total withdrawal. This was made clear by 
a stunning admission by Denis Healey on 22nd October 1969, the significance 
of which curiously escaped a gathering of distinguished officers at 
the Royal United Services Institution. 
At that meeting the Minister for Defence emphatically declared that 
the decision taken in January 1968 to withdraw British forces from South 
East Asia by 1971 " ... accelerated our final withdrawal from South East 
Asia by only twelve months compared with the earliest date envisaged 
immediately after Confrontation". 1 This made it plain that a date for 
withdrawal was provisionally 'envisaged' after Confrontation in August 
1966, and that the earliest date agreed upon was 1972. Richard Crossman 
noted in his diary the agonized confusion of the Cabinet on the question 
of the timing of withdrawal. 2 He claimed to have "got the impression that 
the Defence Committe want us out of Singapore in 1970 and very much 
hope the Australians will turn us down when we ask for a British presence 
there after our withdrawal from Singapore. In fact we have to wait for 
facts to force withdawal on us so, though we are not in any way committed 
to withdrawal, the Chiefs of Staff have been told to work on the assumption 
that Singapore will be untenable long before 1970 and that we shall not 
2 
transfer over troops to Australia". 
Therefore the latest date set for withdrawal in line with the 
traditional practice of setting a three or four year span,was probably 
1975 or 1976. This time-scale would seem plausible because Mr. Healey 
was one of the most eloquent East of Suez advocates and it is known that, 
at this time, he was thinking in terms of a British overseas presence up 
1 
The Government's Defence Policy, The Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institute, December, 1969. 
2 Crossman, Vol. I., op. cit., p. 456. 
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until the mid 19 70s. "Even at the time of the Defence Review", he was 
to say later, "I didn't think we would be East of Suez much after 1975".1 
The significance of Mr. Healey's Royal United Service Institution 
statement is immense. It strikingly confirms that the dramatic events of 
1967 and 1968, considered to be the decisive factors in the withdrawal 
from East of Suez, perhaps only made a difference of months to the date 
of withdrawal; conversely, it gives a far greater significance to the 
events of 1964-66 than had hitherto been supposed. Moreover, if the 
Government decided in 1966 to withdraw from East of Suez sometime 
after 1972, it renders the carrier FIll hiatus somewhat irrelevant, since 
the new carrier could not come on station before 1973 at the earliest. 
It could be that, in February, when the decision on the carrier .was taken, 
the Cabinet was a~ready aware that Britain would not be East of Suez 
for very long after the CVAOl came into service. However this 
explanation for the carrier decision was never officially admitted 
but it may, nevertheless, have been a residual factor in that decision. 
Mr. Healey's RUSI lecture, then, inevitably provokes a dramatically 
different analysis of the Labour Government's decision to abandon the 
World Role to the generally accepted official version. But what were 
the events of 1966 which so critically undermined Britain's East of 
Suez role? Was it the economic crisis of July, the precipitate end to 
Confrontation in August, the growing Eurocentric roles discernable 
towards the end of the year or the reluctance of Britain's allies to 
assume a greater share of the defence burden? 
It cannot be contended that the fluctuating position of the East 




of Britain which the periodic financial crises rather underscored. 
Nevertheless, it certainly gave a marked impetus to the Government's 
determination to cut defence spending. The economic position throughout 
the year was not good; at best the economy might respond to careful 
management, at worst it might be beyond whatever management the Treasury 
could achieve. The May Budget was not as tough as feared, almost 
certainly because the Chancellor was anxious to reconcile the expansionist 
school of Mr. Brown, and the deflationists within the Treasury. He failed. 
That the budget was deflationary enough was doubtful, but of critical 
importance was the seamen's strike which followed two weeks later. 
The subsequently poor trade figures were attributed to the strike and 
the Prime Minister, identified the communists as guiding the industrial 
unrest for political ends. l 
The strike ended on 1st July. But the publication of the steel 
nationalisation bill on the very day the strike ended and by the 
resignation of Mr. Frank Cousins from the Government just two days 
later, alarmed and depressed the stock market. Foreign bankers deserted 
the pound as they perceived what they regarded as an ideologically 
motivated Government likely to be confronted by militant trade unions 
led by renegrade Frank Cousins. 
The overall effect of this spectre was disastrous for Britain. 
There was during the first week in July a heavy run on the pound and the 
Government was forced to act and raise the Bank Rate to 7% and impose 
on 10th July a wage freeze and severe deflationary measures. Moreover, 
any hope that confidence would qui~ l:y return was dashed by George Brown's 
attempted resignation. In the .event, he was persuaded to withdraw his 
1 ' 1 w~ son, Ope cit., pp. 308-311. 
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threatened resignation, but the split in the Cabinet between the 
devaluers, Brown, Jenkins and Crosland, and the deflationists, Wilson 
and Callaghan, was brought into the open. 
In this hectic atmosphere the demand for defence cuts grew 
in volume. The strident demand was all the more potent because Britain's 
allies revealed no great concern to reduce the pressure on the harassed 
Labour Government. Government Ministers made hurried visits to Bonn, 
Canberra and Washington, but to no avail. 
The clear purpose of these diplomatic manouvres was to persuade 
Britain's allies to help to take up the strain of spending nearly £100 
1 
million in foreign exchange in her World Role. While the British 
Government had made quick-fix plans to ease this foreign exchange burden 
by reducing those forces overseas by perhaps one-third by 1970, the 
immediate burden still persisted with ominous magnitude. It was not 
made any less burdensome by Labour's decision to acquire so much American 
. 1 equ~pment. 
Mr. Healey expressed a widespread attitude on both the right and 
left of his Party when he said that Britain could hardly go on accepting 
such a heavy burden East of Suez "... if her neighbours and competitors 
2 in Western Europe are sitting back and raking in the money". In 
consequence the Government adopted a somewhat militant attitude with 
3 the West Germans over the foreign exchange costs of B.A.O.R. On 25th 
October, the Chancellor warned "It remains the Government's policy that 
4 these costs should by one means or another be covered in full". 




were the Phanton £755 million, Flll £425 million and the Hercules £185 
million. See Mason, R. Vol. 756, H. of C., 21st December, 1967, Col. 517. 
The total dollar cost over the same period was £600 million. 
Vol. 725, H. of C., 7th March, 1966, Cols. 1781-2. 
Foreign exchange loss to Germany was £94 million a year gross but allowing 
for offset agreement net figure was about E40 million a year. 
Vol. 734 1 H. of C., 25th October, 1966, Col. 805. Oral answers. 
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Mr. Thomson, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, endorsed this demand 
in Decel!lber, "The foreign exchange costs of maintining our forces in 
Ge rmany must be covered in fulL •. " 1 
Nevertheless, despite all the hyperbole about getting the matter 
resolved by the end of the year, Mr. Thomson in his delicate role as the 
Cabinet's chief debt collector, had to report to the Commons that it 
had not yet been possible to adhere to the timetable agreed. Mr. Paul 
Johnson of the New Statesman expressed the pent-up anger of many Labour 
supporters of both wings who recalled with astonishment that "only a 
few weeks ago a very senior member of the Cabinet swore to me that, 
come what may, the Rhine Army would be cut by 20,000 next year".2 
In an attempt to pacify the Party, Mr. Thomson issued an ultimatum, 
"If by the end of June 1967, agreement has not been reached Her 
Majesty's Government would have to regard themselves as freer to take 
whatever decisions seem necessary to them to cover the foreign exchange 
costs of their forces in Germany 1967-68".3 The Left was not amused. 
"Does my Right Hon. Friend appreciate", asked the still unconvinced 
Michael Foot, "that he will have a first class row on his hands if we 
do not get a better statement than this". 4 
The British Government made as little impression in Washington as 
it had in Bonn. On his return from the American capital the previous 
December the Prime Minister had told the House, "Taking the East of 
Suez role as a whole there was a lively recognition on both sides that 
we could fulfil the kind of role I think it is our duty to fulfil 
1 Vol. 738 L H. of C., 12th December,1966, Col. 45. 
2 New Sta tesman, Vol. 72, 16th December, 1966, p.900. 
3 Vol. 738, H. of C. , 12th December, 1966, Col. 44. 
4 Vol. 738, H. of c. , 12th December, 1966, Col. 46. 
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only the basis of interdependence with our allies and by burden sharing 
in terms of both commitment and cost". 1 And yet it was clear that both the 
Americans and the Australians were not prepared to be lectured to when 
they were already carrying their share of the burden in Vietnam. 
Moreover, the growing disenchantment with the Government's defence 
, , 
policy did not only emanate from the clash of national interests from 
within the alliance which antagonized allies; there now appeared 
important ·political divisions within the Labour Party itself. 
The Government's relationship with the Party both in and outside 
Parliament was at its most tranquil before 1966. The Prime Minister's 
position following the 1964 Election turned out to be one of almost 
towering strength. The Party had pulled off a stunning victory at the 
polls in March, and the Defence White Paper had of course foreshadowed 
substantial limitations on British operations overseas. And yet from 
Whitsum to Christmas was a period of bitter controversey over defence 
matters which cut right across ideological divisions within the Party. 
Indeed there was the improbable alliance of the most unlikely line-up 
of Mendleson, Mikardo, the Kerr's, Wyatt and Mayhew opposing the 
Government's defence policy. 
On 15th June, the Prime Minister, at a meeting of the P.L.P., 
propounded in a remarkable speech the Government's East of Suez policy. 
He spoke against a motion sponsored by both the Left and Right wings which 
called for a "decisive reduction" in Britain's military commitments East 
of Suez by 1969-70 "including withdrawal from Malaysia, Singapore and the 
Persian Gulf •.• resulting in a defence budget below £1,750,000,000 at 
1 Vol. 722, H. of C., 21st December, 1965, Col. 1903. 
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1964 prices" 1 On this celebrated occasion the anti-East of Suez 
faction was decisively defeated, but at the annual conference in the 
autumn the anti-East of Suez faction won a striking victory on the 
same motion. 
However even the decision to withdraw from Aden appeared to 
compromise the Government. Mr. Thomson was not in any doubt about 
the reaction of much of his Party when he said that "Some of my Hon. 
friends have expressed scepticism if not incredulity at the thought 
that at a time when we are withdrawing from the Aden base we are 
2 
adding to our forces in the Persian Gulf". 
There were many variables which increased the opposition to the 
Government's defence policy. Not the least of these was the embarrassing 
fact that Wilson's Government was spending in 1966 a higher percentage 
of G.N.P. on defence than was spent in the last year of the Conservative 
Government. The belief that the economy could be transformed without 
greatly reducing defence expenditure was slowly but severely fading. 
The economy, the left felt, would never have got in such a weak position 
if the Government had withdrawn from East of Suez. 
It was, however, only in 1966, against an ominous background of 
incomes policies and wage restraint that it became starkly apparent to 
the Party that an obvious conflict of priorities existed between its 
social and defence commitments. When this conflict of priorities was 
recognized the Party's watery gaze turned away from those emotionally 
charged and ideologically contentious aspects of foreign policy, such 
as Vietnam and Rhodesia, and towards those aspects which consumed a huge 
chunk of the nation's wealth. The East of Suez role was a blatant 
1 Keesings Contemporary Archives, p. 21494. 
2 Vol. 737, H. of C., 6th December, 1966, Col. 1281. 
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extravagence. The Party both in Parliament and outside was suddenly 
more concerned with the cash nexus than with principles which extolled 
the virtues of an imperial heritage. 
The economic crisis of 1966 also diminished the notion of 
infallability which had enveloped Mr. Wilson for the previous three 
years. The feeling gained ground in the Party that if the Prime Minister 
could be so misinformed about the state of the economy, he could be 
equally misinformed about strategic questions. There was a growing 
indeed militant challenge to the authority of the Prime Minister. 
His position, so towering in the spring, began to decline swiftly 
during the sweltering heat of the climactic summer. 
Labour's brilliant victory at the polls in March looked as if it 
could induce a greater sense of unity within the Party, reflecting the 
euphoria of success, but it soon dissolved in a sour mood of disenchantment. 
Now the Prime Minister could no longer discipline the Left by pOinting 
to a small Labour majority. The majority had risen to 97 seats, and 
this expanded significantly the room for manoeuvre available to 
Mr. Wilson's Left Wing critics. The Left could now act in relative 
safety knowing that it would not bring the Government down. 
The central thread connecting both Left and Rlght was their distaste 
for a greatly inflated defence budget and this was critical because the 
Left required an alliance with the Right if its influence over the Labour 
leadership was to prove effective. 
The controversy over the East of Suez issue reached right into 
the Cabinet rooms and, as Crossman has revealed, throughout late 1965 
and 1966, it was the anti-East of Suez posture which was gaining stre.ngth. 
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The elevation of Roy Jenkins and Anthony Crosland to the Cabinet in 
1965 and the significant conversion df Michael Stewart to the European 
cause, gave the Cabinet a greater anti-East of Suez group. Mr. Paul 
Johnson contended that the anti-East of Suez faction It ••• have half 
the Cabinet behind them, two thirds of the junior Mi~isters and 
three-quarters of the Parliamentary Labour Party". 1 Mr. Crossman also 
indicates that Cabinet unrest was widespread but it appears that 
Mr. Johnson's arithmetic was suspect. Mr. Crossman asserts that 
"East of Suez is solely the P.M.s line - the P.M. with George Wigg's 
backing. Undo~tedly, it's all a fantastic illusion lt • 2 There was 
a deal of truth, however, in the contention that Mr. Johnson made 
that "As things stand the East of Suez issue looks like becoming 
the Party's first, big internal dispute since Wilson became leader".3 
The anti-East of Suez mood persisted during 1966 not only because 
it was clear that Britain could not afford to remain over-committed but 
also because of growing Cabinet enxieties about the relevance of the 
World Role to Britain's security. This latter doubt gained momentum 
from the increasing ~sillusionment with the Commonwealth and the 
growing awareness of the politico-strategic importance of Europe. 
The growing sense of crisis in the Commonwealth connection really 
centred around the Rhodesian issue. But other momentous events were 
under way well before the crisis atmosphere of mid-l966. First on the 
9th April, 1965, fighting broke out between two Commonwealth countries, 
India and Pakistan. This in turn led to the dramatic rupture of 
1 New Statesman, Vol. 71, 3rd June, 1966, p. 804. 





diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Malaysia and to the sending 
of arms from Indonesia to Pakistan. The sorrow and disappointment 
of the British Government in witnessing two Commonwealth members 
waging a bitter conflict was almost negated by the embarrassment of 
the Soviet Union opportunistically offering 'good offices' in settling 
the dispute. 
The positive long-term repercussions of the Tashkent meeting on 
4th January, 1966, were, for the Commonwealth, incalculable. 
Yet the real and admitted source of Labour's disillusionment with 
the Commonwealth came much earlier, however, over Rhodesia. On 12th 
October 1965, Mr. Wilson proposed that a Commonwealth mission should 
go to Rhodesia, but Mr. Ian Smith rejected this diplomatic initiative. 
It was not 'practical' said the Rhodesian leader and the prospects 
. 1 
of a settlement qu~ckly receded. Tanzania broke off relations with 
Britain on 15th December and Ghana did the same a day later. 
It was regarded as likely by the Wilson Administration that the 
divisions in the Commonwealth could be narrowed at the Prime Ministers' 
meeting in Lagos 6n 11th-12th January 1966, but two days before the 
conference sat, Ghana released a remarkable statement: "Ghana believes 
that Britain has lost all control of the situation and is unwilling to 
take any steps by which its authority might be reasserted. It is time 
2 for those more determined and more capable than Britain to take charge." 
At the conference itself Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia all predictably 
called for the use of force to end the rebellion. Britain was pushed 
on to the strategic defensive. 
1 
The Times '. October 14th, 1965. 
2 Keesings Contemporary Archives, p. 21197. 
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A further Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference was held in 
London between 6th - 15th September. It was even more disastrous 
than the Lagos meeting. The Indian delegate talked of a 'crisis 
of confidence' in the Commonwealth and Zambia heightened tension by 
threatening to brea~ away if force were not used to settle the Rhodesia 
question. The manifest failure of the Zambian foreign minister, 
Mr. Kapwepwe, to achieve this objective led to his much-publicized 
departure from London. He declared himself as 'disgusted' with the 
British Government and emotionally declared that "This conference 
1 
makes us know that. Mr. Wilson is coming to be a racialist". This 
absurd 'propositioJ was resented by Mr. Wilson as he subsequently 
made clear. His observations on the subject indicate the nature of 
his personal disenchantment with the Commonwealth connection. 2 
I 
Mr. Wilson wrote that "there was one subject before us, Rhodesia, 
and Britain was in the dock, as we had been a month earlier in 
New York, though this time were were dealing with principals rather 
than distant plenipotentiaries not all of whom represented their 
principals views. I presented Britain's position and then the 
debate began. It was hard-hitting though somewhat repetitive, as one 
African leader after another sought to prove how much more African 
he was than his neighbour. From Asia, Cyprus and the Caribbean the 
meassage of condemnation was the same. Then Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore 
spoke, an off-the-cuff, unprepared speech of some 40 minutes at a 
level of sophistication rarely achieved in any of the Commonwealth 
Conferences which I have attended. I said to my secretary that it 
1 
2 
Keesinqs Contemporary Archives, p. 21638. This charge was repeated 
in Lusaka by the Zambian Foreign Minister on his arrival. He again 
described Mr. Wilson as a 'racialist and an imperialist'. 
Wilson, Ope cit. p. 255. 
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should have been recorded and published in a journal such as Encounter 
to keep a record of what the modern world was really about. Lester 
Pearson said exactly the same to me after the morning's session" 1 
The Commonwealth conferences were, then, a new and dramatic 
foci of division and discord rather than unity and of national inter-
dependence. The search for agreement was in vain. The hurtful 
disagreements that characterised Commonwealth relations in 1966 were 
to become endemic. They were also to increase. 
It must have been a disappointment for Mr. Wilson who had 
conSistently shown a great regard for the Commonwealth. But Mr. Wilson 
could never admit this and he even believed that "the Conference 
ended in an atmosphere of unity, even euphoria".2 In fact the 
Commonwealth was neither the economic nor the political reality he 
had imagined. His rather grand design of uniting the Commonwealth in 
political terms and expanding its economic role proved unworkable. 
This grand design was a chimera and this fact steadily became 
obvious throughout the first two years of Mr. Wilson's administration. 
By Setpember 1966, breaking point for the Commonwealth had been 
reached. It was now an incontrovertible fact that the Commonwealth 
could no longer constitute Mr. Wilson's ideal diplomatic instrument. 
Clearly the Prime Minister had been denigrated and put 'on trial' 
by conference. The days of British imperial benevolence were over. 
British disillusionment with the Commonwealth was virtually 
complete. Britain's interest now turned more and more on Europe. Yet 
the Government's attitude towards the continental commitment was cool and 
aloof. It viewed with disdain the recurring crises in the Common Market 
1 
OPe cit., p. 256. 
2 ibid. 
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and appeared to think that unless and until the Community had settled 
its short-term problems, there was no logic in Britain attempting to 
negotiate terms on entry. The Prime Minister had admitted that "There 
is no immediate issue of our being asked or being able to join the 
Common Market •.• " 1 and for the time being he directed his European 
policies into politically irrelevant thoughts about " •• a single trading 
2 
market for the whole C!f Europe ••• " 
Mr. Stewart,his otherwise rather orthodox foreign secretary, on 
the other hand was already making favourable noises about joining the 
E.E.C., but throughout the rest of 1965 Mr. Wilson almost passionately 
denied that the issue of entry into Europe was being considered. 
According to the Sunday Times the Prime Minister told George Brown 
in January, "George I've got news for you. You'll be startled by 
what I'm going to say. I • i 11 4 We re go~ng n. Mr. Wilson's sudden 
conversion was revealed with rather more caution in the House of 
Commons; " ... the position is that we shall go in if we get the right 
terms".5 This proved a commitment subject to unending qualification. 
Mr. Brown was a convinced pro-European. His own account of the proceedings 
revealed the trend in Government thinking but Mr. Brown however tends 
6 to regard Wilson's conversion as tactical. 
1 
2 
John Mackintosh argued in an article in International Affairs that 
Britain's relationship with the Commonwealth had changed over the years 
in regard to the volume of exports Britain sent to the Commonwealth. "By 
1966-8 the proportion going to the Commonwealth had fallen to 29% and 
that to Europe had risen to 20%". But the cost of overseas defence 
had risen to £449 million a year by 1967 as opposed to £3 million a year 
from 1920-1938. See International Affairs. Vol. 45, 1969, pp. 250-51. 
Vol. 716, H. of C., 19th July, 1965, Col. 1141. 
3 ibid. 
4 
Sunday Times, 7th May, 1967. 
5 
Vol. 724, H. of C., lOth February, 1966, Col. 616. 
6 
Brown, Geqrge, In My Way, pp. 219-220. 
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It was however, not really until after the election had been won, 
that Labour began to admit more openly to its Common Market strategy. 
The drift of its intentions was revealed in the new Government formed by 
Mr. Wilson on 5th April 1966. Mr. Thomson was charged with the 
responsibility of articulating and defining Britain's political relations 
with Europe, and Mr. Brown required to define her economic relations. 
The Eurocentric posture was now on the Cabinet's agenda. The 'national 
interest' was about to be reformulated. 
It was during July that the European policy gained considerable 
momentum for, almost simultaneously, the E.E.C. agreed upon an 
agricultural policy and Britain faced another economic crisis. The 
Common Market strategy was an essential part of the Cabinet's agonized 
discussions on how to resolve the deepening economic crisis. The Cabinet 
was split between those like George Brown and ROy Jenkins who, at the 
price set by Pompidou, wanted to devalue to join Europe, and those 
others who continued to support deflation and the anglo-American 
'special relationship'. Mr. Brown lost his battle and impetuously 
the 
resigned, butl intervention by~ a hundred Labour M.P.s restored him to 
the Cabinet. Emotionally moved, Mr. Brown returned to the Cabinet to 
fight the European cause once more. On lOth August, he was moved 
into the Foreign Office - the turn towards Europe was now to become 
irreversible fact. l 
It might seem that any British initiative towards Europe would 
be discouraged in Washington, but this was not so. President Johnson 
moved to underpin the Kennedy Grand Design and that meant Britain should 
1 His arrival was unusual. He entered the F.O. through a door used 
by Bevin twenty years earlier and was carried in a lift which had 
been slowed down because of Bevin's heart condition. The official 
welcoming party with a large press contingent were however waiting 
outside the main door. ibid. 
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stay East of Suez. He did not believe that this was in any way 
inconsistent with pressing Britain's entry into E.E.C. l Moreover, 
President Johnson's Administration had never been wholly convinced 
that Britain would be able to stay East of Suez for as long as the 
British Government had predicted. 
The change in Labour's strategic perspective from one parliamentary 
session to another was always real, but somewhat obscure and consistently 
denied. For example, Labour's attitude for much of 1964 and 1965 was 
conditioned by its rejection of the E.E.C. because it would "not meet 
the five conditions". 2 From mid-way through 1965 to the early part 
of 1966, Labour still rejected a new approach to the Community but 
less vehemently: the five conditions were becoming less and less 
relevant. During the latter part of 1966 there was another perceptable 
shift. Labour now 'actively' wanted to go in 11 if the remaining obstacles 
3 
could be removed". These different statements marked a definite trend, 
taken separately not all that significant, but, to those well versed, 
put together they were extremely important. 
By the end of 1966 there emerged a hardening of the Government's 
position. On November lOth, the Prime Minister announced to the House 
that the Government was about to engage on " ••• a new high level approach ••• 
to see whether the conditions exist - or do not exist - for fruitful 
-




Johnson, B., The Vantage Point. p' (" 4- . 
Those conditions were laid down by the NEC statement of September 1962. 
They were: 1. strong and binding safeguards for the trade and other 
interests of our friends and partners in the Commonwealth; 2.Freedom 
as at present to pursue our own foreign policy. 3. Fulfillment of the 
Government's pledge to our associates in the European Free Trade area. 
4. The right to plan our economy; 5. Guarantees to safeguard the 
pOSition of British agriculture. 
Vol. 735, H. of C., lOth November, 1966, Col. 1539. 
4 ibid. 
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anti-Common Marketeer, could no longer contain his new found enthusiasm. 
He could only do himself a mischief. "We mean business ••• " he said and 
"we intend to start at - I was going to say at a hell of a pace ,,1 
The pace was indeed hectic, as Messrs. Wilson and Brown made their 
diplomatic tour of European capitals. 
The shift towards Europe was not a decisive factor in the 
weakening of the World Role. Nor was it as important as the need to 
bring commitments , into line with the country's capabilities. Throughout 
1966 the Government repeatedly emphasized the necessity for reducing 
Britain's commitments overseas. In his statement on the Defence Review 
on 22nd February, Mr. Denis Healey, the Minister for Defence, underlined 
why limitations had been imposed on Britain's East of Suez role. "In 
order to reduce overstretch", Mr. Healey explained, "we plan to cut 
our tasks overseas and then to keep a larger proportion of our forces 
in a home station and fewer abroad, and rely more on reinforcements by 
air in an emergency. This has meant certain changes in our current 
2 political commitments overseas." This statement was pregnant with 
possibilities. 
In the defence debate in March, Mr. Healey again returned to this 
theme: It is essential to reduce this overstretch, otherwise recruiting 
and re-engagement will fall, overstretch will increase - and so on, and 
so on, in a vicious circle •••• for the last six months we have 
concentrated on planning to reduce our military tasks, so that we were 
able to save foreign exchange, reduce overstretch and make further 
3 
savings in resources". The down-grading of the East of Suez role, 
1 ibid •. 
2 Vol. 725, H. of C. , 2 2n d Feb ruary , 1966, Col. 240. 
3 Vol. 725! H. of C. , 7th March, 1966, Col. 1777. 
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reflected in the February Defence White Paper, was due, then to an 
1 
attempt to bring commitments into line with manpower and equipment. 
The crying need for the White Paper to cut commitments was obvious -
by now conceivably even accepted by the mandarins of the Foreign Office. 
According to Mr. Healey "The Defence Review compelled the Foreign Office 
for the first time to make decisions where it had previously avoded 
them" . 2 Nevertheless, the Foreign Office publicly revealed no sign 
of such a conversion until the Review had been almost completed. 
During 1965 Mr. Healey had saved about £1,200 million on the aircraft 
projects and yet the Foreign Office had still adhered to an uncompromising 
and uncomprehending opposition to cut - any commitment until a decision 
on the aircraft carrier had been made. The Defence Minister Vigorously 
responded by attempting to point out that even if the carrier were 
cancelled, it would not replace the need to cut commitments. It was, 
though only as summer passed into winter 1965, and with a conspicuous 
absence of Foreign Office enthusiasm, that a decision on Aden was 
finally reached. The carrier decision was taken almost simultaneously. 
Although the 1966 Defence White Paper marked a weakening of the 
East of Suez capability, it at least seemed possible that the cuts would 
go no further. Indeed, the Government continued to articulate plantigrade 
enthusiasm for the overseas role. In February Mr. Healey announced in the 
House that he had " ••• made it clear to all the allied Governments 
concerned that we would wish our forces to stay on in Malaysia and 
Singapore so long as the independent Governments of those countries wish 
3 
them to do so on conditions which meet our military requirements". 
Moreover, the Defence Minister went on to say that, even if Britain 
1 
The Policies of Power, Ope cit., p. 214. 
2 U>id-
• 3 
Vol. 725, H. of C. f 22nd February, 1966, Col. 249. 
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were compelled to abandon these bases negotiation had already commenced 
with the Australians " about the provision of alternative facilities 
in Australia".l 
In March Mr. Healey blandly pontificated,as though the issue were 
beyond contention. " •.. that Britain has got to stay East of Suez 
2 in any case for many years". The Defence Minister went on "The 
question is not whether we stay East of Suez, but in what strength 
3 
and for what purpose and for how long". Mr. Healey advanced the 
belief that the continued world role promoted Britain's " •.• important 
economic and political interests in every continent." "Moreover", said 
Mr. Healey, "the Commonwealth makes an indispensable contribution to 
world order and strengthens the international influence of all its 
members - inclUding Britain".4 Mr. Healey's imperial conviction was 
strongly emphasized and even the Gulf presence, which he personally 
valued less highly than the Far Eastern one, was claimed to be invaluable. 
" • .• the Gulf is an area of such vi tal importance, not only to the economy 
of Western Europe as a whole but also to world peace that it would be 
totally irresponsible for us to withdraw our forces from the area unless 
we were completely satisfied that peace and order would be maintained 
after our withdrawal".5 Mr. Stewart strongly endorsed this argument. 
In a reference to the Gulf the foreign secretary said that" ••• if 
suddenly, British influence and responsibilities disappeared there, we 
would have an extremely disturbed situation which might interrupt the flow 
1 Vol. 725 l H. of C., 22nd February, 1966, Col. 249. 
2 Vol. 725 l H. of C., 7th March, 1966, Col. 1779. 
3 Vol. 72S[ H. of C. l 7th March, 1966, Col. 1780. 
4 ibid. 
S Vol. 725[ H. of C. l 7th March, 1966, Col. 1786-7. 
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of oil and which might be damaging to our economy ••• " 1 These words 
were the prelude to Harold Wilson's extraordinary personal intervention. 
In June, in the face of a massive Party revolt over the East of 
Suez issue, the Prime Minister, at a meeting of the P.L.P., made what 
was by any yardstick a remarkable speech. He struck out in aggressive 
language. "Perhaps there are some members who would like to contract 
out and leave it to the Americans and Chinese, eyeball to eyeball, to 
face this thing out. The world is too small ' for that kind of attitude". 
The Prime Minister grimly warned" It is the surest prescription for a 
nuclear holocaus t I could think of". 2 Mr. Wilson uttered every word 
with great conviction. 
He made the Eas t of Suez role sound indispensable. According to 
the Prime Minister it was at the same time invaluable both for 
operations with the United Nations and for operations solely in the 
'national interes~. It made it possible to enforce the Beira patrol and, 
in so dOing, he contended, would bring Rhodesia to its knees. It was 
imperative in preventing the spread of Chinese, Russian and even South 
African influence in Africa; and it was indispensable for the defence of 
Australia and New Zealand and in avoiding a situation where India became 
" a cockpit forced to choose between Russia and America to protect 
them against China" 3 Mr. Wilson also explEated the anxiety of nuclear 
war, the fear of nuclear proliferation and even the concern of a 
resurgent Japan to support his case. In the light of such an analysis 
nobody could controvert the value of the overseas presence. So, in due 
course, the anti-East of Suez group was overwhelmed by almost a 5 to 1 
ratio. 
1 
Vol. 725, H. of C., 8th March, 1966, Col. 1953. 
2 
Wilson, op. cit:, p. 315. 
3 
Natural Alliance for the West, op. c~., p. 43. 
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It is certain that Mr. Wilson was not as impressed with the East 
of Suez role as his speech indicated. Britain's preference in Asia 
was seen by Harold Wilson as a means of preventing polarisationj a slick 
way of getting Left wing support for the contention that his moderating 
influence over America might prevent nuclear disaster. Denis Healey 
was discomforted by this analysis. He was appalled by the idea that 
Britain could help defend India from the Chinesej and the reported 
suggestion that the British Prime Minister had suggested deploying 
the Polaris force to the Far East in order to defer China seemed to 
him 1 to be a nonsense • But whatever his motivation the Prime Minister 
proved as flexible on this issue as on most others and over the next 
month or so things were to change the Government's assessment quite 
significantly. Indeed, Mr. Wilson admitted his error over the East of 
Suez role, though three years later: "I was asked about mistakes I had 
made in office, I instanced my clinging to our Suez role when facts 
were dictating a recessional. I was, I said, one of the last to be 
converted and it needed a lot of hard facts to convert me. Other of my 
colleagues, left wing and pro-European alike, were wiser in their 
perceptions".2 
During July the East of Suez controversy reached a new phase. 
The economic situation again deteriorated and the end of confrontation 
was within sight. The growing economic crisis threatened to put 
additional constraints on defence policy and the end to confrontation 
created an obvious opportunity to make a grand policy change. While 
there was a sense of relief as well as of achievement at the end of 
1 
The Policies of Power, op. cit., p. 216. 
2 
Wilson, op. cit., p. 315. 
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Confrontation, the overwhelming attitude of the Government was that 
Britain should never again get so deeply involved in a protracted 
counter-insurgency operation. 
Perhaps the Government might have been more sympathetic and 
prepared for another cOlli1ter-insurgency operation if diplomatic relations 
between the United Kingdom and Malaysia had not deteriorated. In fact 
they had deteriorated markedly after the break up of the Malaysian 
federation but it was only when Confrontation was about to be successfully 
overcome that both sides began to reveal in public the irritations they 
had suffered for so long with sealed lips. 
The growing tension between Malaysia and Britain became obvious. 
Britain was accused of negotiating with Indonesia behind Malaysia's 
1 back; "Britain has no right to speak for us", the Tunku insisted firmly. 
He also accused Britain of meddling in Malaysia's affairs, particularly 
in Sarawak, which on a recent visit had given him the impression that 
2 
" ••• it was still a British colony". The accusation of 'interf~rence' 
was later given its most tangible expression with the enforced withdrawal 
from Sarawak of the First Secretary to the Deputy High Commission. 
The most crucial cause of Anglo-Malaysian antagonism was, though 
Kuala Lumpur's strong suspicion that the Labour Government sympathised 
3 
more with Lee Kwan Yew than with the Tunku. This suspicion was 
hardened by Britain's refusal to increase aid to Malaysia. The 
Foreign Office's claim that this was solely because of the economic 
crisis was rudely dismissed, and Kuala Lumpur believed that London was 
really out to compel her into economic and defence understandings 




Reported in The Times~ 12th May, 1966, p. 9. 
Reported in The Times, 26th September, 1966. 
Harold Wilson later claimed that his prompt action in preventing an 
escalation of the crisis (over the break up of the Federation) between 
the Tunku and Lee Kwan Yew had possibly saved the latter's life. 
Wilson, op. cit. p. 177. 
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The Malaysian Minister for Information said rather uncharitably 
of the British on 26th June, "The moment Malaysia ceases to be of any 
importance to them the British will withdraw their help and will leave 
us alone to fend for ourselves." He went on to contend that there was 
only a receding chance of a " .•. lasting friendship with Britain as 
1 British help always has strings attached". The Malaysian Finance 
Minister, moreover, felt it proper to warn the dismayed British Government 
that Malaysia maintained her foreign currency reserves in sterling 'out 
2 
of loyalty' : the threat could not have been more obvious. 
Yet the British Government also had marked reservations: not 
only against Malaysia but Singapore also. Both were opposed to 
S.E.A.T.O.; both had failed to keep Britain informed over the breaking 
up of the Federation; and Malaysia's intemperate attitude was matched 
by Singapore which threatened to get the British 'out in twenty-four 
3 hours' and to 'cripple the bases' • Finally, :Bri tain had carried 
single-handedly the burden of Confrontation and yet even then she was 
placed under severe limitations on her use of the Far Eastern bases. 
The 1966 Defence White: Paper had speculated about staying in 
these bases "as long as the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore agree 
that we should do so", but it added as important qualifications 
4 
concerning acceptable conditions" , which suggested by implication that 
the British Government was itself by no means able to assess the nature 
of its relations with Malaysia and Singapore, and was ambivalent in its 
attitude about how much longer it could sustain a role in the Far East. 
The British Prime Minister revealed that he was painfully conscious of 
1 
Reported in The Times, 27th June, 1966, p. 8. 
3 
The Policies of Power, Sp. cit., p. 215. 
4 
Defence Review, February. 1966. emnd. 2901, p. 8. 
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the extent to which Anglo-Malaysian relations had reached a terribly 
low ebb, in an answer given to Duncan Sandys in the House of Commons 
in late June. Mr. Sandys asked Mr. Wilson what had "happened to bring 
about such a serious deterioration in our relationship with Malaysia?"l 
The Prime Minister made an expansive response w,hen he said "It is a 
little unfortunate in view of the actions of successive governments 
in this country in honouring our commitments to Malaysia on such a 
scale. Difficulties began to arise last August when Singapore was 
pushed out of the Malaysian Federation without consultation with us, 
or prior information being given to us, and I think that once this 
situation arises there is always a suspicion on the part of one party 
that we are leaning over in support of the other party. This is part 
of the difficulty. Also there is the feeling of the Malaysian Government 
that we should be giving them much more defence aid. But we have to 
cut our coat very much in accordance with the financial resources that 
we have available. ,,2 
Relations between Britain and Malaysia deteriorated still further 
during Britain's late summer and early autumn. During July Malaysia 
announced its intention to review its relations with Britain. In 
August the Tunku said "there might be changes in the conduct of our 
foreign affairs" 3, and in october l1alaysia' s Minister of Defence, 
Tun Abdul Razak, announced that the U. K. /Malaysia defence treaty "could 
be reviewed at any time. ,,4 The Tunku threatened unilateral action but 
Wilson warned him that if he were to take action, "it would be unwise 
for him to show his face at the Commonwealth Conference". 5 
I 
vol. 730, H. of C., 28th June, 1966, Cols. 1588-9. 
2 ibid.., 
3 On a broadcast commemorating independence. 
4 
Reported in The Times, 12th October, 1966. 
5 
Wilson, OPe cit., p. 176. 
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There was mounting evidence that the Labour Government was 
astonished at Malaysia's ingratitude. Britain's East of Suez policy 
had involved over-commitment and a great deal ofs~rifice and discomforture 
for the Government and now it was being dismissed as of no account and 
curtly informed that Malaysia was about to look again at its relations 
with the U.K. Moral indignation apart, Kuala Lumpur, however, was not 
alone in reviewing its foreign defence policies, a similar reassessment 
was already in process in Whitehall's corridors of power. 
It appears in retrospect that it was in July and August 1966 that 
Britain's foreign and defence policies were radically realigned away 
from the anglo-American 'special relationship' and 'the open seas' 
towards a Eurocentric commitment. l In an interview on television on 5th 
March 1970, Mr. Healey looked back at his period as Defence Minister and 
stressed the tie up between the economic situation and political decision 
making "Certainly we were under heavy economic pressure. We exaggerated 
our economic possibility at the beginning. Nevertheless the development 
of our policy has been consistent in one direction. We always took the 
view that reductions if they had to come would have to come outside 
Europe and not inside Europe. We have to make the reductions outside 
faster and go further than we thought at the beginning".2 The decisions 
• of July and August 1966 were manifestly the first steps in the process 
of decision-making which would go 'faster' and 'further' than had 
hi~~~rto been regarded as necessary or even desirable. But it was clear 
that the contention contained in the Defence Review that Asia was the 
area in which there was the greatest danger of serious hostilities was 
1 . See R~chard, Ivor; Williams, Geoffrey, Europe or the Open Sea? 1970, p.l7. 
2 
Twenty Four Hours (A BBC television programme), 5th March, 1970. 
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now being reconsidered. 
The events of late 1966 underlined one of the inherent defects of 
the defence review and that was that although a review plans for the 
future it draws its conclusions from the past. Indeed, just as the 
Government got one aspect of defence policy formulated another part 
was rendered obsolete by events. Although the Defence White Paper 
had emphasized that it was part of an ongoing process it gave the 
. i 1 ~mpress on of a definitive statement. Yet by August it had been made 
substantially irrelevant. 
By the end of the year, the Defence Review had lost both its 
logic and relevance; and although at the declaratory level it was 
adhered to, no one in government seemed willing to contemplate the 
next step. A t the outset of the review Mr. Healey had imposed upon 
himself a financial constraint and he rigorously and systematically 
produced a defence policy which met what he regarded as the proper 
criteria for meeting existing commitments with less resources. However, 
by the end of 1966 he was in an impossible position, squeezed between 
the Treasury and the Foreign Office and not knowing in the short-term 
2 
what new conditions on policy would be imposed. 
The review - which had started as a general prescription which would 
resolve certain defence contradictions and produce a settled policy - by 
the end of 1966 was already a profoundly inadequate document largely of 
notional interest. If the Government had a central defence doctrine it 
had now collapsed under the weight of the unfolding economic crisis. 
There was pressure in favour of cutting manpower in the forces, of bringing 
back troops released by the sudden end to Confrontation and demands for 
1 
Natural Alliance for the West, Ope cit., p. 38. 
2 
Denis Healey and the Policies of Power, Ope cit., pp. 194-208. 
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a drastic reduction of the army on the Rhine. And yet the delay in 
facing these choices led to a total failure to grapple with the need for 
a radically different defence policy. 
This was, though understandable, not excusable. From June to 
August the Government was perplexed as to whether Confontation was on 
or off, the Foreign Office confused about its European strategy, while 
the complex problems of the B.A.O.R. Offset costs dragged on. Of course, 
the Ministry of Defence found it impossible to make the economies 
demanded by the Treasury. The Cabinet was in disarray. 
Moreover, the Party leadership was confused and divided. The 
Party Conference as usual was pressing for drastic defence cuts, the P.L.P. 
somewhat reluctantly impressed by Wilson's rhetoric had accepted Britain's 
World Role but wanted economies, and Britain's closest Qlly, the U.S. 
was bent on keeping Britain to her existing European and overseas roles. 
The Labour Government faced the acute need to establish its internal and 
external priorities. This difficult task was to be attempted without a 
sense of direction or dOminating principle or coherent policy in regard 
to the conduct of the affairs of the nation. Britain strove to retain 
an independent political status and accept her share of the burden of 
military stabilisation in areas beyond Europe. But this proved beyond 
her resources. The logic behind the Defence Review was that appropriate 
to a great power, and it rested, as Sir Robert Scott argued, upon "the 
three major components of external policy~' which were r egarded as 
inseparable. These included the need to strengthen her economy which 
could not expand "except in conditions that permit world trade to expand. 
She cannot hope to bring about these conditions except by an active 
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political role which she cannot play without accepting its military 
consequences. Yet she cannot maintain the necessary military support 
'th • 1 w~ out a heal thy economy. It These three major components were to 
require a new policy based upon different principles. Britain's 
Labour government began to see the need to bring its defence commitments 
into line with its capabilities. 
1 
Scott, Robert, Major Theatre of Conflict, 1968, p. 61. 
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C H APT E R X 
THE DANGERS OF OVER-COMMITMENT AND THE NEED 
FOR A REDUCED ROLE 
The cabinet expected an end to the ambiguity that had disfigured 
so much of Labour's defence policy during 1966. The events, however, 
of early 1967 were to destroy this expectation. The February Defence 
White Paper further obscured the drift of future policy and also failed 
to convey even the broad future size and shape of the British forces. 
The document contained so much detail that it added nothing to the broad 
lines of British Defence policy. Only the need for an annual Defence 
White Paper according to Parliamentary convention justified its appearance 
at all. But the Defence White Paper which Mr. Healey had initially 
prepared caused a stir when it came before the Defence Committee of 
the Cabinet. It apparently contained a commitment to what Lord Chalfont 
and Richard Crossman regarded as a doctrine of massive retaliation which 
NATO had formally disavowed. Mr. Crossman in his dictated impressions 
of this meeting is quite explicit. "I'd already been warned by my talk 
with Lord Chalfront about what might be found in the White Paper this 
year. The second part of it, as usual, was a mass of figures and details. 
What really matters is always the first chapter, which only arrived on 
Friday evening. It contained~ flaming apologia for Britain's role in 
NATO as the chief apostle of a return to massive nuclear retaliation. 
When I'd finished it I thought to myself: Oh God, have I got to go and 
have another row with Harold on Monday? Have I got to be the only one 
to raise this in O.P.D. 
It so happened that I didn't have to because George Brown arrived 
in time to say exactly what I'd intended to say. He told the Committee 
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that he didn't want to challenge the doctrine or the strategy but he 
did ask himself why on earth we should have to put it forward in this 
form this year. Would it not profoundly shock the Germans, not to mention 
Kosygin, who arrives this week? Would it not be the cause of a frightful 
row in the Party? Something which Healey had included in his initial 
remarks suggested that his officials had not wanted this first chapter 
and that he'd written it himself. George Brown ended with a bitter 
complaint that he'd only received this on Friday afternoon and that 
Thomson and Chalfont, his two Ministers of State, saw it for the first 
time on Sunday. Surely we had a rule about O.D.P. being given decent 
time to discuss something as important as this? Healey made no effort 
to answer this question though he did not in any way deny that he 
himself had Written the offending first chapter. Nor do I know whether 
Healey had warned the P.M. about the character of this chapter. I rather 
fancy from Harold's behaviour that he wasn't given much warning and that 
Healey was once again acting as a lone wolf pushing his own ideas in his 
own peculiar style. George Brown was supported by George Wigg and then 
by me from rather different points of view and, of course, by the 
Chancellor. The Committee was virtually unanimous that this chapter of 
the White Paper was a quite unnecessary provocation. 
In addition to our objections to the exposition of nuclear strategy 
I pointed out that there was another reason why the chapter should be 
wholly deleted. It gave advance notice of further major cuts. But surely 
it was unwise to commit ourselves to these now. Harold replied that what 
was much more serious was that if we didn't announce the cuts now and then 
made them in July, we would be accused of surrendering to our own left-
wingers." 
1 
Crossman, op. cit. p. 215. 
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In fact the White Paper's only real significance was that it 
quantified the plans outlined the previous year. Gurkha strength was 
to be cut by 5,000 and the total reduction in the Far East by the end 
of 1967 was expected to be between 18,000 and 23,000. There were to 
be other reductions. These were announced by Mr. Healey in the House. 
"As a result of the redeployment from Aden we shall have about 10,000 
additional men home from the Middle East by the end of the next financial 
year, after allowing for the small new build up in the Gulf. Another 
5,000 men will be coming home from Cyprus, Malta and elsewhere, 
including S. Africa and the Caribbean. In all, as the White Paper makes 
clear, we now have firm plans for returning a minimum of 25,000 men to 
Britain from outside . Europe, excluding the base units in Singapore and 
1 the Gurkha rundown ..• " And yet if the Defence White Paper lacked a 
central organizing principle it could' be excused to some extent, because 
the Government was struggling to think through the events of late 1966 
and to discuss them with its allies. There was also monumental anxiety 
about the economy. Mr. Healey needed to get his sums right. All these 
factors compelled the Defence Minister to keep his options open. 
Nevertheless, the White Paper and the subsequent defence debate were 
characterized by what they omitted. Interestingly enough, while the 
importance and success of the Confrontation operation were recognised 
in the White Paper, there were not the strong and emphatic endorsements 
of the East of Suez role which had always been an integral part of 
defence debates. The Government was beginning to articulate a different 
posture. 
Mr. Healey projected these doubts when he pontificated about the 
1 
Vol. 742, H. of C., 27th February, 1967, Col. 105. 
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importance of deciding " th t f · li b k ' ,,1 on e ype 0 IIll. tary ac ~ng... now 
required East of Suez, as though a new strategy might be in the making. 
The White Paper, too announced that "... the foreign exchange problem 
has ...• compelled the Government to re-examine the political, economic 
1 
and military implications of our deployment outside Europe". 
The Foreign Secretary added his own uncertainties about the role. 
"I do not argue" said Mr. Brown, "that we have to go on spending in 
the future £2,000 million a year; nor that we can afford to ••• I do not 
say that we have always got to have troops where we have got them now, or 
in ~e numbers we have got them now. We must constantly search for other 
and better ways to do the job.,,2 Mr. Brown stressed on yet another 
occasion that the problem with the East of Suez role lay in " .•• finding 
a way which we can stay in a reduced ••• form". He also argued that 
"In other cases, the decision to withdraw completely can and must be 
taken.,,3 
The Government's position, though still undefined and obscure, 
was now arguably gaining a new dimension. There was now almost total 
consensus that a pull-out from East of Suez should be the general 
objective of policy. The problem was not whether to disengage but 
how to achieve it in a way least damaging to allies. The approach 
adopted was to continue in low-profile a role East of Suez for that period 
of time to give "... diplomacy a chance to construct a different basis 
for the security of the countries which we are leaving." 4 
As the Government slowly defined its policy, which involved a 
reduction in Britain's presence overseas, the difference between those 
1 
Defence White Pa~r, February! 1967, Cmnd. 3203., p.3. 
2 Vol. 742( H. of C. , 28th February , 1967, Col. 290. 
3 Vol. 742( H. of C. , 28th February, 1967, Col. 283. 
4 Vol. 742, H. of c. , 28th February, 1967, Col. 395. 
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anxious to stay or withdraw from East of Suez groups became less central. 
Mr. Healey, to reinforce the point, speculated freely about, " ••• 
tackling the problem •.• of reductions in our base facilities in 
Singapore" • 1 He admitted " some sympathy .. " wi th Mr. Mayhew' s 
strictures that the World Role was " .•. becoming an increasingly 
doubtful and dangerous proposition" and that it made " ••• nonsense of 
2 the Government's policy in Europe". He even conceded that Mr. Heffer' s 
3 
contention that British forces may constitute a "provocation ••• " 
was of great weight and he allowed himself the admission that the East 
of Suez role was now 'controversial'. Richard Crossman angrily noted 
in his diary that "It's obvious that Whitehall wants what George Brown 
Denis Healey and Harold Wilson want. They're all going for a compromise 
under which we slowly get off the mainland and out of Singapore in the 
next ten years to build up a military presence in Australia. It's a 
barmy compromise. We ought to stay on the mainland or to withdraw from 
4 East of Suez altogether." The February Defence White Paper and the 
debate on it in the House of Commons, then clearly indicated that it 
was likely that Britain would no longer remain East of Suez on an 
indefinite basis and that, even if she decided to stay, it would be on 
a greatly reduced capability. 
A reduced role, of course, had been broadly established in the 
1966 Defence White Paper, but it was not until the collapse of 
Confrontation that the Government had the will to contemplate just what 
a reduced presence would involve. Only in February 1967 did it become 
1 Vol. 742! H. of c. ! 27th rebru9~! 1967 ! CQ1! 103. 
2 Vol. 742£ H. of C' l 18th February, 1967, Col. 409. 
3 See YQ1. :ZJ9, H. Qf !;;;. I lfJth JgnUg~, 1967 ! Col. 404. 
4 Crossman, 012· ci t., E· 313. 
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feasible to cast doubt on the assumption that the East of Suez role 
was a strategic necessity for Britain. It was over a period of five 
months that M.P.s on both sides of the House began to question the 
relevance of Britain's global deployment. 
The Defence Minister shaped the questions which helped to condition 
the process of re-thinking: " ••• what sort of things does it make sense 
economically and politically for us to do" he asked, 11 for how long 
under what conditions, and with what sort of forces? ••• how should we 
disengage from the position that it does not make sense to keep? Over 
what period should we run down our forces? What political arrangements 
Can we make for the security of those who were previously dependent on 
us? And what economic arrangements can we make to cushion them against 
1 the loss of foreign exchange that we save by going?" With questions 
like these, strategic issues which dominated discussions over the next 
few months, with the leaders of the United States, Australia, New 
Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, seeking answers were to lead to the 
2 decision in July to withdraw from the Far East by the mid 1970s. 
1 The July Defence White Paper was indeed an 'historic document. 
This was certainly evident. The document reflected a fundamental shift 
in both Britain's foreign and defence policies. The forces in Singapore 
and Malaysia were to be cut by about one half by 1970-1, and withdrawn 
3 
altogether by the middle of the 1970s. The forces assigned to S.E.A.T.O. 
1 
2 
Vol. 742, H. of C., 27th February, 1967, Cols. 115-6. 
Crossman complained in his diary that the official briefing of Ministers on 
the Defence Committee of the Cabinet was grossly inadequate. "I now feel 
sure that the officials don't reveal any of the important facts to a 
Commi ttee as big as o. P. D." Earlier he had described the official document 
as "the most appalling guff, not a serious strategic analysis •••• ) 
Crossman, OPe ci ~ ., p. 397. 
3 Vol . 11.;-1.. \.{..f c... 1 2-"1 It- ) c-lM.k+t='?;' {, 'W7 eb · cd-
In July t967 the total number f men}and women working in or for the 
services in Singapore and Malaysia was roughly 80,000. It was expected 
that this would drop by April 1968 to 70,000. Between April 1968 and 
19&0-1 the numbers were expected to drop by a further 30,000. This 
would leave a total of 40,000, half of which would be civilian. 
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were to be re-shaped 'in nature and size' and there were to be 
'consultations' on the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. One brigade 
of the B.A.O.R. and one squadron of R.A.F. Germany were to be redeployed 
in the U.K., and the overall cut in the force strengths was to total 
1 37,000 by 1971 and about 75,000 by the mid 19705. 
The nature and extent of these cuts, however, did not completely 
diminish the Far East role. Britain was" ••• to maintain a military 
capacity for use, if required, in the area, even when we no longer have 
2 forces permanently based there". Exactly what this 'capacity' 
would involve was unspecified, but it was certain to centre upon a 
strategic reserve in the United Kingdom and a naval and amphibious force 
. th 3 ~n e Far East. In addition, aircraft would be stationed at Bahrain, 
4 Masirah, Gan and the Cocos Islands, and possibly after 1975 in Australia. 
In fact the Government's redeployment was designed to provide the back-up 
support that Malaysia and Singapore were unable to provide for themselves. 
The July measures were the outcome of the interelationship of 
economic and political and strategic factors which militated against the 
East of Suez role throughout the spring months of 1967. While it was clear 
that no overt economic crisis eXisted, that the position was not as 
frankly bad as the previous summer, it was still clear that Britain's 
secular economic decline was now irreversible. Britain's economic crises 
in March and July of successive years were depressingly inevitable and 
saving the pound became a twice yearly ritual. In the months leading up 
to July the Government appeared outwardly nervous and edgy, waiting for 
1 
There was also to be a reduction of civilians, both U.K. and local, 
2 
of 80,000 by 1975, v . ~ . ,4)"'} "" 1c.} "l.. '1tt. -:t* .. ....", lH1, cp . c.d- . 
Supplementary statement on Defence policy, July, 1967, Cmnd. 3357, p.6. 
3 See ibid. 
-4 
See Healey, Vol. 751, H. of C., 27th July, 1967, Cols. 997-8. 
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the storm clouds to break. 
At the beginning of the year, however, it seemed that the economic 
situation was improving. The balance of payments figures for 1966 had 
picked up and the improvement continued into the first quarter of 1967. 
The wage freeze pressed into a period of severe and painful restrain~ 
in January, bank rate was lowered to 6~% in the same months and there 
were record export figures for February. 
However, there were some disturbing trends. At the end of 1966 
Britain was more acutely m debt than ever before and unemployment in 
January 1967 exceeded 600,000. On 5th June, the Arab-Israelie war 
sprang into full and sudden venom, the Suez canal was quickly closed and 
an oil embargo on the United Kingdom was introduced by the enraged 
Arabs who also threatened to withdraw their sterling balances from 
London. It was thus in a confused and menacing atmosphere of growing 
crisis that the Labour Government contemplated new economic and defence 
policies. 
By the Spring of 1967 it was becoming clear that the Government 
wanted to reflate the economy. The British people were bracing themselves 
for a continued wage freeze, tough deflationary packages and the 
disheartening burden of unemployment. In addition, Party morale was 
desperate. The budget in April was not particularly hard, but the 
Treasury felt confident that a balance of payments surplus for 1967 
of £200 million could be achieved. The Government's concern for Britain's 
trading position slightly diminished and they could now concentrate on 
getting the home economy moving again. On 7th June, just two days after 
the imposition of an oil embargo on Britain by the Arabs, the Government 
somewhat unexpectedly eased the H.P. restrictions on cars. 
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Early summer was hardly a propitious moment to reflate. Confidence 
in sterling was low, Britain was just about to terminate the severe 
restraint and the trade figures for the second quarter of the year were 
cruelly disappointing. There was the risk of money being attracted 
away from Britain by spectacularly good American interest rates and the 
pound was once again vulnerable because of the Middle East war. Never-
the less , the Chancellor was determined that Labour should achieve a 3% 
growth rate and his Treasury advisors encouraged him to allow a temporary 
run on the pound. 
Defence cuts were inextricably bound up with Labour's new 
economic strategy. Mr. Crossman was of the opinion that "We shall not 
be able to get a restoration of the growth rate or indeed pay for major 
1 
social reform without a massive cut-back in defence." His diaries confirm 
his conviction that defence cut-backs were now desirable and inevitable. 
A majority of the Cabinet pinned their hopes for recovery more specifically 
on a withdrawal from the Far East. The view now gaining momentum was 
that a military presence was a costly and inappropriate way of protecting 
economic interests, that Britain's investments in the Far East were 
declining in magnitude anyway, and that the United States interest in 
Britain's economic well being would be sustained even if she abandoned 
her Far Eastern role. Crossman noted as early as April 11th that at 
least six members of the Cabinet "felt we should maintain our military 
presence in the Far East and shouldn't take any drastic cuts or try to 
get off the mainland by 1975. Everbody else felt equally strongly that 
the cuts were not radical enough. This view was best expressed by 
Roy Jenkins, who put the Foreign Secretary in a very difficult position. 
1 . d 73 6 c~te New Statesman, Vol. ,16th June, 19 7, p. 856. 
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As George pointed out, he would now be going to Washington to 
negotiate knowing that a majority of the Cabinet wanted no military 
presence in the Far East at all and were determined not only to get 
off the mainland but to withdraw our naval and air forces from anywhere 
East of Suez. How was he to negotiate with our allies, he plaintively 
asked, in terms of a slow orderly process of withdrawal when most 
1 
of the Cabinet wanted a drastic revision of policy next July?" 
It was the anxieties about the foreign exchange loss that the 
Government was most consious of, since this was an aspect of defence 
spending which directly affected the balance of payments. Indeed two 
years earlier on 8th November 1965, after the usual financial difficulties 
on the exchange markets, Mr. Callaghan had said "... there would not have 
been a sterling crisis if we did not have to bear so much of the burden 
2 
of defence abroad". Mr. Callaghan was still the major influence in 
the Treasury or even perhaps the Minister most able to reflect his views 
on the burden of overseas defence expenditure which had long been voiced 
in Whitehall. 3 The belief that the overseas burden was an unacceptable 
price to pay for imperial influence gained in credibility. 
By July 1967 the Government in fact, was rejoicing about the marked 
cut in foreign exchange costs that it had made. Mr. Healey expressed 
his satisfaction concerning the extent of the Government's achievement; 
" .•• our total stationing costs on defence this year are only £184 
million compared with about £250 million in the last year of the previous 
Government - a reduction of more than one quarter. And we shall have 
1 Crossman, OPe eit., p. 308. 
2 Der Spiegel, 8th November, 1965. 
3 See D. C. Watt, Decisions to Withdraw from the Gulf, Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 39, 1968, p. 310. 
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reduced this net total by two thirds in the middle of th~ 1970s. Our 
foreign stationing costs will then be only a quarter of what they were 
when we assumed office". 1 
But the spinsterish tone of the Economist was by no means as 
enthusiastic. "The cuts to be made in the three years after the 
current financial year will save about £32 million a year in foreign 
exchange. That is half of one per cent of Britain's ·i mport bill. 
The second round of cuts, between 1971 and the middle of the 1970s, 
is even less relevant". 2 The Spectator somewhat sourly agreed with 
the Economist, calling the proposed cuts "pious hopes", and" ••• 
irrelevant to Britain's immediate balance of payments problem". 3 
In addition, the real savings were almost certainly less that the 
Government admitted. Not only did foreign based troops generate 
exports and those redeployed at home increase the import bill, but the 
Government had reiterated its commitment to its Far Eastern allies 
that far-reaching economic aid would be available when Britain finally 
withdrew from the bases. 
Clearly the decision to withdraw from the Far East by the mid-
1970s could not be attributed to the need to save foreign currency. 
And yet this reason for the defence cuts was emphasized with such 
warmth and conviction by almost all the leadi,ng Labour cabinet ministers, 
that it became a self-fulfilling prophecy and therefore an important 
factor in the calculations of the Cabinet. But it was asserted by a 




The net foreign exchange cost of Britain'S overseas role for 1964-67 
inclusive was £237 million, £254 million and £239 million. See Healey,D. 
Vol. 762, H. of C., 2nd April, 1968, Col. 77. Local expenditure in 
Malaysia and Singapore in 1966-7 was estimated at £80 million. Singapore 
accounted for £55 million. See Healey, D., Vol. 755, H. of C., 4th 
December 1967, Col. 233. 
Economist, Vol. 224, 22nd July 1967, p.293. 
Spectator, Vol. 219, 21st July, 1967, p.66. 
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incurring serious political sacrifices and of neglecting humanitarian 
obligations for the sake of some small financial economies. It is time, 
1 perhaps, to recover our sense of proportion." Yet there was 
certainly an urgent need for the Government to emphasize its determination 
to correct the balance of payments situation effectively and as quickly 
as possible. The beneficial effect of the defence cuts in themselves 
were not all that significant or immediate. But the Government 
regarded these savings in foreign exchange important; at different 
times they were heralded as 'drastic', 'dramatic', 'vital', 'essential' 
2 
and as " ... a great contribution to improving our balance of payments". 
The real economic explanation for the decision to withdraw from 
the Far East "'as the imperative need to cut the overall budgetary cost of 
defence. The Government had, of course, pledged itself in 1964 to cut 
defence spending to £2000 million or 6% of G.N.P. by 1969-70, on the 
rather simplistic assumption that these estimates were the same. In fact, 
by 1967, according to the July Defence White Paper, the defence bill 
in 1969-70 was likely to be in excess of £2000 million and consequently 
3 
not very far short of 7% of the G.N.P. 
The July measures however ensured that by 1970-1, defence costs 
would be down to £1900 million and by the mid 1970s to £1800 million. 1 
On the rather sanguine assumption of a three per cent annual growth rate, 
defence, in 1975, would account for only 5% of G.N.P. and in 1970-71 





Thomas Wilson, "What can we afford?", OPt cit. 
Labour Party Talking Points, No. 12, 1967, p. 10. 
" ... partly as a result of the ever growing cost of modern equipment, the 
defence budget from 1970-1 onwards was unlikely to be below £2,100 
million". Supplementary statement on Defence Policy« July, 1967" 
Cmnd. 3357, p.ll. 
Mr. Healey compared the cost of Labour's defence plans with that of the 
Conservatives. "The changes we have made in the programme we inherited from 
the Conservatives have already saved the tax payer over £750 million during 
the last 3 years alone. The further savings announced •• will raise the rate' 
of saving on Tory plans to £500 million a year in 1971 and something like £800 
million a year in the middle 1970s." Vol. 751, H. of C., 27th July 1967 Col. 1009 
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Of course, though, in 1964 it had not forseen a withdrawal from 
the Far East, a cut-back in NATO, and a massive overall reduction 
in Britain's armed forces. 
It was clear that to achieve this kind of saving the cut-back 
would fall on the Far Eastern bases, since there was little scope 
for a massive reduction in Europe. " ..• it is not possible, 
explained Mr. Healey, "to envisage a substantial reduction in 
NATO's present forces without either a major change in NATO's 
strategy or some progress toward agreement for reciprocal reductions 
on both sides of the Iron curtain".l 
Mr. Healey was also painfully aware that a major saving could 
only be made if the Singapore base were abandoned and not just 
reduced. "When we looked beyond 1970", said the Defence Minister, 
"it emerged that, once our presence in the Far East is reduced, the 
sort of base facilities we maintain at present on the Asian mainland 
2 become very bad value for money indeed". In addition Mr. Healey 
was concerned that Britain, in the next few years, could invest 
a great deal of resources on an East of Suez capability on the 
assumption that it purchased Britain diplomatic influence, and then 
be faced with the prospect that indigenous governments could decide 
that the British were no longer needed or welcome. 
In the Government's estimate, then, there were powerful economic 
reasons for its projected withdrawal from the Far Eastern bases. It 
was clear to the Cabinet that budgetary savings would now be possible. 
Mr. Healey voiced the.ir enthusiasm, \'This is a massive contribution 
1 
Vol, 751, H, of C" 27th July, 1967, Cols', 9.88 ... 9. 
2 
Vol. 751, H. of C" 27th Julr, 1967, Col. 990 
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to strengthening our national economy and making valuable resources 
available for other purposes",l claimed Mr. Healey. And Mr. Wilson, 
in the same debate, once more reminded the House that " ••. the 
strength of a nation's defence can never be greater than the 
strength of its economic base ••• ,,2 
Labour's leading Ministers also were aware of internal party 
pressures. And these pressures were of growing importance in 
determining the nature of the impending defence cuts. The Eaonomist 
was in no doubt as to why defence cuts had become necessary. Mr. Wilson 
has decided that he cannot face the Labour Party Conference at 
Scarborough in October without making a major concession to his 
critics in the Party". And then more pertinently, "Mr. Wilson has 
made a calculation of a sort, but it is nothing to do with 
3 foreign policy and is only indirectly about economic policy." The 
New Statesrran agreed that the 11 ••• defence cuts ••• are conveniently 
timed to take the edge off criticism of the Government at the party 
4 
conference." Though a Party Conference cannot bind a Labour 
Government to a particular policy it can and does shape the general 
character of future policies. 
The Prime Minister faced the need to introduce defence cuts as 
back-bench pressures increased in favour of a further down-grading 
of strategic interests. The hope of achieving a strong economy within 
which to build a more socially just society had already been 
compromised. Under the impact of wage freezes and restrictive 
1 ~Q1. 251. H. of ~! • 27th July, 1967 t Col. 1004. 
2 Vol~ 751, H. of C. f 27th Jul:il 1967, Col. 1110, 
3 Economist t Vol. 224, 22nd July, 1967, p • 293, 
. 
4 New Statesman! Vol. 74, July, 1967, p. 69, 
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incomes policies the fiercely loyal back-bench er had had to endure 
the humiliating retreat from election promises which the economic 
situation now demanded. The Party activists both inside and outside 
Parliament had not even the satisfaction of knowing that the 
Government was gaining in popularity. Labour indeed in 1967 
suffered total humiliation at the Greater London elections, and in 
the provinces was in control of only three county councils out 
of fifty-eight. The Left-wing of the party in the shape of the 
Tribune Group were not slow to emphasize that the pursuit of more 
socialist policies could perhaps save the day and might make the 
Party. more popular. The Left-Right division within the party also 
rested upon that unproven proposition. The Government now wanted 
to enter the E.E.C. This dramatic decision was a further cause of 
dissension and confusion within Labour's ranks. Mr. Wilson had 
told a Swansea audience, "never has our influence been weaker than 
when a conservative government, bankrupt of ideas for regenerating 
our economy, looked to the Common Market to solve all our economic 
1 problems." It was manifestly obvious how relevant this statement 
now was in 1967. But the Party's disillusionment was revealed with 
the enforced resignation of six parliamentary private secretaries 
over the Common Market issue. The Government was just beginning a 
desperate struggle to survive. Defence spending was certain to 
suffer further cuts. 
Even before the July measures were announced, the Left-Wing Tribune 
group were issuing warnings to the Government, Mr. Allaun reminded 
Mr, Healey that leaving the \'". Far East by 1975 will not satisfy the 
1 
cited Spectator, Vol. 219, 14th July, 1967, p. 39, referring to 
a speech by Mr. Wilson on 25th January 1964. 
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Labour Party Conference, which has plans to leave five years earlier".l 
It was also clear that the February Defence White Paper had upset the 
susceptibilities of sixty three Labour M.P.s sufficiently for them 
to abstain - " .... a warning no Government could possibly ignore". 2 On 
that occasion the Prime Minister, with the help of some particularly 
strong language, had temporarily disciplined the rebels; but he had 
also incensed them into a state of shock and fragile unity which could 
not and did not last. Indeed, it was the Party's right-wing establishment 
which revealed alarming signs of disarray. Mr. Shinwell, the chairman 
of the P.L.P., after a stormy and embarrassingly open conflict with the 
leader of the House (Mr. Crossman) and the Chief Whip (Mr. Silkin), 
finally reSigned, claiming that the persistent defence rebels should 
have been dealt with more severely. Mr. Crossman noted this episode for 
his forthcoming diaries and emphasized just how bitter the argument 
had become. 3 
Soon after, in late July, came the resignation of the loyal if 
pedestrian Miss Margaret Herbison. The New Statesman's reaction 
captured the feeling of stunned regret which was widely voiced • "The 
church can as readily lose a bishop as a Labour Government its 
Minister of Social security.,,4 Miss Herbison's resignation gave 
further articulation to the growing tension between the irreconcilable 
claims of the social services and defence. It was clear evidence too 
of the confusion of moral purpose within the Party, signifying a crisis 
of values and of ideology. 
In this critical first six months of 1967 the Government was aware 
1 
Vol. 749, H. of C., 5th. July, 1967, Col. l7SQ. Oral answers, 
2 
New Statesman, Vol. 73, lOth March, 1967, p. 313. 
3 
' Crossman, op. cit . . p. 584. 
4 
New Statesman, op. cit. 
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that opposition to th.e East of Suez role would not easily be overcome. 
It was no temporary obsession of a small minority in the Party that 
could be covertly disregarded. It had none of the weaknesses of an 
issue trumpeted by the Left alone, but clearly had the strength and 
attractiveness of an issue which cuts across party divisions. Clearly, 
then, there was some evidence in this period of Government appeasement; 
that economic reflation (slap in the middle of an Arab-Israeli war 
which was certain to adversely affect Britain's balance of payments) and 
\ 
defence cuts were the sacrifi9rl lambs that Mr. Wilson was prepared 
to offer to the highly politicized party conference. 
Also relevant was the Government's bold and unexpected European 
initiative. Although the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had not 
exactly succeeded on their 'probing' mission of the Continent, indeed 
not, their overwhelming determination to go forward encouraged them to 
1 
make a formal application to join the E.E.C. Mr. Wilson admitted that 
this decision, taken on 4th May, was likely to have a marked tmpact on 
Labour's future defence priorities. 
However, it should be noted that the move towards closer relations 
with Europe in Labour's thinking should have been an important factor 
in the decision to withdraw from East of Suez, but in fact it was not. 
Patrick Gordon Walker later expressed this view " ••• the two things 
were not directly or intellectually related. Each policy was being 
separately considered in the Cabinet. 112 Nevertheless the Government 
disingenuously linked the two. Moreover, the July Defence White 
Paper argued that Britain "s contribution to NATO would \' ••• become 
1 In .My Way, OPt cit. 
2 Gordon Walker, P. The Cabinet, 1970, p. 128. 
&CSS 
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even more important as we develop closer political ties between Britain 
3 
and her European neighbours". Even the New Statesman, which had not 
hitherto been known for its pro-European propensities, advised the 
Government to end its " ••• military fantasies East of Suez ••• ", 
1 
and in so doing go " .•• half way to meet ••• " Fre.nch demands. 
It is not easy to see to what extent the European strategy 
influenced Labour's defence policy. But it was certainly of less 
significance than the Government admitted. It was tempting for the 
Government to attach great weight to the Eurocentric strategy, simply 
because it was less odious than having to articulate the withdrawal 
decisions in terms of economic decline or mismanagement or intra-
party fragmentation. 
Yet interestingly enough the East of Suez role was the central 
factor in at least two of De Gaulle's reservations concerning British 
entry into the European Community. The 'special relationship\ and 
national economic decline were linked to Britain ~s East of Suez role. 
There was thus some point in the British Government "s attempt to 
emphasize the fact that the pull-out fran the Far East by the mid 
1970s could give a certain rationale to Britain's new European 
strategy. 
Mr. Bealey was clearly aware of the political arguments for a 
withdrawal from East of Suez, but was more probably conscious at this 
time of the strategic significance of a European strategy. Certainly 
he found it a congenial argument. 
It would be wrong to conclude that out of the blue in July 1967 
the Br~tish Government constructed a new strategic edifice and in 
1 New Statesman, Vol, 73, 3rd March, 1967, p. 277. 
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and in effect rejected the strategic case for the East of Suez role. 
This interpretation runs counter to the Government ~ s strong 
statements about withdrawal being " •.• the surest prescription for 
1 
a nuclear holocaust ••• " , and about the Confrontation operation 
having averted a collapse into 'international anarchy', having 
stood in the way of 'competitive intervention' and having reduced 
escalation and the 'risk of general war'. And yet there were growing 
signs that the Government's assessment of the East of Suez role was 
beginning to change. 
This process of reassessment was not solely due to the domestic 
events of the weeks immediately prior to the July measures. According 
to the New Statesman it was only on the Foreign Office'S insistence 
that the Cabinet had agreed to excise from the February Defence White 
2 Paper " ..• a passage foreshadowing a withdrawal from Singapore'·. 
Certainly the Crossman diaries indicate that there were deeply felt 
and long~standing arguments that determined the withdrawal decision 
3 
when it finally came in July. The biggest argument related to the 
general problem of themape and size and indeed purpose of the Western 
presence in South East Asia. 
Although the British Government had loyally and strongly supported 
United states' intervention in Vietnam, it was clear that the Cabinet 
had strong moral, political and strategic reservations about the policy. 
In addition, although the Government had never displayed overt 
enthusiasm for construing the British presence in the Far East as a 
contribution to international security or as part of a general western 
1 
See W'ilson's famous June 15th speech of 19.66 for example. 
2 New Statesman, Vol, 73,. 17th March, 1967, p. 356. 
3 Crossman, op, ctt. 
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policy of containment, it was clear that Britain's East of Suez role 
could not be seen in isolation from American action in South East 
1 Asia. There would obviously have b een diplomatic repercussions 
abroad, as well as pressure from the Left if the British Government 
had represented its overseas presence as supportive of America. 
A statement by Patrick Gardon Walker, however, underlined that the 
British Government did in fact ' connect the two roles. "The 
consequences of American defeat or humiliation in South Vietnam 
would be a direct Chinese threat not 3 nly to the other Indo-Chinese 
2 
states but to India and Malaysia". It followed that once American 
policy began to change in the face of unsuccessful war, Britain's 
position on the Asian mainland might also become incredible. This 
aspect of a volatile strategic relationship was certainly a factor tn 
the July decision. Indeed, Mr. Healey indicated that this was so in a 
speech to the House. "The United States has publicly announced that, 
once the Vietnam war is over, it wants no bases in Asia and is 
prepared to leave Vietnam •.. we too, must aim at a situation in which 
the local peoples can live at peace without the presence of external 
forces. ,,3 
More evidence of the Government's growing doubts about the 
Western presence in the Far East wer e articulated by the Defence 
Minister after a lengthy and controversial speech by Mr. Mayhew. In 
that speech Mr. Mayhew made the relevant point that there was a 
tendency to exaggerate the threat of Chinese aggression tn South East 




See p . G. Walker, Has the West a Place in Asia? from a BBC Third 
Programme, August, 1965, printed in Survival, yol. YII. No. 8. 
November, 1965, p. 303. 
Gordon Walker, OPt cit. 
Vol. 751, H. of C., 27th July, 1967, Col. 991. 
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I the Western powers are most obstrusive" , and that the West was not 
disposed to allocate sufficient resources to contain China anyway. 
Mr. Healey's interjection in that speech may merely have been in 
line with parliamentary etiquette rather than indicating a basic 
change in attitude by the Government. But Mr. Bealey's remark "I 
follow my Hon. friend's argument and agree with a great deal of it.,,2 
was surprisingly frank. It was evidence that the Government too was 
fully aware of the relevance of the sophisticated and informed 
strategic analysis of the Western presence now emerging from those 
advocating a European strategy and the cause of Europeanism in general. 
It was, however, the actual and particular dangers of Britaints 
exposed position East of Suez that arounsed anxieties for Mr. Bealey. 
These now unaccpetable dangers had become manifest during the 
Confrontation with Indonesia. The Government's resolve had been to 
contend that Britain would never again get enmeshed in such an 
operation; but it was a doctr i ne easy to assert, i t was quite another 
matter to ensure that British military power did not get drawn into 
operations that could escalate from a more physical presence to 
partiCipation in a major conflict. Mr. Bealey was resolved that 
this risk of uncontrolled escalation should not be repeated. 
Britain's exposed military position exacerbated by the Government's 
controversial decisions not to build a new aircraft carrier and to 
drastically curtail the force levels in the Far East. In addition, 
Mr. Healey announced on 5th July, just before the publ i cation of the 
Defence White Paper, that the A. F,V . G, project, 'the core t of 
1 YQl, 742~ 28th 
, H. of ~. , feb~a;!;:~, 19.67. Col, 346, 
2 Vol. 742 f H, of C, , 28th February, 1967, Col, 347, , 
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Britain's long term aircraft programme, had rather dramatically collapsed. 
This implied that Britain might be in the absurd position where she 
had enough strength "... to provoke without enough to deter .•• " 1. 
Mr. Healey was acutely aware of this risk for he admitted that "one 
of the most difficult questions of judgement for any government is to 
decide whether the presence of British forces •••• is acting as an 
irritant in the local political situation •.• ".2 Moreover, it was likely 
that this diminished military capability could invite an unwelcome 
challenge. And should this challenge materialize then there was also the 
problem that if British forces needed rapid back-up, the Government would 
be forced to grapple with problems of over flying rights, of acclimatisation 
of troops and of the prohibitive costs of greater mobility. The proper 
strategy was to avoid further commitment. In the Government's calculation, 
though, disengagement could never be easily accomplished while Britain 
had forces on the ground in the Far East. There had to be a greater 
reliance on indigenous efforts. 
The Prime Minister was indeed adamant; " ••• the provision of ground 
troops must be more and more their (Singapore and Malaysia's) responsibility, 
it is unrealistic to suggest in this day and age that it shold be the 
role of Britain to provide the ground troops in these " 3 areas. •• • 
Mr. Healey later emphasized eagerly that · Bri tain " ••• had forty thousand 
men in Singapore and Malaysia before confrontation. It didn't stop 
confrontation but it forced us to send another fifteen thousand out 
4 there" • 
1 Mayhew, C. Vol. 742, H. of C., 28th February, 1967, Col. 347. 
2 Address by Mr. Healey to the Royal Commonwealth Secretary, London, 
10th May, 1967. 
3 Vol. 751, H. of C., 27th July, 1967, Col. 1107. 
4 
Twenty Four Hours (A BBC television programme) 5th March 1970. 
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It was during the same television programme that Mr. Healey 
explained what the Government considered to be the essential difference 
between the Conservative policy of retaining the bases and Labour's 
policy of extending help to allies with its mobile amphibious forces. 
"The great difference is that under our policy we denegotiate from 
the commitments which compel us to intervene, whether it makes sense 
or not •.•• our policy leaves us free to choose in the light of all 
the circumstances at the time. The Conservative policy commits 
them automatically to intervene". 1 It was this dread of uncontrolled 
escalation that was the central strategic rationale behind the decisions 
2 
of July 1967. The war in Vietnam cast a long shadow. Confrontation 
could have proved to have been Britain's Vietnam. 
Mr. Healey articulated a policy which favoured a more peripheral 
role based on a naval and air presence which would be less open to 
political pressure. It could prove less provocative, even perhaps, 
less inflexible, and more significantly less of a commitment if Britain 
could deter from a distance, from the safety of her aircraft and naval 
vessels. 
As Mr. Healey presented his analysis of Britain's intermediate 
role in strategic terms. It was clear that he was as yet only concerned 
with the military and not the political problem that if Britain could not 
risk a major battle East of Suez she should avoid a position where she 
might be compelled to take part in one. The Service Chiefs were not 
inclined to argue. The military were acutely aware of the dangers of 
over-commitment. 
For a number of years the real danger had been that Britain actually 
1 ibid. 
2 
The Permanent Alliance, op. cit., p. 213. 
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continued her East of Suez role because she had the necessary capability . 
But by July 1967 the opposite now applied. Britain's East of Suez 
capability was now so inadequate that the imperial oceanic role was 
considered beyond her resources. Mr. Mayhew voiced the fear that the 
Government were" •.. seeking to dispose of their commitments not by 
negotiation and diplomacy, but simply by making ourself incapable of 
1 
carrying them out". 
While the over-stretch of British troops in the Far East was the 
most compelling strategic argument for the July measures there were 
others. The explanation which the Government understandably advanced 
was that Britain's local allies were incomparably stronger than in the 
days of confrontation. The Defence White Paper announced that the 
military strength of Britain's " ••. friends and allies was growing"; 
Mr. Healey argued that "Both Malaysia and Singapore are building up 
their own land forces" and added that "The only threat which our 
Commonwealth partners do not feel confidence in dealing with themselves 
by 1970 is the potential threat by air and sea".2 Moreover, even 
if Britain's allies were suddenly threatened it was now possible, claimed 
the White Paper, " ••• to move forces across the world faster and in 
3 larger numbers than was possible even a few years ago". 
Apart from the provision of .increased mobility and of improved 
allied strength locally, the actual strategic changes which justified 
a withdrawal from the Far East were far from clear. The Foreign Secretary 
rather airily spoke about . " the happier atmosphere in South East 
Asia ••• ,,4 and the Defence White Paper even more vaguely speculated 
1 Vol. 751, H. of c. , 27th July, 1967, Col. 1070. 
2 Vol. 75l f H. of C. , 27th July, 1967, Cols. 989-90. 
3 $ypple~entary statement on Defence Policy, July 1967, Cmnd. 3357, p. 4. 
4 
Vol. 750, H. of C., 20th July, 1967, Col. 2498. 
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about the changing "... power and policy of our potential enemies ••• " 1 
But it is clear though that none of these factors were really significant; 
they were in fact rather more in the nature of post hoc rationalisations. 
As we have seen, the real explanation for withdrawal lay in considerations 
rather more complex and even less explicable in terms of the application 
of rational strategic calculation. The arguments used to justify a 
withdrawal from the Far East were not however applied to the Persian 
Gulf. This was indeed rather curious'. Denis Healey wanted to evacuate 
all the Middle Eastern bases, as part of his defence review. It was 
apparent that only the Foreign Office had prevented the Cabinet from 
taking the decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf. 
In attempting an explanation as to why the Government had omitted 
from the July measures any plan to withdraw from the Gulf, the Foreign 
Secretary propounded a somewhat familiar thesis but one that was now 
bereft of meaning. "Our forces" said Mr. Brown, "Are not in the Persian 
Gulf simply to protect our oil interests as such, but to maintain 
stability in the area. Many of the countries in the Gulf have unresolved 
territorial claims on each other •••. if we were to pull out at once 
we could only expect these old claims to come to the surface and the 
stability of the Gulf would thereby be put at risk".2 
The same argument, however, could be applied to the Far East. 
This strategic argument was a poor justification for staying in the Gulf 
while at the same time Britain was erecting a strategic argument for 
quitting South-East Asia. Of course the real consideration was that the 
Gulf role was not as costly as the South-East Asian commitment. And 
1 Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy, July 1967, Cmnd. 3357. 
2 
Vol. 750, H. of C., 29th July, 1967, Coo. 2494. 
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clearly the Gulf states \-lere not as ready to provide for their own 
security as Malaysia and Singapore, but nor would they ever be if 
Britain remained in the area. 
However, What really concerned the Government about the Gulf was 
that it was manifestly an area in which war was an immediate prospect 
or an endemic fear. The July measures were formulated at roughly the 
same time as the June War sprang into full fury in the Middle East, and 
this had some affect on the Defence White Paper. On 19th June the 
Government solemnly announced that it would retain a naval capability 
in Southern Arabian waters for six months after the Britsh withdrawal 
from Aden and would also extend the V-bomber cover for an unspecified 
period. A month later Mr. Brown explained to the House that" ••• in 
the present disturbed situation in the Middle East we must be 
particularly concerned about the stability and security of the Gulf 
area ••. ,,1 • The Gove rnmen t was responding in an ad hoc fashion to a 
growingly volatile situation whiCh could pre-empt the very decisions that 
the government was eager to make. 
Mr. Healey made a similar point: " we are right not to attempt 
to fix, still less announce a date for withdrawal from our positions in 
the Persian Gulf. At the moment, we are making a vital contribution 
towards the stability in the Gulf, a contribution welcomed by the local 
states who are not yet in agreement on how to handle the situation if 
and when we should wi thdraw" . 2 Again, when pressed on Britain's role 
the Defence Minister replied "We shall continue to fulfil our obligations 
in this area, so long as the need is there, this is clearly not the 
1 Vol. 750, H. of C., 20th July, 1967, Col. 1494. 
2 
Vol. 751, H. of C., 27th July, 1967, Col. 993. 
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time to make predications on how long this will be". 1 Indeed not. 
Nevertheless, it did seem obvious that Britain would not stay in the 
Gulf for much longer. The consequences of the Arab Israeli war were to 
reinforce the case for withdrawal and there was now less justification 
forstay±ng in the Gulf than in South East Asia. Indeed while the 
immediate diplomatic response to the June war was that Britain should 
remain in the Gulf, the Cabinet,according to Patrick Gordon Walker, was 
now convinced that" ..• our presence East of Suez was both vain and 
2 
costly". It is clear that even in July the Government had decided upon 
a general time-scale for withdrawal from the Gulf. But the earlier 
speculation in the press about a possible British intervention in the 
3 
six-day war was evidently tantamount to an inspirea leak. 
This whole question of whether to publish firm dates for withdrawal 
was clearly affected by the disastrous experience of Aden. Its effect 
on the Gulf decision was in fact greater than on the Far Eastern decision, 
but in any event the Government compromised by setting no firm date for 
withdrawal but by indicating that it would leave some time in the mid-
19705. This strategem was designed to encourage the area to make its 
own "defence and economic arrangements", while still not inflexibly 
committing the British Government to a withdrawal by a definite date 
regardless of the circumstances at the time. 
The British Government was particularly concerned that Singapore 
and Malaysia should join together to provide for their own defence. Although 
the Cabinet feared that relations between the two countries had worsened 




Vol. 747, H. of C., 5th June, 1967, Col. 140. Written answers. 
Gordon Walker, P. Op. ci t., p. I), i 
See Rostow, Eugene, Peace in the Balance, p. 261. "The idea of an allied 
naval escort plan to carry out the guarantee of 1957 (reaffirming the 
international character of the strait of Tiran) was first broached by 
George Brown •••• Brown's idea received strong support in many parts of 
the American government". Both Brown and Wilson confirm the basis of 
this in their respective accounts of this episode. 
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internecine conflict between its Far Eastern allies. The Government's 
hope was that once a date for withdrawal was agreed, Malaysia and 
Singapore would face the fact that their security depended on improved 
relations and mutual tolerance. 
Despite the Government's declared optimism about the future of the 
Far East, the decision to withdraw was not an easy one to take. There 
were great risks involved. There were obligations which would have to 
be drastically reviewed if not actually abandoned, and there was the 
real fear that the economy of Singapore might be weakened. Nevertheless, 
the economic, political and strategic arguments for withdrawal were 
overwhelming and the Government was pursuaded that it had no choice but 
to admit that Britain's traditional role was about to be concluded rapidly. 
These strategic arguments were to play a vital part in the next 
series of defence decisions taken a few months later. However it can be 
seen that the July measures did not emerge from anyone overwhelming 
constraint. They were due to a multiplicity of factors - economic 
vulnerability, Party pressure, doubts about Britain's strategic 
capacity to discharge the East of Suez role, concern about the escalating 
risks involved, and even doubts about the value of the role itself. 
The Government, though, was reluctant to withdraw too abruptly 
from its commitments, and it followed a policy which demanded enormous 
sensitivity and diplomatic finesse. It warned its allies about the 
need to co-operate with each other, but it did not threaten: it sought 
to reassure, but not to give an erroneous sense of security; it urged 
its allies to act with speed, but not from a sense of panic. The July 
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measures were of course a compromise. Britain re-formulated her 
commitments East of Suez but did not end them; it would intervene in 
some conflict situations not others; it would withdraw from some bases 
but not all; it would be departing soon but it could not say exactly 
when. There was though, a conviction that the Government had produced 
a definitive Defence White Paper. 
Within a few weeks however even this was in doubt. It was soon 
clear that the July measures far from being a final statement were only 
an interim report. It was the beginning in fact of a remarkable sequence 
of events. For the demise of the Defence White Paper was rather sudden. 
And yet the July defence measures remained the 'historic' decisions that 
Mr. Healey had argued they were. 
The July measures suggested that the East of Suez role would be 
terminated, even if it were to be a lingering and painful demise. 
Britain was still East of Suez - but not for long. 
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C H APT E R XI 
BRITAIN STANDS DOWN 
Harold Wilson took over the Department of Economic Affairs on 
28th August, as the economic crisis worsened. On 3 October the 
Treasury announced that gold reserves had dropped for the fourth 
consecutive month. The half per cent increase in Bank Rate that 
month did little to relieve pressure on the pound. On 5 November the 
pound reached its lowest level in ten years. Nine days later the trade 
figures, reflecting recent dock strikes in Liverpool and London showed 
a huge deficit, and the pound had its worst day ever. 
The Cabinet finally decided that Britain had had enough. On 
Thursday, 16th November, the decision to davalue the pound by 14.3 per 
cent was taken. It was announced two days later. It added £50 million 
to the annual cost of defence immediately. 1 
'Devaluation' was such a difficult idea in Government circles, 
since it was believed that even a public reference to it could 
precipitate a crisis, that little or no attempt was made to work out 
what to do if devaluation actually became necessary. Mr. Wilson's 
attitude towards devaluation was the critical factor. He later explained 
that "Recalling the devaluation of 1949, I was aware that there would 
be timid and frightened people thronging the post office and-bank counters 
pathetically believing that for every pound of their ' savings they had 
invested there, they could now draw only seventeen shillings. I was 
anxious to ally these fears. The act of devaluation meant at the same 
time that every pound an individual held or earned abroad automatically, 
1 
In terms of sterling, devaluation increased the cost of F11lK by 
one-sixth, the Phantom by one-tenth and the C130 by one seventh. 
See Healey, D. vol. 754. H. of C., 23rd November, 1967. Co1.422, 
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by the very act of devaluation, would produce not twenty but seventeen 
shillings on conversion into a foreign currency. That had nothing to 
do with what devaluation would, over a period of time, mean for prices. 
For, clearly, if we bought a ton of foreign wheat at sixty-five dollars 
per ton we should have to pay more for it in sterling terms and this 
would, over a period of time, enter into the price of bread. I recalled 
that Sir Stafford Cripps, eighteen years earlier, in his post-devaluation 
broadcast, had forecast a rise of l~d in the cost of a loaf. Obviously, 
this would happen again".i 
Economic experts were, and still are, divided in the merits and 
demerits of devaluation. Devaluation makes a country's goods cheaper 
to other nations and theirs dearer to it. Whether a country can sell 
enough exports to cover the increased cost of imports, and then add some 
- or there will still be a deficit on the balance of payment - depends 
largely on the state of world trade. If it devalues just before a boom 
in world trade things should get better. If the economies of countries 
which buy its goods begin to stagnate, however, or if its own salesmen 
just sit back hoping that lower prices will do the trick, then 
devluation fails. 
It was clear that in the economic package which accompanied 
devaluation, the main burden was found to fall most heavily on the 
Defence budget. The Government settled on proposed cuts amounting to 
£100 million. 2 Mr. Healey, by now spreading the cuts to all the three 
1 Wilson, H. The Labour Government 1964-70, p. 588. 
2 The total cut in Government expenditure was £400 million, 1> . V o L. 7t;;'t .. H t-.( c 
c>~ . L ', ~ 
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services equally, distributed the cuts 'equitably' as possible. H.M.S. 
Victorious was to be phased out immediately and not in 1969, the 
final eight Buccaneers were to be cancelled and so was the Army's 
heavy-lift helicopter. The three services faced the shape of things 
to come: diminished defence resources were to become a well-established 
trend. In addition the plans for a staging post at Aldabra were dropped 
and the research and development programme was greatly reduced. 
The immediate consequences of these cuts on the East of Suez 
role were however slight. It was clear already however that the loss 
of Aldabra would limit Britain's strategic flexibility,l but even 
allowing for this and the phasing out of 'Victorious', the East of 
Suez role remained both credible and essentially intact. This fact 
was obscured and it was assumed that the decision to speed up withdrawal 
immediately followed the decision to devalue. This impression was 
quite false. Yet what was remarkable was the complete reversal in 
Government thinking that occurred in the six weeks after devaluation. 
On 27th November, Mr. Healey was arguing that "We can have no 
reversal of the July decisions, which revised Britain's overseas 
policy over the next decade... "and that"... these cuts mean no 
2 
acceleration in the rundown in the redeployment of our forces". Mr. 
Callaghan, too, was anxious to tell the House of Commons in late 
November that "As regards defence, we are satisfied that the reduction 
of EIOO million in the budget planned for next year can be made within 
3 




This would be particularly true if her forces were unable to overfly 
the Arab or CENTO countries; but in the case of Singapore, the Westabout 
route was nearly as cheap as using Adabra and the southabout route. 
vol. 755, H. of C., 27th November, 1967, Col. 59. 
Vol. 754, H. of C., 20th November, 1967, Col. 937. 
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year, though, that framework was regarded as inadequate and \'1as 
abandoned. 
Government assurances about the future of the FIll proved just 
as impermanent. During a speech by the Prime Minister in late November, 
one M.P. noisely interjected "What about the FIll?", to which 
Mr. Wilson retorted "We are not changing that".l Just two months later 
though it was changed. A similar blandness was also to discomfort 
Mr. Healey when as late as 18th December he was still insisting to a 
2 
somewhat sceptical House that "We do not propose to cancel this aircraft". 
This was an unfortunate remark for on the very same day the Prime Minister 
was promising the major review of public expenditure which was to lead 
to its cancellation. 3 The Government found co-ordination of its 
contradictory policy increasingly difficult to achieve. 
That two months elapsed between devaluation and the decision to 
accelerate the East of Suez withdrawal, was inescapably due to the 
reason that the Government was caught by the untoward events of November. 
Further confusion and consternation was caused by the resignation 
of Mr. Callaghan and the appointment of a new Chancellor, Mr. Jenkins, 
on 27th November. This dramtic appointment explains the definite shift 
in the Government's position in the new year. The new chancellor at 
No. 11 Downing Street was a stronger man than his predecessor. He 
was much less of a public relations exponent: his approach was 
instrumental rather than expressive. 4 He had fought for the TSR2, but with 
its cancellation he had become dedicated to dismantling Britain's World 
1 yol. 754, H. of C., 22nd November, 1967, Col. 1341 
2 Vol. 756, H. of C., 18th December 1967, Col. 310. Written answers. 
3 The FIll programme would have cost the government £425 million over the 
4 
next ten years. See Healey, D. Vol. 756, H. of C. 13th December 1967, 
Cols. 131-2. This figure was higher than the initial estimate because it 
was " ..• subject to adjustment in the light of increases in labour and 
material costs .. " Healey, D. Vol. 744, H. of C., 12th April, 1967, 
Col. 188. Written answers. 
See Cartwright, D. and Zander, A. Group Dynamics & 1968, who suggest two 
types of leaders, those who are 'expressive' and those who are 'instrumental'. 
Callaghan as Chancellor came f~rmly in the former category. 
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Role. Mr. Jenkins constructed an economic strategy with intellectual 
power. Labour had acquired its first real chancellor since taking 
office in 1964. 
The chastened Cabinet was so dispirited that it was in no mood to 
oppose a strong-minded new Chancellor who might just be able to revive 
the economy, revitalise the Party itself and enhance the chances of 
electoral victory, all at the same time. Mr. Jenkins, however, made it 
clear that his new strategy could only be successful if defence cuts 
were introduced. By mid-January he had gathered enough momentum to push 
through a package on public expenditure which included the intention 
to withdraw from East of Suez by the end of 1971. This decision was 
announced to the House on the 18th January. The reversal of Labour's 
grand strategic pretensions were now the Cabinet's chief aim. 
Underlying the policy of withdrawal - now as in the previous 
July - was now the confident belief that political stability had been 
restored East of Suez. The Cabinet's assumptions about future stability 
in the area were obviously crucial to any phased withdrawal plan. If 
favourable estimates could not be drawn, if bloodshed, chaos and 
disruption were inevitably to follow disengagement, then the Government 
would have to possibly reconsider its schedule for withdrawal. 
That there were in Parliament and in Whitehall diverging assessments 
of the implications of Britain's withdrawal, was, in part, due to the 
erratic and volatile nature of politics in the East of Suez area. To 
what extent would President Nasser promote revolution in the Persian 
Gulf and how successful would be he? Was South-East Asian security 
really as tenuous as the 'Domino Theory' suggested? Could the Asian 
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states establish their own balance of power? There were the major 
imponderables upon which stability East of Suez largely depended and 
about which only largely intuitive political and strategic assessments 
were possible. But as the government grappled with these issues it 
was also clear that the alternative government found facing-up to 
realities just as painful and confusing. 
At its most basic, the belief held by the Conservative Party was 
that Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez would both increase local 
turmoil in an area already noted for its unrest and instability, and 
create a vacuum which would be eagerly occupied by the major Communist 
Powers. This was not only the official view of the Conservative Party, 
1 but also the view held by many Labour M.P.s 
This applied particularly to South East Asia, where it was thought 
there were insufficient indiginous forces to fill any vacuum left by 
the British. Australia and New Zealand were already fighting in 
Vietnam, Japan was inclined towards pacifism and India was non-aligned. 
In addition, it was argued that even if the United States were prepared 
to take on Britain's role, she would not be welcomed by the local powers 
for fear of importing the Cold War. The U.N. was simply seen as 
impotent, castrated by economic and even more politically weakening 
developments which shifted the balance of power within the organisation 
in favour of third world countries. 
It was not only the chances of superpower involvement which 
concerned the Opposition Front Bench. It was equally concerned about 
1 l ~ See Williams, Alan. A Stake East of Suez, SQ~~a.i§t Cowmentarx, 
2 
September, 1967. 
See the much earlier view of the UN developed by Sir Alec Douglas-Home 
in 1961. James, Rhodes Robert. Britain's Role in the United Nations, 
p. 36. 
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the possibility of greater local tension. l It was certain, so the 
argument ran, that Singapore's economy,. already suffering from a 10% 
2 
unemployment rate, would decline still more. There was the probability , 
of heightening racial antagonisms between China and Malaya, as well 
as the ever present danger of inter-state squabbling stemming from 
local territorial claims. And not least there was the appalling frailty 
of the Federation to consider. It was clear that the political elites 
of both major British parties were divided over the relevance of the 
world role. 
Gloomy Tory prohecies were also made about the Persian Gulf. The 
Conservatives had unceasingly accused President Nasser of trying to 
take over Aden and to infiltrate Muscat and Oman " •.• the soft underbelly 
of Saudi Arabia". 3 Similarly they saw his Yemen ambitions simply as 
an attempt" ••. to subvert Saudi Arabia and reach through to the 
4 Persian Gulf" . Nor was Egyptian nationalism the only threat to 
local stability. In addition there were the multitude of claims and 
counter claims in the Gulf area. The Iraqui claim on Kuwait, the 
Iranian claim on Bahrain, the Saudi Arabian claim on Burami were all 





An interesting Conservative view of the prerequisite of internal stability 
was revealed when leading front benchers emphasized that it was unreasonable 
to expect Singapore to provide for its own defence when it had neither 
the technical skills nor a sufficiently strong "officer class". Vel. 742, 
H. of C., 27th February, 1967, Cols. 162-188. 
It was estimated that one-fifth of Singapore's G.N.P. was generated directly 
or indirectly from the British presence. Britain employed about 31,500 
civilians or about 6% of the labour force. Singapore got £58 million in 
foreign exchange from Britain, and Malaysia £16 million. See Hanning, H, 
'Britain East of Suez - Facts and Figures? International Affaris, vol. 42, 
No. 2, April 1966, p. 253. 
Martin, Vol. 742, H. of C., 27th February, 1967, Col. 178. 
Amery, J. Vol. 725, H. of C., 8th March, 1966, Col. 1962. 
5 The Permanent Alliance,..Q'£: cit., Pp. 191-204. 
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These local tensions, according to the Conservatives, would almost 
certainly be manipulated by the Soviet Union who would now be welcomed 
in Iraq, Iran and even Aden. Indeed Mr. Maudling warned that Russian 
influence could quite clearly be seen moving" ••• through the Yemen and 
probably.. if a vacuum is left by us ••• into the Gulf also". 1 
Conservative parliamentary spokesmen were also anxious to point 
out that once Britain had left the East of Suez area she could no longer 
react quickly and with strength since she would have no force on the 
spot, no aircraft carriers and now no Fllls. The concept of a mobile 
strategic reserve was simply dismissed as irrelevant. "The Suez 
Canal is closed apparently indefinitely", argued Mr. Boyd Carpenter, 
"Aden is gone; Simonstown is jeopardised; there is the Arab Barrier to 
airtrooping; and there will be no heavy equipment in the area. What 
will be the use of putting a few unhappy soldiers into transport 
aircraft and flying them across the world to areas where airfields may 
2" not be secured and where there is no heavy equipment? 
The essence of the Conservative critique was not that disengagement 
was in principle the wrong policy, but that 1971 was too early to 
disengage. According to the Opposition there would now be no time for 
Britain's former allies to provide for their own defence and in some 
cases there would be total economic disruption. Moreover a British 
withdrawal it was thought held serious implications for the West in 
general. According to Mr. Maudling it would have" ••• a profound 
effect upon American policy", and he added that there was a real danger 
of the United States abandoning" any attempt to contain Communist 
1 
Vol. 756, H. of C., 18th January, 1968, Col. 2073. 
2 
.. Vol. 756, H. of C., 18th January, 1968, Col. 2024. 
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expansion in that area" and returning to " ••. isolationism".l 
It was though, Britain's direct commercia l interests - the need 
for such raw materials as oil, copper, tin and rubber - that primarily 
vexed the Tories. ' Mr. Sandys gloomily told the House "It is quite 
possible that when we go the whole area will fall under Russian 
influence. The Russians are all the time extending their position in 
the Arabian Peninsula. In that case it is more than likely that we 
shall see our numerous concessions cancelled and our oil wells and 
other installations expropriated. This by itself would wipe out at one 
strOke a large chunk of the saving the Government hope to obtain. If 
we were also to lose a substantial part of our commercial assets in 
2 South-East Asia the cuts would prove a ruinously expensive economy." 
Mr . Heath, too, underlined that the Soviet Union was about to purchase 
oil from the Gulf and that this would" put her in a stronger position 
to deny oil to the Western world when she wants to do ,,3 so •.• 
Wi~out doubt then, the Conseratives believed that Britain's 
withdrawal would enhance local violence both in the Persian Gulf and in 
South-East Asia and would enlarge the opportunity for the communists 
to indulge in political subversion and in the manipulation of local 
rivalires. Given this view the Conservatives attempted to reinforce 
Britain's commitment to her traditional values. Even those Conservatives 
who conceded that there were growing signs of regional co-operation 
and local defence-mindedness argued that it was as yet only a weak 
aspiration that had to be nurtured over a period of time and that, if 
1 Vol. 757, 25th Col. 644. H. of C. , January, 1968, 
2 yol. 756£ H. of C. £ 17th January, 1968, Cols. 1849-50. 
3 Vol. , 760, H. of C. , 5th March, 1968, Col. 247. 
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it were exposed to a hostile environment as early as 1971, it would 
almost certainly wither and perhaps die. The right obviously feared 
that the decision to withdraw was precipitate and ill-considered. 
The Government was however guardedly optimistic about withdrawal. 
Indeed it became obvious that as its optimism increased the more 
pessimistic it became about Britain's balance of payments position - the 
policy of withdrawal hardened as the pound weakened. Its optimism was in 
fact a relatively dramatic phenomenom. As we have seen, the Government 
had not always been so inclined to take such a hopeful view about the 
prospects for world peace if Britain conceded an inch East of Suez. 
" 
In February 1965, the statement on Defence had claimed that the 
1 British contribution is paramount in many areas East of Suez". 
The 1966 Defence Review had been equally dogmatic. It asserted that 
" •.• the visible presence of British forces by itself is a deterrent to 
local conf1ict". 2 It also made the rather grandiose claim that " ••• our 
ability to give rapid help to friendly governments, with even small British 
3 forces, can prevent large scale catastrophes". The rationale behind 
Britain's role was construed as that of a great power making a significant 
contribution to international security on the grand scale. And this 
role had prevented, it was argued, the escalation of conflict into major 
disasters. 
Apparently such catastrophes no longer seemed likely by late 
1967, when the Foreign Secretary was able to declare that the cut in 
the forces East of Suez was made possible because " .•• we were confident 
1 Statement on Defence Estimates, February 1965, Cmnd. 2592, p. 9. 
2 Statement on Defence Estimates, February 1966, Part I, The Defence 
Review, Cmnd. 2901, p.7. 
3 ~tatement on Defence Estimates, February 1966, Part I, The Defence 
Review, cmnd. 2901, p.7. 
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in the independent future and stability of South-East ASia".l He went 
on to speculate with great enthusiasm about the great political and 
economic progress being made and concluded that " .•• the prospects look 
bright". 2 Mr. Brown had curiously not been so dogmatic just one month 
before at the Labour Party Conference, when he solemnly reminded 
the delegates that Britain could not withdraw from East of Suez before the 
mid 1970s " ••• and give the Singapore Government time to readjust its 
3 
economy, time to find other ways of looking after its people". 
By early 1968, though, the doubts and anxieties expressed at the 
Party Conference had almost passed from view and the Foreign Secretary 
was no arguing that "The contribution which the British troops in 
Singapore and Malaysia can make to the stability of South-East Asia 
is ••.. becoming progressively les3 relevant" 4 
Perhaps the manifold contradictions in Government policy were most 
vividly illustrated by the co-existence of two statements that were so 
obviously irreconcilable that they represented a genuine duality of 
policy and not as yet real evidence of the finesse that made it possible 
for them both to form the basis of policy almost simultaneously. One of 
these statements appeared in the official Labour Party publication 
Talking Points which said that withdrawal from East of Suez" ••• is 
likely to ensure greater stability as the Governments involved become 
independent . of our constant protection". 5 Even allowing for the fact 
that this was a statement prepared by the Labour Party's research 
department and not by a Minister of the Crown it could hardly be 
1 
,Vol. 753, H. of C., 2nd November, 1967, Col. 336. 
2 ibi d 
+ 
3 
'. Labour Party Conference RepQrt, 4th October, 1967, p. 234. 
4 
vol. 756, H. of C., 18th January, 1968, Col. 2080. 
5 ~alkingPoints. No .12. , August 1968, p.7. 
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reconciled with Mr. Wilson's analysis. ~e other statement was the one 
made by the Prime Minster in June 1966 which has already been 
mentioned. l It was at that time that Harold Wilson passionately warned 
a meeting of the P.L.P., that a withdrawal from East of Suez would be 
the "surest prescription for a nuclear holocaust". Not only does 
the Prime Minister's statement highlight a gross and curious inconsistency 
in Government policy, but it also prompts the question as to whether 
by his decision of January 1968 he was really now conceding that, for 
the sake of a few million pounds, he was willing to do something that 
was the 'surest prescription' for nuclear war? Even Mr. Healey had 
2 
to admit that the Prime Minister might have "overegged the pudding". 
And so it remained that the Government's position looked unconvincing. 
Apparently the relevance and importance of Britain's East of Suez role 
could fluctuate fortuitously from one month to another. 
Perhaps the most compelling explanation of the Government's 
inconsistency is that, just as it had built-upon and exaggerated 
Britain's role East of Suez to justify a British presence, so, after 
devaluation, it played down its importance in order to vindicate the 
decision to withdraw. An. even more obviously, as Crossman suggests, 
equally valid explanation was that the Government quite frankly did 
3 
not know what consequences would follow withdrawal. As the anxiety 
of the moment dictated, the Prime Minister would speak of 'great 
r 
risks' then even Mr. Jenkins would speak of 'difficulty and upheaval' and 




This was, of course, the difference between the party and governmental 
perspective which is a built-in duality which can be perceived in all 
political parties. But this particular contradiction is a striking 
example of the difference between these two perspectives. 
The Policies of Power,.op. cit, p.217. 
Crossman, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 313. 
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would erect contrarily the argument that local conflict might diminish 
and the danger of communism weaken as a result of the decision. 
Tne Government even began to articulate some sympathy for the 
once repudiated view that a British presence might, after all, act as 
an irritant; that it might, far from lessening, in fact exacerbate and 
provoke local differences and attract the subversion and chaos and 
menace it was supposed to deter. On Mr. Healey's own admission the 
Government was " .•. very conscious that in some cases our imperial 
history might make the presence of our forces an irritant rather than 
a stabiliSing factor •.• "l 
In this sense a British presence had become counter-productive. 
It might act as a stimulant for outside pressures, and more critical 
still it might also induce a false sense of security within the area. 
The Government in the fullness of time, was left articulating the not 
unreasonable doctrine that an unequivocal commitment to the effect that 
Britain was quitting the East of Suez area might in fact compel Britain's 
allies into constructing their own defence structures. According to 
Mr. Brown this would inevitably happen tI ••• as soon as these other 
countries understand that we are, in fact, withdrawing". 2 Clearly 
Britain hoped that a local balance of power would emerge. 
While the Government's overall expectation was much less hopeful 
and confident than it actually appeared, its spasmodic and selective 
references to specific areas East of Suez appeared by way of compensation 
tinged with a new-found confidence. When drawing attention to the situation 
1 yol. 757, H. of C., 25th January, 1968, Co. 622 
2 Vol. 757, H. of C., 24th January, 1968, Col. 431. 
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in the Gulf, Government spokesmen took obvious relish in reminding the 
Oppos i tion that President Nasser had failed in his attempt to subjugate 
Syria, Iraq, Jordan and the Yemen and that until he had done that, he 
could not possibly usurp control of Saudi Arabia or dominate the Gulf. 
MOreover, Government optimism rose to considerable heights at the 
prospect of a Federation between the Gulf States, and from the growing 
Egyptian fear of 'another Yemen'. The Foreign Secretary was visibly 
elated that "The Government of the United Arab Republic have decided to 
wi thdraw their forces entirely from the Yemen by the middle of December •• " 1. 
The Government also looked to the common interest shared by Iran and 
Saudi Arabia in keeping Egypt and the Soviet Union out of the Gulf. In 
the opinion of Mr. Brown " •.• the self-interest of the States concerned •••• 
2 
will ensure that peace and stability will survive". His prediction 
proved correct enough. 
The Foreign Secretary, though, still found it hard going in his 
bid to reassure a restive and understandably sceptical House of Commons. 
He could only point to his "own intuition" and to the fact that, after 
giving the Persian Gulf issue a great deal of thoughtful consideration 
he had reached the inescapable conclusion" ••• that the sooner the states 
in the area can look after themselves the better". He continued "There 
comes a time when an alien military presence is a divisive and not a 
cohesive force. I have long thought that this time had come". 3 
The Foreign Secretary was also strongly convinced that an indigenous 
balance could be created by 1971. "It is my belief" he said "that this 
time scale gives adequate time to make the transition t o a new sys tern 
1 ~ol. 753, H. of C. , 2nd November, 1967, Col. 337. 
2 ~Ql. 1;i2, H. of C. , 18th January, 1968, Col. 208l. 
3 ~Ql. 152, of C. , H. 18th January, 1968, Col. 2080. 
- 338 -
1 
not dependent on the presence of British troops". Mr. Brown, seeming to 
grow in stature as his speech progressed, ended with a confident 
prediction that, "The present situation in the Gulf is as calm as it 
2 has been for many years". 
The Government articulated similarly sanguine assumptions about 
the possibility of local harmony in South-East Asia. A recrudescence 
of the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation was now considered unlikely 
because Indonesia was beyond doubt " ... emerging from a dark period ••• ,,3 
It was also assumed that local tension would be reduced as collective 
efforts were made to bring about regional security through a united 
South-East Asian bid to contain China. The convergence of politico-
strategic interests it was said would overshadow the relatively trivial 
local differences. The Government was convinced that the picture was 
increasingly encouraging from the point of view of a British disengagement 
from East of Suez. The Foreign Secretary argued that "There are many 
signs from South-East Asia that events there are on the move, and on the 
move in the right direction".4 
The hope also persisted that Australia and New ~ealand would take 
a greater interest in the area, and that Britain could still influence 
local events by helping Singapore in terms of sophisticated equipment 
and specialist staff. 5 The Foreign Secretary was hardly able to contain 
his optimism, " ••• the roots of peace are growing", he exclaimed with 
characteristic vigour. "The nations of the area are coming together as 
1 Vol. 756£ H. of C., 18th January, 1968, Col. 2081. 
2 ibld. 
3 ~ol. 753« H. of C., 2nd November, 1967, Col. 336. 
4 ~ol. 753« H. of C. « 2nd November, 1967, Col. 335. 
5 Mr. Wilson promised that Britain would be prepared to assist " ••• in 
establishing a future joint air defence system for Malaysia and Singapore 
and in training personnel to operate it". voL 756 I H, of C., 16th 
January, 1968, Col. 1581. 
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the various regional groupings for mutual co-operation evolve and 
develop".l And then later, in a passage expressing considerable hope 
but based upon a logic which Britain's allies could have only viewed 
with incredulity, Mr. Brown roundly asserted that "There can be British 
influence without British armies on the spot. Indeed, I go further ••• 
and repeat that the influence and the help which many of our friends 
in Asia look to us to provide can be more effective without military 
backing".l Of course, whatever the truth of Mr. Brown's proposition, 
it was an argument which was exactly the opposite to that advanced 
previously . If Malaysia and Signapore revealed anxieties about the 
assumptions upon which this argument was based, they could always take 
comfort in Mr. Healey's assessment that "There is no doubt that the 
2 danger of war in South-East Asia at the moment is very low". The 
Cabinet was now agreed that stability in South-East Asia was assured. 
The likelihood of Chinese aggression, seemingly a foregone 
conclusion in Conservative thinking before the Heath-Peking detente, 
had never greatly influenced the Labour Government. It not only 
considered that Chinese aggression was unlikely while she was still weak 
and absorbed in internal development but it also believed that a 
British presence only marginally affected Chinese action anyway. Mr. 
Wilson's belief in Britain's ability to interpose herself between India 
and China was repudiated. Moreover the growing mood in British politics 
was that the West should support but not replace Asian efforts at 
containment. The Government was openly leading the field in the 
articulation of this doctrine. 
While it was fairly clear that the Government1s confidence about 
1 
Vol. 757, H. of C., 24th January, 1968, Col. 434. 
2 
Cited by Enoch Powell, Vol. 760, OH. of C. , 4th March, 1968, Col. 82, 
referring to a statement by Mr. Healey on 7th January 1968. 
- 340 -
the future of East of Suez was now strongly expressed, it was more 
difficult to determine what that confidence meant in terms of actual 
British interests. Indeed no real in-house attempt was made by the 
Government to evaluate in depth what it thought might happen to 
Britain's specific economic, strategic, and political interests East 
of Suez after 1971. The Cabinet felt that it was sufficient to assert 
that there was a good chance of stability East of Suez and that no 
further analysis was either desirable or necessary. The Government's 
assumptions about stability were predicated mainly on strategic 
arguments; it was also clear that the Defence and Overseas Policy 
Committee considered that Britain's strategic interests would not be 
greatly imperilled by a withdrawal from South-East ASia. l 
It is clear that the Cabinet knew that Britain's economic stake 
in the area was of such magnitude and that no Government could withdraw 
unless it thought those interests also would remain free from direct 
2 
menace and more or less intact. It was certainly evident that the 
Government was now denying the relevance of military force in the 
protection of economic interests. "Access to raw materials, trade and 
investment" said Mr. Healey " ••• are things which must be separated from 
3 
mili tary force or they will suffer and not gain". The Government 
moreover had come round to the widespread European view that the Arabs 





Crossman, Ope clt'l p , 'UJI 313 
Britain's economic stake in the area was massive. Investment in the Gulf 
was about £900 million; imports from the Gulf were valued at £395 million, 
exports at £302 million; sterling holdings of Middle East Governments 
amounted to £459 million; percentage of British oil imports about 46%. 
Annual foreign exchange income equalled £200 million. British investments 
in Malaysia and Singapore came to £700 million. These figures were 
given by Sir AlecDouglas Home, Vol. 757, H. of C., 24th January, 1968, 
Col. 424. 
Vol. 760, H. of C., 5th t1arch, 1968, Col. 362. 
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pr0ducing states had an interdependent relationship which reflected 
mutual self-interest. l 
Yet given the magnitude of the decision taken by the Cabinet the 
Government was curiously silent on the question of specific 'national 
interests I • This was not due to a lack of opposition pressure; the 
Conservatives even moved a motion condemning the Government for not 
'producing a coherent policy for the protection of Great Britain's 
'1-
vital sea communications". 
While the Government could hardly avoid the need to appear concerned 
to define Britain's interests in the face of such a specific and formal 
attack, its response was incredibly vague and evasive. It simply 
declared that the motion was really irrelevant to the question of whether 
or not to withdraw from East of Suez which may indeed have been correct 
but the Cabinet missed an opportunity to spell out a new strategic 
doctrine. It argued that British warships had not been able since the 
war to protect all the sea lanes East of Seuz, that" •• • trade, to a 
large extent, protects itself by mutual profitability" 1-; and that in 
both the Gulf and South-East Asia, there was a sufficient build up of 
local naval forces to prevent piracy. This rather low-key debate was 
significantly the only time the Government revealed, with any degree of 
detail how it saw Britain's overseas interests in the 1970s and beyond 
and what might happen to Britain's interests when she no longer had a 
military capability or presence East of Suez. 
For the most part, then, the Government1s views were inexact and 
ill-developed backed by no coherent strategic or political doctrine. 
1 See Maull, Hanns. Oil and Influence: the Oil Weapon Examined~ IISS, 1975. 
This study examines the interaction between OPEC and the oil consuming 
Mr. Foley, Under Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy, 
Vol. 760, H. of C., 11th March, 1968, Col. 1010. 
\l ot. !l bO. 1-+\ of .e.. S-~ ~~ L. {~69/ (~I;, r ~(z, 
states. 
- 342 -
The Government's approach was incremental and ad hoc revealing no new 
consensus about Britain's role either in Europe or outside. Perhaps 
though this was inevitable, given the nature of the calculation that 
the Government was expected to make. At any rate there was no coherent 
prediction about the probable repercussions of a premature withdrawal. 
Even the Cabinet was seriously divided and, as Crossman, Brown and Wigg 
were to reveal, individual ministers argued for a variety of interests 
and policies without much regard for an overall view or central idea. l 
For instance Mr. Healey remained unconvinced about the prospects for 
stability East of Suez, and, not surprisingly, was emphatically less 
confident than the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Jenkins. Indeed 
the overall Cabinet mood lay somewhere between these two men. Most 
ministers took the view that withdrawal would probably heighten the 
likelihood of instability East of Suez, but that the evidence was not 
so overwhelming as to decisively point to a strategy which prolonged 
Britain's role East of Suez arid they all saw good reasons for quitting 
the area. The Government's assessment then was strictly neutral -
if not agnostic. It provided neither sufficient reason for staying 
nor for leaving. 
1 This is apparent from the various accounts of the Labour Government 
which have appeared since 1970 from the pens of Brown, Crosman, 
Patrick Gordon Walker, Wigg and Harold Wilson himself. Also 
Christopher Mayhew has argued /lit his case in several studies. 
But his best contribution lies in his study Britain's Role 
Tomorrow. 
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C H APT E R XII 
THE WITHDRAWAL DECISION 
The decision to withdraw from East of Suez by 1971 was justified 
by the Government almost exclusively in regard to economic considerations. 
And yet the economic case for an accelerated withdrawal had not always 
been so pronounced in official explanations. In November 1967, Mr. Healey 
/ 
had stressed "the economic benefits" that accrued to Britain from being 
East of Suez" for the very small additional defence costs involved •• " 
He went on to assert that " there is very little economic advantage 
in the areas where the Chancellor wishes to get advantages, in speeding 
:redeployment .• " • He concluded, "The economic facts are these. To save 
£100 million on the budget in the Far East we have to spend £500 million 
. th " 1 ~n e U.K ••• Mr. Victor Goodhew, Conservative MP for St. Albans, 
argued that, on the basis of that statement "maintaiqring in the UK the 
12,000 who have returned from the Far East will cost as much as keeping 
60,000 out there. The 18,000 who have returned from 'South Arabia and 
elsewhere' will presumably cost as much as keeping 90,000 troops in the 
Middle East, and the 5,000 coming back from Germany will cost as much as 
2 keeping 100,000 over there." There was a great deal of truth in this. 
Brigadier Thompson contended that "The facile solution for reducing 
overseas defence expenditure is to bring the forces home. For the Army 
there were two snags to this: lack of accommodation and lack of training 
area. On existing plans the home garrison is short of 14,000 married 
quarters:;3 
This was not the only potential cost of withdrawal. As we have seen 
Britain had economic interests in the area which might be put at risk. 
1 Vol. 755, H. of C., 27th November, 1967, Col. 60. 
2 
vol. 755. H. of C., 27th November, 1967, Col. 104. 
3 Thompson, W., The Daily Telegraph, 17th August, 1966. 
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There was also the realization that cancellation charges would have to 
be honoured and "substantial" aid given to local allies. l Furthermore 
there was the risk that Singapore and Malaysia in a mood of disenchantment 
would retaliate by the threat to withdraw their sterling balances from 
London to the tune of £400 million. In November the Government seemed 
to accept that the economic case for withdrawal was by no means 
incontrovertible. 
However, by mid-January the situated had changed dramatically and 
Mr. Brown was now asserting the doctrine that for Britain to go on being 
over-extended as she had been, would lead her along" ••• the path to 
2 bankruptcy" • Even Mr. Healey emphasized that "... the savings we had 
made and plan to make in defence expenditure are necessary if our economy 
is to flourish". 3 These were substantially the very cuts which were 
apparently .unnecessary three months earlier. Not suprisingly there 
were many who doubted the Government's argument that the cuts had been 
reluctantly introduced for economic considerations. 
This complete reversal in Government doctrine was not made any 
more credible by the Government openly conceding that the cuts would 
bring no immediate economic benefit. Indeed, Mr. Jenkins conceded that 
" these defence cuts will not yield any net saving in 1968-9. On 
4 the contrary, there will be some cancellation charges to be met." The 
Prime Minister made the same point "The immediate effect will not be to 
reduce the level of defence expenditure: indeed, in 1968-9 .•••• the 





In the event the aid given to Malaysia and Singapore totalled £75 million, 
£50 million going to Singapore. 
Vol. 760( H. of C. ( 4th March, 1968, Col. 54. 
Vol. 760 f H. of C. l 4th March, 1968, Col. 71. 
Vol. 756, H. of c.~ 17th January, 1968, Col. 1798. These cancellation 
charges according to Mr. Healey "... would doubtless be heavy, and there 
would also be a n ••• substantial loss of offset sales". Vol. 756, 
H. of C' l 18th December, 1967, Col. 310. 
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transitional costs".l The justification of the cuts were certainly 
not therefore to make short run gains. 
Nor was it, unlike the July measures, based on the need to save 
foreign currency. Mr. Healey emphasized that " •••• the objective of 
th 1 d f · h 11 2 , e recent y announce cuts was not to save ore~gn exc ange ••.• 
It was instead " .•. to save Government expenditure and to enable a 
shift of resources into exports ••.• The object is completely different 
3 from the earlier one". 
Mr. Jenkins saw the cuts in an even deeper secular drift towards 
a new role. To him they were a recognition of the " •.• basic currents 
in the tide of historyll.4 Mr. George Thomson, also, believed them to 
be in accord with " abl f hi liS the inexor e pattern 0 story .•• It was 
clear that the cuts would make the overseas bankers more sympathetic 
to Britain's plight, but the main economic effect of the cuts would 
not be felt until the 1970s. The Government was apparently taking 
the long view. But this was curious since in no other respect 
had Britain's external policy reflected the notion of forward thinking 
related to long-term goals. 
It was curiously ambitious of the Government, not renowned for its 
capacity to project policy into the seventies, to start planning for 
the long-term in the middle of an acute crisis. The cuts clearly would 
only take effect some time after the entire devaluation operation had 
succeeded or failed. In either case they would then seem to be largely 
irrelevant. Of course the possible beneficial effects of devaluation 
were once again exaggerated. 
1 Vol. 756 l H. of C. , 16th January, 1968, Col. 1584. 
2 YQl. 758, H. of C. ~ 14th February, 1968, Col. 1346. 
3 Vol. 757 l H. of C. , 24th January, 1968, Col. 424. 
4 Vol . 756, H. of C. ,. 17th January, 1968, Col. 1797. 
5 Vol. 757, H. of C. , 24th January, 1968, Col. 544. 
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The cuts were not primarily made for economic reasons. The 
Government's real aim was to hold down home demand for the financial 
year 1968. The level of military spending around the Indian Ocean 
was largely irrelevant to this problem. The Economist indeed stressed 
that the saving on defence between January 1968 and the Spring of 1970 
would be as little as EllO million concluding that the withdrawal 
decision " was simply one sure way to get the Labour Party to accept 
1 
any restraint on domestic consumption". Indeed,. as Professor Thomas 
Wilson, of the University of Glasgow, argued in the winter of 1966, 
the whole question of defence cuts had become hopelessly confused with 
the establishment of correct social goals. "We are quite affluent 
enough to meet our international obligations on their present scale, 
or even on a larger scale", he wrote. "It is simply that we prefer to 
It 
spend our resources in other ways". Foreign outlays on liquor and 
tobacco are annually in the region of E140m. Imports of minor 
manufacturers absorb about E290m a year. Foreign travel takes another 
E26Om. And these sums were out: of a total foreign expenditure of 
E7,SOOm. In drawing attention to these figures, Professor Wilson 
stressed that his protest was "directed not against frivolity but 
2 
against self-deception." 
Even so, the Government's task had been to keep down domestic 
consumption in relation to which the estimated level of military spending 
around the Indian Ocean was largely irrelevant. Spending abroad on 
military support infrastructure, dockyards and airfields, for example, 
contributed nothing to the inflation of home demand. The level of home 
demand was nonetheless capable of being controlled and the failure of 
the Government to do so was probably more a question of its own 
competence rather than anything else. 
1 
Economist, Vol. 226.[ 20th January, 1968, p.18. 
2 W1lson, Thomas. OPe cit. 
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Nevertheless it had become necessary for the Government to plan 
two or three years ahead. It was clear that the Government was 
attempting to rid itself of the constraints of crisis management and 
that devaluation provided the opportunity to erect a proper economic 
strate~l, including a prices and incomes policy. It might even have 
been that the Government had the next general election in mind which might 
be as late as 1971. The defence cuts would by then be having, it was 
hoped, the impact they were designed to have on the economy. 
It is also clear that, where national security is concerned, a 
Government must take a long view. Indeed a ten year projection is 
11 . d 1 rea y requ~re . The Prime Minister explained that any " ••• cuts 
which act quickly can be achieved only with great disruption and 
great dis-economy". He added that if the defence decisions were not 
taken now" ••• they will not make any impact until well into the 1970s, 
and Parliament in 1970, 1971 and later years will be impotent to secure 
2 
major savings in those programmes" 
Of course, the January defence cuts should not be seen in isolation; 
they were after all just one variable in the new Chancellor's overall 
economic strategy. They were related on the one side to the devaluation 
strategy and the November cuts" ., and on the other related to the March 
budget. The defence cuts were just one component in a strategy to 
" •.. get all the demand components - public expenditure, private 
consumption, investment and exports - approximately into line with our 
3 
more successful trading competitors abroad •• " The main economic 
objective was then to make devaluation work in the 19705 by achieving 
1 Crisis in European Defence, Ope cit. p. 42. 
2 Vol. 756, H. of C., 16th January, 1968, Col. 1592. 
3 Jenkins, R., Vol. 761, H. of C., 25th March, 1968, Col. 1041. 
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an export-led boom. It was to this end, so the Cabinet stressed, that 
the defence cuts were made. 
It would be false, however, to totally dismiss the economic 
justification for the cuts that the Government introduced. There 
were three aspects to this. First, even if the cuts were from an 
economic point of view unnecessary or irrational - and that is putting 
the argument rather strongly - it could be asserted that it would be 
expecting too much for Governments always to behave rationally, particularly 
where the economy is concerned. Second, it is to be expected that a 
Government in deep economic trouble would look to defence cuts to help 
it restore economic vitality. Third, the Wilson Government had 
always contended that defence expenditure took too great a share of 
the diminishing gross national product as well as the total government 
expenditure. 
Its failure in the economic field had also convinced it that 
Britain's ills were deepseated and that a long-term remedy in the form 
of a new balance in the economy was necessary. Defence spending was 
to Labour's parliamentary left-wing the ugliest evidence of a nation 
living beyond its means and at the expense of the underprivileged 
elements in society~ Actually under Labour defence expenditure as a 
percentage of total government expenditure dropped to below 20% for 
1 
the first time since the war. 
Nevertheless, though there were important economic considerations 
at stake, it also must be firmly stated that the Government over 
elaborated the economic argument and that the Cabinet was fully aware 
that the defence cuts were not as directly central to its economic 
1 The figures for 1963-6 inclusive were 21%, 20.2%, 18.1%. Figures 
given by Mr. Diamond, Chief Secretary to the Treasury. yol. 750, 
H. of C., 11th July, 1967, Col. 50. Written answers. 
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strategy as it now so strongly emphasized. Indeed, some Ministerial 
statements were patently absurd. The ebullient Mr. Brown, showing 
, 
a great anxiety to clutch at whatever straw lay to hand in a bid to 
relieve the unmitigating gloom, was quite intoxicated with the 
opportunity the cuts gave Britain. "Last week's decision" he said 
"can mark a turning point in the nation's life. They can mark the 
foundation-stone for our long delayed recovery, recovery not just of 
economic solvency, but of Britain's pride and dignity among nations. 
They can mark not only the end of an old illusion, but the beginning of 
a new achievemen~,.l 
While Mr. Brown's heady optimism reassured the nervous, which 
arguably included the entire Cabinet, it was clear that the savings 
Labour planned to make were substantial. The defence budget of 
1972-3 was to be no more than £1,600 million - £1,650 million at 1964 
prices. The Government could boast that in its first five years of 
office it had saved over £1,600 million on the Conservative programme 
and that between 1967-8 and 1972-3 that figure would rise by a further 
£3000 million. 
According to the Government, however, savings of this magnitude 
could only be realised if Britain withdrew not only from the Far East, 
but from the Persian Gulf also. Mr. Thomson argued that it was 
" .•• impracticable to separate them in any meaningful way which will 
produce economies ... ".2 The Government rather contemptuously rejected 
the Conservative estimates that Britain could stay in the Gulf for as 
little as £12.5 million a year.3 It insisted instead that to remain in 
1 Vol. 757, H. of C.1. 25th January, 1968, Col. 636. 
2 Vol. 757, H. of C.~ 24th January, 1968, Col. 540. 
3 
Buchan, Alastair, East of Suez: " Why dangle vain hopes?",..The.. 
Sunday Times, August 18th, 1968. 
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Gulf " .•. we should require to keep not only our forces now stationed 
in the Gulf, but also all the other forces on which they might need to 
call in a crisis .• ".l The fear of uncontrolled escalation was now a 
factor in determining government policy. Mr. Healey did not need to 
rehearse the argument that the cost of the Singapore base had not 
been excessive until confrontation with Indonesia increased defence 
spending dramatically. The Labour Government had learnt that bitter 
lesson well. 
The political case for withdrawal, like the economic one, raised 
for Labour complex problems. The Government was sensi ti ve to the feeling 
that to quit the East of Suez area would involve abandoning many loyal 
and close allies. Clearly the Commonwealth connexion would be irreparably 
weakened but also non-Commonwealth allies would feel betrayed. And this 
fear worried those ministers like Goronwy Roberts, the Minister of State 
for .Foreign Affairs, who in November hastened to the Persian Gulf in a 
bid to reassure the restive sheiks that Britain would be retaining her 
presence, and was then dispatched again on behalf of the Cabinet just 
two months later to explain that Britain would not be staying after all. 
The distatsteful nature of Mr. Roberts' mission was made evident by 
his own admission that he found his hosts in " ••• a state of dismay 
d I 11 2 an some a arm .••. 
Mr. Healey also must have regretted that he had _ spoken in NoveIIber 
so dogmatically about Britain's obligations. In the defence debate at 
that time he had said "I believe, and the whole Government share my 
view, that we must, above all, keep faith with our forces and with our 
I Healey, D., Vol. 757, H. of C., 25th January, 1968, Col. 623. 
2 Vol. 757, H. of C., 24th January, 1968, Col. 499. 
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. 
allies in making these cuts. We can have no reversal of the July 
d . i " 1 ec~s ons... • The July decisions were reversed, though, and Britain 
did not keep faith with her allies. 
The Government rather lamely if not dishonestly argued that it had 
not broken any treaties. This was a defensible proposition because 
the vagueness and great diversity of Britain's traditional commitments 
2 
made discussion about their validity unreal. Nevertheless the Government 
was fully conscious that it had not adhered to the spirit of the 
treaties. It should be recalled that Mr. Brown some three months earlier 
had bluntly reminded the Labour Party Conference that " ••• unless you want 
us to go unilateral, unless you really want us to tear up our obligations, 
then I say, comrades, you seriously cannot urge us to go faster and 
3 farther than we are going now". In view of this emphatic statement it 
was in January a difficult proposition for the Government to pretend that 
there had been no breaking of its word. Yet it was clear that the 
Government was particularly upset about sympathy for the Gulf states 
and tended to view the defence of Australia, New Zeal,and and India as 
no longer a unique British responsibility but a matter for all the great 
4 powers. 
For all the Foreign Secretary's fine rhetoric that the Government would 
never overlook the military support freely given to Britain in the last 
war, the Commonwealth was bitterly disappointed at the withdrawal decision. 
In the words of the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr. Ho Iyoake , "There 
is all the difference between reducing forces and removing them altogether". 5 
1 Vol. 755, H. of C., 27th Nqvember, 1967, Col. 59. 
2 See Buchan, A.,' Britain in the Indian Ocean: International Affairs, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, April 1966. 
3 Labour Party Conference Report, 4th October, 1967, p. 234. 
4 The Permanent Alliance, Ope cit p. 212. 
5 Cited by Mr. Sandys, Vol. 756, H. of C., 17th January, 1968, Col. 1848. 
- 352 -
But as Dr. Bell observed "though the British withdrawal does 
I 
not leave as la~ge a gap in Australia's security cover as it does in that 
of Singapore or the Persian Gulf area, it still represents a sharp 
deterioration of the position. It increases the already great dependence 
of Australia on American power, and thus reduces still further any 
Australian prospect of even a modest degree of diplomatic independence. 
) 
A few years ago Sir Robert Menzies used to talk about Australia's 
'great and powerful friends', the plural indicating Britain as well as 
America. As late as the end of confrontation in 1965 the British presence 
in South-East Asia represented a sort of alternative model to the 
American in crisis-management: how to win without escalating. It is a 
1 technique that will be missed." Divisions of opinion developed in 
Australia over defence options, with interest being expressed by some 
in Mr. John Gorton's Government in what would have amounted to a Fortress 
Australia policy. This version of security, a reaction to Britain's 
decision to stand down East of Suez, was a mirror image of what was 
thought to be the neo-isolationist sentiments of some American advocates 
of a similar policy. For policy-planning purposes, Australian assessments 
were based on the belief that Britain had opted out of the Indo-Pacific 
theatre and could not be expected back. Canberra had also accepted the 
possibility that, because of US domestic political pressures, American 
intentions in respect of East Asia could prove to be no more trustworthy 
than British intentions have been. Even so, the school of thought led 
by Sir Paul Hasluck, the then Minister of External Affairs, won the day 
and Australia decided to maintain a small presence on the Malay peninsula . 
beyond 1971. 
1 I ) 
Bell, Coral., South-East Asia minus Britain, New Society,. 18th January, 
1968. 
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The Times caught the prevailing mood with great accuracy. The Commonwealth, 
it said, is now" •.. a jellyfish with no sting".l 
Diplomatic pressure on Britain to stay East of Suez did not 
emanate only from the Commonwealth, or indeed merely from the countries 
located in the East of Suez area. Marked pressure also came from the 
United States. 2 The exact nature and degree of this pressure is still 
arguable, but it was certainly clear that the U.S. was more concerned 
about Britain's departure from the Gulf than from Singapore and 
Malaysia. Richard Crossman says that Wilson, though denying this, 
actually unwittingly appeared to confirm it. He wrote, "I found myself 
along with Barbara and others asking questions and extracting from the 
P.M. a very characteristic chain of utterances. First he repeated time 
after time that the Americans had never made any connection between 
the financial support they gave us and our support for them in Vietnam. 
Then about ten ' minutes later he was saying, 'Nevertheless, don't let's 
fail to realize that their financial support is not unrelated to the way 
we behave in tl1e Far East: any direct announcement of our withdrawal, 
for example, could not fail to have a profound effect on my personal 
relations with L.B.J. and the way the Americans treat ,~ 3 us • But rather 
significantly, Washington's concern, that Britain's withdrawal would 
weaken or destroy its position in Vietnam and create a vacuum on its 
southern flank, was only weakly expressed. But President Johnson did 
express concern that Britain seemed indifferent to Vietnam. Yet America 
did not press too hard. That its opposition was not more pronounced 
may well have been due to its fear that the risk of Britain's heavy 
1 The Times,. 24th January, 1968. 
2 Gordon Walker, P., The Cabinet, 1970, p. 124. 
3 Crossman, Vol. I., Ope cit., p.456. 
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overspending to the international monetary system was at least as critical 
as any strategic danger arising from the decision to withdraw from East 
of Suez. At any rate American pressure was not as great as the Labour 
Government m~ght have expected. Patrick Gordon Walker was most insictent 
that it was purely "a myth" that" .•• the Cabinet was influenced by the 
pressure exerted by the United States ••• " 1 Indeed President Johnson 
expected nothing more than "a platoon of bagpipers" by way of a British 
') 2 
contribution to Vietnam. But on the question of Britain's withdrawal 
from East of Suez American pressure was not great if not virtually 
non-existent. Mr. Gordon Walker went on to say that "More influential 
was Commonwealth pressure •.•• this was a factor that played some 
3 part in complicating the decision to abandon our bases East of Suez". 
Indeed it 'complicated' the final decision so much as to materially 
delay its execution. Mr. Thomson, in fact, admitted that it was as 
a direct result of his own, and his colleagues', contact with overseas 
leaders that" ••• the date for withdrawal was extended from the 31st 
4 March 1971 •.•. to 31st December 1971". Mr. Lee Kwan Yew's frantic 
dash to London apparently had not been in vain after all. Britain's 
presumed loss of influence became the dominant issue. 
One of the least considered aspects of Britain's presence East of 
Suez was the influence she had exercised on the Indian sub-continent 
and in Malaysia that had been of a different character from that 
exerted by the USA. Relations with these countries had a permanency 
that provided a distinct advantage when seeking to reassure members of 
I Gordon Walker, op. cit. 
2 Wilson, op. cit., p. 341 
3 Gordon Walker, P., OPt clt., p. 125. 
4 Vol. 757, H. of C., 24th January, 1968, Col. 535. 
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of the Commonwealth who were anxious about the extent of the commitment 
1 being underwritten by London. This confidence was shattered by the defence 
decisions of early 1968. Subsequent widespread discussion of the British 
withdrawal from South-East Asia had probably so undermined Britain's 
credibility as to encourage miscalculation. 
Shortly after the British announcement to accelerate her withdrawal, 
President Marcos, of the Philippines, signed a bill incorporating 
the Malaysian state of Sabah into the Republic of the Philippines, 
thus reasserting and keeping alive a territorial claim that was pressed 
at the beginning of Confrontation. Sir Paul Hasluck, when Australia .'s 
Minister of External Affairs, subsequently obtained from President Marcos 
2 
an undertaking not to pursue the claim, but all the same it remained a 
potential cause of trouble. At the meeting in Wellington on the SEATO 
Ministerial Council in April, 1968, Sir Paul drew attention to continuing 
subversion in parts of Thailand and to the Communist threat to the 
independence of Laos and, with references to much expanded guerrilla 
infiltration, he was plainly worried that Malaysia might be drawn into 
3 
counter-insurgency operations. It was such unstable situations as these 
of course, which had to be taken into account, by the USA and others with 
interests in the area, when considering future security arrangements 
in East Asia. 
Britain's decision to quit Asia by 1971 underscored the need for 
American policy to be spelt out with some exactitude. It was realised 
that the British withdrawal into Europe could mean the USA would tend 
to adopt in Asia unilateral nuclear policies over which Britain, and 
1 Beaton, L.,(Australian Dissent::fhe Guardian~ June 23, 1965. 
2 See Mr. John Gorton's statement in the House of Representatives, Canberra, 
February 25Lh, 1969: reprinted in Survival, April, 1969. 
3 See Keesings Contemporary Archiv; s, 1968, p. 22258. 
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Western Europe generally, would have no capacity to influence i~ the 
absence of a local presence. 
The principal argument frequently adduced by those in favour of 
a retention of the East of Suez role was the view that Britain should 
stay East of Suez, because if Britain withdrew from the area, her 
influence in the world, and particularly in Washington, would plummet. 
Three main dangers were evident. First that Britain's influence in 
Washington would greatly diminish. Second that the United States would 
/ 
place more of its confidence in the short run in Germany and Japan 
and, in the long run, in her relations directly with the Soviet Union. 
Third, that America would conceivably be encouraged to retreat into 
, 1 t' , 1 ~so a ~on~sm. 
The Government was well aware of these dangers even if it saw them 
in less dramatic terms. It was certainly obvious that Harold Wilson 
had long regarded the East of Suez role as a source of great diplomatic 
influence. The Prime Minister regarded the Labour Governm~nt as 
uniquely ~ndowed to bridge the gap between America and Russia over a Vietnam 
settlement, provided British military power in Asia remained fairly 
considerable. Diplomacy based on the deployment of power in an area vital 
2 to the superpowers. 
On the other hand certain members of the Cabinet, including 
ROY Jenkins, obviously felt that less diplomatic influence in Washington 
might not be entirely against British interests. The Government's 
supposed influence over Vietnam had been often an embarrassment. Clearly 
the 'special relationship'with the United States was now of less immediate 
1 
2 
For a perceptive analysis of American arguments for a US withdrawal 
from Asia see Gelber /'8is tory and the American Role~' Orbis, Foreign 
Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 
Spring 1967. Also see Gelber, ' 'The American Role and World Order:1 
The Yale Review, Yale University Press, New Haven, Summer, 1967. 
Denis Healey and the Policies of Power, Ope cit. p. 217. 
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importance ~than a special relationship with Europe. Links with 
1 Australia had also changed. 
Indeed the Government was about to commit an error in supposing 
that France might look more favourably on Britain's application to join 
, 
Europe if the World Role were openly disavowed. Mr. Healey emphasized 
that " ... President de Gaulle has repeatedly made clear, in public and 
in private, that he is not prepared to consider Britain even as a 
candidate for membership of the Common Market so long as she retains 
Id id ' li 1 11 2 a wor -w e m~ tary ro e •••• 
Even if the Government did not actually regard the overseas presence 
as a genuine impediment to Britain's entry into Europe, it was plainly 
fearful that it might be used as one. This was an important factor now 
in the Government'a assessment of its European strategy. Mr. Healey 
at any rate seemed delighted that " ••• the reception of our (withdrawal) 
decision among our friends and allies in Europe has been favourable and 
indeed enthusiastic.,,3 However for those who reasoned, like the Prime 
Minister and George Brown the Foreign Secretary, that devaluation and 
a withdrawal from East of Suez would compel de Gaulle to accept Britain, 
diminished and chastened, into the European Community, there was immediate 
diSillusionment. Although George Brown himself attached great importance 
to the Paris visit, he observed later that "the outcome of our tour round 
Europe was that we persuaded the Cabinet to recommend to Parliament that 
4 Britain should make a formal application to join the Common Market". 
Just a few days after devaluation the general once more declared against 
British membership of the Community. 
1 r .. ' See A. D. Robinson, Australia-New Zealand Defence, Australian Outlook, 
Australian Institute of International Affairs, Canberra, April 1966. 
2 Vol. 760 l H. of C. l 5th March, 1968, Col. 358. 
3 Vol. 757, H. of- C . , 25th January, 1968, Cols. 625-6. 
4 Brown, G. , 012· ci't. , p. 221. 
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Harold Wilson took over the Department of Economic Affairs on 
28th August, as the economic crisis worsened . On 3rd October the Treasury 
announced that gold reserves had dropped for the fourth consecutive 
month. The half per cent increase in Bank Rate that month did little to 
relieve pressure on the pound. On 5th November the pound reached its lowest 
level in ten years. Nine days later the trade figures,reflecting recent 
dock strikes in Liverpool and London showed a huge deficit,and the pound 
hag its worst day ever. 
The Cabinet finally decided that Britain had had enough. On Thursday 
16th November, the decision to devalue the pound by 14.3 per cent was 
taken. It was announced t~o days later. It added £50 million to the 
annual cost of defence immediately. 
Meanwhile, the Cabinet was reconsidering its attitude to the question 
of selling 'defensive arms to South Africa. It began with the commercial 
question of arms sales to help the balance of payments, but the strategic 
issue of the presumed importance of the Cape sea route had to be considered 
after the June 1967 Six Day War. South Africa had raised the issue 
with the Forei~l Office, and indicated that the British Government should 
decide whether to sell her a wide selection of naval hardware - Buccanner 
aircraft and frigates - as a matter of urgency. A formal reply was wanted 
by 31st December. 
South Africa indicated that the whole question of the Simonstown 
treaty was at stake. About nine months earlier the British Prime Minister 
had agreed that the Foreign Secretary, George Brown, should put up a 
paper examining the question of the sale of 'defensive'arms to South 
Africa. They wanted to see what difference this might make to the need 
to cut back social services expenditure. 
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Dr. Vorster, South Africa's Prime Minister, in the meantime suggested 
that Admiral Heinrik Bierman should visit London in mid December to 
discuss the matter with British Chiefs of Staff. On Friday 8th December, 
the Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy sub-committee met to discuss 
the matter. 
As usual the Prime Minister was in the .chair. The committee 
considered George Brown's document which Wilson had earlier asked for, 
but about which he now had serious misgivings. The sub-committee was 
divided. Those present included Roy Jenkins, the new Chancellor (who 
replaced Jim Callaghan on 27th November) Tony Crosland, Richard Crossman, 
Michael Stewart·, Lord Longford, Denis Healey, George Brown, George Thomson, 
and several junior ministers. 
A member of this committee later recalled that both "Brown and 
1 Healey were keen on selling certain arms to South Africa, and said so". 
And another one confirmed that this was so - "within the context of the 
2 ' difficult economic position". The D.O.P.C. were fairly evenly split 
at their meeting on 8th December, with Wilson against the sale of arms, 
3 
supported strongly by Stewart, Crossman and Longford. 
The meeting took place against a disturbed background. The 
D.O.P.C. must have been aware of the Party unrest. The idealistic 
Left were making clear their distaste for any sales on pragmatic 
economic grounds. Mr. Wilson later recalled that "The Committee was 
divided. I accepted Dick's proposal, making clear that at the end of 
the review they would still find me irrevocably opposed to any supply 
of arms. But, I said, if all matters with an economic bearing were to 
be called in question, regardless of wider overseas policy issues, 
I This statement was supplied to the author by Lord Longford. 
2 Interview with Denis Healey recorded by the author. 
3 Cros sman, op. C it., v el er p . y. I b 
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regardless of moral issues, then I must insist that the Foreign Office 
must submit to our scrutiny, the,by that time, indefensible and 
anomalous restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe, under the COCOM 
regulations. The Foreign Office might still find it desirable to humour 
American prejudice, but if exports were to be the only criterion, the 
issue must equally be made subject to rigorous examination and justification 
on merit".l 
Wilson was aware of his weak position as leader. Following 
devaluation his standing was low; and supporters of both Callaghan and 
Jenkins were engaged in trying to rally support for an alternative 
leader. The sale of arms therefore became the question over which the 
issue of the personality and style of leadership was decided. 
It is difficult to sort out the myths from the facts, but it is 
clear that Brown, the Foreign Minister, had been discussing the question 
wi th the South Africans for more than a year on behalf of the Government. 
Wilson had agreed that he should put up a paper for the Cabinet to look 
at. There seems little doubt that the main pressure for this came from 
the Foreign Office, which was anxious to get the South Africans to help 
put pressure on the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia. 2 
Brown left for a NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels on Monday 
11th December, without a firm decision having been reached by the Cabinet; 
but they had a'greed that the South Africans seemed to be rushing things, 
and should be asked to postpone their deadline. By the time he returned, 
on Thursday 14th December, he was convinced that Wilson was organizing a 
, 'h' 3 campa~gn aga~nst ~m. It seems more likely that Wilson was safeguarding 
1 
Wilson, op. cit., pp. 596-597. 
2 Brown u op. cit. p. 172. 
3 ),bid. 
- 361 -
his own traditional left-wing support to maintain his position as 
leader. 
Mr. Kevin McNamara, an M.P. close to Wilson, has said that following 
a dinner on 11th December at which Callaghan was the principal guest, and 
where the question of the change of policy was freely discussed, "John 
Ellis and I agreed to put down an Early Day Motion to test the water'\ 
He added that this " re-affirmed our support of the declared Government 
policy'\ It was this motion, which received the approval of the Whips' 
Office, that was thought to be Wilson's bid to outflank Brown. Callaghan 
unaware that tt.e matter was before Cabinet, had said to Labour back-benchers 
in reply to a question about it, that it would be necessary to weigh the 
economic advantages against the political disadvantages. 
Richard Mi tchell, a back-bench suppo.rter of Healey, and Brown 
described it as" the dirtiest business imaginable ". 1 His view is typical 
of a number of right-wing Labour M.P.s who saw the whole affair as a 
deliberate attempt by Wilson to organize support: li The first thing I knew 
t". 
was that I had a motion presented to me and was asked "" t-lould you sign 
1 
this?~ and I did, because I don't believe in the sale of arms to South 
Africa - but John Silkin,the . Chief Whip, organized i .t for the P .M. I 
found out later that this was an officially sponsored motion being used 
by Harold as part of an intra-Cabinet squabble. I was asked by one 
junior minister why the hell I had signed it." 2 
It was similarly believed that a letter signed by junior ministers, 
including Shirley Williarns and Dr. Jeremy Bray, who reaffirmed their 
support for the policy of withholding arms sales, was part of Wilson's 
attempt to manoeuvre Brown and Healey into an awkward spot. 
1 
In conversation with the author. 
2 ibid. 
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The Cabinet meeting, held against this background of confused 
suspicions on Thursday 14th December, left the question unsettled. 
Mr Wilson took a parliamentary question on the subject that afternoon 
and admitted that "I was at once pressed by Dingle Foot for an 
unequivOcable assurance that in no circumstances will the export of 
arms not already contracted for be permitted to the Republic of South 
Africa" • 
~In view of the way in which the matter had been left by the Defence 
Committee, I could not give the assurance; equally, I could not indicate 
that any contrary decision had been taken. I was determined to see that it 
wasn't. In these circumstances I felt it right to indicate that the 
Cabinet was already looking at the matter but that I had no decision 
to announce. I replied'~ 
I would have hoped to have been able to make a full statement this 
afternoon, but my Rt. Hon. Friend, the Foreign Secretary, who is very 
much concerned with these matters and should have been back this morning, 
was prevented by weather conditions from getting back. I think it right 
that these matters should be the subject of consideration when he is here, 
and then I will make a fuller statement in answer to my Rt. Hon. and learned 
Friend. " 
<t 
It was, of course, perfectly proper and natural for the Cabinet 
to defer such a decision in the absence of the Foreign Secretary, and I 
did not intend my words to carrY any other meaning. But there had been 
so much talking to the press that some journalists - and certainly George 
Brown himself, when he heard about it - concluded that I was .making it 
1 
clear that he was in favour of arms sales." Certainly Wilson's statement 
to the Commons was unfortunate to say the least. 
1 Wilson, Op e cit., p. 599. 
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The battle continued over the weekend with such highlights as 
the Frost television probe in which Alan Lee Williams and Regina~Paget 
were two Labour M.P.s supporting Healey and Brown against Ben Whitaker 
1 
who opposed the resumption of sales. The Party was torn between those 
who would be prepared to sell the arms to avert the possibility of cuts 
in the social services, and those who thought it was necessary to take 
a moral stand against any gesture of support for a regime that prospered 
on the moral evil of apartheid. 
Lord George-Brown later wrote that" during the weekend the press 
publicity, the leaking and the briefing continued, and by Monday morning 
it was pretty evident that it was no longer possible for a balanced 
argument to take place. Mr. Healey and myself, who had jointly 
submitted the original memorandum and recommendation, and those others 
who were originally in favour of supplying these limited arms, had 
become a pretty small minority, and we were no longer able to carry 
,,2 
our colleagues with us. 
Whatever the pros and cons of the decision . itself, the most 
dramatic effect that resulted from it arose from the way in which the 
matter had been discussed, and the manner in which the Cabinet reached 
its final verdict. It has been suggested that Cabinet Ministers who 
shifted their position during the month were persuaded to do so by Wilson, 
who argued that arms sales would have to be dropped for the sake of the 
Party. It was an argument that was acceptable to men like Gordon~Walker. 
As Wilson recalls, "In the event the Cabinet decided overwhelmingly 
against resuming arms supply, and agreed unanimously to the draft of 
the statement I hadinsisted should be made repudiating the stories which 
had been given to the press. At 3.30 p.m., after questions, I made the 
1 A B.B.C. television programme, December 16th, 1967. 
2 Brown, G., OPe cit., p. 173. 
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comprehensive statement we had agreed."l 
Labour Ministers, however, saw the whole question as being 
'more about leadership' than as an attempt by a minority to foist an 
unpalatable policy on the Government in a bid to stave off such unattractive 
domestic measures as the reintroduction of charges for medical prescriptions 
- the issue over which Wilson had ostensibly resigned in 1951. 
The arms to South Africa fracas focused attention on the real struggle 
in the leadership of the Labour Government, and the need for government 
by consent, and with the support of certain sectors of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party. This issue also related to Britain's imperial past; the 
use of naval facilities in South Africa was politically unacceptable to the 
anti-apartheid lobby within the Labour Party. 
Harold Wilson's performance during the consideration of the arms 
sales question is understandable if his weak position as leader at that 
time is taken into account. He appeared, however, to have a paranoid 
streak. He was considerably influenced by his Paymaster General, 
George Wigg. Wigg had organized the campaign which got Wilson the 
leadership of the Party. Wigg's incessant burrowing and questioning had 
unearthed the Profumo scandal which seriously affected the image of 
the Conservative Party in the early .1960s. Wilson also felt he could talk 
freely to Wigg, since he did not fear him as a rival. Wilson's relations 
with senior Cabinet colleagues was never as close. 
Under Wigg's influence Wilson had over-reacted to the alleged 
misuse of D notices (by which the Press voluntarily agreed not to publish 
certain matters considered by the Government to affect national security). 
Wilson deliberately ignored the collective advice of his senior 
colleagues. He organized the Cabinet Committee system so that he alone 
knew all of what was happening. 
1 Wilson, H., Ope cit., Pp. 601-602. 
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Through his contact with junior ministers Wilson was able to 
keep a close eye on what their chiefs were doing. He also placed his 
own men as juniors in the important Ministries, often against the wishes 
of the Minister, so that he would receive reliable reports. By knowing 
all, and keeping his top colleagues ill-informed, Wilson hoped to divide 
and rule. 
By his behaviour over the question of arms sales, however he 
antagonized important Cabinet colleagues, and they organized themselves 
so that Wilson was forced to listen. His senior colleagues demanded a 
greater say on economic policy. Ministers with a knowledge of economics 
and - like Healey - able to master a brief, wanted more control over 
strategic economic policy. Wilson now had to agree to have a more 
powerful version of the Steering Committee for Economic Policy set up 
after the economic crisis of July 1966. 
When Wilson later went to Nigeria, in a bid to settle the civil 
war there, boosting his image as international statesman and peacemaker, 
Crossman, Healey, Jenkins and Peart organized an inner Cabinet, because 
they thought there was a need for a more effective strategy on such 
measures as the Constituency Boundaries Bill and industrial relations. 
Upon his return Wilson accepted this. 
It was too late to be of practical value, however, and the 
introduction of the Industrial Relations Bill was hopelessly out of 
touch with the mood of the House of Commons, as lobby correspondent 
Peter Jenkins showed in his book. l Douglas Houghton, chairman of the ' 
P.L.P., organized the opposition to the Bill, and tried to rally support 
1 Jenkins, Peter, The Battle of Downing Street. 
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for Healey as an alternative leader of the Party if Wilson fell. 
Robert Mellish, the Chief Whip, told the Cabinet that their 
Bill would fall if put to the vote in the Commons. Wilson's colleages 
deserted him, although Healey continued to support him, believing 
that it would be demoralizing to drop the Bill at this stage. The 
time for drastic institutional reform had passed, however, and the 
weakness stemming from the delayed devaluation left Wilson with no 
option but to await the promised economic miracle. l 
As a necessary part of that 'economic miracle' Chancellor Jenkins 
sought to restrain public spending in December 1967/January 1968. In 
the battle over the cuts in Government expenditure Healey nearly left 
the Cabinet. 
The struggle over the proposed cancellation of the F-lll was 
almost unrivalled in intensity and importance during the Labour 
Government's period in office. 
The F-lll was to be sacrificed in a package deal, partly so that 
the left wing of the Party would acceptswlngeing social service cuts 
and partly to help cut total Government spending. As Crosland put it -
'They went round the table saying "What can you give?" If somebody said 
"I am not offering anything" then the others would say "l am not unless 
you are". You had to have a sacred cow from every department - school-
1 d ,,2 eaving age, for example, from E ucation. 
The decision to defer raising the school-leaving age was important 
for a number of reasons. Lord Longford resigned in protest from his 
1 See Beckerman, W., Ope cit. 
2 In conversation with the author. 
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position as Leader of the House of Lords. The decision represented 
the defeat of a policy many Labour supporters felt was an important 
social advance. It was a measure at the heart of socialist philosophy 
- to help the less privileged members of society. 
The change had been pressed by Crosland, an important philosopher 
in the Labour movement, when he had been Secretary of State for 
Education. He was thus strongly in favour of tlie proposal, as being 
essential to the programme of any socialist government. The Labour Party 
did, in fact, emphasize in later propaganda that one of their major 
achievements was to spend more on education than on defence. 
The attitude of other members of the Cabinet, however, was 
illuminating. Croslanq's supporters included Callaghan, Brown, Stewart, 
Marsh, and Gunter. The opposition included some of the better educated 
members of the Cabinet, Castle, Wedgwood Benn, Healey, Crossman and the 
Education Minister, Gorden Walker, who thought it the least harmful cut. 
Stewart was so convinced that there should be no question of going 
back on the earlier commitment to raising the school-leaving age that 
he nearly resigned. Only the intervention of a Cabinet colleague seems 
to have dissuaded him. 
George Brown described the decision to postpone the extra schooling 
as being made for 'a ludicrously small and highly dubious saving of money' • 
He states: 1\ I thought it was one. of the greatest betrayals a Labour 
Government so overwhelmingly composed of university graduates could 
1 
make of the less privileged people who, after all, had elected it." 
Healey, who found himself arguing against Stewart and Brown, did 
not see it as a matter of principle at the core of Labour's political 
philosophy, but thought that the priorities in education were in other 
areas. 
1 Brown, G., op. cit., p. 224. 
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Other Ministers, fearing cuts from their own departments, also 
voted with Healey. For Brown it was the high point of a series of 
Cabinet setbacks, and he resigned from his position as Foreign Secretary 
and Deputy Leader 1 of the Labour Party two months later, on 15th March. 
In his memoirs he writes that he was less affected by the decisions which 
the Government had taken, than by the way in which they were taken. 
Harold Wilson's influence over such men as Gordon-Walker, the 
Education Minister, who had put up no fight when the proposal to scrap 
the raising of the school-leaving age was discussed, showed also in the 
debate on the cancellation of the F-lll. Healey fought for it, not as 
a 'sacred cow' but as something he needed for the newly-envisaged 
European role. Although the R.A.F. had concentrated on the immense 
ferry range, the F~lll was a low-level advanced strike-aircraft, and 
had always been suitable for US6 in Europe. 
The fight within the Cabinet, however, as Taverne said, 'was 
2 
really a battle between Roy and Denis' • 
Healey himself said "1 nearly won on the first discussion in Cabinet. 
Cancellation might never have taken place if Harold hadn't won over 
3 
two weaklings." Healey argued that the F-lll w"as vi tal to Britain's 
defence needs. His opponents, led by Wilson and Jenkins, said that 
for economic reasons alone it had to be cancelled. 
After the first meeting of the Cabinet, where Healey lost by 
only one vote, he decided to raise the subject again. Tavern explained, 
I 'Denis saw Frank Pakenham (Lord Longford) as the weak member. He 
arranged for him to be visited at the House of Lords. He was swung round 




2 Richard Taverne in conversation with the author. 
3 ibid. 
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Longford saw Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Elworthy, to find 
out if it was really important to Britain's total defence effort. He 
explained: " 1 had very little information on which to make up my mind -
we did not have very much information in Cabinet - so I asked to see 
~ , 1 
an expert. Though he had voted for ending the role for the F-lll, 
but he added: "After a three quarters of an hour's talk you can't 
2 pretend that your knowledge is very big' • 
In the second vote he supported Healey because 'defence spending 
was coming down", and Healey had convinced him that Britain would be 
Virtually naked without the F-lll.Lcrd Longford said that - 'The vital 
vote was taken on a totally inadequate basis , and added that Wedgwood 
Benn, for example, after examining all the technological arguments in 
.. 
favour, had exclaimed - " I will probably vote against it", without 
3 
explaining why. 
In spite of winning over Lord Longford, Healey was out-flanked. 
The economizers had won over Patrick Gordon-Walker and Cledwyn Hughes. 
The case had been carried at the Chancellor's push. Healey explained: 
"Roy was brilliant in present~ng his case. He staked his reputation 
publicly at the beginning of post-devaluation to A., ending East of 
Suez, and B., dropping the F-IlI. He always had it in for the F-IlI 
because he had fought to keep the TSR-2. And he took the line, "I 
4 don't mind cancelling TSR-2, providing we don't replace it." 
What had amazed Healey at the outset of tt~e review of policy was 
the Press story that the F-lll was about to be cancelled - put about 
1 Lord Longford in conversation with the author. 
2 ibid . 
3 ibid. 
4 In conversation with author. 
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by the Prime Minister well before the Cabinet had taken a decision on 
it. Healey therefore campaigned hard for support against the Prime 
Minister and very nearly won the .day. 
Healey's attempt to reverse the first Flll Cabinet meeting 
decision took place over a hectic weekend. 
Yet the cancellation of the Flll did not surprise either the 
Areerican Embassy in London or McNamara, the U.S. Defence Secretary. 
Britain had bought the Flll because she thought she had a need for it, 
not because of super-salesmanship by the Americans. McNamara was 
grateful, because it helped him defend his policy against critics. 
But he was doubtful whether Britain had the resources to stay East of 
Suez, and said so to close friends - although he argued with Britain 
throughout that they should remain in the Far East, and suggested that 
American support for sterling would be dependent on Britain staying 
1 there. 
The 1964-5 review of Britain sent by the American Embassy in 
London to the State Department said it was unlikely that Britain could 
afford to stay East of Suez; and if Washington wanted them to stay 
then they should offer some kind of payment. 2 
The decision to withdraw from East of Suez by the end of 1971 
was far more damaging to Britain's relations with the Americans than 
the FlII cancellation. Britain's influence declined from the moment 
the decision was announced. 
The Government was now determined to act as if Britain's European 
~litary capability could serve as a powerful political weapon. 
1 Policies of Power, op. cit., p. 242. 
2 ibid. 
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Mr. Healey reminded the House that the "formidable contribution we shall 
be able to make to the Alliance in the 1970s may be as important political'ly 
as it is militarily."l The Defence Secretary elaborated, "Big changes 
are on the way in Europe. Whatever our hopes may be, it is not possible 
now to foresee the precise nature of our relationship with the Common 
Market in 1972. But what is certain is that our political relations with 
our European neighbours will be even more important than they are 
today, and that the scale and nature of our military contribution to 
their defence may exercise a more important influence on those relations 
2 than it has in the last 20 years". Mr. Brown, too, thought the defence 
measures would " ••• make it easier for us to play a leading role 
i E ,,3 n urope ••. 
The Government's belief that it might have a greater say in 
determining the outcome of international matters if it were in the E.E.C. 
was not without a certain logic, ' if only because its actual influence 
was so inconsiderable. Its capacity to influence the settlement of 
the Vietnam war had been minimal; its influence in the Middle East six-
day war had been no greater althoug~ according to George Brown,it might 
have been greater if Britain had forced the straits of ~ iran with 
the help of the U.S. Navy. Britain could not even affect the outcome 
of the hostilities or secure a continuing flow of oil; in Africa too, 
Britain could expect little future influence as long as the Rhodesian 
affair remained unresolved. 
Above all, though, the Government was committed to the doctrine 




Vol. 757, H. of C., 25th January, 1968, Cols. 625-6. 
Vol. 757, H. of C., 25th January, 1968, Col. 626. The Defence White Paper 
made the point. "We shall thus be able to contribute to the security of 
NATO on a scale corresponding with our efforts to forge closer political 
and economic links with Europe". Statement on Defence Estimate, 
February 1968, Cmnd. 3540., p.3. 
Vol. 757, H. of C., 25th January, 1968, Col. 636. 
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and until she had a strong balance of payments. It consequently put 
its faith into getting into Europe and in attempting to restore 
Britain's ailing economy. A withdrawal from East of Suez, it was 
now advocated by the Cabine~ could achieve both. Indeed the Foreign 
Secretary revealing remarkable intellectual agility, in public if not 
in Cabinet, emphatically denied that Britain's world status would 
diminish as a result of withdrawal. " ••• ou£' standing" he said "will 
not in the future depend upon our military presence. Increasingly 
in other ways, by trade, by aid, by cultural activities, our presence 
will be felt, and, I believe, felt even more strongly".l 
1 Labour Party Conference Report, 1967, p. 217. 
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C H APT E R XIII 
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE LABOUR PARTY: 
THE PROTRACTED RECESSIONAL 
While the Government was concerned about the effects of withdrawal 
on Britain's external position, it was more conscious of the possible 
effects of that decision on the Labour Party. Indeed internal pressures 
within the Labour Party had been increasing quite markedly. At the 
annual Conference held in Scarborough in 1967 - the scene of the great 
CND debate seven years earlier - composite resolution 49 called for a 
cut-back East of Suez. The resolution declared that whilst "this 
Conference records its appreciation of the Labour Government's efforts to 
reduce the nation's burden of overseas military expenditure, but considers 
that, in order to provide necessary relief to the balance of payments 
and ensure a more balanced and realistic pattern of external military 
commitments, this process must be accelerated especially in relation to 
military spending east of Suez. It believes that these actions will enable 
Britain to fulfil a new role, that of peace promoter, and will release 
1 
resources for a more rapid economic deployment of the country". Indeed 
the defence decisions were in part a response to internal party pressures. 
That a defence cut-back was inevitable if not desirable was due to the 
Government's decision to pursue an economic strategy that was certain to be 
overwhelmingly unpopular within an already dispirited and divided party. 
This economic strategy was to combine not only cuts in public 
expenditure but also a statutory incomes policy and a harsh budget 
which could well lead to 2 even greater unemployment. Even in the 
relatively healthy economic climate of September 1967 it was being 
predicted that one million men could be out of work in the winter of 
1968. The post-war settlement was over; full employment, price 
stability and restrained collective bargaining were to pass from view. 
To put it at its lowest, the Government calculated that the defence 
cuts would please the Party and possibly obscure other more objectionable 
1 
Labour Party Conference Report, 1967, p.217. 
2 The Go~er~en~'s plan was to save in planned Government expenditure 
£255 m~ll~on ~n 1968-9 and £440 million in 1969-70. 
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aspects of the January economic package. 
It was the Left Wing, particularly the Tribune Group, of the Party 
which was incensed, not only at these measures, but at a general 
economic strategy which it considered was packaged by orthodox treasury 
officials in consultation with more sinister international bankers. l 
Mr. Jenkins' brand of frankness did little to defuse the situation. 
He had rebuked the Left for its impassioned denunciation of the 
infamous 'letter of intent' which his predecessor had sent to the 
International Monetary Fund after devaluation. "What about the 
so-called 'strings'?", he asked, 11 ••• it is ••• the practice in 
arranging almost any form of financing. The lender wants to know the 
future intentions of the borrower for the management of his affairs. 
That is not unreasonable, and, indeed, it is in any event totally 
.., 
inevitable."" The Left was not amused. The 'strings' were neither 
desirable nore inevitable in its view. 
The Left, then, was not appeased when the cuts in public 
expenditure were announced. Even worse it believed the cuts to be 
totally unnecessary. The Left claimed that there would have been no 
economic crisis if the first thing Labour had done had been to make 
heavy defence cuts including withdrawing from East of Suez. The angry 
mood of the Left, in fact, encouraged the Economist to claim that 
" the Labour Party, both in Parliament and in the country, is once 
again on the point of disintegration ...... It concluded that ..... the 
crisis of confidence and discipline it now faces is graver than that 
caused by the desertions of 1931 or the ferocious quarrels over 
3 
nuclear disarmament in 196011 • Even allowing for some exaggeration 
1 See general teno+r of debate, Labour Part Conference Report, 4th 
October, 1967. 
2 Vol. 755, H. of C., 5th December, 1967, Col. 1198. 
3 Economist, Vol. 226, 9th March, 1968, p. 12. 
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there was little doubt that the Labour Party was in disarray. 
The Party's distress could in part be attributed to its lack of 
electoral success. There was a feeling of despair, even before the 
previous September's wa1thamstow by-election which had shown a swing 
of 18.4% to the Conservatives. Moreover, Harold Wilson was not the same 
dynamic, seemingly far-seeing leader who had exuded such confidence 
just eighteen months before. 
The Government felt it wise to concentrate on party unity. The 
Labour Party since polling day in 1966 had been more rebellious than 
any Government since the war. It was true that Labour's record in 
this respect was unenviable: in July 1966 thirty two members had 
abstained over Vietnam: in August of the same year twenty-two members 
refused to support the prices and incomes bill, and in October 1966 
there were twenty-eight abstentions over Part IV of the bill. In the 
following February sixty-two M.P.s rebelled against the Government's 
defence policy and in May thirty-six voted against the Common Market 
while fifty-one abstained. Just two months later came another revolt 
th ' l' 1 over e ~ncomes po ~cy. It was hardly surprising therefore that the 
Prime Minister was overtly concerned with minimising the differences 
within his Party. 
Not the least of the Prime Minister's growing anxieties was that, 
if the Left did rebel, the great bulk of the Party would almost virtually 
insist on the expUlsion of those involved. It was even rumoured around 
the Palace of Westminster that such a situation might lead to the 
enforced resignation of the Prime Minister's 'own nominee', John Silkin, 
1 '1 W~ son, H., op. cit. 
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the Chief Whip. In the event however the Left's reaction to the 
January measures was only mildly contentious. In the main it limited 
itself with uttering the painful cry of 'bankers ramp' that had been sparked 
off by the 'letter of intent'. Mr. Newens spoke for all his colleagues 
on the Left when he vehemently declared that the cuts were designed 
" .•. to meet the demands of the international bankers, of the speculators 
in sterling and of the most reactionary circles in this country and in 
the world".l Mr. Atkinson, showing equal anger to Mr. Newens, and 
even greater despair, in an emotional release of pent-up frustration, 
argued that the January measures and the March budget, would " ••• mean 
2 
absolute disaster for the Labour movement". 
The costs of defence were not dispassionately quantified by the 
Left in terms of pounds, shillings and pence, but more emotively in 
terms of schools and hospitals. At the 1967 Party Conference Mr. Huzzard, 
of the Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians Association, pointed out to 
a cheering mass of party delegates, "We can have a choice in this 
country. The education school building programme has recently been 
pegged by the Government at £150 million a year, but the Singapore 
base is costing £200 million a year. One Polaris submarine and its 
base is costing £92 million, yet the annual cost of hospital building 
is only £83 million. One FIll aircraft •••• costs £2.6 million and 
- . 3 
for this we can have five big comprehensive schools". This rhetoric 
cleazly pointed to the dilemma over priorities facing the Government. 
It also revealed the Left's unyielding commitment to social objectives. 
1 Vol. 756, H. of C., 17th January, 1968, Col. 1823. 
2 Vol. 761, H. of C., 20th March, 1968, Col. 487. 
3 
Huzzard, R. (Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians Association) • 
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The Left, in fact, far from being satisfied with the defence 
cuts ins~ed on more. According to Mr. Allaun, there was still 
" 1 f f th ,,1 P enty 0 at on at carcas! , .• The Defence Minister 
was in no doubt about the Left's insatiable demands for defence cuts. 
He likened it to " ••• throwing herrings to a sea lion. It gulps 
them down and a second later is back asking for more.,,2 
While it is clear that the Left's mild elation occasioned by the 
defence cuts did not entirely offset its disenchantment at the cuts 
in civil expenditure, it is without doubt obvious that its protest, 
and indeed the Party's protest, ,,'as a low-key affair compared with 
what it would have been if no defence cuts had been envisaged. The 
extent of the disaffection in the Lobby was a mere twenty-five abstentions 
over defence policy in January, while one month later thirty Labour 
M.P.s voted against the ending of free milk and twenty two voted against 
the increased cost of insurance stamps. 
It was, of course, not merely a question of keeping the Left 
reconciled to government policies. For the effect of the Left Wing 
on the decision to withdraw from East of Suez was patently slight. 
It is possible to exaggerate the importance of the Left on this issue, 
but in fact the Government would have faced far more than just mild 
Left-wing dissent if the cuts in civil expenditure had not been 
accompanied by severe defence cuts -: According to The Times "the 
danger for the Government •••• may not be Left wing votes, or even an 
ad hoc combination of centre M.P.s but the spread across the 




Vol. 760, H. of C. r 5th March, 1968, Col. 301. 
Vol. 755, H. of C., 27th November, 1967, Col. 68. 
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew was convinced that the withdrawal decision was induced 
by internal political clashes within the Labour Party. See Philip 
Darby, OPe cit., p. 325. 
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1 
much that they had stood for". This was perfectly valid and disquiet 
about the Government came from all sections of the Party. 
Government Ministers met this alarming situation in different 
ways ;; while Mr. Healey revealed an ability to shadow-box, Mr. Brown 
faced every issue head-on. The evidence of evasiveness or a strong 
desire of the Defence Minister to avoid defining the strategic issues 
involved in a withdrawal from East of Suez came in the defence debate 
in early March. With the House intent on concentrating its energies 
on the East of Suez controversy, Mr. Healey spent the greater part of 
his very long and tedious speech illuminating the technicalities of 
anti-ballistic missile defence. Ministers had the unenviable task of 
explaining the cuts without dealing with the economic policies which 
had made them inevitable. Mr. Healey, moreover, genuinely felt the 
timing of the withdrawal decision to be an error and he was never very 
convincing in defending that schedule. Indeed, there was the classic 
parliamentary set-piece battle with the curious sight of Mr. Healey, 
who disagreed with the decision, defending it stubbornly, and Mr. Powell 
who agreed with the decision, revealing its deficiencies with forensic 
brilliance. 
Nevertheless despite Mr. Healey's personal discomforture, the 
Government made a credible defence of its policies, especially within 
its own Party. The Government's case was ill-thought out if 
baSically correct, but in the event it acquired a certain resilience 
simply because its opponents were divided on the best line of attack. 
The Government played on its critics' .weaknesses and divisions. The 
1 
The Ti.mes '. 12th January, 1968. 
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cuts, both civil and military, it said, were 'unavoidable' and a 
necessary exercise in 'realism'. The Left and the anti-East of 
Suez group were informed by the Ministers concerned that there was to 
be no absolute cut in civil expenditure and that, since defence cuts 
would not impinge for some time, the Government could not " ••• possibly 
have avoided civil cuts by making bigger defence cuts".l The pro-
East of Suez Lobby, on the other hand, were informed that the losses 
suffered by the anti-East of Suez Lobby were much greater and far-
reaching than had been widely recognized. Indeed, the essence of the 
Government's case was that all should take comfort from the losses of 
each other - that there should be a sense of shared misery. 
The Government constantly developed this theme that no one had 
been spared and that the cuts were evenly spread between departments. 
"If everyone of the 630 members" said Mr. Stewart "was asked exactly 
what package he or she would have constructed, no two members would 
produce exactly the same packages. We weighed up what we believed was 
right in general and commended it to the House. But it must be 
2 
commended as a package". This was only one of repeated Government 
efforts to persuade the Party to look at the measures as a whole. The 
Prime Minister also intervened, asking his Party, " ••• to look at the 
package as a whole and not select one item ••• ,,3 Mr. Fred Willey was 
unimpressed, "If I buy 1 lb. of apples" he said "from a greengrocer and 
he gives me a bag in which there is a rotten apple, I cannot appreciate 
4 
the argument that, because it is 1 lb., I must accept it as a whole". 
1 Jerikins, R., Vol. 756, H. of C., 17th January, 1968, Col. 1798. 
2 Vol. 759, H. of C., 20th February, 1968, Col. 361. 
3 Vol. 756, H. of C., 16th January, 1968, Col. 1600. 
4 Vol. 756, H. of C., 18th January, 1968, Col. 2028. 
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Nevertheless the argument that all had been hurt equally in the package 
did soothe to some extent the ruffled feathers within the Party. 
Mr. Brown explained with great feeling just how painful the horse 
trading had been, " ..• in facing the current decisions there have been 
for all of us in the Cabinet hard personal moments. Each of us has 
seen a cherished view threatened and has been obliged to reconcile 
himself to a course which, ideally, he would have sought to avoid".l 
Mr. Crossman's detailed account tellingly indicates the real extent 
of the Cabinet's division and confusions. He noted i~ his diary that 
the schedule for withdrawal was, to begin with, somewhat confusing. 
Indeed, he wrote, a "point of interest arose out of a minute I had 
Circulated on the timetable of the Defence White Paper. On reading the 
draft I had jumped to the conclusion that our announcement of the phased 
withdrawal was carefully planned to run right up to the last day -
December 31st, 1971, whereas all we were committed to was a withdrawal 
by the last day of 1971 and we might be out two or three years earlier 
if we wanted it. I saw here a trick under which the defence Departments 
were transforming a last possible day into the only day for withdrawal. 
George Brown was on my side and said he wanted to be quite sure that he 
could be out of the Gulf much earlier. Denis Healey said that he had 
to make his plans and phase them over a definite period. Then the P.M. 
said that we must draw a distinction about the timetable for our 
withdrawal and the plans for the run-down of the forces consequent on 
our withdrawal. This sounded better than it worked out. But I was 
satisfied because I achieved an absolutely clear statement in the minutes: 
1 Vol. 756, H. of C., 18th January, 1968, Col. 2082. 
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'On the timing of our withdrawal we should not go beyond what has already 
been announced since this gave us the flexibility to withdraw earlier should 
the opportunity arise'. This is the kind of small difference a non-
departmental Minister can occasionally make."l 
In the Cabinet itself the anti-East of Suez faction was 
powerful and entrenched. 
Mr. Healey, however, did not concede the East of Suez role 
without a fight. The Defence Minister was able to call on the support 
of both Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Brown, which was rather surprising in view 
of their former posts, and also on Mr. Richard Marsh and the pro-European 
Mr. George Thomson, but he had lost the support of the Prime Minister. 
In the event Mr. Healey's only success was to wring out of the Cabinet 
an acceptance of a further nine months before withdrawal. 
If the withdrawal decision were to: be assessed solely on whether 
it preserved Cabinet unity or not, it would be proper to have to conclude 
that it was a success. Miss Jennie Lee - a Left-winger by temperament 
and marriage - even publicly admitted that the reason she had not 
resigned over prescription charges was because the defence cuts were 
2 
"real, drastic and permanent." There were certainly others in a 
similar position who were less willing to speak out. Only Lord Longford 
resigned. 
There were possibly other political reasons for the decision 
to withdraw from East of Suez by 1971. Although it is difficult if 
not impossible to be certain, it might well have been the Government's 
intention to present any new Administration with a fait accompli. 
1 Crossman, R., Vol. II, Ope cit., p. 682. 
2 Cited by Powell, E., H. of C., 18th January, 1968, Col. 1901. 
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Such action was in line with known Government practice. The last 
Conservative Administration had brought forward the Polaris programme 
for this reason, and when Labour cancelled the TSR-2 it even ensured 
action to destroy the jigs and too'ls despite Conservative pleas that 
1 it should not do so. It is perhaps significant that the Cabinet's 
initial decision w.as to withdraw from East of Suez just five years 
after the 1966 election. Even the final decision itself virtually 
made certain that regardless of whether Labour won or lost the next 
election no real revival of the East of Suez role could take place! 
While the economic and political reasons for the accelerated 
withdrawal were widely debated, much less attention was given ~to the 
strategic . logic behind the decision. In fact there were compelling 
strategic arguments for withdrawing in 1971 rather than 1975, and in 
not having a special East of Suez capability after that date. Not the 
least inconsiderable of these arguments was that a definite decision, 
however unpopular, would at least end the period of uncertainty that 
had included five re-appraisals of the role of the Services since Labour 
had taken office. Mr. Healey, although opposed to the withdrawal decision, 
later admitted that he was not too unhappy at the chance it offered 
to break out of the self-perpetuating cycle where expectations of defence 
cuts affected recruitment, which in turn led to more defence cuts. 
The manpower shortage in fact had reached such a critical level 
that it was by no means clear that even if the East of Suez role remained 
politically and economically viable, it would be militarily possible for 
very much longer. The Under Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal 
1 See VOl. 760, H. of C., 7th March, 1968, Col. 704. 
2 
The Conservatives under Mr. Heath in fact promised to reverse the 
withdrawal decision. But this commitment was purely cosmetic. 
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Navy, Mr. Foley, admitted that the " •.• Defence reviews and all 
that these involve have had their effect on recruitment and re-engagement. 
It would be idle to deny it. In the last few months we have been 
fighting an uphill battle on recruitment".l 
Some time later in a lecture at the R.U.S.I. Mr. Healey also 
argued that " ... in the future in many areas manpower will be as severe 
a constraint as money on a Defence Minister's freedom of action". 2 
In 1970 on television, Mr. Healey again argued that if Britain had 
retained all her East of Suez commitments it would have been "quite 
impossible to meet the manpower bill".3 It was not unlikely then, even 
in January 1968, that the Government was aware of the great strain that 
the East of Suez role might put on Service manpower in the future. 
Resource constraint was in fact a growing factor in planning defence 
allocation and ensuring a definite level of capability. 
The January decision not only ameliorated the uncertainty within 
the Services, but also removed the confusion facing Britain's allies. 
This was significant because one of the more persuasive criticisms levelled 
at the July measures had been that they were sufficientl¥ ambiguous, 
both in defining when Britain would withdraw and in describing what 
East of Suez capability she would then have, to encourage the East of Suez 
nations to continue to rely on Britain. 
Although L~e January measures 'Here in some respects still unclear, 




Vol. 760, H. of C., 11th March, 1968, Col. 1116. Mr. Reynolds conceded 
that the army was in a similar position. He explained that recruitment was 
" •• below that needed to meet the annual recruitment of 35,000 to maintain 
a steady state". Vol. 767, H. of C., 24th June, 1968, Col. 24. He also 
said that on 31st March 1968 that the soldier strength of the Army was 
4543 below ceiling. Vol. 767, H. of C., 25th June, 1968, Col. 60. 
Lecture to Royal United Services Institution, 22nd October, 1969. 
24 Hours ( a BBC television programme), ' 5th March, 1970. 
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transparently plain. Even the transport fleet, hitherto the basis of the 
mobile strategic reserve, was to be cut back. There was also the 
cancellation of the Flll (discussed earlier) which Mr. Healey admitted 
would" •.• limit the variety of circumstances in which wc can usefully 
intervene outside Europe after our withdrawal". The Defence Minister 
went on to say that "Our allies are well aware of the r.ature of this 
limitation".l 
The weakness of the July measures had not been only that they 
might unwittingly mislead Britain's local allies, but that they might 
also place Britain in a particularly exposed position. Mr. Mayhew had 
warned earlier tha"t Britain's forces would be in greater danger in the 
period" ••• between 1971 and 1975 when our commitments will reach their 
maximum ambiguity, and our troops their maximlUD weakness". 2 The former 
Navy Minister was not alone in extolling the virtues of a more hasty 
retreat. Mr. Jenkins too, suggested that" all our recent history 
shows that, when it has to be done, it is best done reasonably quickly ••• ,,3 
Once the Cabinet had reached agreement on the need for more 
drastic defence savings it was inevitable that the East of Suez role 
would be abandoned. This was for two reasons. First, Mr. Healey was 
unwilling to allow any further cut in capability without a corresponding 
cut in commitment. Immediately after the cuts he proclaimed thi.s doctrine 
rather emphatically" ••• I have made certain that as capability is cut, 





~Ql, 657, H. of C. , 25th January, 19£8, Col. 628. 
Vol. 751[ H. of c. , 27th July, 1967, Col. 1071. 
vol. 756[ H. of C. , 17th January, 1968, Col. 1797. 
~Ql. 7.57., H. of C. , 25th January, 1968, Col. 633. The Prime Minister made 
the same point. "We are determined", he said, "that our commitments,and 
capacities of our force to undertake them, should match and balance 
each other". vol. 756« H. of C., 16th January 1968, Col. 1582. 
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cutting the European commitment and leaving intact the East of Suez one. 
"Above all none of us on this side of the House" said the Defence 
Minister, "has ever believed that, important as our contribution outside 
Europe might be, it should never take precedence over our contribution to 
peace in Europe. For the foundation of Britain's security is today, 
as it has been for the past 1,000 years, the maintenance of peace in 
1 Europe". There could be no .more precise statement of the overwhelming 
dominar.ce of Europe in British foreign and defence policy. Mr. Healey 
concluded "The result is that, whenever economic pressures have forced 
us to reduce our spending on defence, we have had to look for the consequent 
2 
reductions in our military effort outside, not inside Europe". NATO 
had waited nearly twenty years for a British Government to make such a 
declaraticn. 3 
It was, moreover, clear that the demands of European security 
were certain to impose even greater pressures on Britain's defence resources. 
Mr. Healey informed the House that "President Johnson's recent statement 
on the need to reduce American spending overseas may well foreshadow 
some reduction in America's military contribution on this side of the 
Atlantic •.• I believe that if America is to retain her essential 
commitment to the defence of Western Europe in the 1970s we on this 
side of the Atlantic will have to be more self reliant in defence tha~ 
we have been in the 1960s".4 The Defence Minister also underlined that 
the withdrawal from East of Suez would allow for the " ••• concentration 
of the British Navy in the El.lropean theatre ••• ", which would " •.. make 
1 
vol. 757 L H. of C. , 25th January, 1968, Col. 622. 
2 
vol. 759, H. of C. , 25th January, 1968, Col. 622. 
3 Crisis in European Defence, 012. cit. I 12. 174. 
4 Vol. 757 L H. of C. L 25th January, 1968, Col. 626. 
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possible a powerful strengthening of NATO's southern flank at a time 
when the threat to peace may appear to be increasing there".l These were 
powerful strategic reasons for a greater effort in Europe and for 
disengagement from East of Suez. Of course there was much self-deception 
involved as well but in general the Cabinet took the Vi6W that Britain's 
withdrawal from East of Suez would enable a better re-deployment of scarce 
resources for the European role. 
The withdrawal decision however appeared to be 70% economic, 20% 
political and 10% strategic. And yet such a contention in reality obscures 
the complexities of the decisions taken. To quantify or measure a 
decision in this way gives it a simplicity and an inevitability and not 
to say a wisdom, it basically lacks. It is notoriously difficult to 
separate the variables involved. For instance, it has been argued most 
vehemently that the withdrawal decision was made because of the desire to 
maintain party cohesion, and that this was a political imperative. Party 
unity, however, was only a residual factor because it was being undermined 
by the Government's introduction of unpopular economic measures. In this 
variable the decision has a direct political explanation, and an indirect 
economic one. It cannot simply be attributed to either. However despite 
these difficulties certain tentative conclusions seem valid. 
In any consideration of Government decision-making at this level 
it is necessary to look not only at those factors which actually explain 
a decision, but also at those factors which the Government in the last 
analysis has to disregard. One of the most curious and remarkable features 
1 Vol. 757, H. of C., 25th January, 1968, Col. 627. Hr. Mayhew also made out 
a strong case for a greater naval contribution in Europe, arguing that 
fighting between Russia and the West "... is more likely to break out at 
sea than on land" and that a continuing presence East of Suez " ••• would 
diminish our presence in the Mediterranean, in the South Atlantic and 
at Simonstown .•. ". Vol. 760, H. pf C. l 114, March, 1968, Col. 1031. 
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of the withdrawal decision was that the Government finally disregarded 
what was conceptually speaking a very strong case against withdrawal. Its 
fear of instability East of Suez, its hesitation at abandoning its allies 
and its anxieties about Britain's declining world status, were instead 
massively overwhelmed by other strategic, economic and political arguments. 
Political decisions are in the last resort) though as much about 
individual decision-makers) as about issues. If different decision-makers 
had been in power it is not improbable that very different decisions 
1 
would have been taken; ~lthough a somewhat deterministic interpretation 
is possible given the constraints imposed by Britain's secular economic 
decline. The key man was, not surprisingly, the Prime Minister himself. 
This was not only because of his enormous personal power, but also because 
-
it was his change of view about the World Role, occurring some time after 
devaluation, that really brought about its eventual demise. Not surprisingly 
the change in Mr. Wilson's position was accompanied by similar changes in 
the pOSitions of some of his less independently-minded colleagues. Of 
course Mr. Wilson was in a sense reacting to changes in socio-economic-
strategic conditions as well as perceiving their inter-relationship. 
All through his political career Harold Wi1son had shown an obsessive 
regard for the power the Labour Party could command rather than for the 
prinCiples and objectives that power would allow a Labour Government 
to achieve. His obsession with party unity fitted into this pre-occupation. 
This was dramatically illustrated at that time of intense intra-party 
crisis in the late 1950s and early 1960s when Labour's former leader 
1 See an interesting discussion of both the rational actor and decision-
maker approach in Allison, Graham, E~sence of Decision· explaiEing the 
Cuban missile crisis. 1971, p. 5. He describes three models,~tional 
actor or "classical" model; Organizational Process Model; and a Governmental 
(Bureaucratic) Politics model. His use of the term i~ roughly the 
equivalent of "concepr~ (l'\ scheme or framework". 
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Mr. Gaitskell insisted on raising the issues associated with Labour's 
clause four and nuclear policies. Harold Wilson at the 1960 Scarborough 
Conference opposed Hugh Gaitskell not because he thought him to be in 
error, but because he thought that de fence raised issues which need not 
be debated and would, if brought into the open, lead to the fragmentation 
of the Party. Mr. Wilson's criticism of his leader was not one of 
princi ple and not of doctrinal deviation. He is reputed to have asserted 
at the time of the unilateral disarmament debate that he could "draft 
1 
out at least seven defence policies on which the Party could unite". 
It was anyway manifest that in 1968 Mr. Wilson was desperately 
anxious not to antagonise the doctrinaire faction of the Party in the 
way his predecessor had done. On several celebrated occasions he 
revealed himself willing to upset Cabinet colleagues in order to appease 
the Left. The Prime Minister, in fact, never lost contact with the Left. 
Often to the chagrin of his loyalists (the residual heirs of Labourism 
and of social democratism) he would spend many hours informally talking 
to his most fervent and persistent critics among the 'utopians' and 
'scientific socialists'. 
Mr. Jenkins was also a key figure in the withdrawal decisions. 
Indeed Dick Taverne described the fight within the Cabinet as simply 
a battle royal between the Treasur~ and the Minister of Defence. 
1-VL-~U1 W -G!.-
jlndeed Crossman confirm: that such a set~piece battle did also involve 
Departmental interests. Although we have already looked at the 
part the Chancellor played, one can add that Mr. Jenkins was 
successful because he was intellectua lly equipped for the intense 
in-fighting and maneouvering that characterised the final decision. 3 This 




Haseler, S., op. cit., p. 61 . 
Denis Healey and the Policies of Power, 0 • cit., p. 195. 
Of course within the Departmental negotiated order the Treasurey is 
supreme in its clash with Ministry of Defence. ,~_ ---- To date the 
Treasury has yet to be worsted. See Williams, Geoffrey~e Ten-Xe~ 
Rul~ and British Rearmament (unpublished MA thesis, London University) 
1975, pp. 8-15. 
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put a case forcibly enough, but would never push his argument to the 
paint of rupture when things did not look like going his way. This 
"t: 
was not the case with Mr. Brown who frequently threatened to resign; 
but the Foreign Secretary was really only a half-hearted supporter of 
the World Role. While he never accepted the facile East of Suez-
European dichotomy, he was well aware that other powerful European 
statesmen did. His advocacy of the World Role in consequence revealed 
much ambiguity and the erratic volatility that characterised a great 
part of his political work.1J Mr. Crossman also~despite his brilliant 
analytical gifts,was a relative failure as a Minister. His influence 
on defence was also minimal. He was conscripted by Harold Wilson for 
service on the defence sub-committee of the Cabinet (DOPC) but his co~ 
tribution 2 was that of the grand inquisitor. 
Of course, the Government can be criticised for the substance of 
the January decision, but it is more difficult to criticise it for the 
manner in which the decision was taken. The Government itself was not 
doctrinaire and did not take the decision without considerable thought. 
There were at least five intensely fought Cabin~t meetings before the 
final decision. It should also be remembered that the countries affected 
by the decision were all consulted rather than just informed. Mr. Brown 
went to the United States. Mr. Thomson went to the Far East and Goronwy 
Roberts visited the Persian Gulf. No Cabinet decision was taken until 
the views of Britain's allies were assessed and in the event the decision 
was materially affected by those views. 
1 
2 
Brown, G., op. cit. p.IT3 
Crossman, Vol. I., op. cit., p.70. George Wigg however wrote that 
Crossman was "of mighty wit and little wisdom". See Wigg, G., -,o;;;,=._. -=~ 
p. 341. 
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There were, though, some unfortunate aspects of the decision. The 
most unfortunate aspect was that the East of Suez issue was disfigured 
by considerations of party susceptibilities and in consequence it became 
almost impossible to do justice to the intricate strategic arguments 
involved. It was on this occasion almost inevitable that this issue was 
decided not solely on its own merits, but by factors which were not 
strictly relevant. Considerations of party unity should not have had 
such preponderence over matters of supreme .importance. 
The Government also acted in an indecisive manner. If defence 
cuts were so critical to Britain's economic viability why were they not 
taken immediately after devaluation or at least foreshadowed at that time? 
Instead the Government promised that no such cuts would be made and thus, 
in the event, suffered a greater loss of face and left itself open to the 
charge that its word could not even be trusted one month to another. 
Although the Government's decision to leave both the Persian Gulf 
and South-East Asia gave the withdrawal a coherence and a strategic 
rationale, its decision to retain a general capability was both contradictory 
and confusing. This evidence of indecisiveness was perhaps of more 
fundamental significance because it signified a nation in decline. Ebbing 
national power often leads to a precipitate and foolish deployment of 
weapons systems and strategic postures which would earlier have been 
dismissed as irrelevant if not pernicious acquisitions. The concept of 
a general capability was just part of a more widespread self-deception 
which spread right up to the nuclear level. 
- 391 -
There are other aspects of the January decision worthy of discussion 
and analysis, but these can be more properly assessed within the wider 
context of the whole process of withdrawal which started when Labour took 
office in 1964. Although the January 1968 decision will stand as a 
major turning point in British foreign policy, it should not really be 
divided from the events of the preceding three years. It was in the 
last analysis only the final decision in a long series of lesser decisions. 
Having examined the elements separately it is now time to look at the 
decision as a whole. 
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C H APT E R XIV 
THE TRIUMPH OF THE IDEOLOGY OF LABOURISM 
AND THE WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST OF SUEZ 
In the general election of June 1970, Labour was defeated. 
Mr. Wilson, who had presided over the nation's affairs ever since Labour 
Ot'rO).i-"""" ·h'~ t-
had first assumed office some six years earlier, returned to the ~ 
benchf1 - perhaps to deliberate on the momentous changes in foreign 
and defence policy which he had both wittingly and unwittingly 
, 1 lntroduced. In this deliberation he was not alone. There is no 
doubt about the lasting relevance of his decisions, although some 
confusion about how they related to a broader foreign policy perspective, 
and inevitably also criticisms emerged about the way in which they were 
made. In fact, the Labour Government could claim very little credit 
for the way in which withdrawal from East of Suez was accomplished. 
The post-war epoch has been necessarily a period when traditional 
British defence policies were re-formulated fortuitously which inevitably 
implies a process of trial and error. This process reached its apotheosis 
under Labour in the mid-1960s and probably accelerated more quickly because 
Britain had a Labour, and not a Conservative, Government. In essence 
though it was a long term phenomenon; these painful decisions were those 
that any Government would have at first contemplated, and then introduced. 
No political Party can alter the nature of the international environment, 
although it is clear that the Labour Government did learn pragmatically 
to live with it in a multiplicity of ways and with varying degrees of 
l ' 2 rea ~sm. Labour was no more or less pragmatic than the Conservatives 
1 
2 
In his book - A Record of the Labour Goyernment - he does provide some 
evidence of considered retrospection though not much. Mr. Wilson's second 
book The Governance of Brita in is more analytical and for the student of 
politics more useful. 
Obviously political par~ies adjust to environmental changes less 
quickly than governments seeking to grapple with the consequences of 
environmental change. 
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who prided themeselves on having no ideological fixations. Both parties 
in fact articulate and aggregate the interests of a pluralist liberal-
democratic society. Labour both in power and opposition gave expression 
to the broad and conflicting interests of a liberal-democratic-interest-
dominated political process. This required the techniques of crisis 
management rather than the application of rigid political principles 
to the unpredictable and chaotic nature of events in both the internal 
and external environments within which nation-states seek to exist. Such 
political principles which were and are applied were those consistent 
with the ideology of liberal-democracy and with a Labour Government 
the emphasis given to policy reflected a greater commitment to an 
expanded concept of social democracy with more participation if not 
by the masses, then, through organized groups. However by the time Labour 
came to power Britain's secular economic decline was far advanced. The 
seeds of internal political fragmentation had also already been sown. 
Britain was no longer a great military power. A major environmental 
change had occurred. 
Be that as it may, no aspect of Britain's defence policy had 
declined since the war more comprehensively than her overseas role. We 
can identify four main reasons for this. First, environmental factors -
such as the growth and spread of nationalism and the growing hostility 
expressed by small nations towards any intervention from the great powers: 
second, value changes - an example of which would be the diminishing value 
attached to a Western military presence, and the loss of imperial will: 
and third, capability changes - the most obvious of which was the 
enormous military strength of the superpowers and possibly China, and 
the continuing economic decline and military overstretch of Britain; 
four, the dramatic impact of technological innovation. The East of 
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Suez role has been particularly influenced by all four factors, being 
a commitment in fact remote from the British homeland. 
Nevertheless Labour emphatically did not come into office with any 
real intention to~dicalljJChalleng~Britain's foreign policy or to 
end the East of Suez role. On the contrary when it came into office 
in late 1964, it seemed certain to follow the orthodox and well established 
policies of successive British Governments. Continuity of policy was 
inevitable. Labour's top leadership indeed regarded such continuity as 
almost desirable because they felt confident that they could make a better 
job in pursuing Britain's traditional interests. Although it is possible 
to argue that Labour's foreign policy goals, as opposed to short-term 
objectives, centred on a very different view of international policies than 
1 those which the Conservative Party regarded as practicable and' desirable. 
Conceivably Labour believed that national policy should serve to transform 
the international syste~of states into a genuine international society 
of states. Thus Labour' 5 commitment to the ideals of social democracy or 
those of a democratic socialist state revealed a more fundamental desire 
to transform the nature of the present international system. This deep 
underlying aspiration obviously and visibly conflicted with the inevitably 
limited character of policy in the short-run. Labour in office recognised 
the constraints imposed by the exercise of power in existing circumstances. 
But even then Labour appeared occasionally to recognise in opposition 
and more persistently in power, that international stability depended 
upon what Professor Bull describes as the entxenched "institutions of 
the society of states," the balance of power, international law, 
2 diplomacy, war and the great powers ' • 
1 See conclUding remarks of this thesis. 
2 
The Anarchical Society,- op. cit., introduction, xii. 
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In terms of policy, the only important difference therefore between 
the Parties was Labour's shrill insistence that Britain should castrate 
her nuclear independence and concentrate on making a greater conventional 
contribution to the Western alliance. In the event, however, even 
this difference soon diminished and then disappeared. This was not 
altogether unexpected, since Labour's elite ususally became more tentative 
on moving away from the radical influence of Party Conference and that 
of the National Executive Committee and into the more cautious environment 
of the 'departmental negotiated order' in Whitehall. l There was anyway an 
unshakable belief amongst Government Ministers that the traditional 
definition of Britain's 'national interests' was more or less about right 
and that Britain had sufficient power to sustain those interests. The 
East of Suez role, therefore, remained indisputably and indubitably 
safe while the Government retained a traditionalist image of national or 
permanent interests in its approach to foreign policy making (the 
object of which was to avoid foreclosing options) and in its 
assessment of national power. 
This traditionalism was curiously reinforced, up to a point, by 
Labour's somewhat internationalist ideology and also by a feeli.ng of 
obligation towards Britain's allies. This applied most strongly in 
regard to the Commonwealth, towards which Labour had a warm and 
genuinely sentimental and affectionate attachment. To a Party which 
1 See Barber, James. Who Makes British Foreign Policy? Professor Barber 
argues that "the departmental negotiated order and the formal office 
holder perspectives share certain assumptions. He suggests ~;I " P,, : 
(1) "Foreign policy making is essentially an activity of the executive 
arm of the government", (2) "Foreign policy involves specialist knowledge 
and access to a vast range of information, much of which is confidential 
and secret. Policy making therefore .requires time, experience and knowledge 
which is only available to the executive", (3) "The general public has 
little knowledge of or interest in foreign affairs. Even if it had greater 
interest, it would be inappropriate to make policy more public because of 
the need for confidentiality and an agreed national viewpoint", (4) "Parties 
parliament and pressure groups only play a peripheral part in foreign policy 
making, (5) "There are no deep ideological divisions among the policy makers, 
and there is usually consensus on the 'national interest', (6) "in foreign 
policy making the executive not only responds to initiative from others 
and to changing Circumstances, it also has an initiating role." p. 34. 
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was eager to claim responsibility for the birth of the New Commonwealth 
and to which the 'brotherhood of man' was not mere rhetoric but a 
fundamental tenet of faith for a substantial section of the Party, the 
protection of Commonwealth countries trying to foster relatively 
democratic forms was of some importance. This attitu~ was important 
~ 
because the ideology of Labourism was consistent with the long-term 
aspiration to see a transformation in the nature of international 
politics through the creation of a society of nation-states acting 
co-operatively and not in competition with each other over limited and 
diminishing resources. 
Indeed, at first, the new Labour Government conceded greater 
prominence to the oceanic role than to the continental one. Its 
European policy was quietly but definitely shelved and B.A.O.R., far 
from being strengthened, was cut back. Nevertheless the Government 
revealed no desperate anxiety to choose between the two roles; it was 
supposed that they could co-exist as they had done in the past. It 
was supposed by Labour that the two strategies were basically complementary 
and it was just a question of attempting to reconcile them. 
However, in due course the contradiction between Labour's 
declaratory and operational policies widened and by the end of 1966 
the Government had been compelled to adopt a new position. Not only 
had the strategic, economic and political perspective of Europe increased 
at the expense of East of Suez, but the economic and political perspective 
had become of more immediate importance than the strategic one. This 
too worked in favour of Europe and against the East of Suez role, since 
1 
the latter was essentially a military role. 
1 The extent of the military character of the East of Suez role was 
examined in Chapter II (See Annex At B and C) • 
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And yet the Eurocentric posture of Labour's fo"reign and defence 
policies was not entirely convincing, let alone enthusiastically 
endorsed by the Party as a whole. The Party had no great love of the 
European movement. Labour voters, especially amongst manual workers, 
1 
revealed a cultural hostility to a closer alignment with Europe. 
Moreover, Britain had traditionally been unwilling to limit her interests 
to one single area - her foreign policy had consciously reflected the 
principle of overlapping circles. Nevertheless, under Labour this 
traditional diversity of effort and interest, the continental perspective 
and the imperial one, though still apparent, was less marked than before, 
and it seemed that all Britain's interests - strategic, political and 
economic - might slowly converge in just one area, Europe. Labour's 
re-orientation of policy would thus allow Britain to move closer to 
EEC-Europe or perhaps move in favour of a more detached role for Britain 
2 
as Richard Crossman preferred. 
This historic shift in policy had both a negative and a positive 
aspect. It represented both a weariness and a certain unease with 
the post-imperial role and a growing, if muted, identity with Europe. 
It was, however, more of a swing away from East of Suez than a swing 
towards the Continent. This negative aspect of the decision stemmed 
from simultaneous and intersecting doubts about whether Britain had 
enough military capability to continue a World Role and also about the 




Linberg and Schingold, Europe's Would be polity, p. 257. Also See more 
reCent evidence relating to the period after Britain joined the Community 
in The Times, August 13th"l971, referring to an NUP survey which suggested 
that the"opposition to the EEC is found 'mainly among older people, 
manual workers and members of the ' Labour Party" 
Crossman, R., Vol. 11 OPe cit., ' 
Of course, the world role and the East of Suez one are not necessarily 
synonymous but in this analysis I distinguish between the world role, which 
depended upon being perceived by other actors as having a great power role 
within the international system, and the more limited imperial role associated 
with the legacy of Empire and the development of post-imperial connexions 
within the Commonwealth. 
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This doubt about the value of the role was inevitably strongest 
in the econom~c perspective of foreign policy making. Labour's term 
of office saw not only a growing disbelief that Britain's economic 
interests East of Suez could be protected by force, but also a continuing 
decline in Commonwealth trade. Indeed by 1967 few people were suggesting 
that Commonwealth trade could be dramatically increased. Those who 
disapproved of the European move suggested instead that Britain could 
either go it alone or could participate in a North Atlantic Free Trade 
1 Area~ Hardly anyone justified the Commonwealth links on economic grounds. 
As Leonard Beaton wrote "where British trade is concerned, the Commonwealth 
countries accepted the loss of preference implied in British accession to 
EFTA; and after expressing deep concern in 1962 over the consequences of 
facing the EEC tariff at British ports Commonwealth governments adapted 
,,2 
to what they regarded as a British decision which ought to be respected. 
Britain became openly doubtful about the utility of the Commonwealth. 
The Government had similar doubts about the World Role on the 
political level. These doubts increased as Britain drifted from one 
military involvement or political crisis to another. There also existed 
a more pervasive frustration as Britain's influence became less and 
less effective in world politics and her relationship with the 
3 United States less and less central to basic strategic interests. 
The Eurocentric perspective of Labour's foreign and defence 
policies in terms of strategic interests still remained largely undefined 
however. It was clear that Labour was uncertain about the value and 
1 See Maxwell Stamp Associates, The Free Trade Area Option, November, 1967; 
also Beaton, Leonard, Commonwealth in a New Era, pp. 30-32. 
2 ibid. p. 30. 
3 
The Permanent Alliance"op. cit. p. 213. 
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importance of a Western presence East of Suez and possibly resented 
being taken along by United States policY m Vietnam; but it was 
certainly not yet evident that Labour thought that Britain's strategic 
interests only lay in Europe. And yet the longer Labour remained in 
office grappling with intractable realities the stronger became its 
conviction that Europe was a vital'national interest'and East of Suez 
only a peripheral one. 
This changing perception of Britain's interests was in some 
respects curious. After all the East of Suez role was not only a 
strategic interest of some standing but it also arguably underpinned 
another of Britain's vital strategic interests - the special relationship 
with the United States. It was a means goal as well as an ends goal. 
To the Prime Minister and Mr. Healey this was one of the critical 
reasons for preserving the East of Suez role if it were at all possible. 
Nevertheless the strategic relationship, including what Professor 
Coral Be~l has called the advanced-weapons connexion, with the United 
States were not sufficiently strong to stop Labour withdrawing, from 
1 East of Suez or to stand in the way of closer ties with· Europe. This 
was due to two factors. First, the United States, far from wanting 
Britain to remain aloof from the process of European integration, had 
constantly pushed her entry into the E.E.C. Second, United States 
influence over British foreign policy was diminishinc;not least 
2 because the strategiC relationship was less salient than before. 
In the late 1950s and 1960s European Gov.ernments ) much to the 
chagrin of their respective chiefs of staff, generally tended to play-
1 
2 
The Debatable Alliance, op. cit. Dr. Bell discusses the nature of the 
advanced weapons connexion which, when . she wrote about it in 1962, 
had enormous importance for Britain in structuring her strategic 
interests. 
Collective Security, op. cit., p. 65. 
- 400 -
down the strategic dimension; instead they devoted themselves to economic 
problems and political crises, perhaps out of a feeling of strat.egic 
impotence. The prevailing attitude was that there was no real hope 
that Europe could remove its humiliating strategic dependence upon 
the United S ta tes . 1 And this incontrovertible fact, it was feared) if. 
pondered upon for too long might sap confidence and morale. The 
question of European security was fraught with such moral and intellectual 
complexity that it was thought more prudent to let it remain undisturbed. 
Moreover the d~tente encouraged European political elites to turn their 
minds away from intractable defence problems quite safely. This 
optimism did not persist into the seventies. 
It was not only the diminishing prominence of the strategic 
connexion and the stoic acceptance of the strategic nuclear deadlock 
that weakened the strategic raison d'etre for the 'special relationship'. 
Gaullist strategic analysis and theory too had encouraged the notion 
that a close relationship with the United States did not necessarily 
guarantee that America would in all circumstances defend Europe, just 
as a weaker relationship did not necessarily preclude it. 2 Indeed, 
might not a closer relationship with the United States, so the argument 
ran, lead to all sorts of embarrassments and perhaps dangers which 
might be spared if the relationship were not quite so close? The 
Vietnam syndrome had become a part of the political consciousness of 
Europe's political elites. Fear of uncontrolled escalation arising 
from a limited conflict was beginning to diminish the attractiveness of 
the Atlantic Alliance. 3 The Left could agree with this analysis • . 
1 This dependence was not merely political or economic but the result of 
2 
3 
military technology which rendered Europe horribly vulnerable to nuclear 
destruction in the event of deterrence failing~ See Williams, Geoffrey. 
The Permanent Alliance: the European-American Alliance, op. cit., 
pp. 357-362. 
see Kohl, W. L. French Nuclear Diplomacy,. 1971. 
, The Permanent Alliance, OP. cit •. 
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It was this downgrading of the strategic and political links 
with the United States, combined with a political and economic shift 
away from the Commonwealth, which left the East of Suez role in such 
a vulnerable and exposed position. Nevertheless it is improbable 
that this movement would in itself have induced a withdrawal from East 
of Suez. More immediately decisive than the subtle change in Labour's 
perception of the traditional spheres of British strategic interests 
was the increasing gap between capability and commitment that made it 
inevitable that inexorably Labour would have to choose between those 
spheres of interest. 
When the Labour Government assumed office it made no immediate 
attempt to limit the extent and nature of Britain's foreign policy. It 
is true that it strongly emphasized that Britain was over-committed, but 
it simply (and simplistically) argued that the answer to this problem 
lay in greater efficiency in defence matters and not in fewer 
commitments. Nevertheless, despite some modest successes in the area 
of cost-effectiveness, Labour lamentably failed to bridge the gap 
between capability and commitment. In fact the gulf became a chasm. 
Not only did Britain's commitments East of Suez become more onerous and 
ominous as Confrontation escalated to a level which stretched Britain 
to the point just short of what was endurable, but it also seemed 
possible that Britain would be expected to make a greater contribution 
to European defence. 
Whereas Britain's commitment to Europe was relatively stable, 
since there was an irreducible minimum contribution below which a 
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British Government would not fall, the same could not and did not 
apply to East of Suez commitment. Indeed the overseas role was 
largely dependent on what happened in Europe and upon the logic of 
Britain's continental strategy. Britain's interests were so interrelated 
and her forces so stretched that the nation's defence policy could only 
operate on the assumption that commitments were activated only in an 
orderly and conventionally interspersed sequence, one by one in turn. 
It followed that the East of Suez role only appeared stable and 
permanent while the d~tente in Europe continued and while the demands 
of continental security remained low. Unfortunately, under Labour 
the demands of European security threatened to increase. There was 
growing uncertainty about the United States' contribution to the 
Continent, as well as deep foreboding about the dark shadow of the 
Russian naval build-up in the Mediterranean. l 
And yet, while Britain's commitments became more active and 
burdensome, her capacity to fulfil them failed to materialize 
correspondingly. By the end of 1965 Britain's planned defence expenditure 
had been stripped to the bone, its overweight excesses trimmed in a 
flurry of cost-effective exercises. The 1966 Defence Review hardly 
improved matters. In fact, it did not do so. Indeed it "made a point 
of emphaSising the over e:<pansion of British forces but it did relatively 
2 li ttle to relieve the situation". The real tragedy for Labour was that 
each round of defence cuts demanded a reciprocal round of cuts in the 
nation's commitments, and each year's defence White Paper invariably 
appeared just short of the next economic crisis, which thmforeshadowed 
1 
2 
Erickson, John, Soviet Defence Policies and Naval Interests, and Weinland, 
Robert, Analysis of Admiral Gorshkov's Navies in War and Peace, Chapters 4 
and 29 respectively in McGuire, Booth, McDonnell, International Affairs, 
Vol. XLVII, No. 3, July, 1971. 
Martin, L. W., ~ritish Defence Policy: the Long Recessional. OPe cit., 
p. 3. 
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more cuts in defence expenditure the following year. :ef a happy 
equipoise of circumstances were ever reached in this desperately 
downward spiral it was only short-lived: new economic situations 
invariably stimulated further rounds of action and reaction. 
Labour's decision to withdraw from East of Suez - as with earlier 
decisions - was a classic example of the interrelationship between 
1 defence and foreign policy. But they were not well co-ordinated and the 
Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Colonial Offices pursued different 
interpretations of the policy of withdrawal. And it became apparent that 
"the failure of the departments concerned to co-ordinate foreign and 
defence policies" in relation to decolonization led to "several 
2 independent and often contradictory lines of policy". Nevertheless 
it is clear that both were inexorably moving after 1965 in the same 
grand direction and that both contributed to the erosion of the East 
of Suez role. They do not, however, contribute equally. It was the 
growing realisation by the Government that Britain could not sustain 
the broad range of foreign policy commitments that she had done in the 
past, rather than any fundamental assessment of where her interests lay, 
that really explains the withdrawal decision and the turn towards a 
regional and away from a universal defence policy. The Government's 
somewhat tentative bid to establish a general capability should not be 
allowed to obscure this trend: it was perhaps little more than the 
penultimate gesture of an imperial power anxious to both appease its 
conscience and meet the resentments of its ostensible allies. 
2 See John Raylis, et • . al., Ope cit., p. 265. 
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It was clear also, that Britain's capability deficiency and the 
shift from an oceanic to a Eurocentric strategy were secular trends 
and not temporary aberrations. It was because the defence over-stretch 
was not a temporary phenomenon and because the prominence of Europe 
did not cease to be relevant because of the transitory Gaullist veto, 
that the East of Suez role was eventually terminated - the result of 
being constantly squeezed between twin pressures for a prolonged 
period of interaction. 
Clearly, world events militate,d against the East of Suez role, 
but it would be imprudent to see the withdrawal decision entirely in 
terms of external environmental ·factors. After all events are a 
mixture of both the external and internal environments in international 
politics. What matters is how events are perceived by various actors, 
individual decision-makers, political parties, pressure groups, 
government departments and other centres of power, and what influence 
1 is then exerted upon the Government of the day. Indeed the decision to 
withdraw from East of Suez was uniquely that taken by a particular Cabinet 
and would almost certainly not have been taken exactly when it was, had 
Britain not had a Labour Government. The timing of the decision was 
obviously affected by those mUltiplicity of internal pressures which 
are peculiar to Labour Cabinets divided between conflicting ideological 
commitments and expectations. 
Whereas the Labour Party's almost total concern with domestic 
matters often leads in opposition to an apathetic attitude towards 
defence matters, when in power this same Concern frequently stimulates 
an intense hostility to defence policy from the left of the l?arty 
1 
See Vital, David. The Making of British ?oreign pOli£Y, for a general 
discussion of the factors affecting policy-makers. 
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who identify only friends on the left even when as orga nized stat~ 
power those 'friends' have large military establishments. While an 
opposition is generally oblivious to the cost of implementing 
ambitious programmes of social change, and is more concerned with 
packaging its programme for a marked electoral effect, a Government's 
primary concern is to decide who gets what and when, that is, how 
scarce resources are to be allocated between different priorities. 
Political parties tend to face up to the fact that both defence and 
domestic objectives are irreconcilable claimants upon limited resources 
only when they have actually to initiate policy-decisions in power. 
This was made brutally apparent to the Labour Governments of 1964 
and 1966 because they presided over a period of acute resource constraint 
and yet one of increasing social and economic demands. Labour was 
expected to convert increasingly heavy inputs into spectacularly 
1 
successful outputs as rapidly as possible. 
That the Party had so many demands to make was inevitable given 
that Labour had been out of power for so long. It therefore came into 
office with extensive social commitments and a passionate desire to 
implement a programme of radical social change. Nor was it surprising 
that Party pressure on the Government's defence policy reached its 
peak when the Government's efforts to allocate scarce resources were at 
their most intense. Its wage freezes and incomes policies and its 
1 See The Go Ahead Year, 1966, which set the tone of Labour's heady optimism 
on the economy: liThe aims are simple enough; we want full employment, 
a faster rate of industrial expansion; a sensible distribution of industry 
throughout the country; an end to the present chaos in traffic and transport; 
a brake on rising prices and a solution to our balance of payments problems". 
p.S. Also, Labour pledged itself to achieve: " ••• a national plan for 
Transport covering the national networks of road, rail and coach communication 
properly co-ordinated with air, coastal shipping and post services." p.77. 
Finally) it was claimed that "the hation.·.needs and Labour will carry through 
a revolution in our educational system". p.99. 
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overall economic strategy of public expenditure cuts were the clearest 
indications to the Party that it faced a stark choice between social 
and defence priorities. This was not new nor unexpected but the 
agony of the choice to be made proved much more unpalatable than most 
Labour Ministers had expected. 
In any choice between these priorities it is usual for a Labour 
Government to pursue its domestic goals and to disregard its defence 
ones: it would be altogether surprising for a Labour Government to 
forego its social priorities in order to maintain its defence policy. 
Of course its leaders are historically and ideologically susceptible to 
pressure favouring social welfare provision, educational expenditure, the 
maintenance of full.employment and price stability. Moreover, in time 
of Party despondency, of the kind experienced after 1966, the fun~ntalists, 
of both the utopian and marxist Left, usually reassert themselves and 
the demands for a return to a more ideologically 'socialist' orientated 
1 polic~ gather support. Political principles are rediscovered and 
political expediency repudiated. The East of Suez role in fact had 
very little ideological justification or even legitimacy in the eyes 
of the Left, and it was this absence of doctrinal backing, combined 
with a perception that the role was not really central to the 'national 
2 interest' either, that exposed its vulnerability. 
And yet while a degree of hope persisted that the economy would 
pick*up prior to 1966, the East of Suez presence remained a credible 
1 Stephen Hasler defines the Left as "moralistic, idealistic, utopian) 
civil libertarian at home and internationalist abroad", Ope cit., p.l17. 
2 But the Left has always ex~ggerated . the exact importance of Britain to 
the Third World. This attitUde Denis Healey once described as the 
'tea planters of Assam' complex. Mr. Kingsley Martin when editor of 
~e New Statesman and Nation revealed that this complex had also 
become a fixation. 
• 
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policy. It was not thought to be as doctrinally devoid of morality 
or as imprudent as the Vietnam or Rhodesian policies and the 
fundamentalists with growing vehemence therefore concentrated on the 
latter. It was only when a shortage of resources to sustain comprehensive 
commitments really became apparent that the Party's attention turned upon 
1 the East of Suez role. In the first instance., then~ the role came under 
acute intra-party pressure simply because it was absorbing a significant 
part of the nation's resources which it was considered could be diverted 
into social and economic programmes. The Party's barely conceivable 
yet almost total consensus over defence policy could not be sustained 
under the crucible of economic stringency. It was only at that nodal 
point that the East of Suez role's shallow ideological appeal became 
desperately obvious. 
The East of Suez role therefore had three basic weaknesses which 
in the cold atmosphere of bleak austerity made it an obvious candidate 
for a Labour Government's axe: it was only a peripheral 'national 
interest', it was consuming scarce resources and its ideological 
justification carried only a scintilla of conviction with either 
wing of the Labour Party. 
It is now possible, without considering further the substance of the 
withdrawal decision, to evaluate the procedures and processes involved. 
While any final judgement inevitably must be critical if not overwhelmingly s~ 
it will not be entirelyhostile,ML Healey as the Minister responsible for 
the military substance of the East of Suez role, at any rate can be 
partially excused since his defence policy was effectively circumscribed 
1 As Mr. Mayhew remarked in his resignation speech of 1966 that "if the 
Government insists on a world role .for Britain in the 70s it must be 
prepared to pay the price,and provide a balanced force East of Suez, 
including FlllA and carriers". Extract in Survival, Vol. VIII, 
No. 4, April 1966. 
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by the Treasury as well as the Foreign Office and above all by the 
Cabinet. It was inevitable that the 'financial restraint' was never 
far from the Defence Minister's mind, and from that indeed of the 
Cabinet as a whole. It certainly made his task a great deal more 
difficult. "The Treasury were satisfied with E2,000 million and I had 
no incentive to push further", said Mr. Healey. "It was really 
arbitrary. We were obsessed by the fact that there was this automatic 
increase in defence costs if one didn't do something. We were faced 
with a programme which went up from E2,000 million to £2,400 million 
in five years, so we decided that we would make sure ~~at in five years' 
time we didn't go up at all." And then came the crucial observation 
that "the Treasury had totally miscalculated its ability to run the 
economy".l The Cabinet also seriously miscalculated its capacity to 
meet its political commitments with diminishing economic resources. 
Denis Healey then, was not entirely to blame for the failures 
of his defence policy. He was under extreme pressure from the Treasury's 
defence ceiling, from the foreign office's plantigrade reluctance to 
cut commitment and from the Government's own anguished failure to 
achieve economic growth. Then there was the influence of the Prime 
Minister who favoured a grand strategy with imperial overtones .• 
Mr. Healey was not alone in the difficulties he faced. His 
inherited responsibilities and commitments were compounded by Labour'S 
vastly ambitious defence strategy. The Government as a whole was also 
set some fairly intractable defence problems, particularly in relation 
to the East of Suez role. Chronic economic weakness, a Service manpower 
shortage, the costs and risks of Confrontation, escalating defence costs 
1 The Policies of Power, op. ci t., P .187. 
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and greater military capabilities available to actual and potential 
adversaries, all in some significant way obstructed the formulation of 
a strong and consistent defence policy. So did the attitude of much 
of the Labour Party; the Party Conference in particular. The trade 
unions also strongly influenced the Labour Party Conference, and through 
the Conference, the National Executive Committee. Of course the NEC 
tends to take a different view of defence policy from that of the 
government. The trade unions, despite the challenge of Frank COUSins 
over the nuclear question in 1960, have though generally endeavoured to 
support the Cabinet over its defence policy. As the right controlled 
1 the bloc votes they carried the day at Labour Party Conferences. 
The growing influence of the left within the trade unions began to 
complicate the Cabinet's priorities though by 196~ and beyond, but the 
influence of the trade unions should not be underestimated. Of the 
twenty-eight members of the NEC, only ten are not directly or indirectly 
elected, by the bloc vote of the trade unions. And it was cle'ar that 
trade union opposition was the principal reason for the Wilson 
Government's abandonment of the Prices and Incomes Policy in 1969-70. 
The growing left-wing influence within the trade unions and the increase 
in what John MacKintosh described as the populist-socialist influence 
contributed to the marked opposition to the Government's defence and 
2 foreign policies. 
1 
2 
The trade union 'bloc vote' elects the twelve members of the trade union 
section of the NEC; it also effectively determines who is elected as 
the five members of the 'women's section', and the Party Treasurer. 
The populist/socialist approach is strictly speaking a post-1970 development. 
Professor MacKintosh is surely right ,in asserting 'that the populist/ 
socialist approach is not a genuine doctrinaire position but one which 
raises not questions of principle rather than those relating to who is 
m*ing the demand? As MacKintosh contended this populist approach 
consisted of lending support "to the best organized and most defiant 
groups, presumably because they are showing most working-class vigour". 
See Problems of the Labour Party, The Political Quarterly. Oct./Dec. 
1972. 
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Indeed, frequent attempts at a well-informed and dispassionate 
discussion of defence policy therefore simply collapsed into a heated 
exchange of well-rehearsed argument, which established the continued 
existence of deep differences of opinion. The indifference of the 
Party to defence matters, additionally the belief that defence goals 
were of less importance than social priorities, did not make the Government's 
policy-making very ' easy. The non-doctrinal centre of the Party 
rallied to the Government's aid. They ~egarded the defence policy of 
the Cabinet as quite appropriate for an essentially non-theoretical 
Gaitskellite revisionist Party. 
Above all there was the chaotic and wayward nature of events 
East of Suez, and the fact that all projections about what might happen 
if Britain withdrew from the area were impossible to evaluate since they 
could plausibly prove true or false according to the variables which 
any particular scenario might include. There was acute and not unexpected 
doubt about the lessons that could be derived from past and present 
1 
military interventions overseas. The lesson of the American intervention 
in Vietnam seemed very different .from the lesson of the British involvement 
in Confrontation (or indeed of that in Malaya between 1948-60) and the 
2 East African deployments of limited force. 
It was also a complication that as harassed Ministers grappled 
with the East of Suez decision, they must have found it very difficult 
to evaluate all those pressures exerted upon them, because the World 
Role was devoid of real substance. There was no dogma to encapsulate 
1 This point was made by Mayhew in his resignation speech. He said:" It has 
been suggested that in the seventies we would avoid getting involved alone 
with. any country possessi.ng sophisticated weapons, but this concept of 
sophistication is dangerously vague. The Vietcong do not have 'sophisticated 
weapons' yet they tie down . very large United States forces. Moreover, it 
took Indonesia only five .years to acquire these weapons, and other 
countries may quickly follow suit." Survival, OPe cit., p. 127. 
2 
Thompson, Robert, Defeating Communist Insurgency. 
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the debate and there were no clear core interests to dictate where 
Britain's 'national interest' lay. Had the relevance and indeed the 
significance of the East of Suez role as an imperial responsibility 
actually disappeared? Was the role no longer an essential element in 
the containment of so-called global Communism? Did the increasing 
interdependence and interpenetration of nation-states erode the 
relevance of military force? These questions were so complex and 
bewildering because there existed a moral, an intellectual, and 
sentimental aroma about the role which inevitably led to ambivalence 
and confusion. 
Matters were worse confounded for the Government by it so obviously 
being at the mercy of totally unpredictable events. It is however a 
demonstrable fact that middle ranking powers, are unable to control 
their environment to any great extent and are to some extent 
circumscribed by any minor mutation in their surroundings. Thus even 
a minor change in the external environment can compel an extensive 
re-alignment of policy. It is this which explicates the inconstancy 
of policy often imposed on states which are rapidly declining in power. 
"If I were to identify" .. Mr. Healey said .... "one single lesson which a 
minister must learn when he is in office, it is the way in which 
financial constraints must limit a Government's freedom of choice -
even in the richest country in the world".l How much bigger a constraint 
it must be for the Government of a second-rate power, although of "the 
2 first rank" which embraces world wide commitments. 
1 Royal United Services Institute LectUre, 22nd October, 1964. 
2 
The phrase "of the first rank" is a splendid invention of the 
Foreign and Commonweal th Office. 
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Nevertheless1 despite the complexitites and uncertainties faced 
by the Labour Government j it did not take the East of Suez decision 
lightly, and for a considerable time struggled heroically~if mistakenl~ 
to maintain a position which it thought contributed to international 
stability, even in the face of mounting opposition. Indeed, the 
East of Suez role was not universally admired in the country and even 
less than respected by an increasingly politicized Trade Union 
1 
movement and in much of the P.L.P. In standing up to this veritable 
chorus of opposition, in disregarding the insular pre-disposition of 
the Labour Party, and by refusing to con template a precip. t),ous wind-up 
of the World Role, the Government revealed a degree of obduracy and 
resilience if not courage which is to be admired or condemned according 
to political commitment. 
However, Labour had to formulate its defence policy against a 
sombre background and perhaps as a consequence made several fundamental 
errors in judgement and revealed some glaring analytical weaknesses. 
The superficial verdict could be the usual one of 'too little and 
too late'. But the Cabinet's rejoinder to its critics was that 
Britain's defence policy reached "the right place at the right time", 
and that this is all anyone can ask of a Government. But even with the 
contention that Britain had reached "the right place at the right time" 
the Government could still be condemned because it did not get there 
in the 'right way'. Richard Crossman saw it rather in that way. 
1 
Patrick Gordon Walker described an alarming process of trial and 
The Opposition to In Place of Strife which emerged in 1969 in a belated 
bid to control prices an,d incomes through statutory means ran into 
considerable trade union opposition. This played some part in 
radicalizing the Trade Union leadership at both plant and national 
level. See Jenkins, Peter, The Battle of .Downing Street. 
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error and seemed in no doubt about the unplanned nature of the withdrawal 
decisions. "Faltering enough they seem",l he said. "The decision 
appears so reluctant as to have been unintended until almost the last 
moment. The Cabinet looks as if it were pushed and coerced by 
unforeseen events into an unwelcome conclusion. Factors and policies 
that were clearly linked were not correlated". Later on he talked 
ab t th" d'l ds th d i ' ,,2 ou e ••• ~ atory progress towar e great ec s~on.... • This 
impression of decision-making is also confirmed by Crossman and Brown; 
indeed by Wilson himself. 
Labour followed an unpremeditated, erratic and involved course 
and therefore the Government was unable to take the long view. 
Policy simply lacked long-term stability. It was clear that policy-making 
appeared to be somewhat involuntary and often appeared to be an 
ill-considered response to yet another crisis. Labour's policy was 
in fact a mixture of rational and calculated primary decisions which 
then provoked a series of unplanned and unforeseeable secondary 
deciSions. The Government was involved in an action and reaction 
phenomenon, a capability-commitment syndrome, induced by the nation's 
economic plight. Labour came into power strongly committed to 
reinforce the traditional features of British foreign policy: in 
the end it weakened them. This outcome was described as an "act of 
realism".3 
At best Labour's defence policy was based on a painful realism, 




Gardon Walker, P., OPe cit., p. 131. 
ibid. 
This phrase crept into Denis Healey's robust defence of his Defence 
Review of February 1966. In March he described his policy as "an 
exercise in political and military realism". 
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combination of romanticism, sentimentalism and escapism as it shifted 
from one policy stance to another. The Government at first clung 
doggedly to the full range of the nation's commitments and then refused 
to augment Britain's capabilities to meet its obligations. In the 
end it showed itself more willing to take risks East of Suez than to 
strain Party unity or to jeopardise its chances of eventual electoral 
success. Mr. Wilson's priorities carried the day. 
Of course, it has been asserted that it would have been absurd 
for the Government to have flouted the views of the anti-East of Suez 
group while simultaneously reinstating prescription charges. It was 
inevitable that the Government not only acceded to pressures it 
sympathized with, but also came to terms with views which it knew to 
be inconsistent or even ill-founded. And yet while a Government 
should -be responsible to articulated interests)it must not deny 
responsibility for the ultimate decision. This is, of course, an 
accepted and traditional distinction, but was the Labour Government 
guilty of fudging important decisions until and unless they were forced 
Upon it by events or organized interests or both? 
Above all the Labour leadership,while in oppositionJhad imposed 
a formidable straight jacket on themselves and within which they entombed 
their ill-fated defence policy. Its much vaunted defence review was 
primarily designed not to reveal where Britain's interests lay and 
how best to defend them, but instead how best to save money. In 
consequence Labour's defence policy became wracked with self-imposed 
contradictions. The Government was no longer the master of the nation's 
strategic interests. It gave the erroneous impression that a defence 
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policy which was economically constricted was necessarily also 
strategically and politically relevant. Its defence doctrine had been 
undermined by economic exigency and it was now the saliency of issues 
rather than their intrinsic importance which obsessed it. 
Perhaps this was inevitable, given that Labour adopted an 
attitude to policy making where the hope was to keep options open to 
delay making policy choices and to adopt a permissive attitude towards 
the decisions themselves. This Wilsonian approach to policy formulation 
was based upon the Prime Minister's OWD logic that to choose certain 
policy options means to foreclose others. To him it was a sum-zero 
game. While an approach which permits 'decisions to make themselves' 
may be in keeping with Lord Salisbury's famous dictum, it is appropriate 
only for a powerful country which can significantly control its external 
enVironment. Moreover such a doctrine requires sufficient capability 
to limit the damage resulting from the pursuit of perhaps superfluous 
or obsolete interests. As Britain discovered, the honouring of out-
dated commitments put an intolerable strain on its economy. That 
Labour adopted this permissive if not actually passive approach to 
foreign policy making can be attributed to it neither having a coherent 
set of socialist valueslwhich could help shape its foreign policy nor a 
clear grasp of Britain's national interest'. 
It followed, that when the Ldbour Government was faced with the 
need to make a choice in 1968 it didjso not by the process of lengthy 
deliberation or analysis as to where Britain's interests lay, but 
through an unedifying process of drift. Above all, though, it was a 
style of policy making which generated . great diplomatic consternation. 
1 
Labour's actual ideology, that is, what I have called Labourism, a 
synthesis of working-class politics and middle-class revisionist 
doctrine, lacks a basic coherence because it attempts to reconcile 
'national interests' - whatever they might be - with 'international 
interests' which can never be properly perceived. 
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Britain projected the image of a volatile, inconsistent, uncertain 
and dilatory ally. She acted in indecent haste and for mediocre 
reasons. She demonstrably r~vealed herself as a nation with world 
wide cOmmitments she could not afford and still less sustain and 
European aspirations she could not yet define and still less achieve. 
Britain's indignity and not to say impotence, appeared complet e. 
In October 1964 the top priority of the Wilson Government was 
to save money on defence. With the economic situation that then 
existed, and the cost in foreign exchange resulting from Britain's 
global role, this was sensible. 
When Healey began his major Defence Review however, the first 
question posed was ~ 'What is the best policy we can get for less 
money?', rather than the more fundamental 'What must we spend?' This 
emphasis on economy and efficiency, reflecting the mood of the nation 
and of the politicians, preoccupied defence planners throughout the 
1 
period of the Labour Government. It was an emphasis on means and not 
ends. 
Defence expenditure could have been reduced once Britain's role 
for the seventies had been decided. If the answer to 'What sort of 
defence policy do we want?' had been - 'A European-orientated one', 
then Britain could have had both a coherent policy to match her foreign 
policy, and a policy she could have afforded. But the formulation 
of policy became more difficult when expenditure was arbitrarily fixed 
before a serious review of commitments and capabilities had taken place. 
The policy set out in the 1966 Defence Review could, however, 
have been afforded if the Government had succeeded in running the economy. 
1 
See GreenWood, David. "The 1974 Defence Review in Perspective". 
Survival, Vol. XVII, ,Number 5, Sept./Oct. 1975 for a comparison 
between the 1974 r evision of the planned defence effort and that 
of 1966. 
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The Prime Minister's decision not to devalue in 1964-5, and the collapse 
of the National Plan, however, sealed the fate of the Government and of 
its attempts to stay East of Suez. 
Had an attempt been made to cost defence requirements rather 
than what defence would be allowed from the Treasury, Britain could 
have had a coherent policy, and money saved for social services. 
The important question on which the Defence Review should have 
been centred, was how much was required to pay for an adequate policy 
based on a balanced assessment of 'national interests' and commitments. 
Perceived interests must shape commitments, not the other way round. 
A policy more in line with British interests was achieved - by a 
process of trial and error - but ~ through a process of relating ends 
to means. Therefore little credit can be given to the Cabinet for 
successfully perceiving what it felt to be in the 'national interest'. 
In 1966, following the publication of the Review, Britain gave 
the uncomfortable impression of being a country with a global role 
forced on her by commitments that were a legacy of her history and 
tradition. De Gaulle had, for example, kn~wn when to cut his losses. 
He ended the economically exhausting war in Algeria and then incre ased 
the pride of the French by reaching a position of strength following 
a less ambitious policy. Britain however failed to reorder her 
external commitments. 
The key factor inpolitics is the timing of a decision; in defence 
that means knowing when tb withdraw. The Labour Government seemed to 
lack the necessary political judgement. They did not show they had 
mastered 'the art of the possible'. 
If Britain's defence policy was to match her interests there 
should have been a rigorous examination to find out what they were in 
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the late sixties, and what they were expected to be in the seventies 
and eighties. It never took place. 
The Review had all the signs of excessive British pragmatism -
that preoccupation with 'means' rather than 'ends'. It was no doubt 
inevitable with the Foreign Office in a state of intellectual paralysis. 
Clearly the Foreign Office was largely to blame for the banal 
nature of the Defence Review, because it refused to establish a more 
realistic foreign policy, or even to examine it thoroughly. This alone 
could keep defence policy its faithful servant. 
But the Cabinet compounded the mistakes of the Foreign Office 
by pretending that economic facts alone should determine policy. The 
main error of Harold Wilson's Government was the prior and absolute 
commitment to unrealistic goals, which became more and more unrealistic 
as attempts to manage the economy collapsed. Politicians are by nature 
optimistic. Wilson's Government, however, attempted too much with too 
little, and failed to find the extra resources needed. 
It is difficult to alter policies moulded by hundreds of years 
of tradition and history, but the Foreign Office had failed to consider 
Britain's declining economic position. It would have been irresponsible 
to drop everything outside Europe - like Confrontation - immediately, 
but the consequences of having to adjust to crisis changes as events 
got beyond control were worse than the possible effects of a more 
considered and planned withdrawal. If the job of politicians is to 
decide between alternative values and policies, and to decide when to 
do what, then the Wilson Cabinet must be criticized for its inept 
performance during the first three years of office. 
- 419 -
In the crisis following devaluation the Defence Minister was 
told to cut all eXisting commitments except the 'irreducible' 
commitment to NATO Europe. 
This policy was chosen by men in a difficult position, faced 
by the problem of how best to salvage what they could, and, of course, 
to remain in power. The Cabinet must keep its non-defence cohorts 
sufficiently loyal. Their mismanagement of the economy had left them 
weak, and it was the moment when the left wing of the Labour Party 
had most influence in affecting defence affairs. 
But the real ~uestion was still avoided. What were the irreducible 
limits of military effort required to uphold the nation's interest? 
Merely to reduce defence expenditure avoided this. Saving money on 
defence is a virtue only if the essential job can still be done. Yet 
it must be admitted that substantial savings were achieved, and defence 
resources were often more efficiently used. Under a weaker Government 
the cuts would have been even greater. 
With benefit of hindsight it is possible to claim that if the 
Government had devalued sooner - for example, in 1964 or 1965 - then 
the periodic defence cuts would have been less severe. And if 
substantial reductions had occurred in Britain's defence commitments 
and capabilities in 1966 devaluation might perhaps have been averted, 
or postponed to a time chosen to suit the Government and the interests 
of the nation. 
Britain's efforts East of Suez were at last reluctantly abandoned 
by the Labour Government in February 1968. As from 1971 Britain said 
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she would have no further strategic interest in the area east of the 
Persian Gulf. 
The claim advanced in the Review of 1966 and the White Paper of 
July 1967 that Britain could make an indispensable contribution to peace 
and stability East of Suez ended when the Government found that the price 
was too high. Britain had made some contribution to stability by her 
modest military presence,l aut that was alt~ring as growing nationalism 
and the changing pattern of economic and commercial affairs made this 
of declining value. The policy cos t more, and achieved less. For the 
British at least, it no longer seemed worth the money. 
Britain should have announced her decision to withdraw when 
Confrontation ended. Aden, together with the Gulf and the Far East, 
should have been abandoned in 1966, with total withdrawal by 1970 or 
1971. This would have given the Gulf and Asian Commonwealth rulers one 
or two years more in which to cope with the consequences of withdrawal. 
Nevertheless}whatever may be said about the way in which the 
withdrawal decision was made)nobody could deny its importance. It was 
not only a dramatic departure from the norms of Britain's foreign 
policy but it also held out Himalayan implications for other nations 
also. It symbolized not only an admission that Britain's power position 
had declined, but also a belated acceptance that the Commonwealth and 
the Special Relationship with America were no longer what they once 
had been. 
The historical significance of the decision was all the greater 
for it marked the culminating point of over a hundred years of change: 
1 See Annex cl . 
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it was to all intents and purposes an irrevocable decision taken 
belatedly in the fullness of time. The decision owed nothing to 
the ideology of socialism as such but was clearly shaped by Labour's 
social democratic revisionist doctrine which gave expression to the 
values of a pluralist liberal-democratic ideology. The ideology of 
socialism was demonstrated to be functional to Labour in opposition 
but virtually if not totally irrelevant to Labour once in power. The 
imperial role was not at first rejected by the utopian and marxist 
left of the Party because it identified in the Commonwealth the basis 
of a possible neutralist foreign policy for Britain. When that proved 
a chimera the left repudiated the imperial role. The revisionist right 
and the Labourist centre regarded the East of Suez role as the basis of 
Britain's pretence to remain a great power. When that proved also a 
chimera the right repudiated the imperial role. This explains why 
the Labour leadership could embrace the imperial role with considerable 
enthusiasm and abandon it with alacrity when circumstances forced 
them to do so. Cultural Labourism and democratic socialist revisionism 
wi thin the Labour Party became the dominant ideology of the Labour 
government but was not an ideology which encouraged a consistent 
attitude towards international politics. The myth that a Labour 
government meant a commitment to a socialist foreign policy - which 
can never be defined - even in principle, was however effectively 
destroyed. Labour in office indeed differed only from the 
Conservatives in the slight emphasis it occasionally gave to pursuing 
national policies which in the long-run - and perhaps therefore 
never - might assist in the re-structuring of the international system. 
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Labour simply aspired to play a part in creating an international 
society of states whose 'interaction' and 'interdependence' could 
I 
assure world peace. Such a society is. however) an anarchical 
international society in present circumstances) because no real 
element of government - a central agency - exists. Labour appears 
to articulate a somewhat weak Kantian or Grotian belief that expresses 
what Bull calls "the element of trans-national solidarity •••• and 
2 the element of co-operation and regulated intercourse among states". 
This would have appealed to Richard Cobden and John Bright right through 
to Arthur Henderson, George Landsbury and even Ernest Bevin and 
George Brown. All would have wished to strengthen the element of 
society in international politics and weaken Hobbesian elements. 
Of course most Conservative leaders would have shared much the same 
hope, but with a greater expectation that the Hobbesian element 
would always predominate in an international society . 
1 
2 
See Bull, Hedley, Anarchical Society, op. cit., p. 24. Professor Bull 
says that "a society of states (or international society) exists when 
a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common 
values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to 
be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one 
another and share in the working of common institutions". 
ibid., p. 41. 
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with Heavy Weapons 
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Date Operation Service 
1948-60 Malaya RN, Army, RAF 
1949-52 Eritrea: UN plebiscite RN, Army, RAF 
1950-66 Persian Gulf: Patrol RN 
1950 Dar-Es-Salaam : Civil unrest RN 
1950-53 Korea RN. Army, RAF 
1950 Singapore: Hartog riots Army 
1951 Grenada: Civil unrest RN 
\ 
1951-56 Canal Zone RN, Army, RAF 
1951 Abadan: Oil crisis RN, Army, RAF 
1951 Jamaica : Hurricane RN. Army 
1952 Antarctica: Argentinian threat-Hope Bay RN 
1952-56 Kenya RN, Army, RAF 
1953 Antarctica : Argentinian threat-Deception 
Island RN. 
1953 United Kingdom: East Coast floods RN. Army. RAF 
1953-55 Persian Gulf: Buraimi dispute RN. Army. RAF 
1953 Ionian Islands : Earthquak!i RN. Army. RAF 
1953 Cyprus: Earthquake RN. Army. RAF 
1953 British Guiana : Constitutional crisis RN. Army 
1953 Trieste: Civil unrest RN 
1954 Grenada : Civil unrest RN 
1954 Sudan: Internal unrest RAF 
1954-59 Cyprus: Eoka RN, Army, RAF 
1954 Indo-China: Refugees from Hai-Phong RN 
1954 Haiti: Hurricane RN 
1956 Iraq: Supplies to Baghdad RAF 
1956 Hong Kong : Riots Army 
1956 Bahrein: Civil unrest RN, Army, RAF 
1956 Suez RN, Army, RAF 
1957-59 Muscat and Oman Army, RAF 
1957-66 Aden and Southern Arabia: Egyptian 
subversion RN, Army, RAF 
1957 Turkey: Earthquake RN 
1957 British Honduras: Civil unrest RN, Army 
1958 Bahamas : General strike RN, Army 
1958 British North Borneo : Indonesian 
threat to trade RN 
1958 Jordan and Lebanon RN, Army, RAF 
1958-63 Iceland: Patrol RN 
1959 Grenada : Civil unrest RN 
1959 British Honduras: Threat from Guatemala RAF 
1959-60 Gan: Civil unrest RN. Army, RAF 
1959 Grenada : Civil unrest RN 
1959 Libya: Floods RN 
1960 Mauritius : Cyclone RN 
1960 Uganda: Tribal terrorism RAF 
1960-61 Cameroons : Maintenance of stability Army, RAF 
1960 Hong Kong : Typhoon Army 
1960 Jamaica: Rastafarian insurrection RN, Army 
1960- 61 Congo RAF 
f 
Date Operation 
1960 Virgin and Leeward Islands: Hurricane 
1960 Laos : Internal unrest 
1960 Kenya: Floods 
1961 Bahamas: Cuban counter-revolutionaries 
1961 Kuwait 
1961 Zanzibar: Maintenance of stability 
1961 British Honduras: Hurricane 
1961 Kenya: Floods 
1962 British Honduras: Guatemalan threat 
1962-66 British Guiana: Riots 
1962 Hong Kong : Refugee problem 
1962 Gan : Political unrest 
1962 Thailand: Threat from Laos 
1962 East Malaysia : Anti-piracy patrols 
1962 India : Chinese invasion 
1962 Cuba 
1962-66 Malaysia 
1963-66 Swaziland: Civil unrest 
1963 Zanzibar : Maintenance of stability 
1963 Indonesia: Evacuation of British nationals 
1963 Yugoslavia: Skopje earthquake 
1963-66 Bahamas: Cuban expatriates and patrol 
1963-66 Cyprus: UN 
1964 Zanzibar 
} Unrest and mutinies Tanganyika 
Uganda 
Kenya 
1964 Kenya: Tribal terrorism 
1964 Gan : Labour unrest 
1965 Berlin: Air corridor 
1965 Mauritius: Rioting 
1965 El Salvador : Earthquake 
1965 Baham3s: Hurricane 
1965 Rhodesia: UDI 
1965 Malaya: Floods 
1965 Bechuanaland: BBC transmitter 
1966 _ Beira Channel: Patrol 
1966 Hong Kong: Civil unrest 
1966 Das Island: Oil dispute 
1966 Hong Kong: Floods 
1966 Seychelles: Political unrest 
1966 Laos : Floods 
Summary 
Major operations: 22 
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